

Unequal Liberty and a Right to Education

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This article lays the groundwork for a liberty-based right to quality public schooling. We start from the premise that Black, Brown, and poor children now and historically have never enjoyed equal liberty in the United States, and that, for these children, the public school, like the prison, functions as a site of social control that relies upon confinement and force while failing to fulfill their pedagogic purpose. In urging a liberty-based argument, we rest on the foundational principle that the state cannot deprive a person of liberty without a legitimate justification. Notwithstanding this foundational principle, thousands of children in the United States are confined in public schools that do not meaningfully educate and instead function as unsafe and harmful warehouses for the children detained within them. Having first unequally apportioned educational opportunity, the state then compels certain children to attend carceral schools on pain of civil or criminal penalties. The confinement experienced by Black, Brown and poor students within resource-starved, carceral public schools serves to maintain and reproduce race-class subjugation within a system of racial capitalism.

We argue that, examined within the frame of abolition constitutionalism, the traditional guarantee of equal liberty is violated if the content and conditions of public schooling relegate one group of children, because of race and/or class, to sub-standard and unsafe schools, subjecting them to persistent structural disadvantage. In our view, such a system unconstitutionally perpetuates the very kind of racial and class caste that the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to abolish. Moreover, the types of judicial remedies explored to date—which order the provision of only a minimally adequate education—will, in our view, perpetuate the constitutional harm, for that level of schooling will entrench children’s lifelong social and political confinement while exploiting their labor through the caste system created by the prevailing racial capitalist regime. Rather, the remedy must be that of the children’s release from the terms of confinement by affording them access to quality schooling, whether through mobility strategies that allow children to transfer to schools elsewhere or through the state’s provision of a quality education in the “assigned” school at a level that encourages the children’s flourishing as an aspect of their equal liberty.

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In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, when carceral confinement was known to heighten the risk of infection and death,² the state of Michigan ordered Grace, a Black teenage girl with hyperactivity disorder, to be detained in a juvenile facility for not completing her online homework. Released after 78 days, Grace remained on home confinement “with a GPS tether,” and was told she “must attend school and do schoolwork as directed, though school is not currently in session.”³ In response to her initial incarceration, community members organized a social media hashtag: “#FreeGrace.”⁴ Technology has advanced, but their message echoed an

² See Brendan Saloner et al., *COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State Prisons*, 324(6) JAMA 602 (July 8, 2020), available at <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/fullarticle/10.1001/jama.2020.12528> (reporting that the risk of prisoners’ contracting COVID-19 is 4.6 times that of the general population and the risk of death from the virus is 2.6 times higher). See also Casey Tolan et al., *Inside the Federal Prison Where Three out of Every Four Inmates Have Tested Positive for Coronavirus*, CNN (Aug. 8, 2020), available at <https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/08/us/federal-prison-coronavirus-outbreak-invs/index.html> (discussing rates of infection in prison facilities and the failure of the Trump Administration to deal seriously with the viral crisis even in low-security facilities).

³ Jodi S. Cohen, “Grace,” *the Oakland Co. Teen Detained for Skipping Homework Is Released*, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 31, 2020), available at <https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2020/07/31/free-grace-oakland-county-probation-homework-appeal-release/5560282002/>. On August 11, the Michigan judge terminated Grace’s probation, finding she had made adequate progress. See Jodi S. Cohen, *Case Closed: Michigan Judge Removes Grace, Black Teen Jailed for Not Doing Online Schoolwork, From Probation*, PROPUBLICA ILLINOIS (Aug. 11, 2020), <https://www.propublica.org/article/case-closed-michigan-judge-removes-grace-black-teen-jailed-for-not-doing-online-schoolwork-from-probation#987309>. That same day, body-cam footage of the 2018 arrest of an 8-year-old boy with behavioral and emotional disabilities at a Key West, Florida elementary school went viral on Twitter. See Jaclyn Peiser, “You’re Going to Jail”: Body-cam Video Shows an 8-Year-Old Florida Boy Arrested at School, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/11/video-florida-boy-arrested/> (quoting child’s attorney as stating that “[t]his is a heartbreaking example of how our educational and policing systems train children to be criminals by treating them like criminals”).

⁴ See Aimee Ortiz, *Court Frees Michigan Teen Who Was Held for Skipping Online Schoolwork*, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us/michigan-teen-homework-release.html?referringSource=articleShare> (“People protested in support of the high school student outside Oakland County Circuit Court in Pontiac, Mich., earlier this month.”).

NAACP placard from sixty years ago protesting school segregation in St. Louis, Missouri:
“Don’t Treat Our Children Like Prisoners.”⁵

This article lays the groundwork for a liberty-based right to quality public schooling. Our argument is explicitly aligned with the ideals of abolition constitutionalism, which, relying on the emancipatory potential of the Reconstruction Amendments, supports the praxis of ending the prison-industrial complex and the racial and class subordination that the carceral state perpetuates.⁶ The project is one of critique and construction. In particular, we see the constitutional project of establishing a federal constitutional right to education as one of the “building blocks” for construction of “the beloved community,”⁷ or of what Professor Dorothy E. Roberts, a leading scholar of abolition constitutionalism, has called “a more humane, free, and

⁵ See Douglas Jay, *From the NS Archive—Disunited States: 11 February 1956, Public Opinion Following the Ban of Racial Segregation in American Schools*, NEW STATESMAN (21 July 2020), available at <https://www.newstatesman.com/2020/07/ns-archive-disunited-states>.

⁶ According to a common definition, the prison-industrial complex is “the overlapping interests of government and industry that use surveillance, policing, and imprisonment as solutions to economic, social and political problems[,]” which functions to “maintain[] the authority of people who get their power through racial, economic and other privileges.” *What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?*, CRITICAL RESISTANCE (2020), available at <http://criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-common-language/>. In 1974, the North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union used the term “judicial-prison-parole-industrial complex.” See DAN BERGER AND EMILY K. HOBSON, REMAKING RADICALISM: A GRASSROOTS DOCUMENTARY READER OF THE UNITED STATES, 1973–2001 xx (forthcoming 2020). The first known use of the term in its current form was in 1976. FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITIONISTS 181 (Critical Resistance 2002) (1976) (“By identifying the structures and decision-making processes, the people and institutions that comprise the prison/industrial complex, we begin to cast light on some hidden functions of prisons which serve particular interests.”). Its use was popularized in the 1990s. See, e.g., Mike Davis, *Hell-Factories in the Fields: A Prison-Industrial Complex*, THE NATION (Feb. 20, 1995); Angela Y. Davis, *Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex*, COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998).

⁷ The phrase was coined by Josiah Royce, appeared in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech at the end of the Montgomery bus boycott in 1956, and embraced as well by John E. Lewis. We use the term not as a religious statement, but as a statement of political faith in the possibility of creating “a just community,” and of “not merely explicating an unjust social order.” Anthony E. Cook, *Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 988 (1990).

democratic world.”⁸ Thus, this constitutional project supports the understanding of abolition constitutionalism as seeking to bring about the presence of “life-affirming institutions,” and to destroy the carceral infrastructure that instantiates their absence.⁹

We start from the premise that Black, Brown, and poor children now and historically have never enjoyed equal liberty in the United States, and that, for these children, public schools, like prisons, function as a site of social control that relies upon confinement and force while failing to fulfill their pedagogic purpose.¹⁰ In urging a liberty-based argument, we rest on the foundational principle—one that antedates the Reconstruction Amendments—that the state cannot deprive a person of liberty without a legitimate justification. Yet thousands of children in the United States are confined in public schools that do not meaningfully educate and instead function as unsafe and harmful warehouses for the children detained within them.

We use the word “confined” consciously, for the state’s assignment of Black, Brown, and poor children to particular public schools is not random or ad hoc. Rather, it begins with the state’s decision to apportion educational opportunity by districts within limited geographic areas

⁸ Dorothy E. Roberts, *Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism—The Supreme Court 2018 Term*, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (2019) [hereafter *Abolition Constitutionalism*].

⁹ Haymarket Books, *Covid 19, Decarceration, and Abolition: An Evening with Ruth Wilson Gilmore*, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2020), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hf3f5i9vJNM>.

¹⁰ See *infra* Section V. For an early articulation of this view, see CARTER G. WOODSON, *THE MIS-EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO* 45 (1933) (“The education of the Negro, then, becomes a perfect device for control from without.”); see also *id.* at 63 (“[T]he keynote in the education of the Negro has been to do what he is told to do. Any Negro who has learned to do this is well prepared to function in the American social order as others would have him.”); see also Herbert Aptheker, *Introduction*, in W.E.B. DU BOIS’S *THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES 1906–1960* XIII (1973) (explaining that Du Bois understood “tru[e] education” to be “fundamentally subversive” “given the realities of the social order” in which Black people were subject to control by the white population). See also Vinay Harpalani, *Civil Rights Law in Living Color*, 79 Md. L. Rev. 881 (2020) (discussing distinctions between and doctrines concerning race, ethnicity, and color).

that sort children by race and class.¹¹ The legal boundaries of these school districts confine the child within a fixed geographic space, prohibiting the child from attending schools in more affluent neighborhoods, and enforcing that prohibition by criminal punishment when necessary. Spatial confinement inevitably produces economic confinement, stunting the child's lifetime ability to acquire the income and assets needed to achieve geographic mobility. The state's proffered justification for such line-drawing—local control over education—no longer carries empirical support (if it ever did), for it withholds from the households within affected local districts the resources they need to carry out their educational goals.¹² Local line-drawing not only perpetuates racial and class segregation,¹³ but also excludes Black, Brown, and poor people from participating in decisions about their children's public schooling. In a perversion of the concept, local control has become control by public school districts of local communities of color that are kept marginalized and disempowered. Confinement operates on another level, too. For once the state has sorted the children by race and class, confining them to sub-standard schools that they are mandated to attend, the state not only disciplines truancy through the juvenile justice system, but also contracts with security officers and police to restrain children for

¹¹ Derek W. Black uses the term gerrymandering to refer to the process by which a state manipulates geographic boundaries, together with funding formulas, in its design of public school districts. See Derek W. Black, *Educational Gerrymandering: Money, Motives, and Constitutional Rights*, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2019) (“States’ school funding inadequacies and inequities are not accidental but calculated and illicit attempts to underfund the education of some students and get away with it—what this Article terms gerrymandering.”). Black argues that “gerrymandering school funding to advantage and disadvantage students is unconstitutional, regardless of the precise adequacy and equity outcomes it produces,” *id.* at 1391, because the naked preference to disadvantage certain groups, even if those groups are not treated as suspect classes for federal equal protection analysis, is impermissible.

¹² *Id.* at 1415 (arguing that school funding gerrymandering fails to achieve proffered goals of “fostering local control, adapting funding to local circumstances, and meeting student needs”).

¹³ See generally CAMILLE WALSH, *RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, AND TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869-1973* (2018).

“acting out” or throwing tantrums, using suspension to punish the children, and confining them in juvenile detention upon court order where educational services are minimal and sub-standard.¹⁴

The confinement experienced by Black, Brown and poor students in resource-starved carceral public schools serves to maintain and reproduce economic stratification within a system of racial capitalism.¹⁵ On the one hand, this confinement enables racial capitalism by “tracking” already marginalized students toward low-wage and coerced labor through punitive discipline,¹⁶ under-education,¹⁷ and other forms of debasement.¹⁸ In so doing, carceral schools actively participate in the process of racialized differentiation that is necessary for—or at the very least

¹⁴ See, e.g., TERA EVA AGYEPONG, *THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK CHILDREN: RACE, GENDER, AND DELINQUENCY IN CHICAGO'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1899–1945* (2018).

¹⁵ *Abolition Constitutionalism*, *supra* note 8, at 7 (“[T]he expanding criminal punishment system functions to oppress black people and other politically marginalized groups in order to maintain a racial capitalist regime.”).

¹⁶ Angela Y. Davis, *From the Convict Lease System to the Super-Max Prison*, in *STATES OF CONFINEMENT: POLICING, DETENTION, AND PRISONS* 60, 72 (Joy James, ed., 2000) (“In poor black communities . . . schools tend to direct resources needed to address educational crises toward security and discipline. Rather than preparing students for college, middle and high schools in these communities are fast becoming prep schools for prison, molding black children into raw material for punishment and coerced labor.”).

¹⁷ Erica Meiners, *Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline/Building Abolition Futures*, 4 *URB. REV.* 547, 550–51 (2011) (“Public education in the United States has historically aggressively framed particular populations as superfluous to our democracy yet imperative for low wage work, or jobs available after full white employment. . . . [T]he targeted under- or un-education of particular populations . . . has always tracked poor, non-white, non-able bodied, non-citizens and/or queers toward under or un-education, non-living wage work, participation in a permanent war economy and/or permanent detention.”) [hereafter *Building Abolition Futures*].

¹⁸ MANNING MARABLE, *HOW CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA* 150 (1983) (describing the “ideological dependency” caused by the fact that “[t]he Black child attending public school is burdened immediately with an educational pedagogy which rests on the assumption of his/her cultural and intellectual inferiority.”).

facilitates—hyper-exploitation under a racial capitalist regime.¹⁹ On the other hand, carceral schools indirectly stabilize racial capitalism by funneling marginalized students into the criminal punishment system, on which racial capitalism relies to manage “surplus populations” whom the legal and political systems subject to “organized abandonment”²⁰ with its associated joblessness and inequality.²¹ In this account, schools, rather than functioning as tools for liberation, exacerbate and cement unequal liberty.

¹⁹ The term “racial capitalism” was first used to describe South Africa’s political economy under Apartheid. MARTIN LEGASSICK AND DAVID HEMSON, *FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE REPRODUCTION OF RACIAL CAPITALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA* (1976). The concept was adapted by Cedric Robinson to form a general thesis about capitalism. Robinson described capitalism as operating through projects of “differentiation” whereby “regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences” were “exaggerate[d] . . . into ‘racial’ ones,” and then the supposed “racial[] inferior[ity]” effectively justified “domination and exploitation.” CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, *BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION* 26 (1983). In Robinson’s analysis, “[t]he development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions” with the result that “racialism . . . inevitably permeate[d] the social structures emergent from capitalism.” *Id.* at 2. One of the primary implications of Robinson’s argument that “[r]acism . . . was not simply a convention for ordering the relations of European to non-European peoples but has its genesis in the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” in the context of constructing a capitalist economic order, is that capitalism depends on racializing projects to maintain the hierarchies that allow for exploitation and class dominance. For recent articulations, *see, e.g.*, BRETT STORY, *PRISON LAND: MAPPING CARCERAL POWER ACROSS NEOLIBERAL AMERICA* 18 (2019) (“As a system and mode of production that necessitates inequality to function, capitalism, and perhaps especially within liberal democracies, requires race as an ideology and racism as a hierarchical system to enshrine that inequality as legitimate, even natural.”) [hereafter *PRISON LAND*]; Jodi Melamed, *Racial Capitalism*, 12 *CRITICAL ETHNIC STUD.* 76, 77 (2015) (“Capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe inequality among human groups[,] . . . and racism enshrines the inequalities that capitalism requires.”).

²⁰ Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes organized abandonment as the state-facilitated process of capital disinvestment and deindustrialization that displaces workers from jobs and eviscerates public sector services. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, *GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA* 58–86 (2007). The process results in “surplus populations”—“workers at the extreme edges, or completely outside, of restructured labor markets, stranded in urban and rural communities.” *Id.* at 70. The legal and political systems support racial capitalism through rules governing such matters as labor, taxation, and corporate responsibility.

²¹ *See, e.g.*, Dan Berger, *How Prisons Serve Capitalism*, PUB. BOOKS (Aug. 17, 2018), available at <https://www.publicbooks.org/how-prisons-serve-capitalism> (“[C]arceral expansion is a form of political as well as economic repression aimed at managing worklessness among the Black and Brown (and increasingly white) working class for whom global capitalism has limited need.”); *PRISON LAND*, *supra* note 19, at 18 (“Prisons . . . absorb the labor and land rendered surplus by deindustrialization and the globalization of capital. They also operate as a new kind of labor-market institution. . . that . . . has shown

In our view, abolition constitutionalism gestures to the appropriate legal pathway to “Free Grace”—and all students ensnared by various forms of confinement in the profoundly unequal public school system in the United States—for it acknowledges rather than ignores, sidesteps, or camouflages the violence and restraint that public schools currently impose upon young people who are Black, Brown, or poor. It recognizes the harms done to children who are confined in public schools that function at worst as extensions of a carceral state and at best as factories for reproducing expendable low-wage workers.²² Abolition constitutionalism demands that a federal right to education afford children more than simply the minimum skills presumed necessary to participate in a society wracked by racial and class subordination. Rather, the right must be part of a larger democratic project that encourages human flourishing in a society that is still in creation. We do not disguise the aspirational nature of the argument, but in our view it is morally imperative—and critical for fulfillment the democratic vision of Reconstruction, at least the more radical strands associated with the abolition-democracy. In this article, we show that recognition of such a right is legally plausible in terms of precedent and that its effectuation is institutionally practical with regard to federalism and the judicial requirement of manageable

to conceal unemployment in the short run, by absorbing many who would assuredly otherwise be jobless”) (internal quotations omitted); *Abolition Constitutionalism*, *supra* n. 8, at 35 (“Prison expansion instead reflects a response to the needs of rising neoliberal racial capitalism that addresses growing socioeconomic inequality with punitive measures.”); *see also* Tracie R. Porter, *The School-to-Prison Pipeline: The Business Side of Incarcerating, Not Educating, Students in Public Schools*, 68 *ARK. L. REV.* 55, 57, 66–68, 73 (2015) (examining the “school-to-prison pipeline through a capitalistic lens, revealing that African American and Latino students expelled, suspended, or arrested in public schools are exploited by the prison industry[.]”).

²² *See* Steven L. Nelson and Ray Orlando Williams, *From Slave Codes to Educational Racism: Urban Education Policy in the United States as the Dispossession, Containment, Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement of Black Peoples*, 19 *J. L. SOC.* 82, 85 (2019) (discussing “how urban education policy has led to the dispossession, containment, dehumanization, and disenfranchisement of Black people in the United States”).

standards.²³ Above all, we believe that the positive vision of equal liberty encompassed within such a right could be meaningful as support for social mobilization that is the authentic driver of change. Recognizing the skepticism that movement groups have of constitutional rights,²⁴ we nevertheless urge that rights, reimagined within the abolitionist framework, hold significance for social campaigns doing anti-racist, redistributive work.²⁵

Part I of this article sketches out earlier advocacy efforts to secure a right to education under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and the turn over the last generation to state constitutional approaches. State courts have given substantive content to state constitutional education rights, with some emphasizing the development of capabilities that can lead to human flourishing, and a small number have recognized that the withholding of adequate public schooling while enforcing compulsory education laws interferes with a child's liberty.

²³ Compare Bruce Porter, *Expectations of Equality*, 33 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2d 23, 24 (2006) (discussing expectations about equality as both predictions of outcomes and as moral imperatives). See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, *The Pariah Principle*, 13. Const. Comment. 257, 257 n.2 (1996) (“Given the overall tenor of the current Court, it hardly seems plausible that the Justices are about to launch a new crusade for social justice on behalf of the downtrodden.”).

²⁴ See Amna A. Akbar, *Toward a Radical Imagination of Law*, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 409 (2019) (observing that the movement for criminal law reform “has largely refrained from fighting to strengthen preexisting rights or demanding legal recognition of new ones”). For a discussion of contemporary abolitionist movement demands in historical perspective, which eschews constitutional claims as a vehicle for Black liberation, see AirGo Radio, *The Abolition Suite Vol. 4: Robin D.G. Kelley* (July 19, 2020), available at <https://airgoradio.com/airgo/2020/7/19/episode-255-the-abolition-suite-vol-4-robin-dg-kelley>.

²⁵ Roberts argues for “instrumentally using the Constitution to build a society based on principles of freedom, humanity, and democracy” by hearkening to interpretive moves made by slavery abolitionists:

Just as antebellum abolitionists broke from the dominant interpretation of the Constitution as a proslavery document, so too prison abolitionists need not be shackled to the prevailing constitutional jurisprudence in advancing the unfinished freedom struggle. . . . Abolition constitutionalism, unlike other constitutional fidelities, aims not at shoring up the prevailing constitutional reading but at abolishing it and remaking a polity that is radically different.

Abolition Constitutionalism, *supra* note 8, at 105, 109–10.

Part II provides political and social context for the legal argument that follows by surfacing the ways in which Black, Brown, and poor children are locked into inadequate carceral schools, but locked out of politics to change conditions in those schools. This Part contrasts the vision of education advanced by abolitionists during the First Reconstruction—in which robust public education was seen as critical to securing meaningful freedom after emancipation—with efforts of those who sought to undermine emancipation and reconstitute a racial caste system after adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Part III sets out a liberty-based approach to quality education within an abolitionist framework, building on the traditional due process guarantee that the state may not confine a person without a substantial justification related to that confinement. Despite that guarantee, Black, Brown, and poor students are compelled to attend, upon pain of legal sanction, public schools that do not educate and that are physically and psychologically harmful to these children. We show that in contexts of involuntary confinement, a violation of a person's liberty interest may serve as the source of the government's duty to provide the goods and services that justify the confinement.

Examined within the frame of abolition constitutionalism, we argue that the traditional guarantee of equal liberty is violated if the content and conditions of public schooling arbitrarily relegate one group of children, because of race and class, to sub-standard and unsafe schools, and subject the children to persistent structural disadvantage. In our view, such a system unconstitutionally perpetuates the very kind of racial and class caste that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at abolishing. Moreover, a judicial remedy that orders the provision of only a minimally adequate education will, in our view, perpetuate the constitutional harm, for that level of schooling will entrench children's lifelong social and political confinement while

exploiting their caste labor through the prevailing racial capitalist regime. Rather, the remedy must be that of the children's release from the terms of confinement by affording them access to quality schooling, whether through mobility strategies that allow children to transfer to schools elsewhere or through the state's provision of a quality education in the "assigned" school at a level that encourages the children's flourishing as an aspect of their equal liberty.

Finally, we connect the legal argument with theories of social mobilization, and respond to criticisms mounted from different political quarters of law, lawyer, and court-based reform, and briefly conclude.

I. Advocacy Efforts to Secure a Federal Right to Education

Establishing a federal constitutional right to education has long proved elusive despite persistent advocacy,²⁶ elegant scholarship,²⁷ and public mobilization.²⁸ To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides some protection of a child's access to public schooling. Famously, *Brown v. Board of Education* held that a state may not constitutionally segregate children in public schools on the basis of their race.²⁹ Later, *Plyler v. Doe* invalidated a state's complete withholding of public schooling based on a child's parent's

²⁶ Daniel S. Greenspahn, *A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education*, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755 (2007-2008) (reviewing efforts to establish such a right).

²⁷ See *infra* notes 79–82 and accompanying text.

²⁸ Joshua Clark Davis, *The Black Freedom Struggle of the North*, AF. AM. INTELLECTUAL HIST. SOC. (Aug. 20, 2020), available at <https://www.aaihs.org/the-black-freedom-struggle-of-the-north> (recounting that "the single-largest one-day civil rights protest in the 1960s was by most estimates not the March on Washington, but a student boycott of New York City's public schools in February 1964").

²⁹ *Brown v. Board of Educ., Shawnee Co., Kan.*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the District of Columbia's racially segregated public school system violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does not include an equal protection component).

immigration status.³⁰ The Court acknowledged in *Plyler* that public schooling, given its “fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society,” is not “merely some government ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation,”³¹ and although it stopped short of declaring education fundamental under the federal Constitution, it recognized that the arbitrary withholding of public schooling from certain groups violated the anti-caste principle that lays at the core of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.³²

Nevertheless, in-between these decisions came two others that significantly blunted the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for a right to education. The first was *San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez*, holding that disparities in funding across school districts did not deny equal protection to children in low-wealth districts.³³ In *Rodriguez*, the Supreme Court considered a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to Texas’s public education financing scheme, which relied on local property tax revenues and resulted in massive inter-district resource disparities.³⁴ The Court found that strict scrutiny did not apply because no fundamental right was at issue,³⁵ reasoning, “the importance of a service performed by the State does not

³⁰ *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 220 (1982). See Michael A. Olivas, *The Political Efficacy of Plyler v. Doe: The Danger and the Discourse*, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2011) (trying to explain how, “[i]f education were not a fundamental right for citizen children,” “the undocumented children . . . whose parents were unable to organize politically or involve themselves in school issues” nevertheless prevailed).

³¹ *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. at 221, 244.

³² *Id.* at 230.

³³ *San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

³⁴ *Id.* at 8–17.

³⁵ Notably, the lower court had determined that strict scrutiny was called for because a fundamental interest—education—was at issue. *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.*, 337 F.Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971). The majority of the Court, by contrast, looked for the existence of a fundamental right. Both dissents pointed out that the majority transformed the Warren Court’s concept of “fundamental

determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”³⁶ Instead, the Court looked to whether “there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”³⁷ Finding no such right, the Court concluded that the claim did not fall under the “fundamental rights” branch of equal protection analysis.³⁸ In so finding, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ “nexus” theory, which argued that “education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote.”³⁹ *Rodriguez* left open whether the federal Constitution protects a right to a minimum education,⁴⁰ but the Court’s later seemingly narrow holding in *Plyler*—limiting the discussion to a complete withholding of education because of immigrant status—seemed to dim the likelihood of an equality challenge to

interests” into a limited (unwarrantedly so) concept of “fundamental constitutional rights.” *Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. at 98–102 (Marshall, J., dissenting); *id.* at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

³⁶ *Id.* at 30.

³⁷ *Id.* at 33–34.

³⁸ *Id.* at 35.

³⁹ The Court both cast doubt on the theory itself, stating it was difficult to perceive “logical limitations” to its scope, and also found that the Texas system provided the “basic minimal skills” needed to meaningfully exercise speech and voting rights. *Id.* at 36–37.

⁴⁰ See *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (“The [Rodriguez] Court did not . . . foreclose the possibility ‘that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote].’”); see also *Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch.*, 487 U.S. 450, 466 n.1 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . does not address the question whether a State constitutionally could deny a child access to a minimally adequate education.”). The Court could, of course, revisit and overturn cases rejecting the general right, or it could take the path left open by its prior opinions and affirm the existence of a right to a minimally adequate education (such as one that provides access to literacy).

inadequate public schooling.⁴¹ The second decision was that in *Milliken v. Bradley*,⁴² holding that although the Detroit, Michigan public school system was illegally segregated on the basis of race, a multi-district desegregation remedy was constitutionally impermissible absent evidence that school district boundaries had been established “for the purpose of creating, maintaining, or perpetuating segregation of races.”⁴³ These two decisions—combined with the Supreme Court’s increasing rejection of equality-based claims—convinced many advocates to shift the focus of their litigation to state courts and to assert claims that relied on rights to education explicitly set out in state constitutions.⁴⁴

Beginning with *Serrano v. Priest*,⁴⁵ which was pending before California courts at the time *Rodriguez* was decided, some state courts interpreted state constitutional equality guarantees as staking out broader protections than those the Supreme Court was willing to recognize. In an opinion that pre-dated *Rodriguez*, the California Supreme Court had found the California education financing scheme violated both state and federal equal protection guarantees.⁴⁶ When the case returned to the California high court after *Rodriguez*, defendants

⁴¹ *Id.* (stating that “even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of . . . [the individual’s right s to speak and to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short”).

⁴² *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

⁴³ *Id.* at 748.

⁴⁴ Goodwin Liu, *Education, Equality, and National Citizenship*, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 332 (2006) (“In recent decades, the educational plight of disadvantaged schoolchildren, once an absorbing concern of federal constitutional law, has managed to draw sustained legal attention mainly in the state courts. Relying on education clauses in state constitutions, lawyers working together with school experts have filed suits in forty-five states arguing for fairer distribution of educational opportunity.”).

⁴⁵ 18 Cal.3d 728 (1976).

⁴⁶ *Serrano v. Priest*, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971).

argued that *Rodriguez*, which abrogated the federal constitutional holding, compelled revisiting the state constitutional holding given the reasoning of the pre-*Rodriguez* decision. Plaintiffs responded not only by arguing that the state equal protection holding survived *Rodriguez* unscathed, but also that even under *Rodriguez*'s methodology for identifying fundamental rights, the requisite "nexus" to constitutional rights existed because of various positive rights under the state constitution.⁴⁷ The California court held:

[F]or purposes of assessing our state public school financing system in light of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws (1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth involves a suspect classification, and (2) education is a fundamental interest. Because the school financing system here . . . involve[s] a suspect classification [wealth], and because that classification affects the fundamental interest of the students of this state in education, we have no difficulty in concluding . . . that the school financing system before us must be examined under our state constitutional provisions with that strict and searching scrutiny.⁴⁸

In reaching this result, the California Supreme Court made clear that it would not employ the *Rodriguez* Court's methodology for identifying fundamental rights.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ The court cited California Const. Art. IX, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."); Art. IX, § 5 ("The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools."); Art. XVI, § 8 ("From all state revenues there shall first be set apart the monies to be applied by the state for support of the public school system . . .").

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 765–66.

⁴⁹ The California court stated:

[W]e are constrained no more by inclination than by authority to gauge the importance of rights and interests affected by legislative classifications wholly through determining the extent to which they are 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed' [citing *Rodriguez*] by the terms of our . . . state Constitution. In applying our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws we shall continue to apply strict and searching judicial scrutiny to legislative classifications which, because of their impact on those individual rights and liberties which lie at the core of our free and representative form of government, are properly considered 'fundamental.'

In addition to classifying education as a fundamental interest, *Serrano* hinted at, but did not develop, a functional understanding of fundamental rights by linking the provision of certain public goods to the maintenance of a “free and representative form of government.” A decade later, a functional approach—one centered on the capabilities education should help develop in a young person—rose to prominence following a decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. In *Rose v. Council for Better Education*,⁵⁰ a case brought under the Kentucky Constitution’s education clause,⁵¹ the Kentucky Supreme Court identified education as a fundamental right and outlined “seven capacities” that an “adequate” education must be designed to help a child develop:⁵²

(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.⁵³

The Court acknowledged in a footnote that the inclusion of a right in the state constitution was relevant, but not dispositive, to the question whether the right should be considered fundamental. *Serrano II*, 18 Cal.3d at 764.

⁵⁰ *Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.*, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

⁵¹ Ky. Const. § 183 (requiring the legislature “provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”).

⁵² Although the constitution used the phrase “efficient system,” the court credited expert testimony that “efficient” in this context meant, *inter alia*, “adequate.” *Rose*, 790 S.W.2d at 211.

⁵³ *Id.* at 212. *Rose* built on a similar list articulated by the West Virginia Supreme Court—which the Kentucky court quoted to show that “Courts may, should and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a constitutionally mandated educational system,” *id.* at 210—but it was not until the Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion in *Rose* that this approach was widely adopted by state high courts. See *Pauley v. Kelly*, 162 W.Va. 672 (1979).

Emphasizing that “*every child*[.] . . . must be provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education,”⁵⁴ the court drew on Kentucky’s constitutional convention to link equality to the positive right to an education that promoted human flourishing along the seven dimensions that it outlined.⁵⁵

The *Rose* conception of the education right as public schooling sufficient for human flourishing, and not simply that of minimal literacy, influenced succeeding state court litigation. Indeed, as Scott Bauries has documented, the decision was “adopted or relied on in nearly every other successful state court case for . . . two decades nationwide, regardless of differences in the substantive language of the education clauses among the states”.⁵⁶ Indeed, even states with widely different education clauses have adopted the *Rose* capacities list wholesale.⁵⁷ The consensus assessment of these state court efforts, now more than a generation old, is that they

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 211 (emphasis in original).

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 205–06.

⁵⁶ Scott R. Bauries, *The Education Duty*, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 736 (2012).

⁵⁷ Consider Massachusetts, which adopted the *Rose* criteria. *McDuffy v. Sec’y Exec. Office Educ.*, 615 N.E.2d 516, 526 (Mass. 1993) (“The guidelines set forth by [*Rose*] fairly reflect our view of the matter and are consistent with the judicial pronouncements found in other decisions.”). Yet Massachusetts’s constitutional education clause has little in common, textually or historically, with that of Kentucky’s constitution. Mass. Const. Pt. II, Ch. 5, §2 (“Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns[.]”). Other states have adapted it. See *Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State*, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (“We define this minimally adequate education required by our Constitution to include providing students adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2) a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills.”).

bore legal fruit, in the sense of producing litigation victories in a majority of the states, with courts recognizing that claims under state education clauses are justiciable,⁵⁸ and that they provide the basis for ordering states and localities to improve public schooling for the plaintiff-children.⁵⁹ These lawsuits illustrate that even in the teeth of federal court defeats, social movements continued to leverage power from the language of constitutional rights, even when those rights were localized in state constitutional texts.⁶⁰

Significantly, the state court education lawsuits expanded the notion of rights in a number of important respects. First, against arguments that social equality claims are non-justiciable, these state courts acknowledged and acted on their institutional competence to enforce affirmative claims to government-provided services, notwithstanding the admittedly complicated separation of powers issues that the claims present. In conceiving of the content of the right to education, state courts emphasized not simply the acquisition of minimal skills needed for majoritarian participation, but rather access to multiple capabilities that look to a broader conception of individual autonomy at the core of a person's liberty interest. One state court even held a state's failure to provide quality schooling to children whose attendance the state compels

⁵⁸ However, concerns about justiciability persist in some state courts, and have become more pronounced given the protracted nature of reform litigation. See Joshua E. Weishart, *Aligning Education Rights and Remedies*, 27-SUM KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 346, 347 (2018) discussing state courts that have "refused to even entertain the merits of these lawsuits for fear of being ensnared in a decades-long dispute over what they deduced were political questions committed to the legislature for the constitution." See generally Julia A. Simon-Kerr and Robyn K. Sturm, *Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education*, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83 (2010).

⁵⁹ See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, *IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* 30 (2018) (reporting that of 44 state constitutional challenges, plaintiffs won in 27, "and in the process compelled legislatures to adopt a host of additional reforms, many of which increased funding and closed equity gaps").

⁶⁰ Jeffrey S. Sutton, *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath*, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1977 (2008), quoting *Workman v. Bredesen*, 486 F.3d 896, 907 (6th Cir. 2007).

violates a traditional notion of liberty at the core of due process. As the Alabama trial court recognized in its 1993 decision in *Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt*, a child’s liberty interest is violated when the state mandates the student’s attendance at a public school that fails “to provide an adequate education.”⁶¹ The court reasoned:

It is well-settled in this state that when the state deprives citizens of liberty for the purpose of benefiting them with a service, due process requires that the service be provided to them in an adequate form. . . .

The state of Alabama deprives students of their liberty by requiring them to attend school under penalty of law. . . . [T]he purpose of depriving students of their liberty by mandating school attendance is to educate them. . . . [C]ompulsory attendance places a limitation on individuals’ liberty and thus, as a matter of fairness, the state ought to have to provide an adequate education.

Plaintiffs have made a clear showing in this case that the education that they are receiving is not adequate; it falls short in facilities, staff, curriculum, textbooks, supplies, special education, and other areas. . . . [T]he inadequate education that plaintiffs are receiving does not justify the deprivation of their liberty. If the state is to continue to make education compulsory and, thereby, to deprive children of their liberty, due process requires that those children be accorded an adequate education.⁶²

In reaching this conclusion, the court primarily relied on the Alabama Constitution, supplemented by a consideration of federal due process jurisprudence.⁶³

⁶¹ Opinion of the Justices, *Opinion of the Justices*, 624 So. 2d 107, Appendix at 161–62 (Ala. 1993) (attaching the unpublished lower court decision *Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt* (Circuit Ct. Montgomery Co. year) as an appendix to an advisory opinion issued to the Alabama state legislature regarding school funding). One of the authors was co-counsel in the *Hunt* litigation while a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union. See also *King v. State*, 818 N.W.2d 1, 66 (Iowa 2012) (“[B]ecause education is compulsory, it involves liberty and its deprivation triggers a due process right that the infringement of liberty be reasonably related to the intended purpose, namely, education.”) (Appel, J., dissenting).

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.* at 161 n. 61 (noting in a footnote that “the Alabama Supreme Court has expressly adopted a standard of more rigorous judicial scrutiny in state substantive due process review than that applied under the federal due process clause.”). Echoing *Gary B.*, the court also differentiated the facts before it from those of *D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch.*, 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992), in which the Third Circuit rejected the existence of the type of “special relationship” envisioned by *Deshaney* between a child and her public school. The Alabama court emphasized that, unlike in *D.R.*—a § 1983 action against

Further, at least some state courts acknowledged and even highlighted the deep racial impacts of public school inadequacy and found state liability without any showing of a current intent to discriminate as required under federal equality doctrine. In a landmark decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that public school segregation violates a child's right to equal protection whether it has occurred de jure or exists de facto.⁶⁴ Finally, state education litigation gave serious attention to the importance of community-based approaches to remedy, endorsing democratizing strategies that actively engaged parents and other stakeholders in the development of alternative school plans.⁶⁵

Despite these advances, Black, Brown, and poor children continued and continue to be detained in inadequate and harmful schools and prevented under threat of criminal sanction to access educational opportunities in public schools made available to advantaged students

school officials who failed to intervene to prevent the gang-rape of two girls on campus, despite their knowledge that the rapists had engaged in a course of sexually harassing conduct—here “the harm suffered by Alabama schoolchildren is being inflicted by the state itself.” *Opinion of the Justices*, 624 So. 2d at 161 n. 63. Alabama's Supreme Court later retreated from the education finance area altogether. *Ex parte James*, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing, primarily based on remedial concerns, school finance litigation as nonjusticiable).

Aside from Alabama, two states rejected liberty-based substantive due process challenges, see *Lewis v. Spanolo*, 710 N.E.2d 798, 812 (Ill. 1999); *King*, 818 N.W.2d at 31–34. while at least one other state has indicated that such a challenge would be viable if (and only if) students are “not receiving . . . a basic adequate education.” *Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State*, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (Okla. 1987). The theory has also been advanced in some cases that have settled on terms favorable to the plaintiffs. See *Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue*, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (describing “sweeping relief” afforded by the consent decree entered pursuant to a settlement), *rev'd on other grounds* 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (vacating attorney's fee award); see also *Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue*, 2003 WL 25682412 (N.D. Ga.), Complaint at ¶¶ 194–96 (setting forth substantive due process claims).

⁶⁴ *Sheff v. O'Neill*, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996). One of the authors was a co-counsel in this law suit at an earlier stage in the proceedings while an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, *School Finance Reform and the Alabama Experience*, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY (Marilyn J. Gittell, ed., 1998).

elsewhere in the state.⁶⁶ Establishing a federal constitutional right—one that would express a national commitment to quality education for all—thus has remained an active aspiration, motivating new advocacy efforts,⁶⁷ notwithstanding doctrinal barriers that exist from three converging directions and would seem to block recognition of such a right.

First, existing jurisprudence under the federal Equal Protection Clause makes it difficult if not impossible to redress racial disparities without a showing of the government’s current intent to discriminate on the basis of race. As Reva Siegel has bluntly put it, “equal protection no longer protects;” to the contrary, the judicially-developed doctrine permits “the state to act in ways that perpetuate, or even aggravate, the racial stratification of American society.”⁶⁸ The racial effects of the placement of school district boundaries, property tax funding systems, and state-formulas for educational funding, although well-documented, thus seemed impervious to challenge under existing Fourteenth Amendment precedent.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ See Laurie Reynolds, *Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School Finance Reform*, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1844 (2007) (stating that “neither the equality nor the adequacy ‘wave’ of litigation has produced the desired resulted even on the heels of ostensible judicial victory”).

⁶⁷ See Derek W. Black, *The Fundamental Right to Education*, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2019) (“Recently litigants in three states [Michigan, Mississippi, and Rhode Island] returned to federal court in the hope that the Court would finally translate its general commitment to education into a doctrinal right.”).

⁶⁸ Reva Siegel, *Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action*, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). See also Areto A. Imoukhuede, *Education Rights and the New Due Process*, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 491 (2014) (“Equal Protection clause jurisprudence has retreated from the early commitment to equal access to high quality, public education that the Court demonstrated in *Brown v. Board of Education*.”); Andrew M. Siegel, *Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation*, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2359 (2006) (stating that equal protection doctrine fails to distinguish between a racial classification “that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination”), quoting *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

⁶⁹ Peter Enrich, *Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform*, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101 (1995); see also Alan David Freeman, *Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine*, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050

Second, casting the equality claim in terms of poverty or economic status fares no better and in some ways even worse. Indeed, the argument appeared to be a non-starter: absent recognition of a fundamental right to education, the Equal Protection Clause alone would not redress wide disparities in the quality of public schooling attributable to the wealth of the communities in which students lived.⁷⁰ The Court refused to treat poor persons as members of a group in need of heightened protection, and its application of rationality review when assessing laws affecting the poor inevitably was said to be inevitably fatal to a litigant's claim.⁷¹

Third, it is not clear that winning on equality grounds would actually improve educational conditions for Black, Brown, and poor children. In the forty years since Peter Westen referred to the “empty idea of equality,”⁷² scholars have offered substantive principles to fill the gap,⁷³ and tried to redirect attention to specific conditions of relative equality that could give rise to posterior claims of arbitrary state action.⁷⁴ However, the Court has declined to read a

(1978) (“[A]s surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it has affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little political power, [all] without any violation of antidiscrimination law.”).

⁷⁰ See Cary Franklin, *The New Class Blindness*, 128 YALE L.J. 2 (2018) (recounting that the equal protection doctrine does not “recognize class-based discrimination as suspect under the Equal Protection Clause,” but arguing that substantive due process continues to afford some class-based relief for the impoverished when fundamental rights are at stake).

⁷¹ See Stephen Loffredo, *Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law*, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (1993) (explaining that “[f]ormally, the Court set down a rule that claims by poor persons would be evaluated under minimum rationality review,” and that “[f]unctionally, . . . the Court erected what appears to be an insurmountable presumption that political decisions concerning social welfare issues are constitutional”).

⁷² Peter Westen, *The Empty Idea of Equality*, 95 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1982).

⁷³ See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, *How Empty Is the Idea of Equality*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983).

⁷⁴ See Anthony D’Amato, *Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea*, Faculty Working Papers No. 115 (2010), available at <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/115>.

fundamental right to an adequate education into equality, so that an equality claim, even if successful, would permit remedies that treat the favored group on a par with the disfavored group—what is known as ratcheting down.⁷⁵ Of course, ratcheting down was not always politically viable, but it allowed the Court to stake out a minimalist approach consistent with concerns of community backlash (meaning, resistance by white and affluent persons and groups),⁷⁶ a purported need to quell “pluralist anxiety,”⁷⁷ and professed limits of economic austerity, especially after the 2007 financial meltdown.⁷⁸

Against these obstacles, scholars looked beyond the Equal Protection Clause for other doctrinal sources that could support a federal right to education. These included the First Amendment,⁷⁹ the Citizenship Clause,⁸⁰ substantive due process,⁸¹ and originalist arguments that

⁷⁵ See, e.g., *Sessions v. Morales-Santana*, 582 U.S. --- (2017) (explaining that the remedy for a violation of equal protection can be “accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class”) (internal citation omitted). See also Philip B. Kurland, *The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at Last?”*, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 405, 419 (1972) (“With all due respect to those who have labored so hard in the vineyard, equal educational opportunity is not the essence of the claim. It is not equality but quality with which we are concerned. For equality can be secured on a low level no less than a high one. The claim that will have to be developed will be a claim to adequate and appropriate educational opportunity.”).

⁷⁶ Frank Brown, *Brown and the Politics of Equality*, 26 URB. REV. 4 (1994).

⁷⁷ Kenji Yoshino, *The New Equal Protection*, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (“The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court reflects [] pluralism anxiety.”).

⁷⁸ Joshua E. Weishart, *Equal Liberty in Proportion*, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 269 (2017) (“during and after the Great Recession, even courts that had been reliably active and emphatic in their demands on state government ‘stopped short of dictating remedies at a level of detail that encroaches on legislative prerogative.”), quoting Derek W. Black, *The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure*, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 114 (2016).

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, *Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the United States Constitution*, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 101 (1982).

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, *Education, Equality, and National Citizenship*, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006).

⁸¹ See, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, *Reconstituting the Right to Education*, 67 Ala. L. Rev. 915, 972–77 (2016); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, *The Federal Right to an Adequate Education*, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 92 (2013).

paid obeisance to the Court’s dominant interpretive approach.⁸² And so it seemed a banner day when, on April 23, 2020,⁸³ a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized “a basic minimum education” as a “fundamental right” under the federal Constitution.⁸⁴ In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the federal Equal Protection Clause.⁸⁵ Acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s earlier cases gave them “guidance but no answers” as to whether education is an unenumerated but fundamental right,⁸⁶ the circuit court instead applied the “substantive due process framework” of *Glucksberg* and *Obergefell*⁸⁷ to conclude that the right to education is a fundamental right, “narrow in scope,” and one that “only guarantees the education needed to provide access to skills that are essential for the basic exercise of other fundamental rights and liberties, most

⁸² Derek W. Black, *Implying a Federal Right to Education*, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 135, 155–58 (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, ed., 2019).

⁸³ See Mark Walsh, *U.S. Appeals Court Recognizes a Federal Right of Access to Literacy*, SCHOOL LAW (Apr. 23, 2020) (quoting Justin Driver, that the Sixth Circuit ruling is “the most momentous circuit court decision in the field of education in decades”), available at https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2020/04/federal_appeals_court_recognizes.html.

⁸⁴ *Gary B. v. Whitmer*, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020), reversing in part and remanding *Gary B. v. Snyder*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The decision was written by Judge Eric L. Clay and was joined by Judge Jane Branstetter Stranch. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Eric E. Murphy. The Eastern District opinion was written by Judge Steven Murphy. The decision upheld the prior ruling that the plaintiffs failed to “adequately plead their equal protection and compulsory attendance claims.” *Id.* at 3.

⁸⁵ *Gary B.*, 957 F.3d at 633 (explaining that the complaint did not adequately plead an equal-protection claim, “regardless of the level of scrutiny,” because it failed to allege “any disparity in the state’s allocation of resources between their schools and others”).

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 648.

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 642 (relying on *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)). The circuit court also looked to “the reasoning” of *Rodriguez and Plyler*. See *id.* (relying on *San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 220 (1982)).

importantly participation in our political system.”⁸⁸ The Sixth Circuit also considered whether the children suffered a different violation of due process—that they suffered a violation to “the right to freedom of movement and freedom from state custody” because state laws compel their attendance at public schools that are ““schools in name only.””⁸⁹ Observing that the claim “appears to have strong support in the law,” the court nevertheless held that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide information about the extent or nature of the restraint on their liberty,”⁹⁰ and remanded, allowing for amendment of the complaint.

Within a month of the decision, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, contemplating “dismissal of the underlying action” in exchange for institutional reforms that include increased funding for literacy programs and the establishment of an equity task force to consider and recommend additional state-level reforms.⁹¹ And in that same period, following a sua sponte request of a member of the *Gary B.* en banc panel, the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and judgment and stayed the mandate.⁹² Whether the Sixth Circuit, or any federal court,⁹³ will soon recognize education as a fundamental right and a part of a person’s basic

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 659.

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 638.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 642.

⁹¹ See Terms for Settlement Agreement and Release Between All Plaintiffs and the Governor of the State of Michigan in *Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al.*, Settlement Term Sheet (dated May 13, 2020), available at <http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1382.pdf>.

⁹² *Gary B. v. Whitmer*, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).

⁹³ See Class Action Complaint, *Cook et al. v. Raimondo*, 1:18-cv-00645, ECF No. 1 (D.R.I. Nov. 28, 2018) (seeking declaratory and injunctive that plaintiffs have a federal right to education). See also *Williams v. Reeves*, 954 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2020) (reversing dismissal of complaint filed in 2017 alleging that the current version of the Mississippi Constitution violates the “school rights and privileges” condition of the Mississippi Readmission Act).

liberty, or provide redress for gross racial and class inequalities in the provision of educational opportunities within and across school districts, remains an open and vital question.

II. Contextualizing the Argument: Locked into Carceral Schools and Locked Out of Politics

In this Part, we contextualize our argument by showing how race and class have structured American public schooling from its earliest days. In foregrounding these policies and their consequences, we explain how the resulting system relies on coercion and compulsion by either withholding education entirely or requiring children to attend substandard facilities. Understanding that schools have the potential to detain children while both providing little of the promised pedagogic benefits, and disempowering the communities in which they operate, is not a new gloss on the history of U.S. education. Indeed, the encroachment of the prison-industrial complex into public schools—and these schools’ reciprocal engagement with the criminal punishment system—are so manifest as to have a name: the school-to-prison pipeline.⁹⁴ By design and effect, public schools for Black, Brown, and poor children have transformed into extensions of the carceral state and become instruments for maintaining and reproducing racial capitalism.

This Part does not purport to present a comprehensive account of public schooling and its role in racial and class control. But if the project of abolition constitutionalism is to “remak[e] a polity that is radically different,”⁹⁵ it is important to acknowledge in open and sober terms what

⁹⁴ See Deborah N. Archer, *Introduction: Challenging the School-to-Prison Pipeline*, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 868 (2009) (“The school-to-prison pipeline is the collection of education and public safety policies and practices that push our nation’s schoolchildren out of the classroom and into the streets, the juvenile justice system, or the criminal justice system. There are both direct and indirect avenues through the pipeline.”). Some have argued that the name is misleading, because

⁹⁵ *Abolition Constitutionalism*, *supra* note 8, at 10.

needs to be changed. Our project carries forward the best aspirations of the federal Constitution and its promise of equal liberty, but contemplates a break with a present and past—stretching back to Reconstruction—in which public education has been used to perpetuate the unequal and racial distribution of liberty in the United States.

A. Public Schools and the Politics of Racial and Class Exclusion

“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach,” Justice Kennedy wrote in the Court’s landmark decision recognizing marriage equality,⁹⁶ but that promise was empty for the enslaved—recognized to be “[t]he most flagrant violation of the American tradition of equal liberties.”⁹⁷ The withholding of education—and the criminalization of providing education to enslaved Blacks—was a critical weapon in maintaining the institution. Beginning with South Carolina’s Negro Act of 1740, colonies adopted laws to ban slave literacy; indeed, after the Nat Turner Rebellion, Virginia made it a capital offense to violate the act.⁹⁸ By the time of the Civil War, every state except Tennessee had outlawed the education of enslaved Black people.⁹⁹ The southern plantation oligarchy understood denial of education as central to the project of

⁹⁶ *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

⁹⁷ Kenneth Karst, *The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause*, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 101 (2007).

⁹⁸ See Birgit Brander Rasmussen, “Attended with Great Inconveniences”: *Slave Literacy and the 1740 South Carolina Negro Act*, 125 PMLA 201 (Jan. 2010) (discussing legislation that cast “slave literacy as a potential threat to the slaveholding colony” and the extension of such laws to other colonies and after independence). See also MONIQUE W. MORRIS, *PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS* 5 (2016) (stating it was a “punishable offense” to educate a person of African descent).

⁹⁹ ERIC FONER, *RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–77*, at 246 (2d ed. 2015) [hereafter *AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION*].

maintaining the empire of slavery.¹⁰⁰ W.E.B. Du Bois later emphasized that the laws criminalizing the education of Black people were “explicit and severe.”¹⁰¹ Although Black people undertook great risks to secure as much education as possible,¹⁰² 90 percent of the adult Black population in the south was illiterate in 1860.¹⁰³

The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery,¹⁰⁴ and emancipation transformed the terrain of struggle—but did not lessen its intensity—over education for Black people. From the outset of the Reconstruction era, Black people considered “education . . . [to be] central to the meaning of freedom.”¹⁰⁵ This sentiment was shared by abolitionist officials in government. To Freedman’s Bureau Commissioner Oliver Howard, for example, education was “the foundation upon which all efforts to assist the freedmen rested.”¹⁰⁶ The demands of Black people for

¹⁰⁰ Grey Gundaker, *Hidden Education Among African Americans During Slavery*, 109 (7) *TEACHERS COLLEGE REC.* 1597 (2007) (describing white fears about educating Black people after slave revolts led by Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner in 1822 and 1831, and after the 1829 publication of David Walker’s *An Appeal to the World*).

¹⁰¹ W.E.B. DU BOIS, *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860–1880*, at 638 (1935) [hereafter *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION*].

¹⁰² See HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, *SELF-TAUGHT: AFRICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM* 7–29 (2005) (discussing the small percentage of Black people who, “through ingenuity and wit,” acquired basic literacy prior to the Civil War).

¹⁰³ *AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION*, *supra* note 99, at 247.

¹⁰⁴ *But see* Joy James, *Introduction, Democracy and Captivity*, in *THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS*, at xxii (Joy James ed., 2005) (referring to the carve-out that provides, “except as punishment for crime,” as creating an “enslaving anti-enslavement narrative” such that the Thirteenth Amendment “ensnares as it emancipates”).

¹⁰⁵ *AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION*, *supra* note 99, at 247; *see also* *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION*, *supra* note 101, at 641 (“[B]lack folk. . . connected knowledge with power [and] believed that education was the stepping-stone to wealth and respect, and that wealth, without education, was crippled.”).

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 339; *see also* *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION*, *supra* note 101, at 191–215 (describing the positions of Charles Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, and other supporters of abolition democracy, including commitment to education); *see also* W.E.B. DU BOIS, *THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN*

education drove the establishment of the public school system in the south,¹⁰⁷ and led to amendments of state constitutions to include authorization for public schools, which in some states, was a condition of readmission to the union.¹⁰⁸

Recognizing that the project of abolition-democracy posed the threat of permanently securing a radical redistribution of power,¹⁰⁹ the white south mobilized against education—at least as envisioned by proponents of the abolition-democracy.¹¹⁰ A study commissioned by President Andrew Johnson found that the white south was “almost as bitterly set against the Negro’s having the advantage of education as it was when the Negro was a slave.”¹¹¹ The backlash to Black people’s education included not only direct acts of racial terrorism, such as

CRITIQUES 1906–1960 131 (1973) (“It is all well enough to talk about equality of human beings and their liberty to act; the real fact of the matter, as we have known for generations and as we are beginning to admit today, is that a man who does not have enough to eat or the clothing and shelter necessary for health, and who is uncertain as to how long his present meagre income is going to last, is not free, and cannot be called the equal of the man with sufficient and assured income and security of status”).

¹⁰⁷ BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 638 (“Public education for all at public expense, was, in the South, a Negro idea.”); *see also id.* at 641; AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, at 340 (“Bureau schools [] helped lay the foundation for Southern public education”).

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 637–669 (describing state constitutional conventions and legislative efforts pertaining to education). *See Williams v. Reeves*, 954 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing readmission requirements with respect to public schooling).

¹⁰⁹ BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 38 (finding that “the result was little less than phenomenal” whenever newly freed Black persons received “honesty in treatment, and *education*”) (emphasis added).

¹¹⁰ Du Bois described the abolition-democracy as “based on freedom, intelligence and power for all.” BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 182; *see also id.* at 25 (“[A]ll those who sincerely desire to make the freedman a freeman in the true sense of the word, must also be in favor of so educating him[.]”).

¹¹¹ Carl Schurz, *Report on the Condition of the South*, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Executive Document Number 2 (Dec. 1865), *available at* https://wwnorton.com/college/history/america9/brief/docs/Schurz_Carl_Report_on_the_Condition_of_the_South_1865.pdf; *see also* BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 132–36 (describing Schurz’s report as “[t]he classic report on conditions in the South directly after the war”).

burning of independent and Bureau-supported school houses,¹¹² but also subtler forms of opposition and co-optation.

One strategy of co-optation that some Reconstruction-era white southerners consciously pursued was to use the school as an institution of coercive control for the reconstitution of a racial capitalist order, adapted within an agrarian society that would continue to be structured around the same racial hierarchies that pre-dated Emancipation. Wade Hampton III—a Confederate General and, later, financier of the Ku Klux Klan—proposed to establish a system of schools on plantations, and undertook to do so on his own plantation at personal expense.¹¹³ He recognized that the plantation schoolhouse could be a tool of confinement and maintenance of class stratification by “fix[ing] the laborers to the soil . . . result[ing] in vast ultimate benefit to the landlord.”¹¹⁴ Or, as put more succinctly by a southern newspaper: a “freedman” should be taught “that he is *free*, but free only to labor.”¹¹⁵ This strategy and rhetoric reflected southerners’ recognition that schools could confine and discipline as well as emancipate.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, then

¹¹² C.W. Tebeau, *Some Aspects of Planter-Freedman Relations, 1865–1880*, 21 J. NEGRO HIST. 2, 139 (1939).

¹¹³ *Id.* at 138. He and others sought, without success, to obtain state funding for this model. *Id.*

¹¹⁴ *Id.* (quoting Hampton).

¹¹⁵ AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, *supra* note 99, at 321 (emphasis in original); *see also* SARAH HALEY, NO MERCY HERE: GENDER, PUNISHMENT, AND THE MAKING OF JIM CROW MODERNITY 3 (2016) (“State violence alongside gendered forms of labor exploitation made the New South possible, not as a departure from the Old, but as a reworking and extension of previous structures of captivity and abjection[.]”); W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES 1906–1960 122–23 (1973) (“The object of white labor was not the uplift of all labor; it was to join capital in sharing the loot from exploited colored labor. So we too, only half emancipated, hurled ourselves forward. . . . But white folk occupied and crowded these stairs.”).

¹¹⁶ To be clear, this conception of education was not unique to the south. Rather, northern industrialists already recognized the common education system as an “amalgam of benevolent uplift and social control,” *id.* at 342, and they expected post-war southerners to regard education the same way. BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, at 185 (describing expectation that south would began to grant “some popular

as now, the struggle over education was not merely over access and quality, but also over whether the predominant function of the school would be to exercise coercive control or rather to develop the capacities of students.¹¹⁷ On balance, moneyed interests that sought to maintain the existing racial caste system as a source of cheap labor won out.¹¹⁸ Thus, the education system's potential to serve as a tool of Black liberation was subverted from its inception.¹¹⁹

In envisioning the provision of education—within limits—as an instrument for subordinating and exploiting persons for their labor, rather than for achieving their equal liberty, southerners drew on a tradition with roots in the English and U.S. poor laws.¹²⁰ As Frances Fox

education . . . which would be straitly curtailed in its power for mischief by the far larger power of capital.”).

¹¹⁷ On the one hand, the white south struggled to reassert control. AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, *supra* note 99, at 321–22 (“No detail of blacks’ lives seemed exempt from outside control.”). At the same time, Black people struggled to erect independent institutions. *See, e.g., id.* at 212–13 (describing “a desire for independence from white control” manifested in operation of schools, churches, and other public institutions “liberated from white supervision”); *id.* at 248 (quoting a member of an education society describing an autonomous school-house as “the first proof of *independence*.”) (emphasis in original).

¹¹⁸ WILLIAM WATKINS, THE WHITE ARCHITECTS OF BLACK EDUCATION: IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN AMERICA, 1865–1954 22–23 (2001) (tracing how “accommodationism”—a post-Civil War politics that saw subordination of Black people as “part of the natural order”—“shaped the sponsored education of Blacks in the United States” and pursued the “objective[] [of] a stable and orderly south where subservient wage labor and debt farming or share-cropping would provide the livelihood for Black Americans.”) [hereafter WHITE ARCHITECTS]; *see also* W.E.B. DU BOIS’S THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES 1906–1960 97 (1973) (“The organized might of industry north and south is relegating the Negro to the edge of survival and using him as a labor reservoir on starvation wage.”); BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 506 (“The whole criminal system came to be used as a method of keeping Negroes at work and intimidating them. Consequently there began to be a demand of jails and penitentiaries beyond the natural demand due to the rise in crime.”).

¹¹⁹ WHITE ARCHITECTS, *supra* note 119, at 182 (“The shaping of race relations was inextricably connected to Black education. The objective of the ruling order was to wed Constitutional freedom with social subservience. Freedom became the form, subservience the content.”).

¹²⁰ The English Poor Laws, with their emphasis on local assistance, provided the model for indigent relief in colonial America, and made residence within a community a primary determinant of eligibility for assistance. *See* William P. Quigley, *Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America*, 31 SAN FRAN. L. REV. 35, 40–41 (1996) (describing transportation of vagabonds and regulation of vagrants). The rules of settlement imposed strict restrictions on liberty, regulating mobility both within a

Piven and Richard Cloward have shown, there is a long history of “[r]elief arrangements . . . granting [assistance] on condition that [the recipients] behave in certain ways and, most important, on the condition that they work.”¹²¹ Consistent with the idea of “free[dom] only to labor,” Piven and Cloward describe the establishment of schools “to teach pauper children to read and write” as part of the “effort . . . to redirect the employable poor . . . into the work force.”¹²² Piven and Cloward’s analysis echoes that of Du Bois, who recognized the effort to subvert education as envisioned by abolition-democracy for the purpose of preparing a work force for menial jobs.¹²³

town and from town-to-town and were enforced through various devices throughout the colonies during different time periods. Intra-town restrictions typically regulated mobility by confining the poor to almshouses or workhouses, indenturing and apprenticing, the binding out of widows and other women as domestic servants, see MIMI ABRAMOWITZ, *REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN* 86–87 (1988), or enslavement (or registration requirements for free people of color). See Quigley, *supra* note 120, at 70–71, 77–78. Inter-town restrictions depended on a mix of outlawry (vagrants and vagabonds were excluded or expelled), “warning out” rules, waiting periods to acquire residence status, and certificate systems that required a household wishing to relocate to certify that the town of origin would reimburse the receiving town for the cost of any prospective relief. See Caleb Foote, *Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration*, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); see also David J. Rothman, *Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* 24 (1971) (explaining that Delaware’s settlement law required the stranger and the vagrant, whether able to work or disabled, “to post security or quickly leave the county under penalty of daily whippings until they did so”); Quigley, *supra* note 120, at 52 (describing the Pennsylvania certificate system); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, *The Formative Era of American Public Assistance*, 43 CAL. L. REV. 175, 219 (1955) (describing the certificate system of New Amsterdam prior to English colonial rule).

¹²¹ FRANCES FOX PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD, *REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE* 22 (1971) [hereafter *REGULATING THE POOR*]; cf. *AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION*, *supra* note 99, at 253 (describing Black southerners’ desire for “assistance without control” in running schools).

¹²² *REGULATING THE POOR*, *supra* note 121, at 22–23.

¹²³ *BLACK RECONSTRUCTION*, *supra* note 101, at 698 (“An attempt was made through advocacy of so-called industrial education to divert the Negro schools from training in knowledge to training in crafts and industry. But . . . no effective industrial training was ever given in the Southern public schools, except training for cooking and menial service.”).

Limiting the educational opportunity of Black children not only controlled their later access to higher wage jobs, property acquisition, and geographic mobility, but also to the franchise. Many states required a Black citizen to pass—usually with a 100 percent grade—tests that purported to test the person’s literacy skills as a condition of voting. Although the literacy requirement was race-neutral, in practice, white examiners used their discretion to waive requirements for white test-takers and to fail Black test-takers.¹²⁴ Some states even amended their constitutions to require the passing of the test as a condition of voting.¹²⁵ In 1898, the Supreme Court upheld the literacy tests in Mississippi on the view that they were applied to both white and Black registrants, giving no weight to the fact that white officials administering the test did so in a biased way.¹²⁶ Together with the poll tax and property-ownership requirements, these conditions on the right to vote were highly successful: by 1940, only three percent of all eligible Black voters were registered to vote in the South.¹²⁷ The Voting Rights Act of 1965 restricted the use of literacy tests,¹²⁸ and the 1975 amendments broadened those protections to non-English speaking voters.¹²⁹ But by any measure, Black people remained locked out of

¹²⁴ See Rebecca Onion, *Take the Impossible “Literacy” Test Louisiana Gave Black Voters in the 1960s*, SLATE (June 28, 2013), available at <https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/06/voting-rights-and-the-supreme-court-the-impossible-literacy-test-louisiana-used-to-give-black-voters.html>. See also Civil Rights Movement Voting Rights: Are You “Qualified” to Vote? Take a “literacy Test” to Find Out, available at <https://www.crmvet.org/info/lithome.htm>.

¹²⁵ See John Ray Skates, *The Mississippi Constitution of 1890*, *Mississippi History Now*, available at <http://www.mshistorynow.mdah.ms.gov/articles/103/mississippi-constitution-of-1890>

¹²⁶ *Williams v. Mississippi*, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).

¹²⁷ STEVEN S. LAWSON, *RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA SINCE 1941* 81 (1997).

¹²⁸ CHANDLER DAVIDSON, *QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990* (2001).

¹²⁹ See generally David H. Hunter, *The 1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities*, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 250 (1976).

politics,¹³⁰ and their children remained locked in inadequate schools under the combined weight of compulsory education laws and punishment for truancy.¹³¹

The story of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville education experiment dramatically illustrates this dynamic in the early post-*Brown* era. A decade after *Brown*, New York's schools were even more segregated than before 1954, in part because of organized racist backlash against integration from white community groups, and schools in poor Black neighborhoods remained substandard.¹³² The Ocean Hill-Brownsville experimental district, an effort to vest community control of schools in poor Black neighborhoods, was one response to sustained organizing about failing and unsafe schools in Black neighborhoods. The “genesis” of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was a New York City Board of Education public hearing in December 1966.¹³³ After Board President Lloyd Garrison refused to give the floor to a Black mother complaining of “ghetto”-like conditions in the schools, protests erupted, leading a frustrated Garrison to shut it

¹³⁰ Jocelyn Simonson, *Police Reform Through a Power Lens*, 130 YALE L.J. (manuscript at 18–19) (forthcoming 2021) (“Punitive law enforcement practices in [race-class subjugated] neighborhoods become self-reinforcing, independent of crime rates, with a direct impact on political power. . . . The laws and everyday practices of policing preclude poor people of color from being full democratic subjects.”); Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell, and Abril Castro, *Systematic Inequality and American Democracy*, CTR. AM. PROG. (Aug. 7, 2019), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2019/08/07/473003/systematic-inequality-american-democracy/>.

¹³¹ Project, *Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights*, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1383 n.43 (1976). See ELIZABETH GILLESPIE MCRAE, *MOTHERS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: WHITE WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY* (2020); MATTHEW F. DELMONT, *WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION* (2016).

¹³² JERALD PODAIR, *THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED NEW YORK: BLACKS, WHITES, AND THE OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE CRISIS* 21–25 (2003) [hereafter *STRIKE THAT CHANGED NEW YORK*].

¹³³ *Id.* at 71.

down.¹³⁴ Rather than depart, protesters occupied the Board’s offices and anointed themselves the “People’s Board of Education.”¹³⁵ After a multi-day sit-in, Garrison ordered the arrest of the protesters, who were “carried out” by police while supporters looked on with signs that read, “Will Jail Help My Child To Read?”¹³⁶ Weeks later, Ocean Hill-Brownsville residents borrowed the “People’s Board of Education” concept to constitute an “Independent School Board” as part of a boycott of their local school board in response to being locked out of governance by middle-class white people from a nearby neighborhood.¹³⁷ Begrudgingly, the Board and City government conceded that “without community control of education in [B]lack neighborhoods, there would be no peace in New York.”¹³⁸

With funding from the Ford Foundation and support from the Mayor, in 1967, the Board of Education established a local Ocean Hill school board drawn from community residents, to administer its own school district.¹³⁹ In 1968, the local board—which had clashed with both the Board of Education and the 90-percent-white United Federation of Teachers (UFT) over its

¹³⁴ *Id.* at 71–73. That Garrison shut down a public hearing in the face of complaints that gains in material circumstances were not keeping pace with gains in juridical equality represents, perhaps, an ironic echo of history: 100 years earlier, his great-grandfather, famed abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, on the eve of Reconstruction, invoked state’s rights to oppose immediate and universal enfranchisement, differing from radical abolitionists like Frederick Douglass. BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, at 200.

¹³⁵ STRIKE THAT CHANGED NEW YORK, *supra* note 132, at 72.

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 72–73. Then-California Attorney General Kamala Harris derided slogans calling for “schools not jails” for failing to address the reason for “three padlocks on [her] front door.” Chicago Ideas, *Attorney General Kamala Harris: Innovation & Evolution in our Criminal Justice System*, YouTube (Feb. 12, 2013), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bPRtLbyCjY#t=11m41s>.

¹³⁷ STRIKE THAT CHANGED NEW YORK, *supra* note 132, at 73.

¹³⁸ *Id.*

¹³⁹ Jerald Podair, “White” Values, “Black” Values: The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Controversy and New York City Culture, 1965–1975, 59 RAD. HIST. REV. 36, 38 (1994) [hereafter *Ocean-Hill Brownsville Controversy*].

demand to control personnel, curricula, and finances—flexed its independence by ordering the transfer of 18 white teachers it regarded as opposing its agenda of autonomous control.¹⁴⁰ When the local board refused to back down and the City refused to force the issue, the UFT went on strike.¹⁴¹ That fall, in the face of continuing strikes, the City took the Ocean Hill district into a trusteeship, and the following year, the experimental district was terminated.¹⁴² The experiment was short-lived and not to be repeated.

B. Confinement in Schools: Truancy, Criminalization, and Racial Disparities

In the ensuing decades, an understanding of schools as confinement has become even more salient: in addition to being compelled to attend failing schools while being locked out of politics,¹⁴³ the tools used to confine students in schools have become more biting, and the schools themselves have become much more carceral.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 39–40; *see also* STRIKE THAT CHANGED NEW YORK, at 1–5.

¹⁴¹ *Ocean-Hill Brownsville Controversy*, at 39–40.

¹⁴² *Id.* In this sense, Ocean Hill-Brownsville followed the trajectory of other Ford Foundation-funded projects of this era. For example, in 1965, the Ford Foundation cut off support for Mobilization for Youth (MFY), which operated on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, after MFY and its offshoot, Mobilization of Mothers, began pressing more radical demands related to education using strikes, boycotts, and protests, leading the Ford Foundation to balk at negative publicity. Sam Collings-Wells, *Developing Communities: The Ford Foundation and the Global Urban Crisis, 1958–66*, 2020 J. GLOBAL HIST. 1, 16–17 (2020).

¹⁴³ Since *Rodriguez*, discussions of the political dimensions of this issue have largely focused on state and local school finance reform, and more recently, vouchers and school “choice.” *See, e.g.*, James E. Ryan and Michael Heise, *The Political Economy of School Choice*, YALE L.J., 2043, 2058–91 (2002). On the racial motivation for school choice programs in the Brown period, *see* Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, *School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw County*, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1992).

¹⁴⁴ *Building Abolition Futures*, *supra* note 17, at 550 (“While these educational outcomes [funneling targeted non-white and poor youth towards non-living wage work] are not new, the expansion of our prison nation in the U.S. over the last three decades has strengthened policy, practice and ideological linkages between schools and prisons.”).

States confine students in schools by means of compulsory attendance laws. These laws require children of certain ages to be physically present in state-run facilities (subject to specified exceptions) for a certain number of days each year, and for a certain term of years. Failure to comply with these laws subjects both children and parents to a range of penalties.

Massachusetts passed the first compulsory attendance law in 1852,¹⁴⁵ and all other states have since followed suit. The 1852 Massachusetts law required that persons between the ages of 8 and 14-years-old be in a place of learning for at least 12 weeks per year unless “otherwise furnished with the means of education.”¹⁴⁶ It did not specifically penalize truancy—generally defined as an “accumulation of *unexcused* absences in excess of those allowed by state law”¹⁴⁷—but chronic absenteeism under the statute carried a penalty of \$20.¹⁴⁸ Since their inception, compulsory attendance laws have been justified by reference to the necessity of education.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ An Act Concerning the Attendance of Children at School, 1867 Mass. Acts 240, *available at* <https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1852/1852acts0240.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ Jillian M. Conry & Meredith P. Richards, *The Severity of State Truancy Policies and Chronic Absenteeism*, 23:1–2 J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK 187, 188 (2018) (explaining that truancy refers to exceeding a defined number of *unexcused* absences, whereas chronic absenteeism is an absolute cap on absences, excess of which constitutes chronic absenteeism regardless of excuse). Some states even adjudicate juveniles as status offenders on the basis of habitual truancy as an extension of school punishment. For example, in West Virginia, a student may receive an out-of-school suspension, and then be found truant because of the resulting absences. *In re Brandi B.*, 231 W. Va. 71 (2013). In this case, the juvenile was put on probation as a result of the status offense, and the probation conditions required her to stay in school through graduation (whereas the relevant state law otherwise permitted her to withdraw at age 17). *Id.* at 85. The Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld both the suspension and the probation conditions against a due process challenge.

¹⁴⁸ An Act Concerning the Attendance of Children at School, 1867 Mass. Acts 240, *available at* <https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1852/1852acts0240.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ *Com. v. Roberts*, 159 Mass. 372, 374 (1893) (“The great object of these provisions of the statutes has been that all the children shall be educated.”); Jillian M. Conry & Meredith P. Richards, *The Severity of State Truancy Policies and Chronic Absenteeism*, 23:1–2 J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK 187, 190–91 (2018) (“[T]he persistence of such laws [targeting truant students and their parents] underscores the perennial nature of concerns regarding high rates of absenteeism, the conviction that consistent attendance in school is necessary for student success[.]”); Gershon M. Ratner, *A New Legal*

From 1918 to the present, all states have had compulsory attendance laws that generally require confinement of school-age children in school for part of the day for a certain number of days per year.¹⁵⁰ In *Meyer v. Nebraska*, the Court justified compulsory education laws as a corollary to the parent's "right of control" over a minor child.¹⁵¹ By the 1950s, nearly all states mandated school attendance through secondary school.¹⁵² Penalties for truancy or chronic absenteeism are wide-

Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 827 n.208 (1985) (finding that despite secondary justifications, the primary justification has always been educational, and arguing that "the confinement [must be] reasonably related to the primary educational purpose.").

¹⁵⁰ Augustina Reyes, *Compulsory School Attendance: The New American Crime*, 10 EDUC. SCI. 75, 80 (2020); Lisa M. Lukasik, *The Latest Home Education Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools*, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913, 1918 (1996).

¹⁵¹ *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.").

¹⁵² Jillian M. Conry & Meredith P. Richards, *The Severity of State Truancy Policies and Chronic Absenteeism*, 23:1-2 J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK 187, 191 (2018).

ranging, including fines and imprisonment,¹⁵³ denial of welfare benefits,¹⁵⁴ community service,¹⁵⁵ loss or denial of driver's license,¹⁵⁶ and loss of custodial rights by taking the young

¹⁵³ See, e.g., Code of Ala. § 16-28-12 (2006) (up to 90 days incarceration for parent who fails to send or compel child to attend); Alaska Stat. Sec. 11.51.130(a)(3) (1994) (up to one year incarceration for aiding, inducing, causing, or encouraging a child to be absent from school without cause); Cal. Penal Code § 270.1 (2010) (up to one year incarceration for failing to reasonably supervise and encourage the pupil's attendance even after being offered support services to address truancy); Colo. Rev. Stat. 22-33-108 (2016) (on contempt finding for failing to obey order to compel student's attendance, parent may be incarcerated "until the order is complied with"); 14 Del. C. § 2729 (2016) (up to 30 days incarceration for third or subsequent offense of failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure attendance of child); Fla. Stat. § 1003.27 (2012) (up to 60 days incarceration for parent as matter of strict liability for failure of child to attend); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-1135 (1996) (up to 30 days incarceration upon showing that parent had not used "proper diligence to enforce the child's regular attendance"); Idaho Code § 33-207 (2015) (up to 6 months in jail for as matter of strict liability for failure of child to attend); see also *id.* (child may be fined up to five dollars per day of absence); 105 I.L.C.S. (Ill.) 5/26-10 (1977) (up to 30 days imprisonment); Indiana Code 35-50-3-4 (1978) (up to 60 days incarceration as a strict liability matter for failing to ensure attendance); Iowa Code § 299.6 (2013) (up to 30 days incarceration for violating an agreement to ensure attendance after initial truancy); Kentucky Rev. Stat. § 159.990 (2013) (up to 90 days incarceration for failing to "send . . . to school" a child subject to compulsory attendance law); La. Rev. Stat. § 17:221 (2011) (up to 30 days incarceration for failing to "send . . . to . . . school" child subject to compulsory attendance law); 20-A Maine Rev. Stat. § 5053-A (2011) (fine of up to \$250); Md. Education Code Ann. § 7-301 (2017) (up to five days for failing to take reasonable efforts to ensure child's attendance); Mass. Gen. Law ch. 76, §§ 2, 4 (2008) (fine of up to \$200 for inducing absence of minor or \$20 per day for failing to ensure attendance); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1599 (2015) (not less than two nor more than 90 days incarceration as a matter of strict liability for child's truancy); Minn. Stat. § 120A.34 (2002) (fine of up to \$300); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39 (2018) (up to one year of incarceration for knowingly or recklessly committing any act or omission that contributes to the delinquency of any child); Missouri Rev. Stat. § 15-289 (1976) (up to 15 days incarceration for failing to cause the child to regularly attend school); Mon. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106 41-5-1512 (2019) (up to 45 days for the child at a youth correctional facility); R.S. Neb. § 79-210 (2006) (up to 90 days incarceration); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 18A:38-31 (2013) (fine of up to \$100 for guardian failing to ensure appearance of child); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3233 (2019) (up to 60 days imprisonment); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-380 (2014) (up to 120 days incarceration as a matter of strict liability for failing to ensure appearance); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-20-03 (up to 30 days incarceration for parent for not making reasonable and substantial efforts to ensure student attendance); 70 Okl. St. § 10-109 (2014) (temporary detention for the duration of the school day by any law enforcement officer or administrator who finds student outside school during the school day); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-65-20 (2012) (up to 30 days incarceration for parent or guardian who "neglects to enroll" or "refuses to make [their] child . . . attend school"); Tex. Educ. Code Sec. 25.093 (up to \$500 per offense as of a fifth offense, where each day of absence may constitute a separate offense); Utah Code Ann. 53G-6-208 (2019) (temporary detention for the duration of the school day by any law enforcement officer or administrator who finds student outside school during the school day); 16 Vermont S.A. § 1127 (2019) (fine of up to \$1,000 for failing to cause child to attend school continually without valid excuse); Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) 28A.225.090 (2015) (a student defying a court order related to return to school may be incarcerated for contempt or sentence to e-carceration); D.C. Code § 38-203 (2018) (up to five days incarceration for failure to ensure attendance of child).

person into the foster care system, among others.¹⁵⁷ Each year, in policing truancy, U.S. states: remove more than 1,000 truant students from their own homes and place them in foster homes or group homes, or incarcerate them in juvenile detention;¹⁵⁸ incarcerate 150,000 parents or students; and place 15,000 students on probation.¹⁵⁹ Children are found to be educationally neglected by their parents even when the parents have requested, but been denied, services for their children;¹⁶⁰ they are committed to juvenile facilities for truancy even when the family is homeless and necessary interventions to help the household are not provided;¹⁶¹ they are found

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 400.57b (2015). See also HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, *GETTING BY: ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME* 438 (Oxford 2019) (reporting that as of July 2017, 37 states linked eligibility for assistance funded by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families authorization to some kind of attendance requirement).

¹⁵⁵ See, e.g., 14 Del. C. § 2730 (2016) (providing range of coercive interventions, including community service and possibly juvenile detention, for student for failing to attend if parent or guardian made reasonable efforts); Md. Education Code Ann. § 7-301 (2017) (community service for parent); 70 Okl. St. § 2-2-103 (2014) (community service for child).

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., Ariz. A.C.A. § 6-18-222(b)(2) (2013); Fla. Stat. § 1003.27 (2012); O.C.G.A. (Georgia) § 20-2-690.2 (2004); La. Rev. Stat. § 17:221 (2011).

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 1003.27 (2012) (habitual truancy triggers “child-in-need-of-services” petition, which can result in termination of parental rights); O.C.G.A. (Georgia) § 20-2-690.2 (2004) (same); Idaho Code § 33-207 (2015) (same); Kansas S.A. § 72-3121 (2019) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12A-12 (2019) (same); 24 P.S. § 13-1333.3 (2018) (referral for possible disposition as a dependent child for a second truancy violation within three year period of a first violation); R.I. Gen. Laws. Section 16-19-6 (2013) (providing for adjudication as “wayward child,” establishing grounds for family court intervention).

¹⁵⁸ Dana Goldstein, *Inexcusable Absences: Skipping School is a Problem. But Why Is It a Crime?*, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (March 6, 2015), available at <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/06/inexcusable-absences> [hereinafter *Inexcusable Absences*].

¹⁵⁹ Augustina Reyes, *Compulsory School Attendance: The New American Crime*, 10 EDUC. SCI. 75, 95 (2020) [hereinafter *New American Crime*].

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., *In re Mary M.*, 3 Misc. 3d 1101(A) (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004) (child found to be educationally neglected by parents on evidence of inadequate reading skills and truancy, despite mother’s request for educational services).

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., *Chimacum Sch. Dist. v. R.L.P.*, 448 P.3d 94 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing 2017 truancy petition that resulted in juvenile court order against child whose family was homeless).

“guilty” of “unruly” conduct because of medical absences that are not sufficiently documented.¹⁶²

Absence from schools that teach and nurture is a manifest concern.¹⁶³ But studies show that criminalizing absenteeism has “not increased attendance rates”—rather, it “pushes students away from school and forces poor and minority families deeper into poverty.”¹⁶⁴ That the criminalization approach has this perverse effect should not be surprising: Prime among the factors that contribute to a child’s absence from school is poverty¹⁶⁵—and the related problems of housing insecurity or lack of housing, lack of transportation, and food insecurity—all of which is exacerbated by engagement with the criminal punishment system.¹⁶⁶ Nor is prosecution a viable means of dealing with some common causes of absenteeism, such as medical conditions

¹⁶² See, e.g., *In Interest of A.D.F.*, 176 Ga. App. 5 (1985).

¹⁶³ See Farah Z. Ahmad & Tiffany Miller, *The High Cost of Truancy*, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Aug. 2015), available at <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/29113012/Truancy-report4.pdf> (discussing the social costs of truancy and the negative effects that school policy can have on student attendance).

¹⁶⁴ *Id.* See also Dana Goldstein, *Inexcusable Absences*, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 6, 2015), <https://newrepublic.com/article/121186/truancy-laws-unfairly-attack-poor-children-and-parents> (stating that “[g]etting tough on truancy doesn’t help students get an education—and it unfairly attacks the poor”); Deborah Fowler et al., *Class, Not Court: Reconsidering Texas’ Criminalization of Truancy*, Texas Appleseed (2015), available at https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/TruancyReport_All_FINAL_SinglePages.pdf (discussing “disengagement and dropout” as harmful effects of criminalization on children).

¹⁶⁵ See Marc Cutillo, *Poverty’s Prominent Role in Absenteeism*, EDUCATION WEEK (Feb. 28, 2013), available at <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/02/27/22cutillo.h32.html> (reporting results of studies that show higher absentee rates in high-poverty schools and that “[a]n overwhelming majority of chronically absent kids are impoverished”).

¹⁶⁶ ELLA BAKER CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES (2015) (describing how the experience of having a loved one criminalized—including not only lost income but also contending with court costs, fees, and fines—itsself saddles families with unmanageable debts and drives families into poverty).

that schools are unable to or do not accommodate.¹⁶⁷ While many states have nominally moved away from criminalization towards service-delivery models of responding to absenteeism, as recently as 2013, 50 per cent of all juvenile status offense arrests were for truancy.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, most state laws that provide for incarceration permit incarceration only *after* an attempt has been made at delivering some form of service or other support.¹⁶⁹ This suggests that, in practice, the “service-delivery” and openly carceral approaches may reinforce, rather than substitute for, one another.¹⁷⁰

Indeed, for decades, the regulation of truancy and youth delinquency has been an area in which social services were subsumed within the criminal punishment system, creating a potent tool for racial and class stratification.¹⁷¹ Under this model, police in poorer, mostly Black neighborhoods conducted “interrogations of suspected truants” to investigate crimes or even to

¹⁶⁷ Molly Redden, *The Human Costs of Kamala Harris’ War On Truancy*, HUFFPOST (Mar. 3, 2019), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/kamala-harris-truancy-arrests-2020-progressive-prosecutor_n_5c995789e4b0f7bfa1b57d2e (describing the arrest of Cheree Peoples, whose daughter “missed school because she was in too much pain to leave the house or was hospitalized for long-term care” while she “[fought] with the school to get it to agree to additional accommodations under an Individualized Education Plan”).

¹⁶⁸ *New American Crime*, *supra* note 159, at 95.

¹⁶⁹ *See supra* note 153. Indeed, it is the threat of incarceration that is intended to induce acceptance of the offer of support.

¹⁷⁰ The case of “Grace,” which is discussed in some detail below, *see* 206–215 and accompanying text, illustrates the dynamic of the “service-delivery model reinforcing, rather than substituting for, explicitly carceral regulation. Although Grace’s was not a truancy case, when she was put on probation for a school-related incident, she received a classic “support” or “service-delivery” intervention: a caseworker assigned to monitor her progress, set goals, and problem solve. Ultimately, however, her caseworker responded to a lapse in Grace’s fulfillment of agreed criteria not with dialogue, nor with contacting her school, but by reporting her to the court—triggering her incarceration.

¹⁷¹ *See generally* Elizabeth Hinton, *Creating Crime: The Rise and Impact of National Juvenile Delinquency Programs in Black Urban Neighborhoods*, 41(5) J. URBAN HIST. 808 (2015) [hereafter, *Creating Crime*].

“identify potential criminals.”¹⁷² Early on, experts recognized that the rush to detect “predelinquent” or “pre-criminal” youth had the effect of stigmatizing the targeted children, and not simply in a metaphoric sense. Rather, the practice is known to generate for the children who are labeled in this way “multiple handicaps: increased police surveillance, neighborhood isolation, lowered receptivity and tolerance by school officials, and rejection by prospective employers.”¹⁷³ Notwithstanding these warnings, policymakers nevertheless pursued a zealous “war on crime,” extending the reach of the carceral state into childhood and public schooling in ways that worsened conditions for Black, Brown, and poor youth.¹⁷⁴ As Elizabeth Hinton has documented, the consequence of merging social service provision with the criminal punishment system has been to criminalize behaviors and to withhold supportive services along racial and class lines.¹⁷⁵

Nor is the enforcement of confinement in schools the end of the story. Parents and guardians who try to escape the boundaries of school-district confinement—for example, by enrolling a child in an out-of-district school where a family member might live—themselves face

¹⁷² *Id.* at 815.

¹⁷³ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE, YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ADMINISTRATION, *THE CHALLENGE OF YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS 5* (1973).

¹⁷⁴ *Creating Crime*, *supra* note 171, at 814. (discussing the “relentless expansion of the carceral state around [Black youth]”).

¹⁷⁵ ELIZABETH HINTON, *FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION* 221 (2016) [hereafter HINTON, *WAR ON CRIME*] (stating that the merger “effectively criminalize[] black children and teenagers and decriminalize[] white youth”); *see also id.* at 222 (“[T]he social welfare arm . . . treated white and middle-income youth, [while] the punitive arm handled young people from segregated urban neighborhoods.”).

criminal punishment¹⁷⁶ or civil sanction.¹⁷⁷ And, while at school, students are subject to similar criminalizing forces that perpetuate racial and class stratification.¹⁷⁸

C. Carceral Schools as Extensions of the Carceral State

In recent decades, the public school has become ever more carceral in appearance and function. As described by Loïc Wacquant, public schoolchildren in (what he calls) the “hyperghetto” are:

[L]ike inmates, . . . herded into decaying and overcrowded facilities built like bunkers, where undertrained and underpaid teachers, hampered by a shocking penury of equipment and supplies—many schools have no photocopying machines, library, science laboratory, or even functioning bathrooms, and use textbooks that are thirty-year-old rejects from suburban schools—strive to regulate conduct so as to maintain order and minimize violent incidents. . . . [M]ost [] resemble[] fortresses, complete with concertina wire on outside fences, bricked up windows, heavy locks on iron doors, metal detectors at the gates and hallways patrolled by armed guards who conduct spot checks and body searches [E]ssential educational programs have been cut to divert funds for more weapons scanners, cameras, emergency telephones, sign-in desks, and security personnel Indeed, it appears that the main purpose of these school is simply to ‘neutralize’ youth considered unworthy and unruly by holding them under lock for the day [T]he carceral atmosphere of schools . . . habituates the children of the hyperghetto to the

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, *Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women*, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 297, 326 (2013) (among other cases discussed, one mother spent a night in jail, three years on probation, and was required to do 100 hours of community service, having been charged with grand theft for enrolling her children in the schools in the district where her mother lived).

¹⁷⁷ For example, in *Bd. Of Educ. Of City of St. Louis v. Elam*, 70 S.W.3d 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Gloria Elam. Gloria Elam approached Mary O’Neal and requested permission to use her address to enroll her daughter into the St. Louis Public School System. The trial court ruled in favor of the Board and against Elam on violation of § 167.020 with respect to her son in the amount of \$3,994.36, and for fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to her daughter in the amount of \$35,730.00, which included \$3,000.00 in punitive damages. See also Kelly Philips Erb, *Would You Lie About Where You Live To Get Your Child Into A Better School?*, Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphilipserb/2016/11/06/would-you-lie-about-where-you-live-to-get-your-child-into-a-better-school/#14cf88912f48>

¹⁷⁸ Further, as discussed *supra* notes 253–255 and accompanying text, while confined in school on threat of civil and criminal penalties with wide-ranging consequences, students confront conditions that are, in some cases, disturbingly unsafe.

demeanor, tactics, and interactive style of the correctional officers many of them are bound to encounter[.]¹⁷⁹

Statistics bear out this description of “supermax schools.”¹⁸⁰ In New York City, for example, the school-based police officers would, if they were a standalone department, be the fifth-largest police department in the nation and have higher per capita concentration of officers than Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, or Dallas.¹⁸¹

Moreover, the police stationed in, or called into, public schools function as a major force for subordinating Black, Brown, and poor students.¹⁸² Approximately 70 percent of the nation’s nearly 50,000 school-based police officers engage in school discipline enforcement, as well as or instead of law enforcement.¹⁸³ According to New York City data, Black students were 14 times more likely, and Latinx students five times more likely, than white students to be arrested for

¹⁷⁹ Loïc Wacquant, *Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh*, 3(1) PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 108 (2001) [hereafter *Deadly Symbiosis*]; see also *Creating Crime*, supra note 171, at 815–16 (“[L]aw enforcement officials guarded schools like prisons, with monitored entrances, stationed patrol cars, and flying helicopters. . . . [C]onditions [in] . . . urban schools increasingly resemble the penal facilities where an increasing number of young black men would eventually find themselves.”).

¹⁸⁰ ANNETTE FUENTES, LOCKDOWN HIGH: WHEN THE SCHOOLHOUSE BECOMES A JAILHOUSE 81 (2013).

¹⁸¹ GIRLS FOR GENDER EQUITY, NEW YORK CITY CAN’T WAIT: SHRINK POLICING IN THE NAME OF PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (2020); see also CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND OF NEW YORK, “UNTHINKABLE:” A HISTORY OF POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS & THE PATH TOWARD POLICE-FREE SCHOOLS 19 (2019) (“[T]he annual cost of the NYPD’s School Safety Division reaches \$431 million, [but] this does not capture the cost of police outside of the Division that patrol and surveil students in and around schools, or the cost of criminalizing infrastructure like metal detectors and cameras.”) [hereafter UNTHINKABLE]. For more background on the militarization of New York City schools, see NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS (2007).

¹⁸² For an overview of the critical race theory literature on the subject, see David Simson, *Exclusion, Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective on School Discipline*, 61 UCLA L. REV. 506 (2014).

¹⁸³ ALEX VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 43 (2017) [hereafter END OF POLICING].

school-based incidents.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, as the number of school-based police increased (and their mandate expanded) over the past 50 years, it was all but inevitable that more minor disciplinary matters previously handled within the school would result in arrests.¹⁸⁵

The numbers bear out this common sense intuition. In 2015–2016, the last year for which national data are available, 290,600 public school students were referred to law enforcement agencies or arrested.¹⁸⁶ Not only were Black students disproportionately arrested, but the disproportion was worse than in previous years.¹⁸⁷ Disturbingly, between 2013 and 2018, over 30,000 children under 10-years-old were arrested—many at school¹⁸⁸—and in 2018 alone, 100,000 young people were brought before juvenile court judges for status offenses.¹⁸⁹ Accounts of numerous youth arrests have gone “viral,” including a recently revealed incident in which the

¹⁸⁴ NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL-JUSTICE PARTNERSHIP TASK FORCE, KEEPING KIDS IN SCHOOL AND OUT OF COURT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2013). Nor are these results outliers. Travis Riddle and Stacey Sinclair, *Racial Disparities in School-Based Disciplinary Actions are Associated with County-Level Rates of Racial Bias*, 116 PNAS 17 (2019); Jason A. Okonofua and Jennifer L. Eberhardt, *Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining of Young Students*, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 617 (2015); Josh Kinsler, *Understanding the Black-White School Discipline Gap*, 30 ECON. EDU. REV. 1370 (2011); Russell Skiba et al., *Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline*, 40 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 85 (2011).

¹⁸⁵ Augustina Reyes, *The Criminalization of Student Discipline Programs and Adolescent Behavior*, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73 (2006-2007); see also END OF POLICING, *supra* note 183, at 50.

¹⁸⁶ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 2015–16 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: SCHOOL CLIMATE AND SAFETY 3 (2016), available at <https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/school-climate-and-safety.pdf>.

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* Notably, between 2013 and 2016, the number of school arrests dropped, but the proportion of Black students among arrests rose, suggesting a stubborn racism. *Id.*

¹⁸⁸ Bill Hutchison, *More than 30,000 children under age 10 have been arrested in the US since 2013: FBI*, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019), available at <https://abcnews.go.com/US/30000-children-age-10-arrested-us-2013-fbi/story?id=65798787>.

¹⁸⁹ Dawn R. Wolfe, *Thousands of Children on Parole Are Incarcerated Each Year for Nonviolent, Noncriminal Behaviors*, THE APPEAL (Sept. 4, 2020), available at <https://theappeal.org/thousands-of-children-on-parole-are-incarcerated-each-year-for-nonviolent-noncriminal-behaviors/>.

police handcuffed an eight-year-old, three-and-a-half-foot tall student whose wrists were too small to be constrained by the handcuffs.¹⁹⁰ Sometimes the arrest is outsourced: it is tragically common for school officials to report Central American students to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on the purported ground of gang activity.¹⁹¹ In addition to direct subordination of those arrested, the evidence suggests exacerbates racial disparities in educational attainment school-wide: exploiting differences in timing in the rollout of a school-based police surge program in the City, researchers determined that “the negative impact of aggressive policing on Black male students’ [test scores] is large enough to cancel out the potential benefits of other (often costly) interventions” (such as improving teacher quality).¹⁹² The life-long harms caused by arrests (or, to varying degrees, other forms of discipline) at school are extremely well-

¹⁹⁰ Eric Levenson and Tina Burnside, *Key West Police Arrested an 8-Year-Old at School. His Wrists Were Too Small for the Handcuffs*, CNN (Aug. 11, 2020), available at <https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/11/us/8-year-old-boy-key-west-arrest-trnd/index.html>.

¹⁹¹ Hannah Dreier, *He Drew His School Mascot—and ICE Labeled Him a Gang Member: How High Schools Have Embraced the Trump Administration’s Crackdown on MS-13, and Destroyed Immigrant Students’ American Dreams*, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2018) available at <https://features.propublica.org/ms-13-immigrant-students/huntington-school-deportations-ice-honduras/> (describing school resource officer reporting a student’s doodle, resulting eventually in his deportation); see also Randy Capps, Jodi Berger Cardoso, Kalina Brabeck, Michael Fix, and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, *Immigration Enforcement and the Mental Health of Latino High School Students*, Migration Policy Institute (Sept. 2020) (finding a majority of Latinx high school students have diagnosable mental health conditions caused by deportation-related fear, anxiety, and depression); Alice Speri, *From School Suspension to Immigration Detention: For Immigrant Students on Long Island, Trump’s War on Gangs Means the Wrong T-Shirt Could Get You Deported*, The Intercept (Feb. 11, 2018), available at <https://theintercept.com/2018/02/11/ice-schools-immigrant-students-ms-13-long-island/>.

¹⁹² Joscha Legewie, Chelsea Farley, and Kayla Stewart, *Aggressive Policing and Academic Outcomes Examining the Impact of Police “Surges” in NYC Students’ Home Neighborhoods*, RESEARCH ALLIANCE FOR NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS: POLICY BRIEF 4 (2019); see also END OF POLICING, *supra* note 183, at 49 (describing that, when No Child Left Behind sparked an increase in school disciplinary incidents in North Carolina, racial disparities in suspension worsened). Notably, this effect is not limited to the pool of people arrested or otherwise criminalized, but reflects the overall effect on testing score by race at a given school. See also Subini Annamma, Deb Morrison, and Darrell Jackson, *Disproportionality Fills in the Gaps: Connections Between Achievement, Discipline, and Special Education in the School-to-Prison Pipeline*, 5(1) BERKELEY REV. EDU. 53 (2014).

documented,¹⁹³ and create further barriers to public benefits, housing, and employment.¹⁹⁴ Yet even without incidents such as arrests or discipline, the mere presence of police can have a negative impact on students' educational outcomes.¹⁹⁵

But educational carceralism is not limited to police arresting students in schools. Teachers and administrators also play an important role in policing of students, and to similar negative effect. Subini Annamma has theorized a “pedagogy of pathologization,” which responds to students' vulnerability with “hyper-surveillance” and, ultimately, with the “criminalizing of difference.”¹⁹⁶ Many school discipline codes have incorporated elements of criminal law, effectively requiring teachers to do law enforcement work.¹⁹⁷ In an increasing array

¹⁹³ See Jason A. Okonofua, Gregory M. Walton, and Jennifer L. Eberhardt, *A Vicious Cycle: A Social-Psychological Account of Extreme Racial Disparities in School Discipline*, 11 PERSPS. PSYCHOL. SCI. 381 (2016); Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie, *Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records*, 623 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 195 (2009); Paul Hirschfield, *Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High School Dropout*, 82 SOC. EDU. 368 (2009); see also *Deadly Symbiosis*, *supra* note 179, at 115 (“46 percent of the inmates in New York state prisons issue from neighborhoods served by the 16 worst public schools of the city.”).

¹⁹⁴ See HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, *supra* note 154, at 12 (discussing effect of criminal records on eligibility for benefits funded through the Temporary Assistance for Families Program); 106 (discussing effect of criminal records on employment); 650– 51 (discussing effect of criminal records and public housing);

¹⁹⁵ Paige Fry, *More Than 400 People Join March to Call for Removal of Police in Chicago Schools*, Chicago Tribune (Aug. 22, 2020), available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-saturday-protests-chicago-police-cps-whitney-young-20200823-dytuu33cmjdi5alx4th53hagye-story.html> (quoting a student who said, “I got into this school, thinking, hey maybe I’ll have a chance What’s it worth when I’m too scared to ask an SRO (school resource officer) to move out of a space in the library so that I can complete an assignment because my hands are shaking?”).

¹⁹⁶ SUBINI ANNAMMA, PEDAGOGY OF PATHOLOGIZATION: DIS/ABLED GIRLS OF COLOR IN THE SCHOOL-PRISON NEXUS 49 (2018). See also ERICA MEINERS, RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE: SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC ENEMIES 46 (2007) (“The role of teaching (and social work) was to execute class-based surveillance and monitoring.”) [hereafter RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE]. For another, even more disturbing, account, some have argued that teachers in certain districts have responded to pressure to improve test scores by using disciplinary tools to remove from the classroom students anticipated to perform poorly on standardized tests. END OF POLICING, *supra* note 183, at 51.

¹⁹⁷ RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE, *supra* note 196, at 3, 35.

of circumstances, teachers are required to report misbehavior to police.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, schools have adopted prison discipline methods. In Illinois, for example, school officials placed students in solitary confinement (“quiet rooms”) 20,000 times over 15 months—often, prone and shackled (“restrained”) to the floor.¹⁹⁹ Pedagogically and technologically informed by the encroaching carceral logic, teachers are, in some schools, charged with suppressing student will as much (or more than) with helping students develop capabilities necessary to live meaningfully self-determined lives.²⁰⁰ As Erica Meiners explains:

Those disenfranchised, for example, the youth who see this connect[ion] between schools and jails and the correspondingly narrow discussions of what counts as an educational issue, have a right to be hostile. Anger, an ‘outlaw emotion,’ is a legitimate response to injustice or violence. But what happens when individuals who are racially profiled and tracked toward special education, undereducated in low-resource schools that possess metal detectors and have drug searches by the on-site school police stations, one guidance counselor for 500 students, and a low track record of graduation or for placing students in a community college or university, *get angry?* . . . What mechanisms, built into the expanding [prison-industrial complex], transform these legitimate responses of anger and critique into a dysfunction or a pathology? The response and the analysis of someone who clearly has the moral right but not a legal right to be hostile, gets translated from a critique into a youth with an anger management problem. . . . [Y]outh who are caught up in the intersections between schools and jails are [] constructed as dangerous, uneducable public enemies, requiring containment[.]²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹⁹ Lakeidra Chavis, Jennifer Smith Richards, and Jodi S. Cohen, *There’s an Emergency Ban on Isolated Timeouts in Illinois Schools. What’s Next?*, PROPUBLICA ILLINOIS (Nov. 19, 2020), available at <https://www.propublica.org/article/illinois-students-school-seclusion-rooms-state-board-education-meeting-isbe>.

²⁰⁰ *Id.* at 45 (“[T]he white lady teacher is charged, implicitly, with colonizing her ‘native’ students and molding them into good citizens of the republic.”).

²⁰¹ *Id.* at 5–6 (emphasis in original); see also *id.* at 28 (“[I]f one does not have the right to be hostile, where does the anger go when it is ‘a grief of distortions between peers, and its object is change.’”), quoting AUDRE LORDE, *SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES* 129 (1984).

In addition to these legal, institutional, and ideological drivers, one cannot underestimate the effects of austerity, and the state’s inability or refusal to fund social services for households that subsist on minimum wage jobs, temporary jobs, or no jobs at all (while linking such services to carceral methods of surveillance).²⁰² Instead, public moneys are directed toward punitive programs and personnel. Relying on interviews with school and child welfare officials, Kelley Fong has argued that “concerned professionals with limited options end up turning to an agency with coercive authority” to address classroom problems, because that agency (often Child Protective Services) “is what remains.”²⁰³ In so doing, educators often “channel families to state surveillance that threatens child removal” and may end up “criminalizing marginalized youth in the process.”²⁰⁴ Ultimately, however, families are often left “experienc[ing] surveillance without material support,” with the end of “exacerbat[ing] social stratification” because the surveillance leads to some form of criminalization.²⁰⁵

The story of “Grace,” a 15-year-old Black girl who attends high school in a suburb to the north of Detroit, MI, underscores these dynamics. Grace, whose pandemic-era transition to

²⁰² See Dorothy E. Roberts, *Abolishing Policing Also Means Abolishing Family Regulation*, THE IMPRINT (June 16, 2020), available at <https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishing-policing-also-means-abolishing-family-regulation/44480>.

²⁰³ Kelley Fong, *Getting Eyes in the Home: Child Protective Services Investigations and State Surveillance of Family Life*, 85(4) AM. SOC. REV. 610, 629 (2020) [hereafter *Eyes in the Home*].

²⁰⁴ *Id.* at 627, 630. Dorothy Roberts has similarly argued:

All institutions in the United States increasingly address social inequality by punishing the communities that are most marginalized by it. Systems that ostensibly exist to serve people’s needs — health care, education, and public housing, as well as public assistance and child welfare — have become behavior modification programs that regulate the people who rely on them, and these systems resort to a variety of punitive measures to enforce compliance.

Dorothy E. Roberts, *Digitizing the Carceral State*, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1700 (2019).

²⁰⁵ *Eyes in the Home*, *supra* note 203, at 629, 630.

online classes was made more difficult because of “a history of mental health issues and living with disabilities,”²⁰⁶ slept through an online class one morning in May 2020.²⁰⁷ The month before, an Oakland County Circuit Court Judge had sentenced Grace to probation, the terms of which included not missing any coursework.²⁰⁸ The caseworker assigned to monitor Grace—one of several forms of surveillance imposed as part of her probation—informed the court that Grace had missed class.²⁰⁹ On May 14, 2020, the judge sentenced Grace to juvenile detention for violating probation.²¹⁰

To the extent that Grace’s behavior indicated a problem, it could have been understood as one of inadequate service provision, rather than one of misbehavior. Grace, who has an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) because of her Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and mood disorder, had not been receiving the support specified in her IEP since the start of the pandemic.²¹¹ In light of the circumstances and the onerous terms of the probation, Grace and her

²⁰⁶ Letter from Rep. Ayanna Pressley et al. to Attorney General Barr and [Education] Secretary DeVos, dated July 29, 2020, *available at* <https://pressley.house.gov/sites/pressley.house.gov/files/2020%2007%2029%20Grace%20Michigan%20Letter%20ED%20DOJ%20v7%20vF.pdf> [hereafter Pressley Letter].

²⁰⁷ Jodi S. Cohen, *A Teenager Didn’t Do Her Online Schoolwork. So a Judge Sent Her to Juvenile Detention.*, PROPUBLICA (July 14, 2020), *available at* <https://www.propublica.org/article/a-teenager-didnt-do-her-online-schoolwork-so-a-judge-sent-her-to-juvenile-detention> [hereafter *A Teenager Didn’t Do Her Online Schoolwork*].

²⁰⁸ *Id.* The case that resulted in the imposition of probation arose from two incidents dating back to the fall of 2019, one of which involved taking another student’s phone at school (the other was unrelated to school).

²⁰⁹ *Id.*

²¹⁰ *Id.*

²¹¹ Under regulations implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Grace’s school is required to provide this support. 34 C.F.R. § 300.110, §§ 300.121–300.156 (2013); *see also* 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 *et seq.* *See generally* HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, *supra* note 154, at 450–52 (setting out requirements). *See* Pressley Letter, *supra* note 206 (“[R]eports indicate that none of her accommodations, which are guaranteed by federal law, were in place.”).

mother had already told the caseworker that Grace felt “anxious” and “overwhelmed.”²¹² Nonetheless, Grace’s teacher reported that she was performing comparably to her classmates during the pandemic.²¹³ The caseworker did not any of these contextual facts before reporting Grace to court, because she never contacted the school before making her report.²¹⁴ She instead functioned as one more instrument of criminalization targeting Grace, against the backdrop of deprivation. Statistics suggest that Grace’s story is the norm for Black girls—especially Black girls with disabilities.²¹⁵ Indeed, the dynamics illustrated by Grace’s odyssey seemed poised to worsen as the pandemic forces many schools to go virtual, thereby expanding opportunities for schools to surveil and punish children and families in unprecedented ways.²¹⁶

²¹² *A Teenager Didn’t Do Her Online Schoolwork*, *supra* note 207.

²¹³ *Id.*

²¹⁴ *Id.* On August 11, the Michigan judge terminated Grace’s probation, finding she had made adequate progress. See Jodi S. Cohen, *Case Closed: Michigan Judge Removes Grace, Black Teen Jailed for Not Doing Online Schoolwork, From Probation*, PROPUBLICA ILLINOIS (Aug. 11, 2020), <https://www.propublica.org/article/case-closed-michigan-judge-removes-grace-black-teen-jailed-for-not-doing-online-schoolwork-from-probation#987309>.

²¹⁵ SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS: FACT SHEET 4 (2019) (reporting that Black girls “are three-and-a-half times as likely” as white girls to be incarcerated), *available at* <https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-and-Girls.pdf>; Daniel Losen et al., *Disturbing Inequities: Exploring the Relationship Between Racial Disparities in Special Education Identification and Discipline*, 5(2) J. APPLIED. RES. ON CHILDREN: INFORMING POLICY FOR CHILDREN AT RISK 15, 1–2 (2014) (“Black students with disabilities constituted 19% of all students with disabilities, yet they represented 50% of students with disabilities in correctional institutions.”).

²¹⁶ Bianca Vázquez Toness, *Your Child’s a No-Show at Virtual School? You May Get a Call from the State’s Foster Care Agency*, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 15, 2020), *available at* <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/08/15/metro/your-childs-no-show-virtual-school-you-may-get-call-states-foster-care-agency/> (describing calls to child welfare agency after missing class); *Police Called on Student for Missing Zoom Call: Teacher Claims It’s Child Abuse*, INFORMED AMERICAN (Aug. 20, 2020), *available at* <https://www.informedamerican.com/police-called-on-student-for-missing-zoom-call-teacher-claims-its-child-abuse/> (report made based on behavior of sibling of student, where sibling’s conduct was visible to teacher in background during class); Mary Retta, *Schools are Enforcing Dress Codes During Online Classes*, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 20, 2020), *available at* <https://www.teenvogue.com/story/schools-zoom-dress-code> (describing deans threatening suspension based on observation of student dress while at home); Reuters (@Reuters), Twitter (Aug. 19, 2020, 12:35 PM),

In sum, students from less wealthy, less white communities not only are locked into failing schools and their families locked out of politics to change conditions in those schools, but are also criminalized (along with their families) by laws that compel their attendance. Once in the classroom, policing and subjugation continue. If education is understood as a process that helps students develop their capacities to live meaningfully self-determined lives,²¹⁷ then the public schooling offered to Black, Brown, and poor children—preparation for a life of menial labor and criminal punishment—fails utterly.²¹⁸ The focus on surveillance and punishment within schools bears an echo of the concept of teaching freedman they were “free only to labor.”²¹⁹ Carceral schools depend on a system of discipline that is aimed not at fostering the skills and capabilities that justify the compulsory nature of education, but rather of “reproducing [] social relationships” of hierarchy,²²⁰ understood as training for low-wage work and cementing in place constricted possibilities as the result of the child’s unequal liberty.²²¹

<https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1296123510088032256> (“Five kids and one cell-phone hotspot; a low-income family in Los Angeles is trying to ensure its kids can learn virtually”); *see also* Frank Edwards, *Family Surveillance: Police and Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect*, 5 J. SOC. SCI. 50, 51 (2019) (noting that even “low-level” law enforcement contact increasingly results in child welfare investigations).

²¹⁷ *See generally* JEROME S. BRUNER, *THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION* (1960).

²¹⁸ *Deadly Symbiosis*, *supra* note 179, at 108; *see also* *Creating Crime*, *supra* note 171, at 816 (“[U]rban schools increasingly resemble the penal facilities where an increasing number of young black men would eventually find themselves.”).

²¹⁹ *See supra* note 115 and accompanying text.

²²⁰ PAUL WILLIS, *LEARNING TO LABOUR: HOW WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS JOBS* 69, 66 (1977).

²²¹ *Id.* at 212 (discussing the preference of employers for “more disciplined and frightened” students rather than “bright-eyed, enthusiastic” students who are “trying to expand the full range of [their] human talent”); *see also* RUTH WILSON GILMORE, *GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA* 77, 161 (2007) (explaining that where “[c]hanges in public policy with respect to the working poor contributed to the abandonment of entire segments of labor,” students who have “learned to labor” may be “educated for nothing at all” because of limited or non-

III. A Liberty-Based Approach to Quality Public Schooling

Unfortunately, our account of America's public schools covers familiar territory. The system's basic failings, and their severe racial and class effects on hundreds of thousands of Brown, Black, and poor children, are well documented in court papers,²²² foundation reports,²²³ scholarly articles,²²⁴ and the popular press.²²⁵ #BlackLivesMatter and the horrific videos of

existent employment prospects). Indeed, the experience of criminalization, and particularly the burden of criminalization on Black people, has striking labor-market effects. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the decline in the share of union membership accounted for by Black workers in recent decades is likely due in part to criminalization, because past criminalization increases employer power over workers, reduces their likelihood of quitting notwithstanding job dissatisfaction, reduces odds of joining unions, and reduces odds of winning NLRB elections for unions with criminalized members. Adam Reisch and Seth J. Prins, *The Disciplining Effect of Mass Incarceration on Labor Organization*, 125(5) AM. J. SOC. 1303 (March 2020).

²²² See, e.g., *supra* notes 253–255 and accompanying text; See Class Action Complaint, *Cook et al. v. Raimondo*, 1:18-cv-00645, ECF No. 1 (D.R.I. Nov. 28, 2018); Press Release, *Landmark Lawsuit on Behalf of Public School Students Demands Basic Education Rights Promised in State Constitution*, ACLU (May 17, 2000), available at <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/landmark-lawsuit-behalf-public-school-students-demands-basic-education-rights> (summarizing conditions cited in complaint in landmark case of *Williams v. California*).

²²³ See, e.g., MINER P. MARCHBANKS III AND JAMILIA J. BLAKE, *ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT* (2018); Monique W. Morrie, *Race, Gender, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Expanding Our Discussion to Include Black Girls*, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (2012); DANIEL J. LOSEN AND RUSSELL J. SKIBA, *SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN CRISIS* (2010);

²²⁴ See, e.g., MONIQUE W. MORRIS, *PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS* (2018); Wendy Haight, Misa Kayama, and Priscilla Ann Gibson, *Out-of-School Suspensions of Black Youths: Culture, Ability, Disability, Gender, and Perspective*, 61 SOC. WORK 3 (July 2016); Subini Annamma, Deb Morrison, and Darrell Jackson, *Disproportionality Fills in the Gaps: Connections Between Achievement, Discipline, and Special Education in the School-to-Prison Pipeline*, 5(1) BERKELEY REV. EDU. 53 (2014); Sarah Aldridge, *Criminalization and Discrimination in Schools: The Effects of Zero Tolerance Policies on the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Black Girls*, 9 AISTHESIS 1 (2018); AUGUSTINA REYES, *DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT, AND RACE: IS ZERO TOLERANCE THE ANSWER?* (2006); Russell Skiba et al., *The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment*, 34 URB. REV. 317 (2002).

²²⁵ Erica L. Green, *How Black Girls Get Pushed Out of School*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/us/politics/black-girls-school-racism.html>; Editorial Board, *Why Is Va. Treating Its Students—Especially Its Black Students—Like Criminals?*, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2017), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/from-the-classroom-to-the-courts-in-va-too->

police officers suffocating Black men to death have galvanized attention on the racism endemic in the criminal enforcement system and energized calls for the redeployment of funds for policing, jails, and prisons to more humane ends. Certainly, those funds could be used to #FreeGrace—to reimagine public schools as sites that allow children to grow and flourish.²²⁶ But surely the judicial system needs to see no additional videos of police arresting children for tantrums, outbursts, not doing homework, or absence to recognize the unacceptable and unequal treatment of Black, Brown, and poor children in carceral schools.

This Part picks up where the Sixth Circuit in the now-vacated decision in *Gary B.* left off: justifying a right to public schooling in the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause, but understood within the frame of abolition constitutionalism. We celebrate the decision in *Gary B.* and the resulting settlement that will expand educational opportunities for current students who do not have the luxury of waiting for incremental approaches or long-term aspirations to be put in place. But our aim is not simply to defend a right to educational opportunity sufficient to

[many-students-get-treated-like-criminals/2017/10/22/119cda9a-b5d9-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/119cda9a-b5d9-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html); Editorial Board, *Criminalizing Children at School*, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2013), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/criminalizing-children-at-school.html?searchResultPosition=9>; *School-To-Prison Pipeline: A Curated Collection of Links*, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (2020), available at <https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/67-school-to-prison-pipeline>.

²²⁶ In calling for such a reimagining, we are aligned with students who have organized against carceralism in their own schools. See, e.g., *After 7 School Integration Strikes, NYC Students Get Rare Public Meeting With Ed Department Officials, Asking ‘How Much Longer Will We Have to Wait?’*, THE 74 MILLION (Feb. 3, 2020), available at <https://www.the74million.org/article/after-7-school-integration-strikes-nyc-students-get-rare-public-meeting-with-ed-department-officials-asking-how-much-longer-will-we-have-to-wait/> (describing efforts by Teens Take Charge and IntegrateNYC to eliminate punitive practices and remove carceral infrastructure and personnel from schools, as part of a broader program of promoting educational equity); Danny Katch, *NYC Students Get Metal Detectors Expelled*, SOCIALIST WORKER (Jan. 19, 2018) available at <https://socialistworker.org/2018/01/19/nyc-students-get-metal-detectors-expelled> (describing walkout by 500 students at Bayard Rustin Educational Complex that, along with other efforts, succeeded in stopping City plan to install metal detectors in the school). See also *infra* notes 412–432 and accompanying text.

ensure minimal literacy needed for democratic participation, especially when the current governance structure tends to suppress the value of Black, Brown, and poor citizens.²²⁷ Rather, our aim is to lay the foundation for a right to quality public schooling that explicitly counters the current role of education in perpetuating the children’s subordinated and marginalized status. In the 1954 decision in *Bolling v. Sharpe*, the Court held that a Black child’s liberty interest is violated when compelled by law and under threat of punishment to attend segregated public schools.²²⁸ Today segregation is *de facto*, but the force imposed upon Black, Brown, and poor children to attend substandard public schools remains *de jure* and the violation of equal liberty persists. Our liberty-based argument, drawing from the theory of abolition constitutionalism, aims to dismantle the public school as an agent of a carceral state—schools that detain children without pedagogic purpose and that entrench the children’s caste status by perpetuating structural

²²⁷ See generally, e.g., JOE FEAGIN, *WHITE PARTY, WHITE GOVERNMENT: RACE, CLASS, AND U.S. POLITICS* (2012) (describing “our undemocratic political system”). For explorations of the specific ways that the criminal punishment system disenfranchises, alienates, and subjugates Black, Brown and poor people, see TRACI BURCH, *TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND THE DECLINE OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION* 75–104 (2013); AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, *ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL* 199–231 (2014); See, e.g., Joe Soss and Vesla Weaver, *Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities*, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565 (2017); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, *THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE* 244–81 (2011).

²²⁸ See David E. Bernstein, *Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia*, 93 GEO. L. J. 1253, 1255 (2005) (stating “[t]he only novelty in *Bolling* is the idea that forcing blacks to attend segregated schools infringed on a liberty right protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). For a recent and creative interpretation of the relationship between the due process and equality clauses, see Deborah Hellman, *The Epistemic Function of Fusing Equal Protection and Due Process*, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 383, 392 (2019):

Perhaps the intertwining of equal protection and due process rests in judicial humility. . . . The justification for fusion of equal protection and due process on this view is *Epistemic* in nature. Due process claims assert that a fundamental right has been infringed, and in order to adjudicate these claims, we need to know what rights are truly fundamental.⁶⁸ Perhaps equality-based notions can help. Similarly, claims that assert a violation of equal protection require courts to determine if the law distinguishes among people on the basis of a suspect trait.⁶⁹ But what traits should be treated as suspect? Perhaps paying attention to who can and cannot exercise fundamental liberties will be informative.

disadvantage for arbitrary reasons of race and class. In their place, we seek to reimagine public schools as democratic institutions where children can flourish and enjoy lives of equal liberty.

A. Liberty as Protection Against Unjustified Restraint

At the federal level, the U.S. Constitution protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” at the hands of either the federal or any state government.²²⁹ The protections of the Due Process Clause apply to deprivations of liberty in the civil context as well as pursuant to criminal laws.²³⁰ As the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, “[l]iberty from bodily restraint” is the “core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”²³¹ This liberty interest encompasses, but is not limited to, “freedom of movement.”²³² In the context of civil confinement, the Court has held that this interest requires the State to provide “safe conditions.”²³³ The Court, moreover, has explicitly recognized that students in public school benefit from the “historic liberty interest” in being “free from . . . unjustified intrusions on personal security,” which encompasses “freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”²³⁴

²²⁹ U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV § 1.

²³⁰ *Specht v. Patterson*, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) (“[C]ommitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are subject . . . to the Due Process Clause.”).

²³¹ See, e.g., *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates*, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

²³² *Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (recognizing liberty interest in “freedom of movement” and holding that it “survive[s] involuntary [civil] commitment”).

²³³ *Id.* (holding that it is “unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed . . . in unsafe conditions”); see also *Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (recognizing this right in the context of penal confinement).

²³⁴ *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977); see also *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (recognizing student has liberty interest triggering due process protection where suspension “could

In *Meyer v. Nebraska*, the Court acknowledged that a person has a liberty interest “to acquire useful knowledge.”²³⁵ This liberty interest directly affects the nature and scope of the state’s power to mandate public schooling. Because “[t]he hours which a child is able to devote to study . . . are limited,”²³⁶ laws imposing compulsory education are conditioned on the state’s providing the student with meaningful opportunities to learn, for a child’s attendance at school cuts off other options for acquiring comparable skills and knowledge elsewhere. In later cases, the Court has stated that an individual’s liberty interests are “not absolute.”²³⁷ In determining whether a state-imposed restriction violates an individual’s liberty interests, courts “balance the liberty of the individual and the demands of an organized society.”²³⁸ Under this balancing approach, restrictions on liberty will generally be upheld only if they are “reasonably related to legitimate government objectives,”²³⁹ a standard the Court first articulated in *Jackson v. Indiana*.²⁴⁰ But the

seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment.”).

²³⁵ *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that “[w]ithout doubt” liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge”).

²³⁶ *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (“The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited.”).

²³⁷ *Youngberg*, 457 U.S. at 320.

²³⁸ *Id.* (internal quotations omitted); see also *Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the nation has struck a balance between “liberty of the individual” and “the demands of organized society”).

²³⁹ *Id.*; see also *id.* at 322 (rejecting the “‘compelling’ or ‘substantial’ necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a State to meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety.”).

²⁴⁰ 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that, where a criminal defendant was involuntarily and indefinitely committed to a state mental institution before trial because of incapacity, “due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed”).

Meyer principle remains: Although a state may, consistent with due process, compel a young person to attend school, mandating attendance on threat of criminal or civil penalties triggers an obligation on the state's part to provide the student with a meaningful opportunity to learn. And, insofar as the liberty deprivation is justified by the governmental objective of providing education, the failure to adequately provide students with the education ought to render the requirement of compulsory attendance unconstitutional.

B. Liberty as a Source of the State's Affirmative Duty to Provide Education

The federal Constitution generally is regarded as a charter of negative rights against the government, and not of positive duties by the government to its citizens.²⁴¹ Thus, identifying liberty interests as the source of an affirmative duty of the state to provide education at a certain level or quality is analytically different from the more conventional situation of lifting of bans or disabilities that impede liberty, as the Court did in *Obergefell* when recognizing a liberty right to marriage equality as a matter of self-definition.²⁴² But our proposition is doctrinally well established: the state's right to restrain a person's liberty is limited by the purpose of the restraint, and some kinds of detention to be constitutionally valid may require the affirmative provision of goods or services, and public schooling falls comfortably within this category.

Thus, in *Youngberg v. Romeo*, a case concerning the conditions of civil commitment, the Court held that the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause required the state to provide "such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and

²⁴¹ Robin West, *Reconstructing Liberty*, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 446–47 (1992) ("It is liberty or freedom from, not liberty or freedom to, which the Bill of Rights protects.").

²⁴² *Obergefell*, 576 U.S. at 665–67.

freedom from unreasonable restraints.”²⁴³ Drawing on its earlier decision in *Jackson v. Indiana*, the Court found that due process required the state to provide “minimally adequate training” to involuntarily committed persons with developmental disabilities. The Court concluded that, to “prevent unreasonable losses of additional liberty as a result of [the involuntary] confinement,”²⁴⁴ the facility had certain affirmative duties:

[T]he State is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.²⁴⁵

Although every Justice joined the opinion of the Court, a sharp division surfaced in two concurring opinions over the affirmative duty-to-provide-treatment question. Plaintiff argued that his right to “minimally adequate” habilitation embraced the right to such “treatment as [would] afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as [his] capacities permit.”²⁴⁶ Plaintiff found support for this asserted federal constitutional right in Pennsylvania’s statutory right to “care and treatment.”²⁴⁷ In Chief Justice

²⁴³ *Youngberg*, 457 U.S. at 321. In *Youngberg*, the Third Circuit, sitting *en banc*, had endorsed a liberty-based right to treatment—a holding not repudiated by the opinion of the Court and endorsed by three Justices in a concurrence. *Romeo v. Youngberg*, 644 F.2d 147, 168 (3d Cir. 1980), *vacated on other grounds*, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (“By basing Romeo’s deprivation of liberty at least partially upon a promise of treatment, the state ineluctably has committed the community’s resources to providing minimal treatment.”). Unlike in other cases, there was no challenge to the propriety of the commitment itself. As such, the asserted liberty interest pertained only to conditions *within* the institution. *See also O’Connor v. Donaldson*, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that involuntary confinement of a mentally ill person is unconstitutional if they can live in freedom without causing harm).

²⁴⁴ *Id.* at 327.

²⁴⁵ *Id.* at 323.

²⁴⁶ *Id.* at 330 and n.* (Burger, C.J., concurring). The opinion of the Court did not address this argument.

²⁴⁷ *Id.*

Burger’s view, this affirmative duty theory was “frivolous” because it amounted to an argument that “every substantive right created by state law [is] enforceable under the Due Process Clause,” which result in “the distinction between state and federal law [] quickly be[ing] obliterated.”²⁴⁸ Writing for three Justices, however, Justice Blackmun disagreed.²⁴⁹ Citing *Jackson v. Indiana*’s “reasonable relation” requirement, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence opined that it would raise a “serious issue” if the state confined someone for “care *and* treatment”—and then failed to provide the person with treatment.²⁵⁰ When the state justified commitment “upon a promise of treatment,” “due process might well bind the State” to provide at least some treatment” to satisfy due process.²⁵¹ The Court has not since revisited the question over which the concurrences diverged.

The Sixth Circuit’s now-vacated decision in *Gary B.* went far in recognizing the viability of a liberty-based claim to public schooling. The case was an equal protection and due process challenge brought by plaintiffs at Detroit’s five “lowest performing” schools.²⁵² Plaintiffs alleged

²⁴⁸ *Id.*

²⁴⁹ Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, joined by Justices O’Connor and Brennan, agreed with the Court’s decision not to address the “failure to provide treatment” theory because of “uncertainty in the record” regarding whether plaintiff was denied treatment and whether the entitlement to treatment was properly raised below. *Id.* at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

²⁵⁰ *Id.* at 325 (emphasis in original).

²⁵¹ *Id.* at 326.

²⁵² *Gary B. v. Whitmer*, 957 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2020).

shockingly bad conditions with respect to teaching,²⁵³ facilities,²⁵⁴ and materials.²⁵⁵ Echoing *Youngberg* and *Jackson*, plaintiffs made (what they described as) a “negative rights” argument under the Due Process Clause: namely, that because the compulsory attendance law “restricted” plaintiffs’ “freedom of movement and freedom from state custody,” defendants’ subsequent failure to “provide[] . . . an adequate education . . . render[ed] the detention arbitrary,” thereby violating plaintiffs’ due process rights.²⁵⁶ Also under the heading of due process, plaintiffs argued they enjoyed a “fundamental right to a basic education, meaning one that provides access to literacy.”²⁵⁷ As to equal protection, they argued that defendants “discriminated against Plaintiffs by failing to provide the same access to literacy they give to other Michigan students.”²⁵⁸

Beginning with the “negative rights” argument, the majority opinion for the Sixth Circuit recognized that “[c]ompulsory school attendance laws are a restraint on Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement, and thus implicate the core protections of the Due Process Clause.”²⁵⁹ The court noted

²⁵³ *Id.* at 624–25 (listing, *inter alia*, 200 vacancies in teaching staff, rampant short-term absences leading to widespread instruction by uncertified and unlicensed teachers, lack of appropriate curricular materials or support).

²⁵⁴ *Id.* at 625–26 (describing “decrepit or even unsafe physical conditions,” including, *inter alia*, uniform lack of compliance with health and safety codes; excessive heat causes rashes, vomiting, and fainting; excessive cold necessitating outdoor winter gear to be worn at all times; vermin infestations; black mold; undrinkable water; over-crowding such that students lack seating; leaks and falling plaster in classrooms).

²⁵⁵ *Id.* at 626–27 (describing, *inter alia*, lack of “books and materials needed to plausibly provide literacy,” inaccessible libraries, lack of basic supplies).

²⁵⁶ *Id.* at 638.

²⁵⁷ *Id.* at 642.

²⁵⁸ *Id.* at 633.

²⁵⁹ *Id.* at 640.

that “the important governmental interest” in public education meant the state “has the power to compel attendance at school” as a general matter.²⁶⁰ However, the court found that this power is not unconditional. Although “some level of education [] justifies whatever deprivation of liberty is caused by mandatory attendance,” the court nonetheless held that the state could not, consistent with due process, “forc[e] students to attend a ‘school’ in which they are simply warehoused and provided no education at all[.]”²⁶¹ Although the court upheld dismissal of this claim based on the deficiency of plaintiff’s pleading on this point,²⁶² it suggested that the applicable test was whether the deprivation of liberty bore a “reasonable relationship to the state’s asserted purpose.”²⁶³

Notably—and, in our view, correctly—the majority opinion in *Gary B.* rebuffed the dissent’s argument that, under *DeShaney* and its progeny, *Youngberg*’s reasoning did not apply in the public school context.²⁶⁴ *DeShaney* arose from a child’s suit against the state after child protective services returned the child to live with his abusive father—despite the state’s knowledge of the violence the child faced at home—after which the father inflicted extreme and debilitating injuries on the child.²⁶⁵ In *DeShaney*, the Court found the *Youngberg* analysis inapplicable because the child was not in the state’s custody at the time of the injury, and

²⁶⁰ *Id.*

²⁶¹ *Id.*

²⁶² The court found plaintiff’s “factual allegations are insufficient to assess the viability of this claim.” *Id.* Specifically, the court faulted the absence of allegations regarding “the duration or nature of the restraint faced in their schools, such as the hours per day of compulsory attendance, the number of days per year, or the restrictions on Plaintiffs’ liberty throughout the typical school day.” *Id.* at 642.

²⁶³ *Id.* at 641 (citing *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (applying the *Jackson* reasonable relation standard)).

²⁶⁴ *Id.* at 678 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).

²⁶⁵ *DeShaney*, 489 U.S. at 191–94.

because the father was “in no sense a state actor.”²⁶⁶ The Court noted that in limited circumstances, a “special relationship” may arise that generates affirmative duties to protect, but it found that the combination of knowledge of danger from private parties and the past steps taken to protect the child did not qualify.²⁶⁷

The dissent in *Gary B.* inaccurately characterized *Youngberg* as an “exception” to the *DeShaney* framework, rather than recognizing that it addressed a different issue. Judge Murphy’s dissent reasoned that courts have “consistently rejected the argument that *Youngberg*’s custody exception [to the rule that a state has no duty to provide services] covers children based on compulsory attendance laws.”²⁶⁸ But the cases the dissent cited in support of this proposition all concern a distinct issue: whether a public school had a duty to protect a student from harm *at the hands of a private actor*, which required finding a “special relationship” between the state and the student.²⁶⁹ The fact that courts have generally rejected such claims—finding that there is no special relationship between a public school and a student within the meaning of *DeShaney*²⁷⁰—

²⁶⁶ *Id.* at 201.

²⁶⁷ *Id.* at 197–98.

²⁶⁸ *Gary B.*, 957 F.3d at 678, citing *Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger County*, 819 F.3d 834, 854 (6th Cir. 2016); *Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ.*, 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995); and *Doe v. Claiborne County*, 103 F.3d 495, 510 (6th Cir. 1996).

²⁷⁰ Some Circuit Courts of Appeal have categorically dismissed such claims, apparently based on a misreading of *DeShaney*, by reasoning that *DeShaney* required total physical custody over a person to trigger affirmative duties. See, e.g., *D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch.*, 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[T]he school defendants’ authority over D.R. during the school day cannot be said to create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the special relationship noted in *DeShaney*[.]”). Others have made case-by-case determinations of whether a special relationship exists but have nonetheless uniformly reached the same result. *Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (“We decline to hold that compulsory attendance laws alone create a special relationship giving rise to a constitutionally rooted duty of school officials to protect students from private actors.”); *Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ.*, 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here was no special relationship between decedent and the school district that gave rise to a constitutional duty on the part of the Board to protect her from the consequences of a seizure while she was on the school bus[.]”);

says nothing about the liberty theory recognized in *Gary B.* (or that we advance in this section).²⁷¹ Regardless of whether the custodial control is as “strict” as that in *Youngberg*,²⁷² it is undisputed that there is *some* deprivation of liberty when children are compelled to attend public school.²⁷³ To withstand constitutional scrutiny, that justification cannot exist only in theory.²⁷⁴

As to the “fundamental right” aspect of plaintiffs’ due process claim, the Court held that access to “a basic minimum education—one that can plausibly impart literacy—. . . is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.”²⁷⁵ After detailing the history of education in the states and federal litigation regarding the quality and equality of its provision,²⁷⁶ the Court concluded that “literacy is foundational to our political process and society.”²⁷⁷ Emphasizing

see also Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994); *Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist.*, 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); *J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11*, 909 F.2d 267, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1990). Courts have evinced more openness to affirmative duties under *DeShaney* in the boarding-school context. *See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander*, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding a “special relationship” between residential student at boarding school for the deaf), *rev’d in reh’g en banc by Walton v. Alexander*, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A ‘special relationship’ arises between a person and the state only when this person is involuntarily confined against his will through the affirmative exercise of state power.”).

²⁷¹ Indeed, none of the cases cited by the dissent discuss *Youngberg*.

²⁷² *Gary B.*, 957 F.3d at 678 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[*Youngberg*] exception generally applies only for those individuals under strict state control.”).

²⁷³ *Id.* at 640 (“If the state required a group of people to sit in a building for several hours a day without any justification, such a restraint would clearly offend their right to liberty.”).

²⁷⁴ The majority also concluded that even if *DeShaney*’s framework applied, the allegations satisfied the “state-created danger” doctrine. *Id.* at 658–59 (“While the dissent argues against the right to a basic minimum education by comparing it to a constitutional right to food, a better analogy is a world in which the state took charge of the provision of food to the public . . . [and] then left the shelves on all the stores in one city bare, with no compelling governmental reason . . . , plac[ing] the residents of that city in heightened danger”).

²⁷⁵ *Id.* at 655.

²⁷⁶ *Id.* at 650 (citing Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, *The Federal Right to an Adequate Education*, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 127–32 (2013)).

²⁷⁷ *Id.* at 652.

functional considerations, the Court explained:

Effectively every interaction between a citizen and her government depends on literacy. Voting, taxes, the legal system, jury duty—all of these are predicated on the ability to read and comprehend written thoughts. . . .

Even things like road signs and other posted rules, backed by the force of law, are inaccessible without a basic level of literacy. . . .

Access to literacy also draws meaning from related rights, further indicating that it must be protected.²⁷⁸

In so reasoning, the court found that “access to literacy is itself fundamental because it is essential to the enjoyment of [] other fundamental rights,” drawing on both the equal protection and due process precedents.²⁷⁹ The court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations, if proven, “demonstrate . . . depriv[ation] of an education providing access to literacy.”²⁸⁰

Three weeks after the decision in *Gary B.*, and after four years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement.²⁸¹ The terms of that settlement include a commitment by the Governor, in the Governor’s “sole discretion,” to “diligently proposed and support legislation” that will provide the Detroit public schools with a least \$94.4 million for literacy-related programs; expressing agreement that the Detroit public schools will not be disqualified “from prequalifying and qualifying” for capital expenditure bonds; and the establishment of a Literacy Task Force and Educational Policy Committee with student, parent, teacher, and literacy expert-membership.

²⁷⁸ *Id.* at 653.

²⁷⁹ *Id.*

²⁸⁰ *Id.* at 661.

²⁸¹ TERMS FOR SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE BETWEEN ALL PLAINTIFFS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN IN GARY B., ET AL. V. WHITMER, ET AL. SETTLEMENT TERM SHEET (May 13, 2020), available at <http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1382.pdf>.

And, on the heels of that settlement, the Sixth Circuit sua sponte vacated the panel's decision.

C. The Anti-Caste Principle and the Scope of the State's Duty

The vacated decision in *Gary B.*, because it was decided on appeal from the district court's dismissal, did not have to grapple with remedial questions, and thus the court never had a chance to consider how to remedy the state's violation of the liberty-based education rights of Black, Brown, and poor children. In this section, we turn to some of the principles that must inform a court-ordered remedy when the state has violated the liberty-based right to quality public schooling we propose.

In our view, the nature of the remedy flows ineluctably from the nature of the harm. The confinement of the children in carceral schools subjects them to unsafe physical environments, criminal sanction as a mode of punitive discipline, and sub-standard education that blocks personal growth, social and economic advancement, and political participation. Moreover, the harms that flow from the violation of the children's liberty and equality go beyond the terms of their immediate confinement. Rather, by design and effect, carceral schools mark Black, Brown, and poor children as members of excluded classes whose life possibilities are narrowed and truncated. In short, public schools that violate the children's liberty right perpetuate and entrench caste. In the face of such a violation, at a minimum the remedy must release the children from the conditions of their confinement consistent with the mandatory nature and guaranteed provision of public schooling. In the context of compulsory education laws, the children's release must be to schools that ensure their equal liberty, and not to educational settings

that consign them to a lifetime of subordination. For the court to do less is to embrace the very caste system the Fourteenth Amendment bars.

Framing the liberty argument within the theory of abolition constitutionalism restores the anti-caste principle to its central role in the Reconstruction Amendments,²⁸² and as such, an anti-caste orientation informs the yet-to-be recognized federal right to education. The interdiction against racial (and class) caste is clear from the Congressional discussion of the amendment. Certainly, before the Civil War abolitionists understood slavery as a form of caste.²⁸³ At a minimum, as Senator William J. Purman argued in defense of the Fourteenth Amendment, the anti-caste principle holds that “[c]olor is no crime, and the sacrilegious hands that would make it

²⁸² See Horton, *supra* note 284, at ch. 1 *passim* (describing the anti-caste constitutionalism as it took root before and after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment). Prior to the Civil War, abolitionists characterized slavery as a form of caste. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, *On Liberty, Equality, and the Constitution: A Review of Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution*, 8 N.Y.U. J. OF LAW & LIBERTY 839, 894 (2014), quoting Representative Norton Townshend, a Democrat from Ohio:

I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic creed, and against any interpretation of Democracy as makes it the ally of slavery and oppression. Democracy and slavery are directly antagonistic. Democracy is opposed to caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special interest groups; slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by one class--to use another as brute beasts and take their labor without wages; Democracy is for elevating the laboring masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery grinds the laborer into the very dust. . . .” [S]lavery is but the extreme of class legislation [S]lavery is nothing more than the privilege some have of living out of others.

(citing Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 713 (1852)).

²⁸³ See Paul R. Dimond, *The Anti-Caste Principle—Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases*, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 12 (1983) (documenting that “both the statements of the author of the equal protection clause and the congressional debates leading to its submission to the states support an anti-caste interpretation”); see also Clark D. Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon, *Race, Class, Caste . . . ? Rethinking Affirmative Action*, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1297 (1999) (stating that “[t]he use of ‘caste’ in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has, of course, a long tradition, with origins in the Reconstruction Congressional debates on the amendment”); Scott Grinsel, “*The Prejudice of Caste*”: *The Misreading of Justice Harland and the Ascendancy of Anticlassification*, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317 (2010) (discussing caste in the amendment’s debates as a metaphor for anti-subordination, and not of colorblindness).

so . . . must be stayed[.]”²⁸⁴ Senator Charles Sumner, one of the leading proponents of the Reconstruction Amendments, repeatedly referred to the abolition of caste as their core mission.²⁸⁵ Indeed, he highlighted the public school as “the place to commence to break down caste.”²⁸⁶

The anti-caste principle goes beyond conventional equality doctrine, with its formalist emphasis on colorblindness. Rather, it aims to transform, as Cass R. Sunstein has explained, “a social status quo that, through historical and current practices, creates a second-class status.”²⁸⁷ Carceral schools build on a system that, to borrow from Kenneth Karst, in “both its purposes and its effects went well beyond the sum of its parts” in perpetuating and replicating the outcast

²⁸⁴ *Congressional Record*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (1874), 425, *quoted in* CAROL A. HORTON, RACE AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 24 (2005).

²⁸⁵ *See* Charles Sumner, The Question of Caste, in XVII Charles Sumner: His Complete Works 131-83 (Negro Universities Press 1969). *See also* *Adamson v. California*, 332 U.S. 46, 52 n.8 (1947) (quoting Sen. Sumner that the Fourteenth Amendment abolished “oligarchy, aristocracy, caste or monopoly with peculiar privileges and powers”); AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, *supra* note 99, at 232 (citing Charles Sumner’s statement, “The demon of caste must be destroyed”).

²⁸⁶ Hearings on Amnesty Bill (Civil Rights Amendment), 42nd Cong. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner, quoting letter received from Black man urging equality legislation), *quoted in* Bryan K. Fair, *The Anatomy of American Caste*, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 381, 391 (1999). Sumner further stated, in defense of integrated common school:

The common school is important to all; but to the colored child it is a necessity. Excluded from the common school, he finds himself too frequently without any substitute. Often there is no school. But even where a separate school is planted it is inferior in character. No matter what the temporary disposition, the separate school will not flourish as the common school. . . . White parents will take care not only that the common school is not neglected, but that its teachers and means of instruction are the best possible, and the colored child will have the benefit of this watchfulness. This decisive consideration completes the irresistible argument for the common school as the equal parent of all without distinction of color.

Hearings on Amnesty Bill to Remove Political Disabilities Imposed on Former Confederates by 14th Amendment (Civil Rights Amendment, 42nd Cong. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner), *quoted in* Fair, *id.*

²⁸⁷ Cass R. Sunstein, *The Anticaste Principle*, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2436 (1994).

status of Black, Brown, and poor children.²⁸⁸ The ban on caste treats as illicit the laws and structures that reinforce the children's arbitrary subordination, and focuses on systemic injustice, not on the single invidious law or isolated discriminatory action.²⁸⁹ As Isabel Wilkerson has put it, the anti-caste principle seeks to purge "the afterlife of pathogens" that continues to plague American society, even after they have been banished formally as a matter of law.²⁹⁰

In *Plyler v. Doe*, the Court affirmed the anti-caste principle as an aspect of equality doctrine, holding that the state of Texas violated this ban when it withheld public schooling from children on terms available to the rest of the community because of the immigrant status of the student's parents. The challenged law on its face did not bar immigrant children from the public schools; rather, it permitted localities to refuse to enroll the children or to enroll them but to charge tuition, and penalized districts that did accept such children by withholding state funding. The anti-caste principle rendered the law unconstitutional, notwithstanding the refusal of the *Plyler* Court to recognize education to be a fundamental right, or to treat immigrant children as members of a suspect class (so that the challenged law would have received strict scrutiny from the Court). Rather, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment made it impermissible for the

²⁸⁸ Kenneth L. Karst, *Why Equality Matters*, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 274 (1983). See also Paul R. Dimond and Gene Sperling, *Of Cultural Determinism and the Limits of Law*, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (stating that the caste approach reveals that "individual transactions" take place "in the context of larger markets and social spheres that have been shaped by a variety of factors that are subject to some influence, for good or ill, by public action and concerted private effort. Although causal connections are neither simple nor capable of precise delineation, there remains real concern that institutional bias and systemic discrimination have left enduring barriers that continue to obstruct the opportunities of members of historically victimized groups.").

²⁸⁹ See Daniel Kiel, *No Caste Here? Toward a Structural Critique of American Education*, 119 ST. L. REV. 611, 612 (2015) (explaining that "[a] caste system uses a network of laws, policies, customs, and institutions collectively operating to ensure that certain groups remain in a predetermined status within society").

²⁹⁰ ISABEL WILKERSON, *CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS* 3 (2020) (referring to the "afterlife of pathogens" as an aspect of caste).

state, by impeding the students' access to public schooling, to "impose a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status," and, by effect, to mark the children with a stigma that marred their ability to "live within the structure of our civil institutions."²⁹¹ Later, in a case challenging a school bus fee that impeded an indigent child's access to public school, the Court acknowledged the force of the anti-caste principle, but found that the bus fee did not threaten "to promote the creation and perpetuation of a sub-class of illiterates" and so the principle was not violated.²⁹² *Plyler*, however, remains potent support for the anti-caste principle. As Justin Driver has emphasized, "[p]roperly understood," the *Plyer* decision "rests among the most egalitarian, momentous, and efficacious constitutional opinions that the Supreme Court has issued throughout its entire history."²⁹³

The anti-caste principle as applied to educational inequality draws unlikely support from Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in *Zelman v. Simmon-Harris*, involving a voucher program that allowed for inner-city children to transfer from low-performing schools to any school, including parochial schools. Justice Thomas wrote:²⁹⁴

Frederick Douglass once said that "[e]ducation . . . means emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made free." Today many of our inner-city public schools deny emancipation to urban minority students. Despite this Court's observation nearly 50 years ago in *Brown v.*

²⁹¹ *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).

²⁹² *Kdrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools*, 487 U.S. 450 (1988). One of the authors was amicus curiae in this lawsuit before the Supreme Court. See *The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, Leading Cases, Access to Public Education*, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 208 (1987) ("Justice O'Connor essentially re-wrote *Plyler*, however, by focusing on Justice Powell's concurrence and the dissent in which she joined, rather than on the reasoning of the majority.").

²⁹³ JUSTIN DRIVER, *THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND* 316 (2018).

²⁹⁴ 536 U.S. 639, 682–83 (2002).

Board of Education . . . that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education,” urban children have been forced into a system that continually fails them.²⁹⁵

He continued:

The failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can arm minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of discrimination’s effects.²⁹⁶

Justice Thomas supported this common sense understanding of the relation between educational equality and life possibilities with data,²⁹⁷ discussing empirical studies that confirm the generally strong relationship between education and “socioeconomic attainment.”²⁹⁸

To these studies one can cite numerous others that confirm the importance of higher education for increasing life outcomes,²⁹⁹ especially for those from disadvantaged

²⁹⁵ *Id.* at 676.

²⁹⁶ *Id.* at 682–83.

²⁹⁷ *See id.* at 683 (stating that “a black high school dropout earns just over \$13,500, but with a high school degree the average income is almost \$21,000”).

²⁹⁸ David B. Bills, *Credentials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship between Schooling and Job Assignment*, 73 REV. EDUC. RES. 441, 441 (2003). *See* David Card, *Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econometric Problems* 69 ECONOMETRICA 1127 (2001) (reviewing a large body of academic research suggesting there is a strong causal relationship between increases in education and increases in earnings).

²⁹⁹ *See* Eric Grodsky & Julie Posselt, *Higher Education and the Labor Market*, in EDUCATION AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (Thurston Domina et al., eds., 2019) (“In addition to economic benefits, those who complete college experience a range of noneconomic benefits. Educational attainment is a critical social determinant of health, for example. Education in general, and college in particular, also contributes to the “diverging destinies” of American families, with patterns of marriage, marital timing and longevity, and fertility closely bound to college attendance and completion. College graduates are markedly less likely to be convicted of a crime or experience incarceration and are more likely to vote and show other evidence of civic engagement.”) (citations omitted); Nathan Grawe, *Education and Economic Mobility*, URBAN INSTITUTE (2008), available at <https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/31161/1001157-education-and-economic-mobility.pdf> (“In the last 50 years, the college-high school wage premium has nearly doubled from around 30 percent to just over 60 percent, reaching levels not seen since the turn of the twentieth

backgrounds.³⁰⁰ Recognizing the importance of higher education only further underscores the need to invest in K-12 education: completion of, and success in, high school often determines access to higher education.³⁰¹ For this reason alone, K-12 education is critical for increasing life outcomes of children in the United States. Moreover, studies show that quality primary and secondary education has the ability to increase mobility prospects for children by their own accord.³⁰² As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “every child deserves a shot at the American Dream—

century. Not only do college graduates earn much more than high school graduates, but much of the returns appear to be caused by the college experience. There is little doubt that post-secondary schooling aids absolute mobility.” (citations omitted); Omari Scott Simmons, *Class Dismissed: Rethinking Socio-Economic Status and Higher Education Attainment*, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 231, 260 (2014) (explaining how higher education not only contributes to individuals’ increased income but also contributes to “better personal, spousal and child health outcomes; children’s educational gains; greater longevity, and even happiness.”).

³⁰⁰ Michael Greenstone et al., *Thirteen Economic Facts about Social Mobility and the Role of Education*, HAMILTON PROJECT (June 2013), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_13EconFacts_FINAL.pdf (explaining that data shows “a college degree can be a ticket out of poverty” since “a low-income individual without a college degree will very likely remain in the lower part of the earnings distribution, whereas a low-income individual with a college degree could just as easily land in any income quintile—including the highest.”); Michael J. Petrilli, *Education is Still a Sturdy Path to Upward Mobility*, FLYPAPER (Oct. 13, 2017), available at <https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/commentary/education-still-sturdy-path-upward-mobility#> (“[T]he overwhelming research consensus still stands: Students who attain valuable postsecondary credential have a much better chance of making it into the middle class and beyond.”).

³⁰¹ Arguably, this extends to pre-kindergarten schooling as well, given that studies show children need access to quality pre-kindergarten programs to be learning ready when they enter kindergarten. See, e.g., Beth Meloy, Madelyn Gardner, and Linda Darling-Hammond, *Untangling the Evidence on Preschool Effectiveness: Insights for Policymakers*, LEARNING POLICY INSTITUTE (Jan. 2019), (discussing impact of preschool programs), available at https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/Untangling_Evidence_Preschool_Effectiveness_REPORT.pdf; see James E. Ryan, *A Constitutional Right to Preschool*, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 50 (2006) (discussing reports that show that “the first few years of life are crucial for cognitive development and that early experiences can influence the emerging architecture of the brain”).

³⁰² See Grawe, *supra* n. 2 at 1 (“A sizeable majority of studies suggest school quality improvements [at the K-12 level] raise earnings supporting absolute mobility. Moreover, many studies find the effects are greatest among children in low-income families, suggesting greater relative mobility as well (though on this point there is disagreement).”); Anjaleck Flowers, *The Implied Promise of a Guaranteed Education in the United States and How a Failure to Deliver it Equitably Perpetuates Generational Poverty*, 45 MITCHELL HAMLIN L. REV. 1, 83 (2019) (“One of the strongest tools for breaking

and the key to social mobility is a good education.”³⁰³ Provision of quality K-12 education, then, is a political imperative that needs immediate effectuation to secure the goals of the Reconstruction Amendments.³⁰⁴

IV. From Right to Remedy: An Abolitionist Approach to Public Schooling

In this Part we move from the justification for a federal right to education to defending and giving content to its realization. At the outset, we acknowledge the standard objections that federal courts lack institutional competence and democratic legitimacy to address constitutional claims involving “positive” rights such as that to public schooling. We argue that the anti-caste principle provides courts with a manageable standard for implementing a right to quality public schooling, and that such a standard bolsters democratic legitimacy by supporting, rather than suppressing, efforts at social mobilization by politically marginalized people. . We further argue that judicial reliance upon the anti-caste principle as a foundation for a federal education right comports with federalism, for it potentially can draw from state court decisions that already have defined a state constitutional education right in terms of human flourishing.

generational poverty and having a life of financial success is a quality education.”) (*citing* Brian A. Jacob and Jens Ludwig, *Improving Educational Outcomes for Poor Children*, 26 FOCUS 56 (2009), *available at* <https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc262j.pdf>). However, schooling today has had only a “modest contribution to variation in intergenerational income transmission.” *See* Jesse Rothstein, *Inequality of Educational Opportunity? Schools as Mediators of the Intergenerational Transmission of Income*, 37 J. LAB. ECON. S. 85, S122 (2019) (“Taken together, these factors indicate that the education system makes only a modest contribution to variation in intergenerational income transmission.”).

³⁰³ *Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par.*, 906 F.3d 327, 339 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., concurring).

³⁰⁴ Joy James, *Introduction, Democracy and Captivity*, in *THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS*, at xxii (Joy James ed., 2005) (“Emancipation is *given* by the dominant . . . Freedom is *taken* and created.”) (emphasis in original); *see also* BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, *supra* note 101, at 201 (describing steps needed to “implement[] emancipation mak[e] Negro freedom real.”).

A. Education Reform, Judicial Competence, and Democratic Legitimacy

Arguments against recognizing a federal education right often focus on the federal judiciary's presumed institutional incompetence and lack of democratic legitimacy when disputes involve rights that have a "positive" component requiring the government to provide goods or services.³⁰⁵ Both the institutional incompetence and illegitimacy arguments sound in separation of powers and federalism.³⁰⁶ We briefly survey this rich literature.

According to the standard account of the institutional objection, political branches (state and federal) have a comparative advantage in devising policy. They can better assess societal problems through institutional tools, such as investigations and committees, that allow for gathering facts and expertise.³⁰⁷ Moreover, legislation is said to avoid a "one size fits all" approach because it can fine-tune solutions with greater granularity.³⁰⁸ By contrast, the judiciary's lack of competence is said to flow from the institutional structure of courts and litigation, which are subject to procedural rules (such as those of evidence and party structure)³⁰⁹

³⁰⁵ See Scott R. Bauries, *Foreword: Rights, Remedies, and Rose*, 98 KY. L.J. 703, 708 (2009–2010) (explaining that "a positive right theoretically allows its order to compel government action").

³⁰⁶ See Helen Hershkoff, *Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review*, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157–69 (1999) (discussing these objections to federal court recognition and enforcement of positive rights).

³⁰⁷ See F. Andrew Hessick, *Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality*, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1447, 1472 (2010) (discussing presumption of legislative superiority in the field of policy making and rules of judicial deference and restraint that have developed in response).

³⁰⁸ See Jeremy Waldron, *The Dignity of Legislation*, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 663 (1995) (stating that "one of the values most commonly associated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy").

³⁰⁹ See Allegra M. McLeod, *Envisioning Abolition Democracy*, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1627 (2019) (observing that "litigation is limited by legal rules that are not necessarily designed to promote justice," including rules "exclud[ing] certain kinds of evidence," as well as more generally, the limits inherent in "resources and incentives of lawyers").

that purportedly impede the judiciary's ability to resolve disputes that have a polycentric structure (such as public schooling).³¹⁰ Moreover, because litigation depends on the professional expertise of lawyers, courts are said to be ill-suited to eliciting the voices of outsiders who lack "adjudicative equipage."³¹¹ Finally, permitting courts to constitutionalize complex social and economic problems is said to distort democracy, undermine public deliberation, and deflate autonomous decision making, generating backlash in the process that is politically self-defeating.³¹² As to legitimacy, the unelected judges that populate Article III courts are said to lack the democratic bona fides of directly elected officials who can be disciplined at the ballot box.³¹³ In addition, critics argue that court-centric approaches are counter-productive because constitutionalism tends to deflate political aspirations and sap energy from social movements,³¹⁴ and because courts cannot deliver the goods that they declare to be constitutionally required.³¹⁵

³¹⁰ See generally Lon L. Fuller, *The Forms and Limits of Adjudication*, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).

³¹¹ William Rubenstein, *The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure*, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865 (2002).

³¹² See Frank I. Michelman, *Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship*, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001) (discussing backlash to judicial recognition of social citizenship rights).

³¹³ See Carol Nackenoff, *Is There a Political Tilt to "Juristocracy"?*, 65 MD. L. REV. 139 (2006) (discussing conservative and liberal criticisms of unelected judiciaries). See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, *THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS* 16, 18 (1962) (discussing federal judicial review as "counter-majoritarian" and "deviant" in a democracy).

³¹⁴ See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, *The Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist Activism, 1966–1974*, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577, 579 (2010) (stating that critics of judicially cognizable rights "have called attention to the empty formality, false neutrality, and constrained scope of rights defined through litigation," and the fact that "attorneys' professional interests and class-based political agendas, as well as the rules of doctrinal argumentation, constrain rights claims made by lawyers arguing in the courts"); Scott L. Cummings, *The Social Movement Turn in Law*, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360 (2018).

³¹⁵ See Frank B. Cross, *The Error of Positive Rights*, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 893 (2001) (An empirical examination demonstrates that courts have not been very active in enforcing state constitutional positive rights and that the poor appear to be no better off in the presence of such rights").

Our response to these concerns is that of confession and avoidance: we concede a measure of incompetence and illegitimacy, and move on. No doubt courts have limited competence, but, as many have argued, the comparative advantage of the elected branches would seem—especially during these days of legislative and executive dysfunction—to rest on a Nirvana fallacy.³¹⁶ And comparative statements about democratic legitimacy often depend on formulaic platitudes, which omit any mention of race and class, rather than meaningful functional analysis. In the face of pressing concerns about democratic gaps and in Congress and state legislatures,³¹⁷ and about suppression and exclusion that enables electoral minorities to block the policy preferences of a majority of Americans,³¹⁸ it is hardly decisive to point to the lack of electoral pedigree of the Article III courts. As for positive rights claims having a unique decision making structure tending toward non-justiciability, the concern seems overstated and

³¹⁶ See Harold Demsetz, *Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint*, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969) (explaining the fallacy as a “choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement”). On the other hand, we recognize that heroic assumptions about judges, placing emphasis on their reliance on principle, rationality, and fairness, can verge on hyperbole. See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, *Interpretation and Institutions*, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (observing that “theorists frequently work with an idealized, even heroic picture of judicial capacities and, as a corollary, a jaundiced view of the capacities of other lawmakers and interpreters”).

³¹⁷ As the Sixth Circuit explained in the now-vacated Gary B. decision,

[I]t is unsurprising that our political process, one in which participation is effectively predicated on literacy, would fail to address a lack of access to education that is endemic to a discrete population. The affected group—students and families of students without access to literacy—is especially vulnerable and faces a built-in disadvantage at seeking political recourse.

³¹⁸ See, e.g., Fatema Ghasletwala, *Examining the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Sending Students to Prison Instead of School*, 32 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 19 (2018) (positing that “it would be illogical to expect a sensible, systemic remedy from the judiciary or legislators” for the school-to-prison pipeline that has developed in the wake of “lack of resources, race and socioeconomic status, and zero-tolerance policies, injunction with legislation and once-legal but now persisting structural discrimination”).

would, if taken seriously, require—as one commentator has stated—“locking up the courts” in almost all disputes “and flinging the keys into the sea.”³¹⁹

Above all, however, claims about competence and legitimacy ignore a consideration that abolition constitutionalism brings to the foreground: the historic and continuing role of race and class in the composition and function of the institutions of government.³²⁰ In the realm of education, the argument that opposes recognition of a federal education right is indifferent to the ways in which federal and state laws—statutes as well as judicial opinions—have combined to confine Black, Brown, and poor children in inferior public schools that are instruments of a carceral state. Rather than retreat from courts and law, however, we see them as a tool for challenging students’ confinement—a tool that can be used most effectively when an asserted legal right comports with a vision of substantive justice that meaningfully challenges students’ confinement and the nature of the right aligns with movement demands.³²¹ By approaching law instrumentally, the aspiration is to reorient judicial decision-making in a more humane direction. To borrow from Dorothy E. Roberts, lawyers can “help[] to articulate and present the demands of people subject to carceral punishment . . . —even when they anticipate failure.”³²²

³¹⁹ Shivprasad Swaminathan, *What the Centipede Knows: Polycentricity and “Theory” for Common Lawyers*, 40 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDS. 265 (2020) (quoting Jeff King, *Judging Social Rights* 189 (2012)).

³²⁰ See Juan F. Perea, *Echoes of Slaver II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts Democracy*, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2018) (discussing slavery protection and the Electoral College); Sanford Levinson, *Still Complacent After All These Years: Some Ruminations on the Continuing Need for a “New Political Science”*, 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 418 (2009) (“The Senate, along with slavery, was one of the two “great compromises” that enabled the proposal and ratification of the Constitution. No one would think of praising the values undergirding chattel slavery today; one wonders exactly why the Senate is any different.”).

³²¹ See *infra* notes 412–432 and accompanying text.

³²² See Roberts, *supra* note 8, at 113 & n.706 (discussing the role of the National Conference of Black Lawyers in the racial justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s).

B. The Anti-Caste Principle as a Manageable Standard

Consistent with the argument about institutional incompetence, a frequent objection to the recognition of a federal right to education is the purported lack of manageable standards to guide the court in its decisionmaking. Thus, Derek W. Black observes that the lack of judicially managed standards was the “death knell”³²³ of an equality-based right to public schooling in *San Antonio Independent School Board v. Rodriguez*.³²⁴ Abolition constitutionalism meets this objection by pointing to the ban on caste, at the core of *Brown v. Board of Education*,³²⁵ as a principle that is sufficiently definite to provide a manageable standard for federal courts to declare and enforce.³²⁶ As James E. Fleming has written,

[Chief Justice] Warren articulate[d] a powerful conception of the harm of segregation in terms of an anti-caste principle of equal protection: “To separate [black school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” Therefore, Warren conclude[d], “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”³²⁷

³²³ Derek W. Black, *The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education*, 70 STAN. L. REV. 730, 800 (2018).

³²⁴ 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also *Melvin H. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Syst.*, No. 1:08-CV-1435, 2008 WL 11342510 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (discussing purported lack of manageable standards in suit by children challenging the adequacy of education provided in Georgia “alternative” education programs for “students who are suspended from regular classrooms”).

³²⁵ Bryan K. Fair, *The Darker Face of Brown, the Promise and Reality of the Decision Remain Unreconciled*, 88 JUDICATURE 80, 82 (2004) (“*Brown* reaffirms Justice Harlan’s Anticaste declaration [in his dissenting opinion in *Plessy v. Ferguson*”]; Paul Dimond, *Anti-Caste Principle*, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 23 (1983) (“The school segregation cases eventually provided the most direct avenue for challenging the Court’s early decisions embracing caste.”).

³²⁶ See Donald D. Judges, *Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods*, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 702 (1992) (“Although a finding of caste-creating and cast-perpetuating conditions rests in part on qualitative judgments about a combination of factors, the standard of extreme dehumanization, powerlessness, and exclusion is nevertheless a manageable one for courts.”).

³²⁷ James E. Fleming, *Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy*, 52 ST. LOUIS U.L. J. 1141, 1142 (2008), citing *Brown v. Board of Educ.*, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 495 (1954).

No doubt the Court has moved away from this reading of *Brown*, substituting instead a version of equality that ignores the institutional and informal structures of racial subordination and blocks even voluntary efforts to end practices of racial containment.³²⁸ But as *Plyler* shows,³²⁹ the anti-caste principle remains an intact doctrine and provides a powerful potential basis for abolishing carceral schools.³³⁰

The anti-caste principle points to an education right that affords more than minimally sufficient public schooling, defined as one that provides the basic literacy presumed necessary for democratic participation. But before discussing its shortcomings, we must acknowledge that the minimally adequate education approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit carries an impressive philosophical pedigree.

Beginning in the 1960s, Frank Michelman developed a “minimum welfare” theory of equal protection. Michelman’s approach, which drew from the liberal philosophy of John Rawls,³³¹ responded to the problem of wealth deprivation, not racial discrimination. Under the

³²⁸ See, e.g., Cedric Merlin Powell, *Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism*, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 451, 477 (2014) (stating that “Justice Thomas and the Roberts Court would say that it is time to move on: the formal signs of the state caste system have been removed and there is nothing to remedy except our own obsession with securing artificial, race-based outcomes.”); Bryan K. Fair, *Been in the Storm Too Long, Without Redemption: What We Must Do Next*, 25 A.S.U. L. REV. 121 (1997) (“One reason we have lost so much ground is because the Court has returned to the definition of equality captured in *Plessy*, while, at several turns, explicitly undermining the anti-caste meaning of *Brown*. We cannot concede this interpretive ground; we need to define equality in a consistent, substantive way that aids traditionally disfavored persons in their efforts to eliminate their caste.”).

³²⁹ *Supra* notes 291–293 and accompanying text.

³³⁰ We underscore that even in the absence of manageable standards, declaring the education right would remain a viable judicial prospect given the “benefit to be achieved” in terms of children’s development and improved life changes. *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004).

³³¹ JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see Frank I. Michelman, *In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice*, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).

minimum welfare theory of equal protection, the Constitution required fulfillment of “just wants” that, in the aggregate, were said to constitute a justiciable “just minimum” entitlement that courts should safeguard for the poor.³³²

Yet even by Rawls’ own terms, it is not clear that U.S. society satisfies the criteria for application of his notion of justice. In later writings, Rawls acknowledged that his ideal theory of justice did not address “serious problems arising from existing discrimination and distinctions based on . . . race.”³³³ There is sharp disagreement about the relation of his theory of justice to various programs for and theories of racial justice.³³⁴ Even leaving aside those first-order

³³² Frank I. Michelman, *The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment*, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). Michelman’s account is the classic argument for heightened constitutional protections for poor persons against exclusionary majoritarian outcomes. Michelman explained that his theory reflected a moral intuition that the state should offer “minimum protection against economic hazard,” and openly acknowledged that the proposed remedy lay “more in provision than equalization.” *Id.* at 13. Economic hazard refers to instances where “persons have important needs or interests which they are prevented from satisfying” due to resource constraints. *Id.* at 35 (emphasis added). For an overview of the minimum core, see Katharine G. Young, *The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content*, 33 YALE. J. INT’L L. 113 (2008).

³³³ JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 66 (Erin Kelly, ed., 2001). See Charles W. Mills, *Retrieving Rawls for Racial Justice? A Critique of Tommie Shelby*, 1 CRIT. PHIL. OF RACE 1, 2 (2013) (discussing the “intellectual chasm between the worlds of the black American freed struggle for justice and the white American academic philosophical community’s discussions of justice” as “nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the centrality of racial justice as a theme to the former and its virtually complete absence from the latter”). Conversely, critical race scholars generally “have said very little about Rawls.” Sheila Foster, *Race and Ethnicity, Rawls, Race, and Reason*, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2004).

³³⁴ Some scholars have argued that racial antidiscrimination norms are compatible with his approach, at least in terms of compensatory and not restorative justice. Compare Tommie Shelby, *Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations*, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697 (2004) (offering a Rawlsian approach to achieving racial and arguing that the fair equality of opportunity principle could be adapted to “remove many of the socioeconomic burdens that racial minorities presently shoulder because of the history of racial injustice” and can “insure that their life prospects are not unfairly diminished by the economic inequalities that have been created by a history of racism.”), with Mills, *supra* note 333. others have claimed that a “Rawlsian constitution” would be incompatible with legislative affirmative action, but supportive of reparations as a component of racial justice. See Martin D. Carcieri, *Rawls and Reparations*, 15 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 267 (2010).

questions, however, Rawls acknowledged that his ideal theory could be applied only to a democratic society, and not “a caste, slave, or racist one.”³³⁵ In the non-ideal world, such as the one that exists in the United States today, welfare rights, as Goodwin Liu has urged, must instead be understood in the light of “the shared understandings of particular social goods,” taking into account democratic commitments as expressed in laws and regulatory programs.³³⁶ The anti-caste principle underscores that what constitutes “shared understandings” must include the views of those who have been excluded from the construction of that understanding; the shared understanding must acknowledge not only the value of education as a social good, but also the power and history of that social good as used by dominant groups to subordinate those who are and have been excluded from education’s purported benefits.³³⁷ Public schooling, from the time

³³⁵ Rawls, *supra* note 333, 21. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2010) (arguing that racial justice is a matter of non-ideal theory).

³³⁶ Goodwin Liu, *Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights*, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 203, 228 (2008). A part of Michelman’s defense of the minimum core concept was to render the concept of welfare rights justiciable, and that aim, as William Forbath has argued, led to his having too narrowly defined the core and to ignore that in the American tradition, welfare rights require “more than a decent minimum of food, shelter, and other material goods.” William E. Forbath, *Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction*, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1876 (2001); see also William E. Forbath, *Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969–Present*, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 622 (2004) (explaining that justiciability was the basis for Michelman’s seeking constitutional welfare rights in terms of an insurance right rather than as a broader right of social citizenship). In response, see Frank I. Michelman, *Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship*, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001) (questioning the conflation of justiciability and narrowness of conception, and predicting that the more expansive social citizenship right would be blocked by “democratic-based resistance”).

³³⁷ Conversely, when the Court has blocked efforts to promote educational equality, it has deployed, on occasion, instrumental denial of this history, which Naomi Murakawa calls “practiced fantasies of racial innocence.” Naomi Murakawa, *Racial Innocence: Law, Social Science, and the Unknowing of Racism in the US Carceral State*, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 473, 475 (2019) (“Racial innocence is the dominant US epistemology, a way of knowing fueled by the desire for unknowing. . . . Ignorance is no absence of knowledge; it is, rather, the cultivation of institutions, ideologies, and rhetorical mazes that unwitting racism[.]”) (*discussing Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle*, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)); see also GEORGE SHULMAN, AMERICAN PROPHECY: RACE AND REDEMPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 134 (2008) (defining racial innocence as “partly, a denial of the reality of others and a disclaiming of this refusal [to acknowledge]; and, partly, a denial of the past that constitutes our situated

of slavery, has been wielded as an instrument of racial and class containment, used to perpetuate subordination for invidious reasons of race and class. It is precisely this harm that the anti-caste principle of the Fourteenth Amendment takes aim, and suggests that the application of ideal theory as a basis for an education right would not be appropriate given history, tradition, and current circumstances.

We further recognize another argument that would support the minimally adequate education approach: that a judicial declaration of the education right should be narrow to account for judicial limitations in effectuation of the right. What this amounts to, in our view, is an important acknowledgement that the “gap” between judicial declaration and enforcement or implementation needs to be filled not by the courts alone, but rather by others—including mobilized communities pursuing the abolitionist project of dismantlement and transformation. Courts cannot and should not, unilaterally, assume the responsibility of effectuating the education right. However, as Gene Sperling has warned, “[t]o allow . . . remedial considerations to trim rights is to allow the depth of past wrongs and majoritarian hostility or unwillingness to bear remedial costs to be instrumental in narrowing present and future rights.”³³⁸

Indeed, experience suggests that defining a “positive” right—whether constitutional or statutory—in terms of a minimum core or as minimal sufficiency tends to exert downward hydraulic pressure on the further elaboration and construction of that right, at least when implementation involves important question about race and poverty.³³⁹ We provide two

particularity.”); James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time* (1963) (“It is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime.”).

³³⁸ Gene B. Sperling, *Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination*, 94 *YALE L.J.* 1741, 1742 (1987).

³³⁹ See David A. Super, *Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law*, 157 *U. PA. L. REV.* 541, 597 (2008).

examples, from the federal “food stamp” program and the statutory right to food assistance, and from the experience of the South African Constitutional Court enforcing a constitutional right to housing and medicine. Both, we submit, highlight the considerable dangers that can result from a court’s defining a positive right in the most minimal and narrow terms.

1. Minimal Sufficiency and the Provision of Food in the United States

The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to food assistance, even if an individual is destitute and starving for reasons out of that person’s control.³⁴⁰ However, over the years the federal government has developed programs to provide some food assistance to indigent persons.³⁴¹ Initially the federal government, like the states, limited assistance to the distribution of surplus food—bitterly memorialized in *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*.³⁴² During the 1960s, the United States shifted toward programs that use a market-based approach that boosts the purchasing power of participating households to buy groceries.³⁴³

Originally enacted as the Food Stamp Program, and later renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), this program embodies the minimum core approach. It provides targeted assistance to indigent households to enable them to purchase food in grocery

³⁴⁰ See Jesse Burgess, *Let Them Eat Cake: Constitutional Rights to Food*, 18 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 256 (2010).

³⁴¹ For an overview of these programs, see Hershkoff & Loffredo, *supra* note 154, at 243–327.

³⁴² MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, *THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOM X AS TOLD TO ALEX HALEY* 18 (1987) (“It seemed that everything to eat in our house was stamped Not To Be Sold. All Welfare food bore this stamp to keep the recipients from selling it. It’s a wonder we didn’t come to think of Not To Be Sold as a brand name.”).

³⁴³ For a history of the Food Stamp Program, see ARDITH L. MANEY, *STILL HUNGRY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: FOOD ASSISTANCE POLICY FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN* (1989); see also JANET POPPENDIECK, *BREADLINES KNEE-DEEP IN WHEAT: FOOD ASSISTANCE IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION* (1986).

stores. Rather than looking to Rawls or Michelman, SNAP draws from the Economy Food Plan developed by Mollie Orshansky while at the U.S. Department of Agriculture and later the Social Security Administration. Orshansky designed the Economy Food Plan based on food and other consumption data in the 1955 Household Consumption Survey, and viewed food consumption under the plan as a temporary and highly constrained expedient for “emergency use when funds are low,” and in households that could spend “a considerable amount of [time on] home preparation with little waste and . . . [had] skill in food shopping and preparation.”³⁴⁴ The current poverty threshold consists of three times the cost of the food plan.

Food assistance to the needy continues to adhere to the basic parameters of the minimal approach (set out in the Thrifty Food Plan). Yet the underlying basis of the Economy Food Plan has long been known to be out of date and to understate even subsistence needs.³⁴⁵ On the one hand, it is true that SNAP benefits reduce food insecurity for participating households,³⁴⁶ while also supporting the agricultural economy, improving neighborhoods, and lifting families out of poverty.³⁴⁷ But benefits average about \$1.40 per person per meal and, not surprisingly, monthly

³⁴⁴ See Kenneth Hanson, *Mollie Orshansky’s Strategy to Poverty Measurement as a Relationship Between Household Food Expenditures and Economy Food Plan*, 30 REV. OF AG. ECON. 572 (2008).

³⁴⁵ Rebecca M. Blank, *Testimony: Why the United States Needs an Improved Measure of Poverty*, BROOKINGS INST. (July 17, 2008), available at <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/why-the-united-states-needs-an-improved-measure-of-poverty/> (“While this methodology for calculating a poverty line was fine in 1963, and was based on the best data available, it is seriously flawed in 2008. There is no other economic statistic in use today that relies on 1955 data and methods developed in the early 1960s.”).

³⁴⁶ Caroline Radcliffe, Signe-Mary McKernan, and Sisi Zhang, *How Much Does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Reduce Food Insecurity?*, 93(4) AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1082 (2011).

³⁴⁷ See U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *Economic Linkages: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Linkages with the General Economy* (2019), available at <https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap/economic-linkages/>.

benefits are known to run out within the first week of receipt given the actual cost of food.

Reports indicate that these food shortages have serious negative effects on children who are more likely to face school discipline and earn lower test scores during the later parts of a SNAP monthly cycle.³⁴⁸

Over the years, some legislators have sought to increase food assistance benefits by replacing the Thrifty Food Plan as the basis for SNAP benefits.³⁴⁹ Notwithstanding SNAP's well-known benefits, legislators instead have diminished, rather than expanded, the program by reducing eligibility. This diminution has largely been accomplished by extending coercive work requirements already built into SNAP, which has been shown to have disparate effects by race.³⁵⁰ In particular, although white households make up the majority of SNAP recipients,³⁵¹ negative stereotypes of Black people, and especially of Black males, have had some implicit effect on the policy discussion.³⁵² President Reagan's first Inaugural Address, attacking the legitimacy of the

³⁴⁸ See Steven Carlson, More Adequate SNAP Benefits Would Help Millions of Participants Afford Food, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (July 30, 2019), available at <https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-adequate-snap-benefits-would-help-millions-of-participants-better>.

³⁴⁹ Such efforts include the Food Security Improvement Act or the Closing the Meal Gap Act. For a summary of legislative developments, see Food Research & Action Center, *SNAP/Farm Bill*, available at <https://frac.org/action/snap-farm-bill>.

³⁵⁰ See, e.g., Erin Brantley, *Association of Work Requirements with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation by Race/Ethnicity and Disability Status, 2013-2017*, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (June 26, 2020), available at <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2767673>.

³⁵¹ See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *SNAP Helps Millions of African Americans* (Feb. 26, 2018), available at <https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-2-17fa4.pdf> (finding Black people made up 26% of SNAP participants in 2016 based on available data).

³⁵² See P.R. Lockhart, *Republicans Say Race Isn't a Factor in the Food Stamp Debate. Research Suggests Otherwise.*, VOX (June 13, 2018), available at <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/13/17460362/race-food-stamps-snap-farm-bill-2018-republicans-welfare> (reporting the statement of Rep. David Scott (D-GA), who is Black, that 'The image of able-bodied men not working are African-American men in the minds—not in everybody's minds, but there are unfortunately people out there who have this mental disposition'"); Martha R. Mahoney, *Segregation, Whiteness, and*

Food Stamp Program, relied on racist tropes, referring to a “‘strapping young buck’ [who] bought T-bone steaks with food stamps.”³⁵³

To be sure, funding for food assistance has expanded significantly over the years: In 2018, the United States spent \$68 billion on SNAP and additional food benefits such as free and reduced-price breakfast, lunch, and snack programs for school-age children, assisting 40 million low-income people.³⁵⁴ These programs bring unquestionable nutritional, social, and health benefits to participants, but the amount of assistance continues to be pitched at what is needed on a temporary, emergency basis, and does not meet nutritional need. Program rules also share an unfortunate relationship with the carceral state (as, for example the SNAP program’s onerous exclusions of persons who have had contact with the criminal law system³⁵⁵). Moreover, in indirect ways, the programs bolster the system of racial capitalism, acting as a subsidy to service and other low-wage industries that resist increasing hourly rates of pay for workers whose poverty wages are supplemented by the government.³⁵⁶ The programs have lifted some recipients

Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1683 (1995) (“Programs like public housing, Medicaid, welfare, and food stamps have become publicly “raced” and endowed with a racial character (marked as nonwhite) in white perception and in much political discourse despite the fact that whites are at least a plurality of the beneficiaries.”).

³⁵³ LeLand Ware and David C. Wilson, *Jim Crow on the “Down Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential Campaigns*, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 311 (2009) (noting that while “[r]ace was not mentioned, but the connotation was clear”—Reagan referred to an “able-bodied African American who was taking advantage of the system.”).

³⁵⁴ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)*, available at <https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/policy-basics-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap>.

³⁵⁵ Hershkoff & Loffredo, *supra* note 154, at 254 (discussing rules governing disqualification for SNAP assistance because of certain criminal convictions).

³⁵⁶ See Candace Kovack-Fleischer, *Food Stamps, Unjust Enrichment, and Minimum Wage*, 35 LAW & INEQ. 1, 21 (2017) (“The retailers’ profitability is therefore in part a result of the government subsidies the retailers receive through food stamp payments to their employees, a program designed to help the poor.”).

out of poverty, but the legislature’s minimum core approach has not catalyzed or transformed into a more humane food policy.³⁵⁷ Instead, SNAP benefits come at a significant price to recipients, who by program design are under constant suspicion of fraud, expected to comply with coercive and complicated regulations, and made to feel stigmatized and devalued, even as they continue to suffer from food insecurity.³⁵⁸ Today, more than 37 million people in the United States are food insecure.³⁵⁹

2. Minimal Sufficiency and the Provision of Housing

The South African Constitutional Court, influenced by developments in the international human rights regime, famously experimented with judicial enforcement of a positive right to a subsistence floor. Shortly before South Africa drafted its post-Apartheid Constitution, the United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights became the first international body to recognize a minimum core by articulating a state duty to provide “minimum essential levels” of food, health care, shelter, and housing.³⁶⁰ The Committee’s notion of minimum essential levels was a true “subsistence floor”—what Samuel Moyn described as “a minimum within a

³⁵⁷ *But see* Edward Rubin, *The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights*, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1708 (2012) (suggesting that because the federal government has enacted food assistance program, recognizing that it is “unacceptable” to allow “citizens to starve,” then the “courts can recognize” a right to subsistence “without creating administrative difficulties”).

³⁵⁸ *See* Tianna Gaines-Turner, Joanna Cruz Simmons, and Mariana Chilton, *Recommendations from SNAP Participations to Improve Wages and End Stigma*, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 2019), available at <https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/epub/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305362>.

³⁵⁹ *America at Hunger’s Edge*, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 2, 2020), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/02/magazine/food-insecurity-hunger-us.html> (“In the pandemic economy, nearly one in eight households doesn’t have enough to eat.”).

³⁶⁰ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations under art. 2(1)*, E/1991/23, ¶ 10 (14 December 1990); *see also Acevedo Buendia et al v. Peru*, Series C No. 198, ¶ 102, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1 July 2009) (embracing this standard).

minimum.”³⁶¹ In other words, although the right to housing or food might sweep more broadly—and take longer to fulfill—than the “minimum core,” States bore “obligations which are of immediate effect” to provide goods or services sufficient to satisfy that core.³⁶² In a notable departure from the norm for human rights advisory bodies, the Committee called for judicial enforcement of an immediate right to a minimum core.³⁶³

South Africa’s post-Apartheid Constitutional Court partially took up the call.³⁶⁴ In the leading case known as *Grootboom*, the Court recognized, in principle, that a minimum core right to housing may eventually be identified, but declined to define the content of the right or hold that the government had failed to fulfill it.³⁶⁵ Still, it found that the government had failed to make “reasonable” accommodations for “categories of people in desperate need.”³⁶⁶ On this basis, the Court struck down a housing development program but left open for political decision-

³⁶¹ SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 200 (2018) [hereafter NOT ENOUGH].

³⁶² General Comment 3, *supra* note 360, at ¶ 1.

³⁶³ *Id.* at ¶ 5.

³⁶⁴ This section focuses on South Africa as an illustrative example because South Africa’s experience with enforcement minimum levels of social protection through constitutional litigation is perhaps the “most famous” example—and in any event, it is one that Michelman and other U.S. proponents of social minimum protections looked for inspiration. NOT ENOUGH, *supra* note 361, at 199–200. Other countries that have developed variations on the minimum core concept include. *See, e.g.*, Ingrid Leijten, *The German Right to an Existenzminimum, Human Dignity, and the Possibility of Minimum Core Socioeconomic Rights Protection*, 16 GERMAN L.J. 23 (2015) (Germany); Nicholas Wasonga Orago, *The Place of the “Minimum Core Approach” in the Realisation of the Entrenched Socio-Economic Rights in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution*, 59 J. AFR. L. 237, 245 (2015) (Kenya).

³⁶⁵ *Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom*, 2001 (1) SA 46, ¶¶ 29–33 (CC) (S. Afr.). The court found it did not have sufficient information to determine what the content of the right would be—in part because the Government had so far made “no provision . . . for relief.” *Id.* ¶ 69.

³⁶⁶ *Id.*

making precisely what level of provision would be “reasonable.”³⁶⁷ Since *Grootboom*, the concept of safeguarding “basic necessities” or “minimum levels” of public provision has featured prominently in the Constitutional Court’s case law.³⁶⁸

The promise and limits of the Constitutional Court’s approach is well illustrated by the case of *Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)* and its legacy in South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence.³⁶⁹ *TAC* concerned the government’s failure to provide anti-retroviral (ARV) medication to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV amidst one of the worst HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world.³⁷⁰ As told by one of TAC’s founders, the campaign for a program to stop mother-to-child transmission “galvanize[d] a social movement that was made up of people who were predominantly poor, black, and living with HIV” to “mobilize around material needs, rather than general and abstract complaints of inequality.”³⁷¹ The combined mobilization and litigation strategy paid off. The Constitutional Court found that the Government “fail[ed] to address the needs of mothers and their newborn children who do not have access” to the limited sites where the ARV medication was available and ordered the Government make the drug widely in the

³⁶⁷ *Id.* at ¶ 99. For a broader discussion of the South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, see Karin Lehmann, *In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core*, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 163, 165 (2006).

³⁶⁸ Formally, the court has refused to define the content of a minimum core in any given area, but regularly makes reference to a requirement to provide a minimum level of necessities. See, e.g., *Khosa v. Minister of Social Development*, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) ¶ 52 (S. Afr.) (“A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are accessible to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are foundational.”).

³⁶⁹ *Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)*, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).

³⁷⁰ Mark Heywood, *South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health*, 1(1) J. Hum. Rts. Practice 14, 19–20 (2009) [hereafter *Law and Social Mobilization*].

³⁷¹ *Id.* at 20.

public health system, invoking the notion of entitlement to a “basic level” of healthcare provision.³⁷²

Despite hopes that the case and strategy could herald a broader redistributive turn in constitutional law and politics, *TAC* represented the high-water mark, rather than a catalyzing starting point, for securing socio-economic rights under South Africa’s Constitution. Seven years after the court victory, *TAC*’s founders continued to insist on an understanding of the case and surrounding developments as fundamentally “redistributive,” arguing that it could serve as a “model” for campaigns in education, housing, and other areas.³⁷³ Today, however, even the greatest proponents of the *TAC* “model” of popular mobilization around a minimum constitutional entitlement admit that the social and political formations they relied on are “almost completely powerless” in the face of today’s “inequalities.”³⁷⁴ The Constitutional Court’s experiment with socio-economic rights enforcement ultimately proved better tailored to “includ[ing] groups into the social and economic status quo” who were previously entirely

³⁷² *TAC, supra*, at ¶ 28 (“No one should be condemned to a life below the basic level of dignified human existence. The very notion of individual rights presupposes that anyone in that position should be able to obtain relief from a court.”). Although the court eschewed formal reliance on the “minimum core” concept, the reasoning effectively recognized a floor of provision that was required, given certain conditions. *See generally* Mark Heywood, *Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health*, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 278 (2003).

³⁷³ *Law and Social Mobilization, supra* note 370, at 23–30.

³⁷⁴ Mark Heywood, *The Transformative Power of Civil Society in South Africa: An Activist’s Perspective on Innovative Forms of Organizing and Rights-Based Practices*, 17:2 GLOBALIZATIONS 294, 297 (2020). Heywood blames the left for “ignor[ing]” the “potential” of their approach. *Id.* at 296. Developments have supported the more conservative initial assessments of the South African cases. *See, e.g.*, CASS SUNSTEIN, *DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO* 234 (2002) (“What the South African Constitutional Court has basically done is to adopt an administrative law model of socioeconomic rights.”).

excluded, rather than “fundamentally disrupt[ing] or transform[ing] that status quo.”³⁷⁵

The South African experience with enforcement of “minimum core” raises concerns about the incompatibility of such an approach with the emancipatory aspirations of abolition constitutionalism. The court’s focus on basic necessities is indicative of a modest agenda inconsistent with the pursuit of systemic changes that implicate redistributive questions and, as Katharine Young has warned, “misses the important connections between dignity and human flourishing.”³⁷⁶ In fact, the approach may justify institutional arrangements that further subordinate, leading, in the words of South African political activist Jeremy Cronin, to a “two-faced developmental state,” in which:

[o]n the one hand, a “first world” state, with relatively well-resourced departments and state-owned enterprises whose principal mission is to remove market constraints[and] lower[] the cost of doing business (for business). On the other hand, a “caring” but woefully under-resourced and overwhelmed “third world” state, focused on delivery to the poor.³⁷⁷

Further, insofar as inequality is “heightened by—or indeed constituted by—waiting,” the very minimalism of the core itself entrenches inequality.³⁷⁸ Under the mainstream international human rights interpretation of the minimum core, “the obligations left out of the ‘core’ are those

³⁷⁵ Catherine Albertyn, *Contested Substantive Equality in the South African Constitution: Beyond Social Inclusion Towards Systemic Justice*, S. AFR. J. HUM RTS 441, 459 (2018).

³⁷⁶ Katharine G. Young, *The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content*, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 130–31 (2008).

³⁷⁷ Jeremy Cronin, *The Dangers of Two-Faced Development*, GLOBE & MAIL (June 1, 2007), available at <https://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-01-the-dangers-of-twofaced-development/>.

³⁷⁸ Katherine G. Young, *Waiting for Rights: Progressive Realization and Lost Time*, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 654, 666 (Katherine G. Young, ed., 2019). The tragic consequences of waiting are illustrated by the afterlife of the *Grootboom* case itself. Despite her victory in court, Irene Grootboom was still homeless and impoverished when she died eight years after the Constitutional Court’s decision.

with lesser priority.”³⁷⁹ Although it is widely recognized that securing social and economic rights requires mobilization from organizers,³⁸⁰ the minimalism of the core has historically exerted a demobilizing effect on transformative movements.³⁸¹ Nor is this critique of the core approach simply a critique of judicialization: as with the United States’ experience with food assistance, even when basic minima are secured through politics—such as with the African National Congress’s heralded campaign pledge to provide Johannesburg residents with a “free basic amount of water” and other utilities—the results have been disappointing.³⁸² In South Africa and elsewhere, provision for a “social minima” has “proven compatible with the expansion rather than the reduction of material inequality.”³⁸³

C. The Anti-Caste Principle and Federalism

³⁷⁹ *Id.* at 667; see also Theunis Roux, *Understanding Grootboom-A Response to Cass R. Sunstein*, 12 CONST. F. 41, 46–47 (2002) (suggesting a priority-setting approach for determining “the temporal order in which government chooses to meet competing social needs,” guided by the minimum core concept articulated by the Committee); John Tasioulas, *Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now*, World Bank Research Paper (Oct. 2017).

³⁸⁰ Angelina Fisher, “*Minimum Core*” and the “*Right to Education*”, World Bank Research Paper 33 (Oct. 2017) (“[C]itizen demand is critical to the successful the outcome. Even where a human right is unequivocally recognized and implemented at a national level, the downward implementation of such policies often fails where citizens are not aware of and are not empowered to demand what is due to them.”) (emphasis in original).

³⁸¹ Patrick Bond, *Constitutionalism as a Barrier to the Resolution of Widespread Community Rebellions in South Africa*, 41:3 POLITIKON 461, 463, 472–73 (2014) (listing examples of activists associated with major constitutional litigation campaigns in South Africa) [hereafter *Constitutionalism as a Barrier*].

³⁸² *Id.* at 473–74 (explaining that “for many poor people there was no meaningful difference to their average monthly bills even after the first free 6000 litres” because of compensating price increases in the second “block”). Conversely, social movements have in some cases successfully used litigation on issues related to housing and settlements. See *Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA et al. v. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others* (1874/08) [2009] ZAKZHC 1 (striking down a 2007 law in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which made it easier for authorities to evict informal settlement dwellers). Our critique targets the cramped moral vision of the core, not the strategy of litigation.

³⁸³ NOT ENOUGH, *supra* note 361, at 66.

Our emphasis on a federal education right as a right to quality education also draws support from federalism. This argument may seem surprising. Conventionally, federalism is raised as a barrier to recognizing even a basic federal right to education, on the theory that states and localities ought to have autonomy in the ways in which they provide public schooling.³⁸⁴ Additional normative justification for self-governance at the local level stems from the view that there should be political space for states to function as “laboratories of experimentation.”³⁸⁵ However, this argument looks at federalism from only one end of the telescope. It does not ask, and so leaves unanswered, how state and local experimentation in turn might affect federal constitutional interpretation.

Students of federalism have begun to examine and, in some contexts, to see the value of having the Supreme Court look to, and learn from, state constitutional law in its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, for example, Joseph Blocher asks, “If states have a constitutionally guaranteed role as laboratories for constitutional innovation, why does the Court discard the lab results?”³⁸⁶ In areas in which the federal and state constitutions overlap—for example, in criminal procedure—the Court already has undertaken what Blocher calls “reverse

³⁸⁴ Jennifer Hochschild & Nathan Scovronick, *The American Dream and the Public Schools* 5 (2003) (“Americans want neighborhood schools, decentralized decision making, and democratic control. . . . They simply will not permit distant politicians or experts in a centralized civil service to make educational decisions.”);

³⁸⁵ See *Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. at 50 (“Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.’ No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.”) (internal citation omitted).

³⁸⁶ Joseph Blocher, *Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law*, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 326 (2011).

incorporation.”³⁸⁷ In these areas, evidence of local practice has provided the federal system with important information pertinent to constitutional interpretation.³⁸⁸ Similarly, the First Amendment is a doctrinal space in which the Court routinely looks to “community values” in determining the appropriate meaning of the expressive right,³⁸⁹ and state definitions of property and liberty likewise inform the federal conception of due process.³⁹⁰

Notwithstanding that these pockets of reverse incorporation appear in fields where the federal and state constitutional provisions overlap, two features make public schooling a plausible candidate for reverse incorporation of this type. As the conventional arguments against recognizing a federal right—lack of competence and democratic legitimacy—make clear, it is a field in which the Court has exercised restraint out of deference to expertise and federalism.³⁹¹ In the half century since the Supreme Court’s decision in *Rodriguez*, state courts have been active players in federalist experiments, and they have developed robust principles regarding a right to education. Indeed, state courts have advanced a conception of a public schooling right—as the discussion of the *Rose* and *Hunt* litigations made clear³⁹²—that goes far beyond a right to mere literacy. The approach taken in this line of cases has obvious resonance with Amartya Sen’s and

³⁸⁷ *Id.* at 372 (discussing the Court’s reliance on state judicial practice in the area of criminal procedure in shaping the content of Fourth Amendment rights).

³⁸⁸ See Brandon L. Garrett, *Local Evidence in Constitutional Interpretation*, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 860 (2019) (justifying “robust use of local evidence” to “define” the federal constitutional right).

³⁸⁹ See generally Robert C. Post, *Community and the First Amendment*, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1997).

³⁹⁰ See generally Martha I. Morgan, *Fundamental State Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal Protection Review*, 17 GA. L. REV. 77 (1982).

³⁹¹ See Blocher, *supra* note 386, at 375 (stating that “criminal procedure is one of those areas in which the underlying values of reverse incorporation—respect for federalism and state expertise, for example—are particularly salient”).

³⁹² See *supra* notes 50–65 and accompanying text.

Martha Nussbaum's theory of capabilities, which forges a link between material welfare and human liberty.³⁹³ Under Sen's approach, capabilities are "substantive freedoms" that enable the achievement of "functionings," which are "beings and doings" essential to human flourishing (such as being educated, being fed and housed, voting, working, etc.).³⁹⁴ Education has been at the "heart" of the "capabilities approach" since its inception.³⁹⁵ The approach taken by state courts in the *Rose* line of cases is consistent with capabilities theorists who favor ensuring that every person an opportunity to flourish in society—an aspiration that goes to the core of the anti-caste principle.³⁹⁶

Establishing a federal right to a quality education would build upon these state experiments, whereas pitching the right at too low a level of sufficiency would suppress their results. Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, in his discussion of state school funding challenges, argued that the failure of a federal constitutional right in *Rodriguez* created political and legal pressure in the states to step into the gap.³⁹⁷ He asked whether these reform movements, developed by state

³⁹³ Amartya Sen, *Justice: Means Versus Freedoms*, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 111, 118 (1990) ("Capability reflects a person's freedom to choose between alternative lives"); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78–80 (2000) (listing ten capabilities that all democracies should promote because of their necessity to human flourishing: "(1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; (10) control over one's environment").

³⁹⁴ See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18, 70–86 (1999); Amartya Sen, *Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984*, 82 J. PHIL. 169, 201-03 (1985).

³⁹⁵ MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 152 (2011); see also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 44 (1992) (listing education as one of "a relatively small number of centrally important" beings and doings).

³⁹⁶ Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, *Children's Rights and a Capabilities Approach: The Question of Special Priority*, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 554 (2012) ("[Capabilities approach] is generally committed to the equal protection of rights for all up to a certain minimum threshold.").

³⁹⁷ See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018). The idea of states "stepping into the breach" draws from Justice

legislatures and ordered by state supreme courts, would have happened had the *Rodriguez* Court announced a right to education. Emphasizing that the definition of such a right would have been “diluted” by the Court’s sense of “institutional constraints,” Judge Sutton referred to a “federalism discount to [the Court’s] articulation of the constitutional right and remedy.”³⁹⁸ Given this pattern of state court decision-making, federalism now should provide a bonus to the federal definition of an education right, just as state court decisions boosted the Court’s recognition of a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in light of state practice.³⁹⁹ The capabilities-oriented education rights recognized under state constitutions highlight that to be adequate, the education afforded to Black, Brown, and poor students—as to all students—must ensure an equal chance at achieving the capacities essential to human flourishing and to eliminate caste.

D. The Liberty-Based Right to Quality Education and the Broader Abolitionist Project

In this section, we continue with the theme of implementation, with an eye towards efforts at social mobilization. We do not presume to put forward anything approaching a comprehensive plan for the abolition we propose. For too long Black, Brown, and poor young people and their families have been locked out of political decisions affecting their futures. We recognize that any abolitionist project must move forward in a manner that promotes, rather than

Brennan’s germinal article, William J. Brennan, Jr., *State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights*, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).

³⁹⁸ Sutton, *supra* note 397, at 214. See Goodwin Liu, *State Courts and Constitutional Structure*, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1314 (2019) (discussing this feature of Judge Sutton’s argument).

³⁹⁹ See Blocher, *supra* note 386, at 374 (discussing case law).

undermines, self-determination.⁴⁰⁰ However, a brief survey of salient features of abolitionist organizing, and of organizing against carceralism in schools, reveals significant alignments between the demands of popular movements and potential advocacy for the federal right we describe.⁴⁰¹ Indeed, a conception of freedom aligned with our notion of liberty has long been central to the Black feminist tradition⁴⁰²—a tradition that is a core ideological influence on the contemporary abolitionist movement.⁴⁰³ We thus turn to a discussion of the role of rights and litigation in this abolitionist project, and in so doing, touch on principles that might inform constitutional meaning and guide legislative actions.

In recent decades, the literature on courts and social change has shown renewed interest in the role of social movements in the process of spurring legal and political transformations.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰⁰ Marbre Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, *Transformative Reforms, Abolitionists Demands*, STANFORD J. C.R.-C.L. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author) [hereafter *Abolitionist Demands*] (listing as one of the “elements for transformative reforms that advance an abolitionist horizon” that “the reform builds and shifts power into the hands of those directly impacted, who are often Black, brown, working class, and poor”).

⁴⁰¹ For an argument for the importance of such alignment, see Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar, and Jocelyn Simonson, *Movement Visions for a Renewed Left Legalism*, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (May 3, 2019), available at <https://lpeproject.org/blog/movement-visions-for-a-renewed-left-legalism/> (“[W]e believe a left political agenda must be grounded in solidarities with social movement and left organizations, largely outside of formal legal and elite academic spaces.”).

⁴⁰² BELL HOOKS, *AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM* 117 (1981) (defining freedom as “positive social equality that grants all humans the opportunity to shape their destinies in the most healthy and communally productive way.”). For an application to education, see BELL HOOKS, *TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM* 4 (1994) (describing the difference between “the difference between education as the practice of freedom and education that merely strives to reinforce domination.”).

⁴⁰³ Center for the Study of Race, Politics, and Culture, *Angela Y. Davis at the University of Chicago—Feminism and Abolition: Theories and Practices for the Twenty-First Century*, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2013), <https://youtu.be/IKb99K3AEaA> (describing the emergence of radical women of color feminism and its relationship to abolitionist organizing); see also ANGELA DAVIS, GINA DENT, BETH RICHIE, AND ERICA MEINERS, *ABOLITION. FEMINISM. NOW.* (forthcoming 2021).

⁴⁰⁴ Jocelyn Simonson, *The Place of "The People" in Criminal Procedure*, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289 (2019) (“[P]opular participation need not be mediated through representatives, but can and should also spring up through direct forms of participation and contestation.”); Amna A. Akbar, *Law's Exposure:*

Scholars have shed light on the relationship between movements and legal change with concepts such as “demosprudence,”⁴⁰⁵ “popular constitutionalism,”⁴⁰⁶ and “community constitutionalism.”⁴⁰⁷ Demosprudence, for instance, describes a mechanism through which groups that traditionally have been contained as legal and political outsiders take actions that disrupt—and ultimately transform—constitutional meaning.⁴⁰⁸ The demosprudential process is one in which “mobilized constituencies . . . challenge basic constitutive understandings of justice in our democracy,”⁴⁰⁹ and in so doing, spur jurisprudential developments.⁴¹⁰

The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (2015); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, *From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s Agenda*, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, *COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT* (2011); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, Eds., 2006); JENNIFER GORDON, *SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS* (2005); MICHAEL KLARMAN, *FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY* (2004); CATHERINE ALBISTON, *The Dark Side Of Litigation As A Social Movement Strategy*, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61 (2011); Sameer Ashar, *Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements*, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879 (2007); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, *Principles, Practices, and Social Movements*, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, *How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure*, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Reva B. Siegel, *Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA*, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (2006) (“ERA debate guided the Court. . .”); Kenneth W. Mack, *Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown*, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); William N. Eskridge, *Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century*, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).

⁴⁰⁵ Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, *Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements*, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014); *see also* Lani Guinier, *Demosprudence Through Dissent*, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–16 (2008) (conceptualizing demosprudence as “legal practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the people,” which are “democracy-enhancing”).

⁴⁰⁶ *See generally* LARRY D. KRAMER, *THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW* (2004).

⁴⁰⁷ Yxta Maya Murray, *The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights*, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 141 (2018) (documenting “a community constitutionalism . . . based on alterative perceptions of property rights expressed by on-the-ground protesters”).

⁴⁰⁸ Guinier & Torres, *supra* note 405, at 2749–58.

⁴⁰⁹ *Id.* at 2760.

⁴¹⁰ *Id.*

Without suggesting that the call to recognize a liberty-based right to quality education emerges directly from “mobilized constituencies,” we note that our proposal aligns closely with the abolitionist project as conceived by some of its leading movement proponents.⁴¹¹ Materially, the remedy for violations of this federal right would necessarily track the prominent movement demand of “invest-divest,”⁴¹² which calls for divestment from policing in all forms, and investment in life-affirming resources necessary to thrive.⁴¹³ In the education context, the Movement 4 Black Lives (M4BL), an umbrella group of over 150 self-identified abolitionist organizations,⁴¹⁴ envisions a federal constitutional amendment establishing a right to

⁴¹¹ For other existing recommendations in the literature, *see, e.g.*, Deborah Fowler, Madison Sloan, & Dr. Ellen Stone, *Making the Case for a School and Neighborhood Desegregation Approach to Deconstructing the School-to-Prison Pipeline*, 42 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 723 (2020) (recognizing the relation between school segregation and the school-to-prison pipeline); David M. Fox, *Breaking the Geographic Barrier Removing Residency Requirements from California Public School Enrollment*, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 297 (2019) (recommending legislative and administrative solutions including open enrollment and tax revision); Kiel, *supra* note 289, at 641 (describing the transfer option from “failing” schools under the No Child Left Behind act and the lack of meaningful options when “district sovereignty” remain intact); *see also* Paul Butler, *The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform*, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1475–78 (2016) (advocating for a Third Reconstruction). For a broad review of “[l]egal scholarship[’s] . . . reckoning with the centrality of the violence of policing to the United States,” *see generally* Amna Akbar, *An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform*, 108 CAL. L. REV. 101, 108–20 (forthcoming 2020).

⁴¹² *Abolitionist Demands*, *supra* note 400, at *10 (“Invest-divest focuses attention on the size and scale of the criminal system, makes a call to divest from and shrink that system, and brings attention to alternative modes of social response”). The Movement 4 Black Lives popularized the “Invest-Divest” demand in 2015, although the concept is attributed to Eddie Ellis. AirGo Radio, *Episode 253, The Abolition Suite Vol. 2: Mariame Kaba*, (July 19, 2020), available at <https://airgoradio.com/airgo/2020/7/7/episode-253-the-abolition-suite-vol-2-mariame-kaba> (“When I hear folks from the Movement 4 Black Lives . . . coming up in 2015 saying ‘invest-divest,’ I smile because I know that’s Eddie Ellis. . . . He made it possible for us to think about invest-divest.”); *see also* Eddie Ellis, *Prison Reform Visionary*, OUR TIME PRESS (Aug. 5, 2019), available at <https://www.ourtimepress.com/eddie-ellis-prison-reform-visionary/>.

⁴¹³ MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, INVEST-DIVEST (2020) (“We demand investments in the education, health and safety of Black people, instead of investments in the criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people”), available at <https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/invest-divest/>; *see also generally* MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: 2020 POLICY FRAMEWORK (2020), available at <https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/>.

education.⁴¹⁵ The content of the proposed amendment differs sharply from the “minimally adequate education” or basic literacy right contemplated by federal courts to date,⁴¹⁶ resembling much more closely a right of the type we propose:

A constitutional amendment would also provide a chance to clearly articulate the *necessary components of a quality education*, which include the right to: a free education for all, wrap around services, a social worker for every 40 students, free health services (including reproductive body autonomy and dental care), a curriculum that acknowledges and addresses youth’s material and cultural needs, physical activity and recreation, high quality food, free daycare, *freedom from unwarranted search, seizure or arrest* The amendment would also acknowledge the right of students to respect and dignity.⁴¹⁷

Similar demands are reflected in the BREATHE Act—federal legislation also championed by M4BL—which has earned support from Rep. Ayanna Pressley and Rep. Rashida Tlaib.⁴¹⁸ The education provisions of the BREATHE Act would prohibit federal law enforcement from being within 1,000 feet of any public or private schools,⁴¹⁹ and would incentivize states and localities

⁴¹⁴ MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, ABOUT US (“We are Abolitionist. We believe that prisons, police and all other institutions that inflict violence on Black people must be abolished and replaced by institutions that value and affirm the flourishing of Black lives.”), available at <https://m4bl.org/about-us/>; see also *id.* (“We believe and understand that Black people will never achieve liberation under the current global racialized capitalist system.”).

⁴¹⁵ Invest-Divest, *supra* note 413, at 4.

⁴¹⁶ See *supra* notes 40, 244, and 257 and accompanying text.

⁴¹⁷ MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, EDUCATION AMENDMENT POLICY BRIEF, available at <https://m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Education-Amendment-Policy-Brief.pdf> (emphasis added).

⁴¹⁸ Selena Hill, *Reps. Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib Announce the BREATHE Act, Calling for Defunding Police, Reparations, and Universal Basic Income*, BLACK ENTERPRISE (July 10, 2020) available at <https://www.blackenterprise.com/rep-ayanna-pressley-and-rashida-tlaib-announce-the-breathe-act-calling-for-defunding-police-reparations-and-universal-basic-income/>.

⁴¹⁹ M4BL, THE BREATHE ACT: FEDERAL BILL OUTLINE (unpublished draft) (on file with authors). Although most policing is a local matter, scholars have documented how federal agenda-setting through bureaucracies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration dramatically altered the nature of state and local carceral systems. See generally HINTON, WAR ON CRIME, *supra* note 175.

to: remove police and school resource officers from schools,⁴²⁰ close youth jails,⁴²¹ alter school funding formulas for funding equity,⁴²² repair and renovate school facilities,⁴²³ increase access to adult education for incarcerated and formerly incarcerated persons,⁴²⁴ provide additional services,⁴²⁵ and develop curricula on the political, economic, and social legacies of colonialism, genocide against indigenous people, and slavery.⁴²⁶ Numerous other popular movement demands for education reform either embrace the invest-divest framework or mirror its substance, as reflected in slogans such as “counselors, not cops.”⁴²⁷

Similarly, fulfillment of the federal constitutional right we describe would require divesting from carceral systems within public schools, and investing in curricula, learning

⁴²⁰ FEDERAL BILL OUTLINE, *supra* note 419.

⁴²¹ M4BL, THE BREATHE ACT: BILL SUMMARY 7 (July 2020), *available at* https://breatheact.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-BREATHE-Act-PDF_FINAL3-1.pdf.

⁴²² *Id.* at 7.

⁴²³ *Id.* at 8

⁴²⁴ *Id.*

⁴²⁵ *Id.* at 7–8.

⁴²⁶ *Id.* at 7.

⁴²⁷ *See, e.g.*, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., POLICE IN SCHOOLS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 5 (2018), *available at* <https://advancementproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Police-In-Schools-2018-FINAL.pdf> (demanding divestment from “criminalization infrastructure,” and investment in “psychologists, therapists, counselors, social workers, and nurses[.]”); *We Came to Learn: A Call to Action for Police-Free Schools*, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, *available at* <https://advancementproject.org/wecametolearn/>; DIGNITY IN SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN, WHY COUNSELORS, NOT COPS? (2018), <http://dignityinschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WhyCounselorsNotCops.pdf>; Angela Helm, *Counselors, Not Cops: New Yorkers Protest Millions Proposed for School Safety Budget, Saying Money Fuels School-to-Prison Pipeline*, ROOT (Mar. 21, 2019), *available at* <https://www.theroot.com/counselors-not-cops-new-yorkers-protest-millions-prop-1833464478>; *see also generally* DREAM DEFENDERS, DEFUND POLICE, REBUILD OUR COMMUNITIES (2020), *available at* <https://secure.everyaction.com/p/PN6aQpREDU6OccefBqxPmQ2>.

materials, facilities, and services.⁴²⁸ In this way, our project aligns with, and offers another tool to, abolitionist organizing led by communities and young people combatting confinement in carceral schools.⁴²⁹ Implementing such a right would not, standing alone, fulfill the maximalist vision advanced by movement demands. Crucially, however, we believe that it neither undermines that maximalist vision, nor legitimizes the subordinating systems that popular movements seek to dismantle.⁴³⁰ Moreover, in contrast with a right to basic literacy, our proposed federal right connects closely to the calls of organizers mobilizing to defund policing in their schools and to fund other services that contribute to human flourishing.⁴³¹ As such, it is

⁴²⁸ Obviously, fulfilling the right to quality public schooling requires investments in the elements necessary for a good education. But it could also require reducing the liberty restrictions—including but not limited to policing—students experience during the school day. *Cf. Gary B.*, 957 F.3d at 642 (finding that, to assess a liberty-based claim, the court would need evidence about, *inter alia*, the “restrictions on [students’] liberty throughout the typical school day.”). As discussed *supra* notes 179–216 and accompanying text, these liberty restrictions within carceral schools are extensive and extremely harmful.

⁴²⁹ *Cf. Abolitionist Demands*, *supra* note 400, at *10 (“Transformative demands come out of campaigns, mass movements, and organizations that center and are run by people directly impacted Indeed, they must be the ones diagnosing problems and proposing and implementing solutions, engaging in self-governance.”); *see also supra* note 226.

⁴³⁰ Abolitionist movements generally oppose reforms that seek to humanize or reduce bias in carceral processes. They argue that such reforms legitimize carceral systems, and entrench carceral infrastructure by investing more resources into that infrastructure. *See generally* SURVIVED & PUNISHED NEW YORK, PRESERVING PUNISHMENT POWER: A GRASSROOTS ABOLITIONIST ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK REFORMS (2020), available at <https://bit.ly/NYAbolitionistAssessment> (proposing a series of questions to ask of any reform to determine whether it is consistent with abolitionist principles, including “Does it . . . legitimize or expand the carceral system we’re trying to dismantle,” criticizing, among other reforms, a bill intended to make prisons safer for trans people, and “Does it undermine efforts to organize and mobilize the most affected for ongoing struggle?”). One of the authors is a member of Survived & Punished NY and contributed to this abolitionist assessment. For an example of such a reform effort addressing carceralism in schools in a manner that would result in more resources flowing into carceral systems (in the form of training) and overall legitimization, see NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MODEL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS, available at https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/mou_recommendations_for_schools_and_police_0.pdf (providing for training on bias, cultural sensitivity, disability rights, crisis intervention, and de-escalation, as well as for removal for use of force or acts of bias).

⁴³¹ *See generally* #COPSOUTCPS, A REPORT ON WHY IT’S TIME FOR CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO DIVEST FROM THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 2020), available at <https://copsoutcps.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CopsOutCPS-Report-6.16.20-1.pdf> (calling for the \$33 million invested in

complementary to, and compatible with, abolitionist movement demands. Indeed, a liberty-based right to quality education, as outlined here, fulfills the criteria of a “transformative reform that advance[s] an abolitionist horizon,” as described by Amna Akbar and Marbre Stahly-Butts:

(1) the reform shrinks the criminal legal system; (2) the reform relies on modes of political, economic, social organization that contradict prevailing arrangements, and gesture at new possibilities; (3) the reform builds and shifts power into the hands of those directly impacted, who are often Black, brown, working class, and poor; (4) the reform acknowledges and repairs past harm; and (5) the reform improves material conditions of directly impacted people.⁴³²

Whether pursued through legislation, constitutional amendment, or litigation to recognize a liberty-based constitutional right to quality public education, abolishing carceral schools aligns with this movement-defined vision of transformation.

Conclusion

In this article, we have focused on the project of abolishing public schools that rely on punitive and carceral approaches to the education of Black, Brown, and poor children. Our project—like that of prison abolition—is not just a project of dismantlement.⁴³³ Rather, if the law is to play a role in children securing the equal liberty they need to grow and flourish, it must, as abolitionist organizer Mariame Kaba says, facilitate “building up of new ways of . . . relating with each other.”⁴³⁴ To be sure, today’s abolitionists—as was true of those in the 1850s—can

school resource officers to be put towards counselors, social/emotional learning, and other services and programs that promote safety and development).

⁴³² *Abolitionist Demands*, *supra* note 400, at *4–*5.

⁴³³ See Allegra M. McLeod, *Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice*, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1167-68 (2015) (“Prison abolition . . . is an aspirational ethical, institutional, and political framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and collective social life, rather than simply a plan to tear down prison walls.”).

⁴³⁴ AirGo Radio, *Episode 29—Mariame Kaba*, (Feb. 2, 2016), available at <https://soundcloud.com/airgoradio/ep-29-mariame-kaba>.

find much in constitutional law that enables racial oppression.⁴³⁵ But in this article we have tried to show that the Constitution also can provide a framework for creative demands of equality and liberty. Although lawyers' role in the movement for abolition is peripheral, legal argument can support new ideas about constitutional meaning —ideas that respond to the historical and current experience of Black, Brown, and poor children facing confinement in carceral public schools. We hope that this article contributes toward efforts seeking to achieve a better “society in the making.”⁴³⁶

⁴³⁵ See, e.g., *Abolitionist Horizon*, *supra* note 411, at 109 (“The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence facilitates, rather than constrains, police violence.”).

⁴³⁶ Roberts, *supra* note 8, at 122. See also Amna A. Akbar, *Toward a Radical Imagination of Law*, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 479 (2018) (describing abolition constitutionalism as “reconstructive and visionary, pushing for a radical reimagination of the state and the law that serves it. It is here that legal scholars may have the most to learn from, and the most to contribute, if we imagine collaboratively with these movements.”).