



CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON SOLANO

Staff Safety Evaluation

Oct. 31 - Nov. 4, 2005

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

Corrections Standards Authority

600 Bercut Drive, Suite A

Sacramento, California 95814

www.csa.ca.gov



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BACKGROUND

In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state's adult and youth detention facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the CSA, the proposal was presented and accepted. On May 24-25, 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, a team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.

On July 5-8, 2005, a team comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's (CDCR) CSA, Division of Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice pilot tested the Staff Safety Evaluation criteria at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and perpetrator data, a preliminary site visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff, a review of applicable written policies and procedures governing the operation of the institution and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, inmate population and safety equipment. The basic criteria were deemed appropriate and subsequent evaluations have been based on the outcome of the pilot criteria.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

California State Prison Solano was selected as the third adult facility for review and the MCSP evaluation protocol was followed. An entrance letter was sent to Warden Thomas L. Carey informing him of the October 31 through November 4, 2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record information from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to ascertain if any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before the site visit (Attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided copies of existing documents or researched their records for information.

The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team (Attachment E). The evaluation began on October 31, 2005 at the institution with an entrance conference with Chief Deputy Warden Robert A. Horel, appropriate institutional administrative staff and evaluation team members. The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Chief Deputy Warden Horel as well as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Field Representative Robert Takeshta. Following the entrance conference, the evaluation team members were provided a tour of the institution.

Using a conference room as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Available documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety

equipment, staffing levels, staff assaults and inmate population. The group looked for any trends or related issues.

The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it related to staffing, and the inmate population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety such as inmate crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication.

Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on the second and third watch were interviewed to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews, and is included as an attachment to this report (Attachment D). The responses were categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this report (page 20-24). Conflicts between the documentation, staffs' perception of the practice and their concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted.

An exit conference was conducted with Chief Deputy Warden Horel and the institution management staff to provide a summary of the results of the evaluation. The exit conference included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made by staff.

FACILITY PROFILE

California State Prison, Solano (CSP Solano), located near Vacaville, California was first opened as California Medical Facility – South in 1984. The institution was originally under the administration of the California Medical Facility – Vacaville, located on the adjacent property. In 1992, the institutions were separated and California State Prison – Solano was established with its own warden and administration. The institution was initially planned to provide extensive vocational training programs and Prison Industry Authority programs to Level II and Level III male inmates and the mission has remained the same.

According to documentation reviewed at the institution¹ and discussions with staff, the institution was originally designed to house 1204 Level II and 1200 Level III general population inmates in two facilities, using a 270-degree design, for a total institutional capacity of 2404. The portion of the institution designated for Level III housing consisted of two 600 bed housing complexes creating a perimeter around the exercise yard of each complex. The complexes shared a gymnasium, administrative and program support area. Each housing complex was constructed with six buildings. Each building contained 100 individually secured cells, each containing a toilet/washbasin combination unit.

The original design included a 1204 bed Level II facility that mirrored the Level III facility footprint; however, the buildings were to be a 270-degree dormitory design with 172 beds in each building. While the original design included 12 buildings to house Level II inmates, only 7 were actually built. The Level II portion of the institution also had a shared gymnasium and program support area.

In the late 1990's, five open dormitories were built in the locations originally planned for 270-degree dormitories. While designed to house 100 Level II inmates in each, the open dormitories were occupied with 200 inmates each.

Today, the facility has been divided into four facilities designated Facilities 1, 2, 3 and 4. Central Control, a Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) and the receiving and releasing unit are located near a central point between the four facilities. A secure electrified perimeter fence surrounds the entire institution.

To accommodate the increased population of Level III inmates, each of the single cells in Facilities 1 and 2 have been converted to double occupancy. Emergency beds (e-beds), consisting of 75 triple bunks have been added to the gymnasium. To accommodate the increased population of Level II inmates in Facilities 3 and 4, 48 triple bunks have been added each of the 270-degree dormitory units and 75 triple bunks have been added to the shared gymnasium. The open dormitories continue to house 200 inmates each. The total institution bed count is 6287.

Inmate vocational and academic education and PLA programs are located within the secure perimeter on the north side of the institution. Located outside of the secure perimeter are

¹ Design Criteria Guidelines, 1986

buildings for various staff office space, inmate records, firehouse and the Office of Substance Abuse Programs (OSAP).

Current Usage

The institution continues to provide inmate programs including educational study for high school diploma/GED, specialized vocational training for several trades and professions (automotive/mechanical repair, electronics, landscaping, building trades, optical lab, etc.), and other various programs to either support the community or otherwise better prepare the inmate for community reentry. CSP Solano's mission is to provide education and training to inmates and at the time of the evaluation, 3465 inmates (57%) were enrolled in one or more of the many programs offered at the institution.

Population Summary

The total institution bed count is 6287 (Attachment C). During the evaluation, the inmate count was 6118. 2512 inmates were designated Level III and 3606 were Level II; Level III being a higher security designation. There were 1923 inmates serving life sentences. There were 1101 gang members/associates, the majority of which were considered Northern Mexicans.

Sixteen inmates were designated as being Enhanced Out Patient (EOP) inmates. EOP inmates, while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care than do other mentally ill inmates. 1410 inmates were classified as Clinical Care Case Management System (CCCMS), inmates also diagnosed with mental illness but not requiring the heightened level of care of EOP inmates.

Of the total inmate population, there were 2354 black (38.4%), 1845 white (30.1%), 1312 Hispanic (21.4%), and 607 other (10.1 %).

Staffing Allocation and Availability

On October 31, 2005, the initial day of the evaluation, the funded staffing was established at 832.7 custody personnel, which includes the ranks of Correctional Officer through Warden. Of the allocated positions, there are currently 65.8 vacant custody positions and 21 employees off on long-term leave (over 3 months). The below listing reflects the ranges of custody classifications.

- Managerial custody staff at CSP Solano consists of the Warden, Chief Deputy Warden, 4 Associate Wardens, Correctional Counselor III and 5 Captains.
- Supervisory custody staff consists of Correctional Lieutenants, Correctional Counselor IIs (CC II), Correctional Sergeants, and Senior Medical Technical Assistant (SMTA).
- Rank and file custody staff consist of Correctional Officers, Medical Technical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselor I (CC I) staff. In addition to the allocated Correctional Officer positions at CSP-Solano, there are 5 part-time intermittent (PIE) Correctional Officer employees.

There are 446.2 allocated non-custody positions with 92.8 vacancies and 12 employees have been off on long-term leaves (over 3 months).

- Of the non-custody vacancies, 22.5 (24 percent) are medical positions, 15 (16 percent) are education positions, 11.7 (13 percent) are mental health positions and the other 43.6 various vacant positions are less critical support positions.

See Table I below for a summary of positions, vacancies, long-term leave and staff availability.

Table I				
	Allocated Positions	Vacancies	Long-term Leave	Available Staff
Custody Staff	832.7	65.8	21	745.9
Non-Custody Staff	446.2	92.8	12	341.4
Total	1278.9	158.6	33	1087.3

The following finding is related to staffing issues as identified by the team:

FINDING: Shift replacement of custody positions may be a contributing factor to staff assaults.

DISCUSSION: The institution has an 8.8% vacancy rate among the line custody staff. When including the staff off on long term leave (over 3 months for the purpose of this review), the effective vacancy rate increases to 9.1%. Shift replacement must be found to replace vacant officer positions, officers off on long-term leave, officers absent to attend training and officers off on a short-term basis for all other types of leaves. As a result, the number of volunteers to work overtime is insufficient to fill the required posts and officers must be ordered to work overtime. The information provided to the team was that as many as 23 officers must be ordered to work overtime each day, after working their assigned 8-hour shift. Officers working shift replacement overtime may be tired, preoccupied or performing at less than their full potential because they are working assignments in which they are unfamiliar. The team was unable to confirm if staff injuries occurred at a higher frequency during overtime as opposed to during regular shifts. Considering the crowded conditions, the team recommends staffing levels be maintained with as few vacancies as possible.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION

The Data/Documentation Review Team reviewed available documentation, records and policy manuals to identify any trends or common themes among the incidents. The items reviewed included:

- Incident reports for staff assaults or attempted assaults (CDC 837).
- Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
- State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
- Inmate appeals (602).
- Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
- Use of Force Executive Review Committee (ERC) findings.
- Facility training records.
- Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
- Employee safety grievances.
- Daily chronological/watch commander's report.
- Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
- Staffing information.
- Classification records.
- Inmate files.
- Department Operations Manual (DOM) – Relevant sections only.
- Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) – Relevant sections only.

Based on the documentation review, interviews and observations, the following findings are presented.

Staff Assault Incident Reports

FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff assaults. Other than inmate classification (see discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the various incidents.

DISCUSSION: Sixteen incidents of battery or attempted battery on staff were reported during the time period from November 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005 at CSP – Solano. The institution reports that 17 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during incidents:

- Seven victims were from the ranks of correctional officers and 2 were correctional sergeants. The remaining victims included a Supervising MTA, three medical staff, two cooks, one SAP Counselor and one Prison Industry Authority staff member.
- Twelve of the victims were male and five were female.
- Five of the victims were white, 5 were black, 5 were Hispanic, and two were reported as other.

FINDING: The victim demographics are generally consistent with those of the overall institution staff demographics.

DISCUSSION: The average age of the victims was approximately 44 years with 8.02 years of service while the average age of custody staff is 42 with 12 years of service. The average age of non-custody staff is 49 with 11 years of service. Eight victims had less than 7 years of experience while 9 victims had eight or more years of experience.

FINDING: Race and age of the involved inmates do not appear to be significant assault factors.

DISCUSSION: No significant variances were noted when comparing the race or age of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Black inmates were involved in 10 incidents; white inmates were involved in 5 incidents; Hispanic inmates were involved in 2 incidents.

The average age of the involved inmates was 34.9 and they had been incarcerated for an average of 1152 days, including 122 days at CSP, Solano. The institution was unable to provide the average age of the total inmate population.

FINDING: While the vast majority of the staff assaults did not initially appear to result in injury to the victim staff member or to other personnel involved in the emergency response; in some instances follow-up medical treatment has been required resulting in lost work time.

DISCUSSION: In the reports reviewed, serious injuries² were not initially reported by the victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's infirmary. Only one of the victims is currently off duty as a result of an assault and will be off for at least 30 days. Another was off for 34 days and one officer was off for 14 days. One officer has a corrective surgery scheduled that may result in a 30-day absence.

FINDING: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff.

DISCUSSION: Fourteen of the incidents involved inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues. Twelve of the incidents occurred in the "hot house" housing units (buildings equipped with air conditioning to house inmates taking temperature-sensitive psychotropic medications) or outside the hot house but committed by a hot house inmate. Five of the incidents occurred in the medical/mental health treatment area. Six of the incidents involved CCCMS inmates (inmates diagnosed with mental illness). Three of the involved inmates were serving a life sentence.

FINDING: Inmate manufactured weapons were not factors in assaults on staff.

² A serious injury is defined by Title 15, Section 3000 as a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring suturing; and disfigurement.

DISCUSSION: An inmate manufactured weapon was involved in one of the incidents reviewed. In that case, an inmate used a sharpened toothbrush to stab a PLA laundry worker. In one incident, the inmate was in the process of concealing or disposing of a weapon but made no attempt to assault staff with it. An inmate threw an unknown liquid substance on staff in one of the incidents, and a food tray was used in another. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by striking, kicking or otherwise unlawfully touching with their hands and/or their feet.

FINDING: Insufficient data were available to determine if gang affiliation was a contributing factor related to staff assaults.

DISCUSSION: The facility had 1101 inmates documented as being aligned with a gang among the total population of 6118. In the reports reviewed, only 4 documented that the involved inmate was a gang member and no single gang was identified in a significant number of incidents.

FINDING: Hours of the day may be factors in assaults on staff.

DISCUSSION: The frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 11 occurrences; second watch had five incidents while only one occurred during first watch. The probability of being the victim of a staff assault may be higher during third watch because the number of available staff is significantly less than that of the second watch.

Although the data were insufficient to draw any conclusions, the frequency of incidents was highest during the month of September in 2005 with 4 assaults. The frequency of occurrences was evenly distributed among the days of the week.

FINDING: Insufficient programming availability for the inmate population may be a consideration to improve staff safety.

DISCUSSION: The primary mission of the institution is to provide educational and vocational training to the men incarcerated at CSP – Solano. Because the prison is crowded with over twice the original designed number of inmates, many do not have access to programmed activities or job assignments. The programming space has not been increased to match the increase in population so many of the inmates stay on their yards or inside their housing buildings all day.

Fifteen of the 38 educational positions were vacant at the time of our review. Five of the 28 vocational education positions were vacant.

Of the 6118 inmates at the institution, 3465 had some type of a program assignment. Included in that statistic are the inmates assigned to educational and vocational programs and it also includes those inmates with job assignments. Most job assignments involved maintenance and work crews. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the result of crowding, over 43% of the inmates at CSP – Solano are not involved in any program activity.

FINDING: Accidental injuries are not a frequent occurrence.

DISCUSSION: The evaluation team reviewed staff injury reports for the period from November 2004 through October 2005 as well as summaries from previous years. The evaluation team noted that staff injuries have been on a downward trend for the last 3 years. Currently, reported injuries for 2005 are down nearly 40% over the same time period from last year. The safety officer and the return to work coordinator attribute the decline to the constant monitoring of workplace safety issues. Both said injury reports are reviewed; maintenance issues are corrected, relevant issues are included in the monthly safety meetings and training issues are identified. No safety grievances have been filed during the time period reviewed.

FINDING: Monthly work area safety inspections are not being documented.

DISCUSSION: The safety officer provides a generic work area safety checklist as a method for the supervisor or designee to document a workplace inspection at least monthly. The checklist may be modified as needed for specific site applications. The team reviewed two examples of the checklist and found both to be useful. Unfortunately, the reporting forms are not being used and the safety officer had few records of workplace inspections. The review team suggests that one person be designated to oversee the required review process, maintain the appropriate documentation, and ensure appropriate follow-up is completed.

FINDING: The In-Service Training (IST) Manager is not being included in the safety meetings.

DISCUSSION: The safety officer schedules safety meetings to discuss safety issues and recent accidents and injuries. The IST manager is not being included in the process. Training is a key component when ensuring staff performance is consistent with established procedures or when effecting changes to improve working conditions. The training manager should be attending the safety meetings and be an active participant in any follow-up process to a critical incident, accidental injury or injury from a staff assault.

Training

FINDING: Documentation received by the review team provides that custody staff, non-custody staff, and all new employees at CSP-Solano are receiving 40 hours of mandated classroom training.

DISCUSSION: CSP-Solano has a designated training manager and assistant training manager who coordinate the training needs of all custody and non-custody staff. The IST manager receives a list of required formal training topics from the Office of Training and Professional Development (OTPD), CDCR headquarters. The training topics identified by the OTPD are specific to employee job classifications at the institution. Mandated training topics are specified by the California Penal Code, California Code of Regulations - Title 15, and the Departmental Operations Manual (DOM). The institution may add training that would be considered as being site-specific. Depending on the institution's mission and construction, site-specific training topics are determined by the training manager and subject to final approval by the Warden. The following are the training requirements for the various employee classifications.

- Custody employees up to the rank of correctional lieutenant are receiving 40 hours of required annual training. CSP-Solano does not currently offer On the Job Training (OJT) modules that would supplement other training. However, OJT is available from the employee's supervisor and quizzes in the monthly training bulletin. The review team was advised by the IST manager that there is a plan ready to be implemented which will provide an additional 12 hours of OJT via module segments. Management classifications (Captain through Warden) receive mandatory annual training during Administrative Officer of the Day (AOD) training.
- Non custody employees are receiving eight hours of formal classroom training in addition to any OJT provided by the employee's supervisor or quizzes offered in the monthly training bulletin.
- Orientation training is provided for both custody and non-custody staff who are new to the institution. Employees new to the department receive orientation. The orientation training includes 40 hours of classroom instruction specific to departmental requirements and institutional needs. Lateral transfers, promotions, etc., are not required by the institution to attend the 40-hour orientation, however they receive a condensed version which includes a tour of the institution and an orientation package with specific information about the institution.

In addition to the above annual training requirements, each employee may attend or request additional training from the IST department. Monthly training bulletins are available to each employee which provide a schedule of all upcoming monthly training classes and/or OJT modules.

Each employee's training year begins on their birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year. The training files reviewed indicated that regular, ongoing training was being performed. The training manager reported that all employees, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates.

FINDING: MTA staff have not been provided training necessary to be proficient as "first responders" in the event of a staff injury.

DISCUSSION: Several staff at CSP-Solano expressed concerns regarding MTAs who are required to respond to medical emergencies in various locations throughout the facility and are not trained or certified as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) or Certified First Responders (CFR). The review team was advised that the institution does not offer avenues or provide on-site training that would provide EMT or CFR training or certification for the staff required to respond and provide first response treatment. Of the MTAs who are EMT certified most have received EMT training from other agencies not associated with CDCR. That training came during previous employment and as with any perishable skill, must be updated at appropriate intervals. Since the MTA staff is the closest medically trained personnel and the most appropriate to respond to a staff injury within the secure portion of the facility, the team suggested all MTA staff receive the training necessary to equal that of community first responders. The need is reinforced by the fact that it may take extra time for ambulance and fire

personnel to respond through the security to get to an injured officer and the MTA is left to do whatever he/she can for first aid. The first responding medical personnel should be trained to the community standard.

FINDING: Meeting notes and attendance records are not being returned to the safety officer.

DISCUSSION: The Safety Officer provides binders to supervisors that contain topics, information, lesson plans and testing materials relative to safety issues as part of the IIPP training requirements. The supervisors deliver the safety information to their staff as they deem appropriate. The safety officer is not being provided the documentation that the lessons are being delivered. All safety training should be documented as being provided and reviewed to ensure the subject matter is current and relevant to current workplace needs.

FINDING: Staff members who provide post-specific orientation training do not receive specialized training in being a trainer or in the necessary elements of the post-specific duties that should be covered.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors and managers interviewed said the officers performing orientation training to new employees for a specific assigned post are determined by the post and bid process rather than a formal selection process. Trained officers provide the initial 40-hour orientation training; however, once the trainee is assigned to a post, he or she is paired with the correctional officer normally assigned to the position to become familiar with the specific duties.

In the past, officers were selected to act as lead officers for the purpose of post-specific orientation based on the manager's personal assessment of all available staff. The officer who has bid to that assignment now trains new staff. No formal process is used to recruit and select these trainers and no special training is provided to them.

FINDING: No formal training program is in place to provide "field training" to newly appointed peace officers.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors and managers interviewed said the orientation provided to new employees is limited to the 40-hour orientation process. Once the initial 40-hour training is completed, officers are assigned to duty posts. Upon initial assignment, the new employee works with another officer to become familiar with the tasks involved. While specialized training officers are utilized for the initial orientation, post specific training is provided by officers regularly assigned to the post who may or may not have been specially trained themselves.

All deputy sheriffs, police officers and the majority of local juvenile and adult correctional officers are required to complete a formal training program under the direction of a specially selected and trained officer. The program is designed to ensure the trainee is exposed to most situations that would be routinely encountered during the assignment and instructed on the expected performance. The training program ensures the employee performs within the applicable law, the department's policy and in a safe manner. The training officer observes the employee's performance at regular intervals, documents the progress, and provides any

necessary remedial instruction. The trainee must demonstrate competence before being allowed to function alone in the position. The team suggests the CDCR Division of Adult Institutions consider developing a formalized institutional training program for new recruits and an abbreviated program for newly transferred officers.

FINDING: New employees may work several shifts before receiving orientation training.

DISCUSSION: Forty hours of orientation is offered every other month. Depending on the assignment date, orientation cycle and trainer's schedule, a new employee could work for as long as two months before receiving orientation training. Typically, the new employee is assigned to the institution and attends the orientation training the following month. The team suggested all employees are provided orientation training before working an assigned shift without being accompanied by a lead staff/training officer.

FINDING: Institutional orientation training is not being provided to existing state employees, both custody and non-custody who transfer to CSP – Solano from other institutions.

DISCUSSION: Forty hours of orientation, specific to CSP – Solano is only provided to all newly hired employees, both custody and non-custody. Employees transferring from other institutions are not included in the orientation classes and are instead only provided a tour. A thorough facility-specific orientation should be provided to all employees upon initial assignment to an institution because California prisons have differing physical plant characteristics and operational procedures.

FINDING: The review team was unable to find documentation of institutional orientation training being provided to contract employees who provide short-term services at the institution.

DISCUSSION: In order to maintain a sufficient number of staff to provide mandated services, temporary vacancies are filled with temporary workers sent to the institution by contract employment services. Examples include replacement health care workers such as registry nurses and physicians. Building and maintenance contractors performing repair or construction work would also be included in this category. These employees may only work one day at the institution or they may work for a few days. They are not state employees. Even though the responsibility for orientation training may reside with the employment service, the information may be better delivered by CDCR staff. Since orientation training is offered every other month; it is conceivable that the contract employee(s) is no longer working. We discussed some options such as using a checklist generated by institution staff or a short video and acknowledgment produced by CDCR to ensure that a basic standardized orientation is provided in a consistent manner to all contract employees.

FINDING: The transportation team does not receive training appropriate for the potential emergencies they may encounter while moving inmates outside of the institution.

DISCUSSION: The transportation teams are responsible for the safe and secure movement of prison inmates outside of the secure perimeter of the institution. Inmates are transported to and from courts, county jails, medical offices, hospitals other institutions using specially equipped

and marked cars and vans. Members reported they do not receive specialized training relative to this task. The defensive tactics training, defensive driver's training and firearms training they are given is the same as for all state correctional officers whose duties are typically limited to the custody environment. No training is provided for emergency vehicle operation or high speed driving. The officers are not trained on the operation of the mobile radios, sirens, emergency lighting or other unique features of the vehicles.

The firearms training does not include combat shooting scenarios the team might encounter. Escapes and rescues will probably take place in a public area by armed suspects and further complicated by the presence of bystanders. The setting may be a busy freeway, a rural roadway, a city street or a medical waiting/treatment room. The review team suggests specialized training be provided to transportation teams.

Safety Equipment

The Department Operations Manual, Section 55050 addresses equipment such as weapons, chemical agents and the armory. This section, in part identifies departmentally approved chemical agents and munitions. CSP-Solano issues chemical agents to correctional officers during each shift. Additional chemical agents, impact munitions and less-lethal devices are maintained in various secured locations throughout the institution. A review of the equipment inventory records did not identify any apparent deficiencies regarding the accountability of emergency equipment.

FINDING: The institution properly maintains an institutional armory and sub armory for the storage of lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and related emergency equipment.

DISCUSSION: The review team toured the armory and examined documentation pertaining to required inventory and maintenance of lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions, and all emergency equipment.

The institution's main armory consists of a freestanding concrete building located outside of the institution's secured perimeter which is enclosed with a chain link fence topped with razor wire. The armory is under constant observation (24/7) by an armed tower adjacent to the armory structure. Access to the armory is restricted to authorized personnel only or as authorized by the watch commander during extreme emergencies. The Tower #1 officer has direct control of armory access for those individuals authorized to enter.

The institution's sub-armory is maintained inside of the central control room that is contained in a secured armed location within the institution's secured perimeter. The sub-armory maintains lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and emergency equipment.

During the tour of the armory the review team noted that appropriate entry and exit log books were in place and evaluation team members were required to sign in and out.

FINDING: The institution provides stab-resistant vests to custody classifications of correctional officer, correctional sergeant and correctional lieutenant; however, several problems have surfaced regarding fit and serviceability.

DISCUSSION: The review team toured the institution and talked with custody staff and the armory sergeant regarding the condition of personal stab-resistant vests that have been issued.

Many of CSP-Solano's custody staff relayed complaints about their personally issued stab-resistant vest. The majority of the complaints were related to one particular vest manufacturer. The original contract for the purchase of vests was with the Protective Apparel Corporation of America (PACA). Of the PACA vests fitted and issued to the custody staff, 24% (168 vests) had problems associated with the fitting. Staff complained that after a few weeks, the vest fabric begins to bunch up and sag, which causes the vest to slip from the vital protection areas. Some of the vests begin to slip at the waistline causing interference with the emergency equipment secured to the duty belts.

The current contract provides for the purchase and fitting of a Second Chance brand vest. The armory sergeant advised the review team that there have not been any complaints or problems associated with the Second Chance vest. There are currently 47 Second Chance brand vests in service, and 48 Second Chance vests are on order. The CDCR Emergency Operations Unit (EOU) has allotted the institution 84 Second Chance vest for the current fiscal year. The armory sergeant has a pending request with EOU for an additional allotment of 187 Second Chance vests that would be used to rotate out the unserviceable PACA vests. Of the 697 PACA vest purchased, 55 are unserviceable and stored in the warehouse.

The review team was advised that the Department of General Services (DGS) has initiated litigation to resolve the manufacturing issues associated with the PACA vest.

FINDING: The Medical Technical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselors (CC), who are custody staff, are not fitted and issued stab-resistant vests.

DISCUSSION: The soft body armor stab-resistant vest inventory records were reviewed and it was noted that the MTAs and CCs who are custody staff are not issued vests. Vests are available for these officers to use when they plan to go into an area of significant risk; however, they are not routinely worn in their normal assignments. While these classifications are not first responders to alarms, they could be present or in the immediate vicinity when emergency response is needed. Absent a policy direction for the distribution of vests (and the classification of employee designated to receive vests), the team suggests that consideration be given to including the MTA and CC classifications among the staff to be issued vests. Alternatively, institution administrators must ensure that there is a pool of clean, serviceable vests made available for these employees.

FINDING: The institution has an approved Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), which outlines procedures to be implemented during emergencies. These procedures are contained in 50 individual confidential DOM Resource Supplements which are specific to a variety of emergency situations.

DISCUSSION: In March of 2005, the institution submitted the EOP to CDCR Institutions Division (Deputy Director for review and approval. On March 30, 2005, the CSP-Solano EOP was approved by Suzan Hubbard, Deputy Director (A), Institutions Division.

The DOM Resource Supplement outlining mutual aid response was current and among those DOM Supplements approved. The mutual aid plan contains a comprehensive plan for the use of mutual aid resources during emergency situations.

In addition to the DOM Resource Supplements, the review team examined the institutions plan for staff accountability. The Institutions Operation Plan (OP CSPA-CS-04-002) was recently revised and approved by the Warden in February 2005. The staff accountability plan contains a thorough and well-developed plan to accurately account for staff in a timely manner.

FINDING: Pursuant to department policy, one floor officer and the tower officer are equipped with radios. Under certain circumstances an officer can be left to supervise inmates without radio communication availability.

DISCUSSION: The floor officer designated to carry the radio assigned to each unit is also the designated responder to emergencies or other inmate movements. As a result, the remaining floor officer on the housing unit can be left without radio communication. The tower officer is issued a radio and should provide for communication on behalf of the floor officer; however, during the on-site review an alarm sounded and the radio-equipped officer left the unit. The tower officer concentrated his attention on the events occurring outside the unit leaving the remaining floor officer to supervise the inmates without the ability to communicate outside the unit. While this points more to the need for training towers officers on their responsibilities, the team recommends issuing radios to all staff to ensure the safety and security of staff and inmates.

FINDING: Staff reported that radio batteries did not hold a charge. Some staff reported that batteries lasted only two hours before needing replacement. Defective or worn out equipment is a staff safety issue.

DISCUSSION: The institution is encouraged to ensure an adequate supply of dependable batteries are available to staff.

FINDING: Custody staff report to their work site by walking through the institution (where inmates are participating in programming) without the benefit of some items of standard issue safety equipment that may be needed in the event of an emergency.

DISCUSSION: The operating process mandates that staff walk to their work site without safety equipment such as a radio, chemical agent, baton, personal alarm, etc. Once at their designated post, the staff member then receives safety equipment from the officer that is being relieved. This process is reversed for the staff going off-duty, as they have to exit their duty station by walking through the institution without safety equipment. Non-custody staff is not issued personal alarms until they arrive at their work site. It is recommended that safety equipment be issued to staff prior to entering the security area.

PHYSICAL PLANT

The institution is comprised of four quadrants designated as facilities. Each facility contains six housing units situated around an outdoor exercise yard. Facility 1 and 2 are designated to house level III inmates and Facility 3 and 4 are designated to house Level II inmates. Two fences, approximately 30 feet apart, with a high voltage electric fence in between define the secure perimeter. All housing units and support buildings are located within the secure perimeter.

The housing units within Facilities 1 and 2 are all of the 270-degree design. Each living unit contains 100 cells, originally designed to house one inmate in each cell. The cells are located on two tiers that face an elevated control station. The control stations are each staffed with one armed correctional officer identified as a gunner. Located below the control station is a sally port that serves as a means of entry and egress to and from the living unit. There are two staff offices located below the control stations and are assessable to the dayroom. Two correctional officers are assigned as floor officers.

Located within Facilities 3 and 4 are seven 270-degree design living units. Each of these living units contains 24 small dormitories located on two tiers. The original design capacity for these living units is 172, although each of them currently houses more than twice that many inmates. These dormitory segments have open fronts (no wall/door or other barrier) and inmates can walk unimpeded from the dormitory unit to the dayroom, unless ordered to remain within their assigned bunk area by staff. There are three of these living units located in Facility 3 and four of these living units are located within Facility 4. In addition to the 270-degree living units, there are three large open dormitories located in Facility 3 and two such dormitories in Facility 4. The large dormitories were designed to house 100 inmates each though each currently houses up to 200 inmates.

Facilities 1 and 2 are separated by a common wing (accessible from either side), that contains a chapel, dining hall, canteen, staff support offices and the gymnasium. Facilities 3 and 4 have a similar configuration. Located in the center of the four quadrants is a release and receiving building, a tall observation tower, a medical clinic, a laundry and a central kitchen.

The Prison Industries Authority operates a metal fabrication shop, a binding/printing shop, and an optical laboratory within the secure perimeter. These shops are located on the western side of the facility. Additionally, 10 educational classrooms and the Substance Abuse Program meeting rooms are located adjacent to the shop areas. A fenced walkway leads from the central area to the classrooms and shops. There is a building between the shops/classrooms and the living units where inmates are searched before returning to their living units.

Based on the assessment and related interviews conducted by the physical plant team, the following findings are presented:

FINDING: The institution is crowded, leading to unsafe conditions.

DISCUSSION: Emergency-beds are utilized within several housing units and the gymnasiums have been converted to dormitories. The additional beds have in many cases led to limited sightlines, and adversely impacted staffs' ability to supervise and monitor the activities of inmates. In the gymnasiums, the bunks are so close together that walking between the rows of bunks is ill advised. The additional inmate population has taxed the resources available for inmate supervision, outside yard opportunities and inmate services. The conversion of the gymnasiums to create living spaces has also eliminated vital recreation areas and altered the initial intent of the facility program.

FINDING: Building 11 has been used as overflow housing for inmates classified to administrative segregation. This building is not equipped to safely house Administrative Segregation inmates and doing so is contrary to policy.

DISCUSSION: Building 10 was originally designed and constructed to house inmates requiring administrative segregation. Due to persistent crowding, Building 9 was identified as the overflow building for inmates requiring administrative segregation. Building 9 was retrofitted with food ports and secure shower areas several years ago in response to the increased classification of inmates housed within it. As crowded conditions have continued, Building 11 is now identified and utilized as the overflow. Food ports in the cell doors and secure shower areas are not provided within Building 11. The institution is encouraged to install food ports in the cell doors and secure shower areas within Building 11.

FINDING: Due to staff vacancies, there is an insufficient number of staff to safely supervise inmates in the Prison Industry Authority shops.

DISCUSSION: Prison Industry Authority staff reported nine vacancies. These nine positions provide supervision of the inmates working in the Prison Industry Authority shops. As a result of these vacant positions (which are reportedly not backfilled), supervision of inmates is reduced in all of the Prison Industry Authority shops. Proper inmate supervision is necessary for the safety of everyone in the institution. The institution is encouraged to fill these vacant positions.

FINDING: When an alarm activates in education, there is no audible alarm to alert other education staff to a problem. Custody staff must check every classroom to locate the emergency.

DISCUSSION: It is recommended when an alarm activated, an audible alert sounds at the specific area of the emergency.

FINDING: Some housing units had several inoperative overhead lights. Dimly lit areas do not foster a safe environment.

DISCUSSION: The team recommends Plant Operations check and repair all overhead lights on a continual basis and encourage staff to better report the need to replace lights.

FINDING: The Public Address (PA) system does not work properly in all housing units. In addition to other functions, this system alerts staff and inmates of emergency situations.

DISCUSSION: The team recommends that Plant Operations check all PA systems on a regular basis and make repairs as necessary.

FINDING: Evaluation team members observed loose stones on the exercise yards. Some of these stones were large and could be used as weapons.

DISCUSSION: The Institution is encouraged to remove the loose stones from inmate areas.

FINDING: The evaluation team observed windows in facility classrooms covered with papers (inmate school work, etc.) that prevent custody staff from providing classroom security without entering the room.

DISCUSSION: Institution staff is encouraged to remove the papers from the windows in classrooms.

FINDING: Plant Operations staff indicates there are a limited number of electric vehicles. These vehicles are the primary means for transporting plant operations staff and equipment in and around the institutions to make repairs to the facility. Delayed repairs have potential staff safety implications.

DISCUSSION: The institution is encouraged to purchase additional electric vehicles.

FINDING: The Institution allows inmates to possess personal property in excess of Department Operations Manual (DOM), Chapter 5, Article 43 – Inmate Property.

DISCUSSION: During a tour of the institution, specifically in the open dorm settings and temporary gym dorms, the evaluation team noted excessive amounts of personal property being stored under bunks in cardboard boxes, at the edge of lockers and bed areas, on top of lockers, and numerous clotheslines strung from bunks and lockers. Storage lockers are provided to each inmate for the storage of personal property that will accommodate the six cubic feet allowed per DOM. The amount of property being stored outside of the lockers creates an additional fuel load and could interfere with fire fighting efforts and obstruct the escape routes during emergencies or actual fires. In addition to the safety concerns associated with excessive property, the items hanging from clothes lines create a security concern because the officers do not have a clear line of sight to observe movement and activities within the dorm and gym living areas.

FINDING: According to DOM Chapter 5, Article 24, Section 52090.7.6, Annual Inspections, the State Fire Marshal is to conduct an inspection of the institution annually.

DISCUSSION: Fire department staff informed the review team that an annual fire inspection has not been conducted in the last several years because the State Fire Marshal is not obligated to operate under the requirements of DOM. The State Fire Marshal cannot inspect the institution annually due to budget constraints. The institution is encouraged to find a means to receive the required fire inspections.

FINDING: The windows located under the stairwells in the dayrooms of Buildings 1 through 12 are a staff safety concern.

DISCUSSION: The windows under the stairwells serve no apparent purpose. The natural light resulting from the placement of the windows is minimal. These windows are decorative in nature and do not enhance supervision or security. The majority of the windows are broken due to inmates pounding on them in an attempt to get the attention of other inmates on the outside exercise yard. Officer time is spent keeping inmates away from the windows, diverting their attention from other matters. Plant Operation staff reported these windows are replaced regularly. These windows are 9/16 glass-clad-polycarbonate and are expensive. The evaluation team recommends removing these windows and replacing them with cement block similar to that of the surrounding wall material.

FINDING: In the 270-degree design buildings, many of the windows located in the floors of the tower area that provide sight lines down into the sally port and offices below need to be replaced. The majority of the windows are scratched and cracked to the point that vision through them is obscured.

DISCUSSION: Plant Operations staff reported they are aware of the need to replace many of these windows; however, a means of replacing these windows has not been developed at this time. Apparently the window frames will be damaged if disassembled to remove the damaged glass and Plant Operations staff believe the integrity of the reassembled window frames will not provide the level of security needed to protect the tower area from inmate access. Buildings 1 through 12 are 270-degree design and weapons and munitions are located within their tower areas. The institution is encouraged to develop a means of replacing these windows and expediting the repair.

FINDING: The fire alarm system needs to be replaced.

DISCUSSION: The safety officer informed the team that the fire alarm system that was originally installed in the buildings has outlived its usefulness. The system is difficult to repair and many of the components are either no longer available or are in short supply. The institution needs to begin the process to replace the system.

STAFF INTERVIEWS

Interview Process

The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with custody and non-custody staff at California State Prison – Solano from Monday, October 31 through Friday, November 4, 2005. Members of the team interviewed staff about safety related issues (e.g., safety equipment issued to staff and their perception of personal safety at the institution). The list of specific questions asked by the interview team is attached to this report (Attachment D).

The evaluation team conducted random interviews with staff during the second and third watches at the following work locations: receiving and release; Level II yards; Facility III and IV, Buildings 13-24 and G Dorm; Level III yards; Facility I and II Buildings 1-12 and H Dorm, canteen, infirmary, satellite clinic, kitchens, mailroom, and inmate visiting. Custody staff classifications interviewed included: the Chief Deputy Warden, Associate Wardens, Correctional and Facility Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Correctional Officers, Senior Medical Technical Assistant, Medical Technician Assistants, Correctional Counselors I, II, and III. Non-custody staff classifications included: the Medical Physicians, Senior Registered Nurse, Registered Nurses, Senior Psychiatrist, Psychiatrists, Psychiatric Technicians, Pharmacy Technicians, Associate Governmental Program Analyst, Office Technician, Office Assistant, Correctional Cooks, and Teachers.

Responses are grouped for custody staff and non-custody staff.

Interviews with Managers

The interview team met with the Chief Deputy Warden, Associate Wardens, Captains, and Correctional Counselor III.

The managers stated that CSP-Solano is a Level II and III institution, with an inmate population of 6118 inmates (snapshot on November 4, 2005). This population exceeds the facility design capacity by more than 100%. They said that crowding in the open dormitories (Facilities III and IV) and the gymnasiums (Facilities II and IV) are areas of great concern as it relates to staff safety.

Staff safety issues identified by the managers included the following:

FINDING: The inmate population in the open dormitories in Facilities III and IV exceed the facility design, and the use of the gymnasiums as living units compromise the security of the institution and the safety of staff.

DISCUSSION: The managers said that the open dormitories have 348 beds, and the housing bays are cramped with double and triple bunks. They told us that due to this crowding; one additional post has been added to the second and third watch (a total of three staff). The gymnasium for Facilities I and II (referred to as H Dorm) and Facilities III and IV (referred to as

G Dorm) have 225 beds each. H Dorm has a "gunner" station and a raised podium, and is staffed with two floor officers. G Dorm does not have a "gunner" station, and there are three floor officers. Due to the crowded conditions, officers' sight lines are obstructed (clothes, towels and other items hanging from the bunk beds), and it is difficult for staff to maneuver from one section of the gym to other side.

FINDING: Post and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.

DISCUSSION: The managers said that "post and bid" (a process in which lieutenant, sergeants and COs request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. Managers said that supervisor post and bid has limited their ability to place qualified supervisory staff in administrative positions identified for prison program facilitation and operation. They told us in the past, they could cross train staff, so they could be more proficient in key job areas. Now, senior staff bid a job (primarily based on the shift and days off it provides) and operational need become secondary. Managers said that "post and bid" gives the employees the sense of entitlement, and can lead to staff complacency.

FINDING: Managers said that since provisions to reduce sick leave abuse were eliminated from the Bargaining Unit 6 contract, staff use of sick leave has increased. The increased sick leave results in a greater reliance on overtime and can negatively impact staff performance.

DISCUSSION: Managers said it is difficult to hold employees accountable for sick leave abuse. They said prior to the last labor agreement with Unit 6, they could require an employee, who called in sick, to return to work with a doctor's note to explain the reason for their absence. Managers said that many of the staff feel entitled to use sick leave as they would vacation time. Due to staff shortages, whenever an employee calls in sick, on-duty line staff must be "drafted" (ordered over) to cover the staff vacancy. When staff becomes tired from working double shifts, facility security can be compromised.

FINDING: Managers said there is little incentive for staff to promote to the ranks of supervisors or managers.

DISCUSSION: Managers said that pay scales are compacted for sergeants, lieutenants and captains. Senior officers express no interest in promoting because they will lose "post and bid" seniority for a preferential shift, and that the monetary compensation is minimal. For example, a senior correctional officer said he can work two shifts of overtime, and will take home more money than a sergeant. Lieutenants are equally uninterested in promoting because of the workload of the captains, the lack of monetary compensation, and not having equal retirement benefits (3% at 50).

FINDING: Managers morale is low due to their increasing workload, and a lack of acknowledgement for their efforts.

DISCUSSION: Operational requirements, ongoing audits, compliance monitoring and court agreements are contributing to the frustration of managers. Many of the managers would prefer to delegate some of their responsibilities to subordinates to allow them to take a more active role

in the operational security of the institution and to train and develop their staff; however, policy does not allow this to occur.

FINDING: Managers feel that Headquarters does not empower the institution with the authority to decide how to implement agency policy.

DISCUSSION: The managers said that Headquarters does not grant them the authority to implement agency policy. They gave the following example: Headquarters issued a memorandum stating that sergeants were required to sign inmate housing logbooks (using red ink) once per shift. Managers said this memorandum essentially dictated policy and procedures for them to accomplish this task. They told us that "proof of practice" (signing of the logbook) does not guarantee an effective outcome; the sergeant's signature in the logbook does not ensure that the log entries are accurate, or that required policy and procedures are met. They said this is another example of trying to assign blame (if the logbook is not signed) rather than implement an effective practice. Managers recommend that Headquarters dictate policy and trust the institution to develop specific procedures to accomplish it.

Interviews with Supervisors

The first and second line supervisors (Sergeants, Lieutenants, Senior Medical Technical Assistant, and Correctional Counselor II) were interviewed at various work locations throughout the institution. Supervisor concerns mirrored those of managers in the areas of post and bid and sick leave abuse.

FINDING: Supervisors feel that the importance of inmate programs takes priority over facility security.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that the institution is inundated with contraband (illegal narcotics, homemade weapons, and illegal possession of cell phones by inmates). They told us that the institution does not have an adequate number of staff available to conduct thorough searches of buildings, yards, or inmates' personal property for these contraband items. Secondly, they told us that they would be criticized for closing inmate programs while these searches were taking place. They believe additional contributing factors for the increase in illegal drugs is because the main gate is not manned to screen visitors, and visitors are allowed to park in restricted parking, where they hide drugs for outside work crews.

Additionally, supervisors stated that staff is denied the opportunity to conduct on going investigations (staff are discouraged from developing informants), or to request outside assistance. They said as a result of this lack of interdiction, drugs are prevalent within the institution.

The staff safety evaluation team reviewed incident reports (CDC 837s) from January - September 2005. There were a total of 418 incidents documented. 138 incidents were drug related incidents (possession of drugs, etc.) and 39 incidents involved an inmate in possession of a weapon. These offenses represent 42.34% of all incidents reports.

FINDING: Supervisors said line staff need additional training in critical job skills such as dealing with mentally ill inmates.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors said mandated training emphasizes complying with court mandates, but it does not provide line staff with the "tools" to improve staff safety. They said that staff need additional communication and awareness training. They told us, in past years, staff was able to shut down inmate programs for a short period so all staff could participate in "OJT", which focused on officer safety issues. The supervisors believe that the institutional priority is inmate programs while security and staff safety is secondary.

Interviews with Line Staff

The interview team conducted random interviews with line staff throughout the institution.

FINDING: Crowding is a major safety concern with line staff.

DISCUSSION: Correctional Officer, Correctional Counselor I, and Medical Technical Assistant personnel told us that they would like to see additional staff assigned to G and H Dorms (gymnasiums). They said it is difficult, if not impossible to see beyond the first row of triple bunks, and they cannot maintain visual observation on staff when they are conducting security checks due to sight line obstructions.

FINDING: Line staff reported that they felt comfortable and satisfied with the safety equipment that is issued to them at the institution.

DISCUSSION: All line staff interviewed said they felt relatively safe working at CSP Solano. They told us the primary reason is because there are very few incidents of staff assaults. Line staff told us that they are provided with personal alarms, radios in designated positions, handcuffs, expandable batons, and OC spray. Staff members felt that the safety equipment issued to them is adequate for the job, although they would like to see an additional radio assigned to each building.

Custody staff interviewed by the team said they were fitted for a stab vest. The majority of the staff that we spoke with told us that their vest did not fit them correctly (the PACA vests were too big or too small, the bottom of the vest "rolled up" or the top "dropped down"). While staff said that they were required to wear a vest if they were issued one, it was evident during our review that a substantial number of staff were not wearing a vest. Staff told us they were not wearing a vest because their vest was turned in for repair or replacement; the vest doesn't fit correctly; or, they don't like to wear the vest.

FINDING: Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) and Correctional Counselor I (CC I) staff reported they have not been fitted or issued a stab vest at CSP Solano.

DISCUSSION: MTA and CC I staff do not have stab vests issued to them for duty assignments at CSP Solano. They believe they are performing line staff peace officer functions, and they

should be issued the same safety equipment as Correctional Officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants. They said this issue is to be considered during the next contract negotiation.

FINDING: MTAs are in need of emergency medical training (e.g., first responder for medical emergencies).

DISCUSSION: The majority of MTAs are licensed vocational nurses, who are graduating from nursing school, with little or no emergency medical training. MTAs are the primary responders for emergency medical response at this institution, and it would be beneficial if they received additional training in emergency medical response. The fire chief and the medical staff echoed this feeling.

FINDING: Line staff would like to be promptly informed of relevant safety issues such as a riot at another institution in the event the circumstances incite tension or a similar event at CSP Solano.

DISCUSSION: Line staff said that they would like to see communications improved for sharing information regarding incidents at other prison sites, rather than hearing the information second/third hand or from the inmates themselves.

Interviews with Non-Custody Staff

The interview team spoke with non-custody staff at various work locations.

Findings: Medical staff said they would like to see communication improve between custody and non-custody staff.

DISCUSSION: Medical staff said if an inmate assaulted custody staff, they would like to know prior to treating the inmate. This would condition medical staff to be more on the alert, or to request that a MTA is present during treatment. They told us that more open discussion concerning individual inmates would benefit both medical and custody operations. Informing each other of changes to the inmate's behavior or custody status (e.g., medication, disciplinary status, or change of custody level) could mutually benefit and possibly mitigate future assaults.

FINDING: Teachers would like to see a greater presence of custody staff while they are conducting classes.

DISCUSSION: Teachers said they feel relatively safe while working at the institution. They said they would welcome the presence of a uniformed officer periodically while they are instructing class. They said it helps by letting the inmates know that custody staff is in the immediate area, and it makes the teachers feel safer.

FINDING: Prison Industry Authority (PIA) staff believed that the alarms in the PIA areas should be tested daily.

DISCUSSION: The alarms for non-custody staff in Prison Industry Authority program areas are tested once per week. Staff informed the evaluation team that custody personnel complete alarm testing on the Wednesday of each week. This process is accomplished by utilizing a special key that activates the alarm test process. Prison Industry Authority staff reported that they could complete the alarm testing daily if they were assigned the alarm-testing key. Consideration should be given to test alarms on a daily basis to ensure the safety of staff.

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

This report details the findings of the seventh staff safety evaluation conducted at the direction of the Corrections Standards Authority and the third adult institution evaluated (four Division of Juvenile Justice facilities have also been evaluated). There are many findings outlined in this report that are similar to those found in the other adult institutions evaluated (though there are institution specific findings as well). There are three primary reasons for the similar findings:

1. One of the objectives of criteria development panel was to avoid duplicating audits, inspections and evaluations that were already been conducted. As such, the scope of these evaluations has been limited to specific issues concerning staff assaults, training, safety equipment, staffing, physical plant issues and interviews with staff.
2. Many of the findings are a result of institutional crowding. The adult facilities are all crowded and that crowding results in similar findings across the institutions.
3. Other similar findings relate to established policy, provisions of employee contracts, the issuance of safety equipment, and limited resources. As these are system-wide issues, many of the resulting findings will occur in all institutions evaluated.

Crowding is again the greatest concern identified by the staff safety evaluation team and institution staff. Until the number of inmates in the CDCR adult institutions is reduced, the crowding related findings in this report will remain at issue.

Despite the crowded conditions at CSP Solano, the staff take pride in their work and their institution. There were some encouraging findings indicating that staff injuries are on the decline at CSP Solano and the number of assaults on staff resulting in serious injury were lower at CSP Solano than at the other institutions evaluated.

As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to CSA members, CDCR administration and Warden Carey. It is outside the scope of this project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan and appropriate action will be the responsibility of CDCR Division of Adult Institutions.

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY.

600 Bercut Drive
Sacramento, CA 95814

October 18, 2005

Thomas L. Carey, Warden
P. O. Box 4000
Vacaville, CA 95696-4000

Dear Warden Carey:

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) asked the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) to develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the CSA unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety evaluations.

The panel met on May 24-25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted. As a result, a team comprised of CSA, Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice will be conducting the evaluations over the next 28 months. We expect to be on site at California State Prison Solano for five days, October 31-November 4 and plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible.

We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff on October 31, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.

In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while at CSP Solano (The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment.):

- A contact person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (please call or e-mail this information when the contact is identified).
- An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs, facility map, facility telephone directory and a telephone in which a team of nine may work.
- Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned work areas and we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.
- Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff - CDC 837:
 - A data collection form was e-mailed asking that facility staff code staff assault incident reports for the past year in the identified format, addressing incident information, inmate information and victim(s) information (please provide an electronic copy of this data as soon as practical).

- Staff Assault Committee Minutes
- Summaries of State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for all injuries on staff and/or the complete reports. Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator
- A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)

Supplemental Data Sources – to be accessed as needed

- Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes*
 - Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
- Inmate Appeals (CDC) *
- Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities*
- Authorized Equipment and Functionality
- Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations*
- Employee Training records including summary of curriculum and attendance for orientation and annual updates for selected areas*
- Corrective Action Plans for previous audits*
- Safety Committee Meeting Minutes and Risk Management Action Plans
- Program descriptions and locations
- Staffing summary including duty roster, allotted positions, vacancies, and leave of absence for over 120 days for all staff.
- Staffing profile summary including age, sex, years of service and ethnicity
- Facility design and current capacity
- Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes*

Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference with you and/or appropriate members of your staff (on or about November 4, 2005). The results of the evaluation will be reported to the CSA at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to CDCR with a courtesy copy sent to you.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or jread@bdcrr.ca.gov.

Sincerely,

Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)

*= 2005 to date

cc: Joe McGrath, Chief Deputy Secretary Adult Operations
John Dovey, Director, Adult Institutions

California State Prison Solano
Staff Assault Data 10/2004 TO 10/2005

Attachment B

Attachment B

INCIDENT INFORMATION								INMATE/WARD INFORMATION										VICTIM INFORMATION					
IR/SIR#	Date	Time	Day of Week	Site and Location	Type of Assault	Serious Injury	Inmate Weapon	INM/YAB	Ethnicity	Classification	Rec'd CDC CYA	Rec'd Inst	Anticipated Rel Date/FBD	Age	Housing Loc	Special Program/MH Status	Garq	Work Assign	Gender	Classification (CDC/CCU/Work)	Age	Yrs of Exp	Race
CSP-SF1-04-10-0330	10/28/2004	20:00	Tues.	Barbours C-10	Attempted	No	None	V-46558	WHT	20	6/11/2004	10/15/2004	1/26/2005	37	10-101	CCCMS	N/A		M	CG	24	2	WHE
CSP-SCS-04-11-0372	11/28/2004	18:30	Sun	CTC	Battery	No	None	O-58583	WHT	28	5/12/1997	1/30/1997	Liter	48	CTC	N/A	N/A		F	LVN		0.5	BLK
CSP-SCS-04-11-0374	11/30/2004	16:15	Tues.	CTC	Gassing #	No	None	K-81481	BLK	0	8/5/1997	12/5/2002	9/21/2005	29	CTC	MHC9	N/A		M	Declar	67	4	WHT
CSP-SCS-04-12-0380	12/7/2004	8:50	Tues.	Main Kitchen	Battery	No	None	T-69680	WHT	20	10/8/2002	12/11/2002	1/5/2007	48	HD-146	N/A	N/A		F	Sup. Cook	52	6	P-H
CSP-SF1-04-12-0352	12/14/2004	17:20	Tues.	Bldg 1	Battery	No	Yes	K-10839	BLK	49	6/7/1956	9/9/2004	7/19/2018	28	1-248	N/A	N/A		M/F	CO/CO	43/45	2.6	BLK
CSP-SF1-04-12-0404	12/22/2004	18:40	Weds	Dining Hall	Attempted	No	None	H-52478	WHT	45	10/23/1952	10/15/2004	2/27/2008	31	2-225	N/A	Unarmed Cook		M	ScL	48	9	BLK
CSP-SF1-05-02-0068	2/22/2005	7:00	Tues.	Breezeway C	Battery	No	None	J-64168	BLK	31	6/15/1995	4/8/2003	Liter	34	2-143	CCCMS	Crip		M	EMTA	56	22	BLK
CSP-SF1-05-03-0068	3/17/2005	13:15	Thurs	Level III SAP	Battery	No	Pen	V-30472	OTH	30	4/7/2004	8/27/2004	12/19/2006	25	5-113	CCCMS	N/A		F	SAP Coordinator		3	WHS
CSP-SF2-05-04-0131	4/25/2005	20:00	Mon	H Dorm	Battery	No	Ball	B-26679	WHT	28	4/8/1970	10/5/1998	Liter	59	8-118	CCCMS	N/A		M	CO	43	9	WHS
CSP-SF1-05-05-0142	5/9/2005	7:05	Mon	Facility I Dir	Battery	No	None	P-37728	BLK	45	7/14/1999	12/18/2004	10/30/2031	33	5-245	N/A	N/A		M	CO	49	11	WHT
CSP-SF2-05-04-0144	5/8/2005	9:45	Mon	Bldg 8	Battery	No	None	T-40372	BLK	48	12/31/2001	2/28/2004	12/9/2007	48	8-153	CCCMS	N/A		F	CO	43	7	WHS
CSP-SF2-05-08-0180	8/4/2005	17:40	Sat	Bldg 10	Attempt	No	Food Tray	V-41153	BLK	35	8/24/2004	2/24/2005	1/11/2007	21	10-213	N/A	N/A		M	CO	25	3	WHS
CSP-SF1-05-07-0237	7/9/2005	14:55	Sat	Facility I Yard	Battery	No	None	P-70423	BLK	28	2/18/2000	3/25/2002	7/14/2007	25	4-203	CCCMS	Blond		M	ScL	33	9	WHT
CSP-SCS-05-08-0318	8/24/2005	14:20	Weds	Main Kitchen	Battery	No	None	K-81745	BLK	26	4/7/1998	2/18/2004	7/9/2015	48	5/146	N/A	N/A		M	Sup. Cook	61	9	OTH
CSP-SCS-05-09-0334	9/5/2005	19:00	Mon	Main Kitchen	Battery	No	None	T-02032	BLK	42	12/7/2002	10/26/2004	6/29/2038	23	4-222	N/A	Crip		F	Sup. Cook	43	8	WHT
CSP-SF1-05-09-0352	9/22/2005	11:30	Thurs	Bldg 4	Battery	No	None	K-88514	BLK	22	3/16/1998	6/27/2002	1/1/2023	44	4-105	N/A	N/A		M	CO	33	10	BLK
CSP-SCS-05-09-0354	9/23/2005	15:05	Fri	PIA Laundry	Battery	No	Slapping instrument	K-27762	OTH	19	10/20/1996	2/15/2000	2/11/2021	19	154-4	N/A	N/A		M	PIA Sup	27	16	WHS

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATIONS

Institutional Information

LIVING AREA SPACE EVALUATION

FACILITY: CSP-SOLANO	TYPE:	DATE: October 31, 2005
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Building/Housing Unit							Each Building									
Location	Cell Type	Custody Level	# Cells	EACH CELL		Pop.	Program	Staffing								
				Beds	E-Beds			F			G			S		
								1 st	2 nd	3 rd	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Facility I		III					Yard officers	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	3	2
Building 1	Double	III	100	2	0	199	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 2	Double	III	100	2	0	195	General Population Heat Sensitive Building	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 3	Double	III	100	2	0	198	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 4	Double	III	100	2	0	199	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 5	Double	III	100	2	0	198	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 6	Double	III	100	2	0	199	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Education	Classrooms						10 classrooms 1 library		1	1						
Gym II dorm	Dorm	III	1		226	226	General Population	2	2	2	1	1	1			
Facility II		III					Yard officers	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	3	2
Building 7	Double	III	100	2	0	198	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 8	Double	III	100	2	0	190	General Population Heat Sensitive Building	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Building 9	Double	III	100	2	0	147	Ad Seg	1	2	2	1	2	1		6	
Building 10	Double	III	100	2	0	175	Ad Seg	1	2	2	1	1	1		6	4
Building 11	Double	III	100	2	0	190	General Population Ad Seg Overflow	5	2	2	1	1	1			

Building/Housing Unit							Each Building									
Location	Cell Type	Custody Level	# Cells	EACH CELL		Pop.	Program	Staffing								
				Beds	E Beds			F			G			S		
								1 st	2 nd	3 rd	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Building 12	Double	III	100	2	0	200	General Population	5	2	2	1	1	1			
Facility III		II					Yard officers	0	1	3	0	0	0	3	4	2
Building 13	Dorm	II	24	172	176	337	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 14	Dorm	II	24	172	176	341	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 15	Dorm	II	24	172	176	179	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 16	Dorm	II	1	100	100	199	General Population Heat Sensitive Building	2	2	2						
Building 17	Dorm	II	1	100	100	199	General Population	2	2	2						
Building 18	Dorm	II	1	100	100	222	General Population	2	2	2						
Education	Classrooms						10 classrooms 1 library		1							
Gym G dorm	Dorm	II			225	222		2	2	3						
Facility IV		II					Yard officers	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	3	3
Building 19	Dorm	II	1	100	100	197	General Population Heat Sensitive Building	2	2	2						
Building 20	Dorm	II	24	172	176	343	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 21	Dorm	II	24	172	176	348	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 22	Dorm	II	24	172	176	344	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 23	Dorm	II	24	172	176	336	General Population	2	3	3						
Building 24	Dorm	II	1	100	100	199	General Population Heat Sensitive Building	2	2	2						

California State Prison - Solano
October 31 – November 4, 2005

Line Staff:

1. What is your current job title?
2. What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (Post Orders)?
3. When did you start working for the department as...?
4. How long have you been assigned to this facility?
5. How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification?
6. What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times, otherwise have access to, or have to check out from a central location?
7. What is the general condition of your safety equipment?
8. Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?
9. If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?
10. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
11. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?
12. Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and when do you feel the most safe?

13. What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the most as you are performing your duties?
14. Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staff safety?
15. What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?
16. How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's supervisor? The warden?
17. Are protocols in place for emergency responses?
18. (Policy?) What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Supervisors:

1. How many years have you been a supervisor?
2. Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institutions?
3. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. How many officers do you directly supervise?
6. How many do you indirectly supervise?
7. What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your subordinates?

8. What kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge? How do you handle them?
9. How often do you see your supervisors?
10. What safety equipment is issued and carried by your staff?
11. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use? What is it, and how is it issued?
12. Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they wear it at all times?
13. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
14. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
15. What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?
16. What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff assaults?
17. What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?
18. What protocols in place for emergency responses?
19. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Managers:

1. How many years do you have as a manager?
2. Have you been a manager at any other CDC institution?
3. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. How often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general staff safety practices?
6. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is available for them to use?
7. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use? What is it, and how is it issued?
8. How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been fitted? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive them?
9. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
10. When considering staff safety, what types of concerns do you have?
11. From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?
12. What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?

13. Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff assaults?
14. What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge?
15. If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes?
16. What protocols in place for emergency responses?
17. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

**Evaluation Team Members
CSP SOLANO**

Team 1

Staff Interviews:

Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative

John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II

Jeff Plunkett, Juvenile Justice, Captain

Team 2

Physical Plant, Staffing and Population:

Gary Wion, CSA Field Representative

Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain

Gina Lum, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant

Team 3

Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:

Don Allen, CSA Field Representative

Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant

David Finley, Juvenile Justice, Major

Robert Takeshta, Field Representative

Corrections Standards Authority

Phone: 916-322-8346

Fax: 916-327-3317

E-Mail: rtakeshta@bdcarr.ca.gov

Dave Stark, Lieutenant

Adult Operations

Phone: 916-358-2473

Fax: 916-358-2499

E-Mail: dave.stark@corr.ca.gov

Gary Wion, Field Representative

Corrections Standards Authority

Phone: 916-324-1641

Fax: 916-327-3317

E-Mail: gwion@bdcarr.ca.gov

Mark Perkins, Captain

Adult Operations

Phone: 916-358-2626

Fax: 916-358-2499

E-Mail: mperkins@corr.ca.gov

Don Allen, Field Representative

Corrections Standards Authority

Phone: 916-324-9153

Fax: 916-327-3317

E-Mail: dallen@bdcarr.ca.gov

Jeff Plunkett, Captain

Division of Juvenile Justice

Phone: 916-262-0802

Fax: 916-262-1767

E-Mail: jplunkett@cya.ca.gov

John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II

Adult Operations

Phone: 916-358-2628

Fax: 916-358-2636

E-Mail: john.mcauliffe@corr.ca.gov

David Finley, Major

CDCR - Juvenile Justice Division

Ventura Youth Correctional Facility

Phone: 805-278-3710

Fax: 805-278-1499

E-Mail: dfinley@cya.ca.gov

Gina Lum, Lieutenant

CDCR - Juvenile Justice Division

N.A. Chaderjian Youth Facility

Phone: 209-944-6580

E-Mail: glum@cdcr.ca.gov