

**Arizona Department of Corrections**  
**August 19, 2010**

<b>ASP-KINGMAN HISTORY</b>
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1. The privately operated prison at Kingman has housed minimum custody inmates since 2004 and medium custody inmates since 2005.
2. Medium security prisons are designed, constructed and operated specifically for the housing of dangerous inmates, including violent offenders, "lifers" and murderers. This is standard practice in corrections throughout the US.
3. ADC has an objective classification system that determines the risks and needs of each inmate. This system is used to determine placement in appropriate facilities. AG signed off on these
4. **July 1, 2002:** Original RFP issued for 1,400 private DUI beds for adult males in minimum, medium, close custody.
  - 09/05/02: Attorney General's Office reviewed the RFP. Memorandum from AAG Anne Longo to ADC's Lacy Scott regarding RFP No. 020100DC - Non-Procurement Solicitation for a 1400 Bed DUI Private Prison.
5. **September 19, 2002:** Favorable JLBC review of the RFP.
6. **September 2003:** JCCR requests expedited approval of Contract by Attorney General.
7. **March 2004:** Attorney General's Office approves the Contract.
  - 03/15/04: Memorandum from Unit Chief Counsel Anne Longo (AG's office) to ADC's Mike Smarik regarding Review and Approval of ADC Contract No. 040120DC - Non-Procurement Contract for a 1400 Bed DUI Private Prison. Review of Contract.
  - 03/24/04: Memorandum from Unit Chief Counsel Anne Longo (AG's office) to ADC's Mike Smarik regarding Review and Approval of ADC Contract No. 040120DC - Non-Procurement Contract for a 1400 Bed DUI Private Prison. **Review and Approval of Revised Contract.**
8. **March 22, 2004:** Original Contract awarded to MTC for 1,100 minimum security beds and 300 medium security beds to house DUI inmates; and for an additional 108 emergency beds once the population reached 1,400 inmates.

9. **August 2004 – October 2004:** Loading of the minimum and medium beds begins with the first 472 DUI minimum custody inmates. Loading of the 472 beds completed in October 2004.
10. **May 12, 2005:** Director Dora Schriro approved a change in Kingman inmate population from DUI to General Population, which allowed non-DUI inmates to be housed at Kingman.
11. **May 13 – June 28, 2005:** ADC loaded 150 inmates per week until the original 1,100 minimum beds and 300 medium beds were filled.
12. **June 2006:** ADC began loading the 108 emergency beds; 80 minimum custody general population beds and 28 medium general population beds. This brought the total Kingman capacity to 1,180 minimum beds and 328 medium beds.
13. **November 23, 2006:** In a memo to ADC, MTC proposed modifying treatment requirements from DUI outpatient clinics to a more generic treatment to accommodate the new general population. MTC stated that this “will eliminate contractual conflicts and hiring issues which have been experienced since the opening of phase II at ASP-Kingman.”
14. **December 13, 2006:** ADC notified Arizona Legislature (Senate President and Speaker of the House) in a monthly ADC Status Report that ASP-Kingman is in substantial non-compliance with the terms of the contract. Its substance abuse services are deficient and the majority of the full-time employees required by the contract to staff the substance abuse program have been vacant since the facility opened. All of the 1,508 inmates at the facility are in need of substance abuse services including mandated DUI programming per Arizona Administrative Code but fewer than one third (only 448) inmates are receiving services.
15. **December 28, 2006:** An ADC memo from ADC Contract Beds Administrator E. Pierson to ADC Division Director Sam Sublett identifies that monetary offsets to MTC invoices for staffing non-compliance (vacancy deductions) have been taken since September 2006; and cites the following MTC Kingman contract violations:
  - Failure to staff the substance abuse program since January 2006, with an average 13 vacancies out of 18 positions.
  - Failure to staff the substance abuse program with required Substance Abuse Counselors.
  - Failure to provide substance abuse programming for 1,400 inmates as required while still receiving a per diem rate based on full staffing and service delivery.
16. **2007:** Legislation authorizing ADOA to contract for 2,000 general population adult male beds.
17. **August 29, 2007:** Original RFP issued for 2,000 general population minimum custody adult male beds.

18. **December 13, 2007:** For the first time, murderers were assigned to Kingman; including a medium custody inmate and a minimum custody inmate sentenced for 2<sup>nd</sup> degree murder. Only persons sentenced for non-premeditated murder or attempted murder can be classified as minimum custody.
19. **February 2008:** Contract for 2,000 minimum custody male beds finalized and awarded to MTC.
20. **May 2008:** Contract amendment combined 2,000 and 1,400 beds at Kingman, to create a 3,400 minimum/medium custody prison.
21. **July 22, 2008:**
  - The count sheet was changed in error to reflect all 1,508 Kingman beds as minimum.
  - The change to the count sheet was not approved and was changed in error.
  - Medium custody inmates continued to be housed at Kingman from July 22, 2008 to the present.
22. **October 2009:** Prior to activation of new 2,000 Kingman beds, Director Ryan determined that Kingman Cerbat Unit (new 2,000 unit) does not have a perimeter consistent with medium security and re-designates it as a minimum custody unit. Director Ryan also re-designated Kingman Hualapai Unit (original 1,400 unit) as a medium custody unit since it has a medium perimeter and experience managing a medium population.
23. **December 23, 2009:** The error to the count sheet in July of 2008 was corrected to reflect the correct count to Kingman as 1,180 minimum custody general population and 328 medium custody general population.
24. **April 6, 2010:** ADC began loading the new 2,000 minimum custody general population Kingman beds at a rate of 140 inmates per week.
25. **May 31, 2010:** Movement ceased by Director Ryan based on a disturbance. Kingman population at the time of disturbance was 2,550.
26. **June 15, 2010:** ADC resumed loading of 140 inmates per week at Kingman.
27. **July 2010:** Movement ceased by Director Ryan based on escapes. Kingman population the day after the escapes (July 31, 2010) was 3,390.

## CLASSIFICATION/CUSTODY

### **Classification System:**

ADC utilizes an objective classification system which determines each inmate's risks (and needs) in order to determine appropriate placement in a custody level (and facility). The purpose of this classification process is to ensure the protection of the public, employees and even inmates, by placing inmates in a custody and facility setting commensurate with the risk they pose to the public.

Medium security facilities are designed to ensure that serious offenders are in a secure setting and have always housed serious offenders convicted of violent offenses.

The following guidelines represent the criteria for placement of inmates to ensure public safety:

- Inmates sentenced to Death are classified to Maximum, never to reduce.
- Inmates sentenced to Life must serve at least two years in maximum custody.
- Inmates sentenced to Life, after serving two years in maximum must serve an additional three years in close before they are eligible to reduce to medium.
- Inmates sentenced to Life can never reduce below medium custody.
- Inmates with more than five years to serve can not reduce below medium custody.
- Inmates with a felony sex offense conviction can not reduce below medium custody.
- Inmates with a felony detainer can not reduce below medium custody.
- Inmates who have been validated as a security threat group member are classified to maximum custody.

### **Custody Levels:**

**Maximum Custody** - Inmates who represent the highest risk to the public and staff, and require housing in a single cell setting. (Some maximum custody inmates may be eligible for a double cell environment). These inmates have limited work opportunities within the secure perimeter and require frequent monitoring. These inmates require escorted movement in full restraints within the institution.

**Close Custody** - Inmates who represent a high risk to the public and staff, and require housing in a secure institution. These inmates shall not be assigned to work outside the secure perimeter of an institution. These inmates require controlled movement within the institution.

**Medium Custody** - Inmates who represent a moderate risk to the public and staff. These inmates shall not work outside the secure perimeter of an institution and require limited controlled movement within the institution.

**Minimum Custody** - Inmates who represent a low risk to the public and staff. These inmate may work outside the secure perimeter of an institution, to include community work crews, and do not require controlled movement within the institution.

### **Medium Security Physical Plant Standards:**

Medium security facilities are at least a dormitory setting (but may include cells). Internal to the unit, there is a design, including fencing and gates that support a "controlled movement" operation, which restricts the maximum number of inmates that are out of the cell blocks or dormitories in any given area at any given time. This creates a smaller, segregated population group that is directly overseen and managed by security staff.

The perimeter of the medium security unit must share at least the following design elements:

- 15' wide sand trap at the perimeter.
- Quartz lighting at 75' intervals.
- 1, 14' tall perimeter fence, including a "candy cane" (inwardly curved) chain link fence, including:
  - 6' of "no-climb security fence fabric at the top,
  - One roll of "detainer-hook-barb" razor wire at the top,
  - 3 stacked rolls of this same razor wire at the bottom, interior.
- A "ported cable system" (electronic security detection system) at 15' in from the exterior fence.
- At least a 4' tall, 4-strand barbed wire fence located 45' inside of the exterior fence (placing the electronic system between the fences).

### **Inmates Convicted of Murder: 2,689 Inmates convicted of Murder as of June 30, 2010**

#### Minimum Custody (less than 5 years remaining on sentence)

Total Units = 30

Total Beds = 15,565 or 38%

Inmates convicted of Murder = 172 or 6.4%

#### Medium Custody

Total Units = 17

Total Beds = 16,397 or 40%

Inmates convicted of Murder = 1,438 or 53.5% (796 are "lifers")

NOTE: All medium security prisons house violent offenders to include murder.

#### Close Custody

Total Units = 11

Total Beds = 5,203 or 13%

Inmates convicted of Murder = 455 or 16.9%

#### Maximum Custody

Total Units = 6

Total Beds = 3,678 or 9%

Inmates convicted of Murder = 624 or 23.2%

Total Beds = 40,843

## Overview of ASP-Kingman (Management Training Corporation-MTC):

- **August 2004 – May 2005:** Minimum custody, **DUI** inmates.
- **May 2005 – April 2010:** 1,100 (+80 emergency) Minimum general population inmate capacity and 300 (+28 emergency) Medium **general population** inmate capacity.
- **Population Shift:** After the Kingman population was changed from DUI to general population in May 2005, the percentage of violent inmates (assault, child abuse, domestic violence, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, robbery, sex offenses, weapons) increased in both the minimum and medium custody levels. Minimum increased from a low of 3% violent offenders in 2005 to 28% violent offenders in 2010. Medium increased from a low of 4% violent offenders in 2005 to approximately 50% violent offenders in 2010. This increase was reflective of an overall proportional increase in violent offenders being committed to ADC.
- **Population as of July 31, 2010:**
  - 3,390 total inmates
  - 56% Minimum (1898)
  - 44% Medium (1492)
  - Current Offenses:
    - 32% Drug/DUI
    - 14% Assault
    - 9% Robbery
    - 8% Auto Theft
    - 5.4% Murder (60 for 1<sup>st</sup> degree murder; 16 for attempted 1<sup>st</sup> degree murder; 92 for 2<sup>nd</sup> degree murder; 14 for attempted 2<sup>nd</sup> degree murder)
  - 40% of inmates committed for violent crimes (assault 14%, child abuse 0.3%, domestic violence 0.6%, kidnapping 4%, manslaughter 2.9%, murder 5.4%, robbery 9%, sex offenses <1%, weapons 4.7%)
  - 4% of inmates have sex offender status
  - 27% of inmates are criminal aliens

### Inmate McCluskey 074469

- Admitted on 07/17/09
- Initially classified to Medium custody.
- **Arrived at Kingman on 02/23/10**

### Inmate Province 071253

- Admitted on 01/29/93
- Initially classified to Maximum custody
- Reduced to Close custody on 02/07/95
- Reduced to Medium custody on 03/05/97
- Increased to Close custody on 11/02/04
- Reduced to Medium custody on 12/01/05 and has been Medium custody since.
- **Arrived at Kingman on 02/25/10**

**Inmate Renwick 164446**

- Admitted on 02/01/02
- Initially classified to maximum custody
- Reduced to Close custody on 02/09/04
- Reduced to Medium custody on 01/05/06
- Arrived at Kingman on 04/20/10

## **MTC ADMISSIONS AND COMMITMENT TO "CHANGE" (IE: FIXING PROBLEMS)**

- August 13, 2010, MTC letter to ADC making admission of responsibility for the escapes.
- MTC relieved the Complex Warden, the Hualapai Unit Warden, the Chief of Security, and at least 3 Correctional officers of duty.
- August 17, 2010, MTC response to ADC regarding changes and improvements.
- Corrective Action Commitments from MTC Regarding Kingman:

### Perimeter & Fence

1. Contract with Vendor/manufacturer of perimeter alarm system to recalibrate system, retrain MTC IT staff and install audible alarm system in control room, provide preventative maintenance and repair services in addition to MTC IT staff activities. Complete by September 1, 2010.
2. Ensure perimeter alarm system is fully functional according to manufacturer's intent. Complete by September, 1, 2010.
3. Immediately reroute unauthorized traffic away from perimeter security road. Complete by August 31, 2010.
4. Pave new road that will route unauthorized traffic away from perimeter security road and install fence to further separate this road from perimeter security areas. Contract for services by August 31, 2010.
5. Set up blocking gates on existing "shared use section of road to Cerbat. Complete by September 14, 2010.
6. Ensure sand/soil on perimeter is correct: placement of depth stakes and replacement of sand/soil. Complete by August 25, 2010.
7. Supply perimeter vehicles with high-intensity lights. Complete by August 31, 2010.
8. Place semi-static perimeter observation post on berm at SE corner of Hualapai unit. Complete by September 7, 2010.
9. Ensure all security lights are repaired and checked every night, with next day repairs. Completion by August 20, 2010.
10. Placement of weapons clearing barrels on perimeter. Complete by August 31, 2010.



### Staff Training

1. Training, observation and compliance with ADC policy regarding supervisor presence on yards and "command presence" of staff. Complete by August 31, 2010.
2. Train staff on alarm response procedures and re-publish post orders. Complete by August 31, 2010.
3. Conduct monthly DART exercises on each shift. Complete by August 31, 2010.
4. Ensure all (including last 4) employees are trained and issued current weapons qualifications cards. Complete by August 18, 2010.
5. Retrain and identify staff that will use weapons. Complete by August 31, 2010.
6. Institute emergency simulation training quarterly on each shift. Provide ADC monitor written report regarding tests of infrastructure tested. Complete by September 7, 2010.
7. Provide training for all staff on the proper management of medium security inmates. Complete by August 31, 2010. (Request extension to September 15, 2010).
8. Collaborate with ADC and MCSO on escape response and prevention training. Complete by October 1, 2010.

### Security Operations

1. Institute inner and outer walking fence checks at least twice each shift (at beginning and end). Complete by August 31, 2010.
2. Institute aggressive perimeter intrusion and detection tests. Completed.
3. Institute zone checks on each shift, verification by Chief of Security. Complete by September 7, 2010.
4. Respond to zone alarms within 1 minute, clear zone within 3 minutes. Complete by August 31, 2010.
5. Ensure cardboard and other security impediments stored in no-man's land or other unsecured areas are removed and secured. Complete by August 31, 2010.
6. Ensure pod and building doors are all locked and only opened by staff when appropriate and supervised. Complete.
7. Institute random pat searches of inmates and institute inmate pass process. Complete by August 25, 2010.

8. Ensure all staff are searched in compliance with DO 513, with chief of security verification. Complete.
9. End the use of the pre-printed journal. Complete by August 31, 2010.
10. Improve count procedures to ensure that face-to-ID card counts are conducted and called in, as opposed to submitting only numbers of inmates counted; utilize out-counts and vacant beds on count sheet. Complete by August 31, 2010.
11. Change shift relief procedures to ensure shift change happens on post. Complete by August 31, 2010.
12. Assign SSU duties to night lieutenant or designee. Complete by August 31, 2010.
13. Terminate the K-9 Adoption Program. Completed.

#### Inmate Management

1. Eliminate direct supervision model and implement controlled movement model. Complete by September 7, 2010.
2. Complete review and revision of ERP plan. Complete by September 7, 2010.
3. Update inmate ID pictures: submit waiver of DO 901.05 to allow for immediate local update of photo. Complete by August 25, 2010.
4. Develop controlled movement and staggered recreation schedules. Dependent upon return to normal operations from lock down.
5. Issue ID card clips to all inmates by August 27, 2010.
6. Ensure staff compliance with ADC policy regarding inmate grooming and wearing of ID card. Complete by August 31, 2010.
7. Ensure inmate living area compliance (DO 704). Complete by August 31, 2010.

#### Armory

1. Post a master inventory on the outside of the inner armory door. Complete.
2. Publish new armory/weapons post orders. Complete.
3. Conduct monthly and weekly inventories per ADC policy; verify all stored weapons are unloaded. Complete.
4. Conduct weekly and monthly supervisor weapons counts. Begin by August 2010.

Physical Plant

1. Complete painting of all fence ties with red paint. Complete by August 31, 2010.
2. Remove/spread all dirt in no-man's land behind buildings. Complete by August 31, 2010.
3. Chain all picnic benches together when not in use, or secure in place. Complete by August 31, 2010.
4. Complete construction of shade structures (remove construction materials). Complete by August 31, 2010.
5. Replace all metal tools and materials that are inappropriate for a medium security facility. Complete by August 31, 2010.
6. Shorten shower curtains for visibility. By August 27, 2010.
7. Secure Sweat Lodge with razor wire (completed) and move sweat lodge out of no-man's land area onto securable site on yard. Complete by September 30, 2010.

# ASP-KINGMAN ASSESSMENT

August 4-6, 2010

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**ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
OFFENDER OPERATIONS**

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Charles L. Ryan, Director

**THROUGH:** Robert Patton, Division Director, Offender Operations

**FROM:** *Therese Schroeder*  
Therese Schroeder, Security Operations Administrator

**SUBJECT:** Security Assessment- ASP-Kingman Hualapai Unit / August 4-6, 2010  
Final Report

**DATE:** August 18, 2010

**Team members:**

Therese Schroeder- Security Operations Administrator  
Richard Haggard- Major ASPC-Safford  
Thomas Higginson- Major ASPC- Eyman  
Edwin Lao- Major ASPC- Florence  
Ron Lawrence- Captain ASPC- Lewis  
Dennis Bool- Captain ASPC- Perryville

On August 4, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the Kingman facility. At 1000 hours, Warden Lori Leider met with us and reviewed the Management and Training Corporation's (MTC) time line and summary of the inmate escape on July 30, 2010. Warden Leider then took the team on a tour of the Hualapai Unit.

Following is a summary of the team's findings:

**Initial Tour:**

- While monitoring chow turnout we witnessed a large percentage of the inmate population- approximately 75%- walking without their identification cards. Many were out of grooming compliance (shirts untucked, beards, mustaches).
- The inmate attitude appeared to be poor. One inmate spoke in a disrespectful manner to the Warden when she questioned his lack of identification, another yelled out "Fuck ADC" as we approached.
- Unit sanitation was very good.
- DO 704/cell conditions were adequate but there was a large amount of cardboard and hobbycraft items in the cells.

- Staff morale was high and their demeanor was friendly when interacting with our team. The unit is staffed with a very high percentage of new staff and many of them demonstrated a lack of experience and “command presence”. Warden Leider reports that approximately 80% of her staff is new or newly promoted.
- Staffing- staff adequacy and/or collapsing of posts is not an issue for this facility. Overtime is utilized to fill vacant posts and all shift posts are filled.

### **Assessment Team’s Observation Summary:**

#### **Alarm Zone System:**

The perimeter system at the Kingman Hualapai unit is not functioning properly, it is not maintained properly, it is not monitored correctly, and it is not tested properly. The procedures currently in place for all aspects of this system have bred a culture of laxness among the staff. The system:

- Alarms excessively throughout the day and night. Staff have become conditioned to the false alarms and react to them with complacency.
- Zones are often left activated and unattended for extended periods of time.
- Contract Maintenance on the system has not been performed for over one year.
- Staff report repeated documentation of malfunctioning alarms, yet Unit IT and Maintenance staff do not get these reports and the Security Device Inspection report does not contain them.
- The system does not audibly alert staff to zone activations. Control room staff are extremely busy opening doors and gates and answering the phones and the alerts often go unnoticed and are not a priority duty. Cameras automatically switch to gates when a button is pushed to access gates. Thus most often only gates are being monitored.
- Maintenance of the system is done by the unit maintenance and IT staff. These staff have not been trained to maintain the system.
- The system has not been calibrated professionally by the contract vendor and IT staff report that staff complain if it is set to be too sensitive.
- MTC officers and supervisors are not familiar with the system and are not properly trained to operate or test it
- While testing the system each day, each zone is left in activation status until the testing is completed. We witnessed one alarm zone test that took 22 minutes thus the zones were not functioning for this time period. This testing was also being

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conducted in a predictable pattern each night on grave shift following the 2115 count.

**Perimeter:**

- The perimeter is in fair condition. It is regularly raked and weeded by an inmate crew however it lacks sand and is somewhat dry and hard packed. It is difficult to see tracks and in fact several tracks that were laid by our team were missed by MTC staff. MTC staff report that the wind blows the sand away each time they replace it.
- The procedures in place for shift relief are ineffective and detrimental to security. It creates an un-manned perimeter for extended periods of time, 10 to 15 minutes or longer, at the beginning of each shift.
- COs are inadequately trained on response to alarm procedures. The post orders need to be more detailed.
- At the time of the escape only one perimeter patrol was in place.
- COs even in the days following the escape, failed to detect tracks or to challenge team members' presence on the perimeter. This did improve by Day 3 of our assessment.
- The malfunctioning alarm system has led to desensitization to alarm activations. Staff assume it is just another false alarm.
- There is too much traffic (pedestrian and vehicular) in close proximity to the perimeter.
- There is one section of perimeter road that is a shared use section. It is traveled by perimeter vehicles, and civilian and staff traffic en-route to the Cerbat unit.
- Drainage ditches have been rocked in. They look visually pleasing but create a barrier to sound security practices. An inmate could hide in the ditch while the perimeter patrol passed and he could go undetected.
- Staff are not proficient with weapons. In addition to safety concerns this also further delays the relief process.
- Large amounts of cardboard are stored in no-mans land for the recycling program.
- Eight (8) light poles were noted with lights burned out.

The amount and condition of the razor wire is adequate and it is spaced appropriately. There were a few areas in which the wire needs to be re-attached at the bottom.



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**Counts:**

Count is cleared by the Accountability officer or the Shift Lieutenant. Housing unit officers call in their numbers only. They do not call in out counts or vacant beds. If the number they give does not match for a pod, they are directed to do a recount. Every count monitored by the team resulted in pods that had to be re-counted.

Many of the officers did not effectively control inmate movement during count. Inmates were not all at their bunks for a proper face to ID process. Inmates were witnessed in the showers and on phones during count. There was some confusion on the new 2030 count time and this may have played a role in some of the movement, but in general it appeared to be a staff training or lack of "command presence" issue in most cases.

**Armory:**

The armory was out of compliance in several areas. Ammunition and inventory deficiencies were noted.

Dart Equipment and drill procedures are also out of compliance. Weapons are stored loaded and drills are not being conducted regularly.

- Major Richard Haggard's report has additional information on Armory and Dart.

**Inmate Movement:**

Our team was not able to monitor typical inmate movement patterns due to the unit lockdown.

Warden Leider reports that all inmates from the 3 fenced yards within the unit recreate at the same time. This would result in a very large number of inmates **out to** recreation at the same time. She is reviewing the recreation procedures and scheduling now.

Prior to the escape, the yard closed at 2045 hours. Count was conducted at 2115 hours. This has now been changed to 2000 hour yard closure and 2030 hour count. Shift change for MTC staff is at 2100, this is currently under review.

**Ingress/Egress:**

MTC employees appeared to be surprised by the searches of their property. Team's belief is that procedures were lax prior to our arrival.

**Searches:**

Unit was in compliance for cell and unit searches.

Inmate pat searches are not being conducted. Warden Leider reports that random pat searches of inmates exiting chow are required but are not being done. Seeing no pat searches being done, I asked an officer if he conducted random pat searches of inmates

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exiting chow. He hesitated and then said that he, "pat searches a couple of inmates every 30 minutes."

**Keys:**

Overall the key audit was in compliance. One key error was noted and corrected on the spot. \* More information on keys is included in Captain Dennis Bool's report.

The unit has a "hot box" key system. Staff have a take home key that opens their assigned "hot box" located in the main control room. They turn in their key and are given their assigned key set for the day.

The Hualapai detention unit has a "hot box" with emergency keys in the open pod area. Warden Leider reports that this is an ACA accreditation requirement.

**Tools:**

Tool audit was in compliance.

**Journals:**

MTC uses a pre-printed journal page. The team felt that these forms could easily be "pencil whipped" and lead to officer complacency for reporting required duties.

**Phone Monitoring:**

MTC does not have an SSU officer in place. The shift lieutenant does act as SSU when possible and he monitors phone calls as time permits.

**Visitation:**

No issues noted. Suspended visitors are to be suspended for phone usage. This did not happen in the case of Casslyn Welch. The Shift Lt. reported first that it fell through the cracks, and later said that he did not have her phone privileges revoked in order to gather intel information from her calls.

**Emergency Response Plan:**

Kingman's ERP is a very generic plan – See Major Lao/Higginson's report. Also our team was told on numerous occasion that private prison staff may not "chase" an escapee.

**Transition from Minimum Custody to Medium Custody:**

It appears that very little action was taken to prepare the physical plant and the staff for the transition to Medium Custody in April of 2010. Warden Leider did not report any physical changes that were implemented. She stated that several evening program times were changed.

- The dog program was left in place in the area behind ~~Dorm 2~~ with a 10 foot fence that had no razor wire. Staff report that the door to the outside was often left on access due to the amount of traffic. A large rock was next to the door, it appeared to be there to prop open the door.
- Metal dust mops, mop wringers, and metal horse shoes are still being used.
- All 3 yards with in the unit recreate at the same time.
- Shower curtains do not allow for any staff visibility. They should be shortened to allow for "feet visibility"
- The sweat lodge is in the no-man's land. It is currently being renovated to increase fence height and to add razor wire.
- No additional or follow-up training has been done with MTC staff to assist with the transition of populations.
- Nothing has been done to reduce inmate movement. Radio traffic for opening gates is constant and keeps the tower and/or control room officer focused on gate and doors versus perimeter alarms and inmate monitoring.
- Random pat searches of inmates are not being done.

**Assessment of MTC Executive staff:**

**Captain Smith:**

Captain Smith is ineffective in his role. Both the Complex Administrator and the Warden expressed concerns over his promotion to Captain and his performance. He lacks attention to detail and the energy level to do the job. All team members noted that he had a lackadaisical attitude and was more than willing to abdicate his responsibilities. He stated that "once he makes the higher ups known of SDI issues- in reference to the malfunctioning alarm system- he washes his hands of it". I asked him about the PA system microphone which is not working in HU2- he stated it had been broken for 3 days. I advised him that staff reported it had been broken for weeks and that so many IRs had been written that a notation was made in the read book to stop writing IRs. He was unaware that it had been that long.

**ADW Ramsey:**

ADW Ramsey was very quick to advise multiple team members that he is not in the chain of command for the Captain and that he is not "over security". He reported that Captain Smith reports directly to the Warden and that he has been told not to interfere with the supervision of him.

ADW Ramsey did not seem to understand his role as an Administrator or to embrace his ownership of the unit.

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**Warden Leider:**

Warden Leider interacted often with our team. She toured with us and worked through until grave shift on Thursday. It was apparent from her interaction with staff and inmates that they knew her and were comfortable talking to her.

Warden Leider is aware of the poor performance of her COS. However, she does not seem to have taken steps to address the issue. She discussed the supervision of Captain Smith and stated that although ADW Ramsey is not in the chain of command for the Captain he has been directed to interact and become involved with monitoring his performance. Warden Leider showed me a large stack (12 or more inches high) of journal pages that she had directed the Captain to review. Because he had not done so, she had and there were a very large amount of notations indicating that corrections were needed.

Warden Leider attributes issues on the unit to the high percentage of new staff and supervisors. When asked what has been done to counteract this, she did not advise me of any additional training or mentoring. She mentioned the FTO officers but admitted that many of them had transferred or promoted as well.

**Complex Administrator Darla Elliott:**

I had a conversation with Warden Elliott on Thursday, August 5, 2010. I asked her who the contract vender was for the Zone Alarm System. She reported there was none on contract and that Unit IT staff made the necessary repairs. I asked what the procedure was for a malfunction on a Friday evening, would the needed repair wait until Monday? She said IT would be called out. We discussed Captain Smith and Elliott said that she was surprised he had been the candidate chosen, and that she questioned it at the time but he was the one promoted.

**Cerbat Unit:**

The assessment team spent only a short time on the Cerbat Unit and some of our observations were made from touring the perimeter of the unit.

- Unit sanitation was excellent. There were large numbers of inmate labor pool workers out to work on the unit.
- Many inmates were seen without wearing their Identification cards.
- There are fence ties that need to be painted red.
- Several piles of dirt are located behind the buildings in the no-man's land.
- Visitation benches are not secured and could be used to assist in climbing fences.
- Awning/shade structure parts were stored in no-man's land.

The reports from the members of the Security Assessment Team follow this report.



**Assessment provided by: Captain Ronald Lawrence:**

**Malfunctioning alarm system:**

- The alarm system in the perimeter zones has not been serviced or maintained by trained experts. Maintenance staff check the system for power failures, cut cables, exposed cable, etc. If the discrepancy does not involve a mechanical problem, the issue is passed to the IT person. By his own admission, the IT person has read manuals on the system, but has received no formal, let alone advanced, training. The sensitivity of the zones is not routinely tested or adjusted. This has led to constant false alarms (during one five minute period on Swing Shift, I noted six alarm activations) which, over the course of months, has led to staff being desensitized.

**Maintenance of Perimeter Zones:**

- Several perimeter zones have deep ruts cut through the area by water drainage. These ruts (in some areas as much as 5 feet wide and 18 or more inches deep) have become “institutionalized” in that they have been lined with rock to reduce erosion. In a number of areas these ruts cut right across the buried cable path.
- The “drag” area of the perimeter is, in most areas, only 10-15 feet wide. According to the Unit ADW, sand has been added to the drag a number of times, but the wind in Kingman blows the sand away. The sand was raked when I observed it.



However, I personally watched an Officer lay track in the sand during daylight hours. Knowing where the track had been laid and looking for it in daylight hours, it was still very difficult to see.

- One zone has the remains of a concrete header that was part of a (since removed) fence system running perpendicular across the zones.

**Staff Training / Response Contributors:**

- Alarms regularly and routinely activate throughout the day.
- This has become such a “norm” that zone activation events are treated at a lower priority than other duties such as answering the telephone, issuing keys, checking staff in, etc.
- We discovered several instances where zone alarms were left unattended for as much as ten to fifteen minutes.
- On the night the escape took place, I observed video coverage of the perimeter officer passing a zone which had just activated. The zone activated at 2143 hours. The perimeter officer continued his path away from the activated zone. He did not turn around to check it. The Perimeter Officer is next seen after he has made an entire circuit of the perimeter. He enters the camera 2151 hours. Either the zone was not cleared, or Main Control failed to reset the zone. Note: The perimeter officer discovered the hole in the fence at 2207 hours according to video footage shot from the Cerbat Unit.
- Staff have not been trained on the proper way to conduct zone checks on a buried cable system.
- I walked the zones with COs as well as Sergeants. None demonstrated the proper technique (crossing the zone at three distinct points in each zone).
  - In two instances with MTC Sergeant King, we found areas within zones that did not activate.
  - None understood how the zones work or how they are activated.
  - None understood how the microwave system worked
  - There was no attempt made (nor tools readily available such as a rake or similar device) to activate the upper microwave that detects movement above the main staff ingress corridor
  - There is no audible cue to alert the Main Control Officer that a perimeter zone has activated.
  - The perimeter zone monitor is one of several monitors the Main Control Officer is expected to observe.
- The perimeter monitor is set off to the side of the Main Control Officer. His primary focus is on yard cameras and opening gates.
- If the Main Control officer is viewing a perimeter monitor, and someone from the yard presses a call button to access a gate, the camera view immediately switches to the gate being accessed.
- Staff are fairly “green” across all shifts. Many staff have under one year of service. Finding staff with 2 or more years of service is rare.

- Although most of the Sergeants and Lieutenants I encountered had more tenure, they also seemed hesitant and less assertive than their ADC counterparts. In fairness, this may have been because of the circumstances under which we were interacting with them.

#### **Security Practice Errors:**

- Dog pens accessible through the emergency exit of Dorm 2 C and D pods
- According to staff, these doors were placed on “access” during open yard times. Inmates could move freely within the building (Inmates who were not part of the dog program were told if they were discovered in C or D pods they would be placed on report).
- The emergency doors were on access until 2045 hours when the yard closed according to the two officers who worked Dorm 2 on the night of the escape.
- The dog pen had already been taken down and the program suspended by the time we toured the facility.
- There is still a sweat lodge in no man’s land. The Unit is working to increase the fence height and installing razor wire – however, it is my recommendation that no inmate activities be allowed outside the confines of the secure yard unless the inmates are under direct supervision at all times.
- Perimeter Officers travel the same pattern, same direction of travel, consistent cycle time throughout the shift – making the perimeter officer predictable and easy to avoid.
- Zone checks are done once per day, on Graves.
- This practice had not been changed, even after the incident
- Zone lights are reported out only once per month.
- Several poles were noted with lights burnt out (8 total)
- Inmates from Cerbat are allowed to walk unescorted on the perimeter road for Hualapai – making it “normal” to see inmates on the perimeter.
- Perimeter Officers between shifts meet each other at the front of the Unit, then drive to the unloading barrel at the Sallyport to exchange weapons. The relieving Officer then drives the relieved Officer back to the front of the Unit so he can go inside and stamp out.
- This provides an extremely reliable, predictable window of opportunity for inmates to exploit the lack of perimeter coverage.

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- Recommend all ADC facilities implement a process where the oncoming perimeter Officer picks up his own weapons, equipment, and vehicle and relieves the off-going Officer via radio.

**Other Issues of Note:**

- Trash Compactor is not enclosed in a cage. It is similar to the compactor that was at Stiner when the inmates escaped from there.
- Very poor controlled ingress onto the Unit.
- Limited signage directing traffic
- Route to Cerbat Unit is confusing
- No time is allotted for briefing of any kind
- Numerous pallets of compressed cardboard and other recycle bins behind the Kitchen area. Provides areas for inmates to hide as well as "body armor" to defeat razor wire.
- We did not observe any signage along I-40 advising drivers they are near a state prison – do not stop for hitchhikers.
- According to IT, no alarm sounds in Main Control when an emergency door is accessed to no man's land. The only indication in Main Control is if the Officer pulls up the building overview, the door icon will show red instead of green. I did not confirm this
- Morale of staff on the Unit was extremely high. They appeared very eager to learn how the systems work and why they are in place.



**Assessment provided by: Captain Richard Haggard**

My assessment covered the following areas: Perimeter Security, Armory Weapons/DART, Keys, Count/Inmate Movement, Searches and Environmental Observations.

**Perimeter Security:**

- The Zone alarm system has been malfunctioning for months. Zones continually are activated and more so after 1930 hours, according to staff.
- Staff and Supervisors claim work orders have been submitted, but when checking the SDI log, this was found to be incorrect. None have been submitted for months.
- My observations of staff while riding with them in the perimeter vehicle is that they are obviously affected by the continuous alarms and take responses to zone alarms less seriously. Comment made, "Sometimes I don't even want to get on the radio to clear it, because it takes up so much radio time."
- Perimeter Officer had no idea the procedure for responding to tracks in the sand trap. His response contradicted the Post Order, which was actually the correct way.
- Post Orders give little direction in regards to, "Outside Intrusion," this needs to be more specific and added into them.
- Swings to Graves weapon exchange took app. 9 minutes with an additional 7 minutes in the front parking lot (checking oil, starting their journal etc.) leaving the vulnerable zones 8 -14 unattended for app. 16 minutes.
- The Graves Perimeter Officer was not proficient with either weapon. He struggled to unload the shotgun and required assistance from the Swings officer and did not safely load the, "Hot round," in the chamber on the 9mm.

**Armory Weapons/DART:**

- No master inventory is maintained in the Armory or where weapons are stored. They utilize a "Daily Armory Inventory" (Attached) which only provides you with what is currently in that area. Not what is supposed to be there. This includes the Tower, DART lockers, and Regular Use Weapons storage areas.
- Armory Post Order sec. 1.8.7 requires a Daily
- The last inventory on the Duty Ammunition was also on 7/21/10. The Birdshot count was off by 800 rounds. Noted was 2050, Actual 1250. 800 rounds were moved to the training locker last month and never notated. 00 Buck was off by

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50 rounds. They had 50 more than reflected on the Daily Inventory sheet. This was accredited to a counting error.

- Their Red Tag Seal System is in place and they are utilizing the logs. Although, it is apparent this has substituted for the inventory process.
- Beginning and ending inventories are completed by the shift commanders, but with no master inventory the accuracy is questionable.
- Supervisors above the rank of Lt. have not completed inventories for months according to their staff.
- Armory Post Order sec 1.6.4 requires weapons in the Armory shall remain empty at all times. DART shotguns remain loaded with 5 rounds of Birdshot with no rounds chambered. See Attached IR 10-M59-0822 for these results during the Cerbat disturbance.
- DART drills are not being regularly conducted. When they are conducted, they utilize only Shotguns even to simulate the 37 mm. This does not allow staff to become familiar with this weapon.
- Review of the Weapons qualification revealed only 4 out of 233 staff have expired weapons cards.

**Keys: Restricted**

- They utilize a "Hot Box" key system for their restricted keys.
- A Permanent issued key is assigned as a take home set.
- That key opens the "Hot Box" that holds their duty keys. Main Control cannot access restricted keys without the persons take home set or without breaking the seal on the restricted key set.

**Concern: Not all the take home sets have just the "Hot Box" key on the ring. Transportations take home set has the Belly chain padlock key on it for the entire Complex.**

**Count/Inmate Movement:**

- Inmate movement could not be observed due to the lockdown. The movement plan was explained by Warden Leider which defined movement to approved programs only occurred 10 minutes before the hour and half hour. The yard movement is controlled by officers running gates at two different locations. One of which is uncomfortably close to the tower. The Tower does not maintain lethal weapons. Only non-lethal.

- Different observations on the count procedures. Some staff was struggling to get the inmates to go to their bunks for count while other staff completed the task correctly. Appears to be more of a training issue rather than a systemic problem.
- Observed two formal counts; both counts needed to have at least one cell block re-count before clearing. Proper procedures for this were followed.
- The shift commander was actively involved in clearing the count. During Swings we actually observed the Shift Commander receiving the count.

**Searches:**

- Searches are being conducted on a regular basis. With a unit population of over 1500 they complete on an average of 500 plus searches per month. This is accredited to the Unit Management and the fact that they are fully staffed at all times. Every post is filled every day utilizing overtime if need be. They never collapse a post.

**Environmental Observations:**

- Grooming and Housing compliance is not being enforced, giving the impression that the inmates are in control. DO 704 is in place yet the impression is that the staff are reluctant to challenge the inmates for compliance.
- Excessive amounts of cardboard in the Housing cubicles being used for hobby craft.
- The Unit still utilizes the use of Metal Horseshoes.
- Mop buckets in the housing units still have the metal rods that we eliminated years ago.
- Observed one male supervisor with an earring in his ear.
- They recycle cardboard in the no man's land and it accumulates in "Semi Loads" waiting to be picked up.
- The SSU position is only part time as it is not part of the contract according to a MTC Lt. With the addition of medium custody inmates this needs to be added to their post charts as we have learned the valuable importance of this position.
- The Chief of Security position seems to have a lack of security. Tour reports indicated lack of attentiveness to the shifts. No corrective action taken on serious security conditions, and no follow up on items that should require his direct involvement.






















	CORRECTED EVENT TIME	ZONE ALARM	ALARM TIME	ALARM RESET	TIME ELAPSED (hr/min)	LINE	COMPUTER TIME (+42 min)
BASED ON PERIMETER SYSTEM CLOCK							
* Alarm Time minus Reset Time = Elapsed Time Zone was Unsecure							
START OF SWINGS 1300	1303	14	1345	1420	35	1488	1345
	1310	4	1352	1420	28	1489	1352
	1316	13	1358	1420	22	1490	1358
	1324	10	1406	1420	14	1491	1406
	1326	12	1408	1420	12	1492	1408
	1327	6	1409	1420	11	1493	1409
	1327	11	1409	1420	11	1494	1409
	1329	5	1411	1420	9	1495	1411
	1338	4	1420	1427	7	1513	1420
	1338	5	1420	1427	7	1514	1420
	1343	8	1425	1427	2	1515	1425
	1345	5	1427	1433	6	1523	1427
	1347	8	1429	1433	4	1524	1429
	1350	11	1432	1433	1	1525	1432
	1352	4	1434	1525	51	1533	1434
1359	5	1441	1525	44	1534	1441	
1359	3	1441	1525	44	1535	1441	
1400 hrs	1413	6	1455	1525	30	1536	1455
	1414	11	1456	1525	29	1537	1456
	1415	13	1457	1525	28	1538	1457
	1418	9	1500	1525	25	1539	1500
	1444	4	1526	1545	19	1555	1526
	1445	5	1527	1545	18	1556	1527
	1445	8	1527	1545	18	1557	1527
	1447	13	1529	1545	16	1558	1529
	1449	14	1531	1545	14	1559	1531
	1450	3	1532	1545	13	1560	1532
	1450	12	1532	1545	13	1561	1532
1455	11	1537	1545	8	1562	1537	



1500 hrs

1456	10	1538	1545	7	1563	1538
1457	3	1539	1545	6	1564	1539
1459	9	1541	1545	4	1565	1541
1500	2	1542	1545	3	1566	1542
1503	13	1545	1545	0	1580	1545
1503	3	1545	1545	0	1587	1545
1503	4	1545	1545	0	1590	1545
1503	13	1545	1545	0	1604	1545
1503	10	1545	1545	0	1606	1545
1503	3	1545	1545	0	1607	1545
1503	8	1545	1545	0	1608	1545
1503	4	1545	1545	0	1609	1545
1503	2	1545	1545	0	1610	1545
1503	11	1545	1636	51	1611	1545
1503	13	1545	1636	51	1621	1545
1503	12	1545	1636	51	1623	1545
1503	14	1545	1636	51	1629	1545
1504	3	1545	1636	51	1630	1545
1504	4	1545	1636	51	1631	1545
1504	8	1546	1636	50	1632	1546
1504	10	1546	1636	50	1633	1546
1504	9	1546	1636	50	1634	1546
1504	3	1546	1636	50	1635	1546
1504	2	1546	1636	50	1636	1546
1505	5	1547	1636	49	1637	1547
1507	6	1549	1636	47	1638	1549
1601	3	1643	1752	69	1666	1643
1606	11	1648	1752	64	1667	1648
1628	8	1710	1752	42	1668	1710
1628	9	1710	1752	42	1669	1710
1701	13	1743	1752	9	1670	1743
1703	4	1745	1752	7	1671	1745
1704	14	1746	1752	6	1672	1746
1710	13	1752	1815	23	1688	1752
1711	12	1753	1815	22	1689	1753
1711	4	1753	1815	22	1690	1753
1712	11	1754	1815	21	1691	1754



1600HRS



1700 HRS

	1714	6	1756	1815	19	1692	1756
	1714	14	1756	1815	19	1693	1756
	1730	10	1812	1815	3	1694	1812
	1749	8	1831	1853	22	1710	1831
1800 HRS	1802	13	1844	1853	9	1711	1844
OPERATOR LOGGED	1802	10	1844	1853	9	1712	1844
SYSTEM OFF	1826		OPERATOR LOG OFF (1hr 14 min)			1720	1908
1900 HRS	1940	8	2022	2051	29	1721	2022
	1944	11	2026	2051	25	1722	2026
	1947	12	2029	2051	22	1723	2029
	1954	10	2036	2051	15	1724	2036
	1955	13	2037	2051	14	1725	2037
2000 HRS	2012	13	2054	2127	73	1737	2054
	<b>2022</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2104</b>	<b>2127</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1738</b>	<b>2104</b>
	<b>2057</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2139</b>	<b>2159</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1744</b>	<b>2139</b>
2100 HRS START OF SWINGS	2142	5	2224	126	3hrs 2min	1748	2224
2200 HRS	2206	13	2248	126	2hrs 38min	1749	2248
	2206	12	2248	126	2hrs 38min	1750	2248
	2207	11	2249	126	2hrs 37min	1751	2249
	2207	10	2249	126	2hrs 37min	1752	2249
	2208	9	2250	126	2hrs 36min	1753	2250
2300 HRS	2312	8	2354	126	2hrs 32min	1754	2354
0000 HRS	1244		OPERATOR LOG ON			1771	126
MIDNIGHT	1244		OPERATOR LOG OFF			1772	126
	1244		SYSTEM MANAGER LOG ON			1773	126
	1252		SYSTEM MANAGER LOG OFF			1774	134
	1252		OPERATOR LOG ON			1775	134
0100 hrs	107		OPERATOR LOG OFF			1776	149
	120	9	140	648	5hrs 8min	1777	202
0200 thru 0600 HRS	323	8	323	648	3hrs 31min	1778	405
END OF GRAVEYARD	NO FURTHER ZONE ACTIVITY ON GRAVEYARD						













































# ADC Facilities by Mission, Security Level

**DUI = DUI**  
**GP = General Pop.**  
**R = Reception**  
**M = Medical**  
**MH = Mental Health**  
**PS = Protective Seg.**  
**Sp = Specialized**

**Physical Security Levels:**

**5 = Highest (max)**  
**4 = High (close)**  
**3 = Moderate (medium)**  
**2 = Low (minimum)**

