

SRCI Escape Review

June 22, 2010

On June 21– 23, 2010, an audit team consisting of Paula Myers, Superintendent CRCI/SFFC, Jeri Taylor, Assistant Superintendent of Security/TRCI, Brandon Kelly, Institution Security Manager/OSCI, Ken Neff, Operations Manager/PRCF and Melissa Premo, Transport Manager conducted a review of the physical security as well as security practices at the Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI) in response to the attempted escape by inmate Michael Norwood, #8403436 on June 12, 2010 and inmate Robert Emery #13650508 on June 14, 2010.

Reviewed Items:

Count Process:

The review team observed unit counts as well as the out count process in the laundry and physical plant. In addition, we reviewed the current SRCI procedure on Institution Counts #10 and the DOC policy on Counts 40.1.3. While our observations are just a snapshot of reality, we found the institution out of compliance with its own procedure and DOC security standards. The institution management team should review the DOC policy on Counts and cross reference it with its own procedure to be in compliance with standards. ✓

The review team observed counts being performed on both first and second shift. There were no discrepancies noted on second shift with how count was conducted. The review team was concerned about [REDACTED] The review team was told the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A review team member observed count on first shift, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In regard to the attempted escape by inmate Emery, staff failed to account for only living breathing inmates for three official counts. He was missed by two different count officers. Inmate Emery was in a privileged housing unit which had open dayroom until 1 am. His absence was not observed for the entire shift. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During our review we observed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Inmate Emery was assigned to the bottom bunk). In addition, the review team [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The review team would recommend an evaluation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Out Counts: The review team also observed the out count process in Physical Plant and the OCE Laundry. The out count in the Physical Plant was completed prior to count being announced. There were 61 inmates in the area during the 11 am count. The inmates were eating lunch in the area, and the officer assigned to the area was in the office (with the candy machine) eating his own lunch. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Physical Plant is not an area listed as authorized by SRCI's procedure on count. It is standard practice at all medium custody institutions to require inmates assigned to Physical Plant to return to their housing unit for count for the 11 am and 4:15 pm count unless otherwise approved by the OIC. In the laundry, the out count process was disorganized and was not in compliance with the institution procedure. Inmates did not line up nor did they show any identification. The inmates just called off their name and cell number and the officer checked off their information without looking up.

The 2009 Security Audit noted areas of concern and non-compliance in the area of Counts and Out Counts (Food Services).

Given the level of complacency in this area, we would recommend a systematic approach to training which includes hands on training (OJT) documented including security staff, lieutenants, captains and OD's to bring the institution into compliance of its own written procedures.

The review team [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The review team observed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The review team would recommend [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The review team would recommend the institution review [REDACTED]

Mr. Nooth asked the review team to look at the system for allowing pedestrian traffic through the vehicle gate and whether or not pedestrian traffic should be eliminated through the vehicle gate. After reviewing systems in place, the review team saw no reason to eliminate pedestrian traffic from the vehicle gate. Pedestrian traffic should be limited to business needs only. Staff assigned to the Vehicle Gate are doing a good job checking ID cards prior to allowing access to the area. In fact, we heard complaints when staff known to the institution were denied access because they had lost or forgotten their ID cards.

Mr. Nooth also asked the review team to make a recommendation on the use of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It is the recommendation of the review team [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The review team was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This should be a priority not only for the institution but for facility services.

The review team discussed the request for additional security equipment [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for the main tower sally port and the concern with moving the BCT program moving houses and furniture out through the vehicle gate. Given the current economic times, the review team would have a hard time recommending [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The team believes the institution has sound policies in place to guard against escape [REDACTED]

The team would recommend [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Review team recommends [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We don't recommend [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Controlled Movement:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] While the institution has set times for general line movements, an example of the call outs looks like the following: 7:00 am, 7:15 am, 7:20 am, 7:30 am, 7:45 am, etc, etc. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The review team did not have enough time to conduct any additional review in this area.

An observation of the BCT program by the review team was that [REDACTED]
While being processed out of the BCT during lunch it was disorganized and inmates were crowded into an area. While we observed inmates going through the metal detector [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. Nooth requested the review team look at housing and work assignments. The team did some following up on housing unit moves because it was noted in the report that inmate Emery's cellmate had requested a move on June 11th citing that his cellmate was acting strange. We found there was a formal system in place for housing and work assignments but we were told the informal system was used more frequently especially in incentive housing. In the Emery case when his cellmate requested a move the housing officer called down and made it happen. It was never challenged. We also observed during a line movement in Complex 3 an inmate approached the Complex Lieutenant and asked for a new cellmate. The Lieutenant told the inmate to give him the name of only one inmate he wanted to live with because he didn't want to have to make a decision and he would make the move happen that day. The institution has guidelines for job assignments as it relates to conduct. The review team would recommend [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Tours/Management Presences:

In reviewing the post information logs it does not appear in the past 30 days that there was a regular presence of management tours. The log books indicated the shift sergeants are making daily unit checks but there were limited signatures to indicate that the Complex Lieutenants, Captains, OIC or Officer of the Day have been making tours. (Note: Lt. Sullivan in Complex 1 and Captain JR Smith, Perimeter Captain, were very consistent in making rounds).

Laundry/Cart Process:

Modifications to the laundry cart process have already been implemented. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The review team observed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The review team suggested that the [REDACTED] This procedure appeared to speed up the process. [REDACTED]

In the event of inclement weather, the review team recommends [REDACTED]

Cell Lighting:

The review team observed especially in Complex 3 that the lighting in the cells was very dim. Inmates are only required to keep their night light on during daylight hours or during the 11:00 a.m., and 4:15 p.m., count. During our tour we observed during daylight hours [REDACTED]

The review team would recommend the institution review the cell light procedure during business hours.

Searches/Pat Downs:

The review team looked at unit log books and found the number of searches to be average. An area of concern was the number of notations during cell searches that nothing was found or taken (NF/NT). The review team observed pat down searches during line movements [REDACTED]

It appeared to be unclear whether or not the Complex 3 yard was searched following staff locating inmate Norwood on the yard. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During the Emery escape attempt [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During our tour during normal business hours we [REDACTED]

We had been told all the [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] and they were checked in and out daily [REDACTED] We saw numerous [REDACTED] that were identified to us as [REDACTED] When we did our inspection [REDACTED] we found there is only one [REDACTED] for the institution and it is checked in and out daily. On the day we did our inspection [REDACTED] The review team would recommend [REDACTED]

While touring the [REDACTED] the review team [REDACTED] When we completed our inspection [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was also reported to the review team [REDACTED]

The review team would recommend the institution management team review their existing procedure on [REDACTED]

Classification Review:

Classification Review of Inmate Robert Emery, #13650508

Inmate Emery was classified on 5/29/08 as a custody level 4 by Correctional Counselor Steve Olson. Emery has two classification policy elements that drove his custody level to a 4. (1) Sentence Remaining: Emery is serving between 121 months to Life (PRD 2/28/2060); (2) Escape History: Emery was scored with a ESNV escape designator from an attempted escape from EOCI in 2001. Inmate Emery was found in violation for Escape (4H) on 2/23/2001 by a DOC Hearings Officer. In reviewing his case file, the classification was scored correctly at custody level 4.

Classification Review of Inmate Norwood, Michael, #8403436

Inmate Norwood was classified 12/15/2009 as a custody level 4 by Intake Counselor Terry Foreman. Norwood has one classification policy element that drove his custody level to a 4 - Sentence Remaining: Norwood is serving between 121 months to Life (PRD 9/17/2021). Norwood does have a prior discontinued Escape designator of ESMO on record. The discontinued escape designator showed he escaped from a halfway house in Colorado in order to evade apprehension for a prior crime. The escape designator was removed from the classification policy element on 12/19/2009. The escape data was entered incorrectly by the Intake counselor. The classification rule states that all non DOC escapes are based upon the date of apprehension. The counselor had entered the date as the offense date of escape, not date of apprehension. Therefore, the escape category of ESMO was correct, however the timeframes for the escape should have started on 5/27/05. This escape (ESMO) would have remained on his classification until 5/27/10, and would have scored the classification escape policy element as 3. So in this case, the Sentencing Remaining policy element would have overridden his Escape policy element anyway since the scoring was higher and the ESMO would have expired 2 weeks prior to the actual SRCI attempted escape. Even though there was an error in the classification, it didn't affect the overall classification level of custody level 4.

However, we need to capture the correct data in the DOC400 even though the Colorado escape has now expired. OPM will take care of this matter.

Both inmates were appropriately classified and appropriately housed at SRCI. Inmate Emery was listed [REDACTED]