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	the Concections Standards Authonity Staff	Salety Eveluatio	niccommends (her (MCSP)) externes following):	CHOIRS A.		
T		Action Required		Date To Be	Current	
lter	m Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #1: There were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery.

1.	Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted	N/A	No corrective action necessary as this is information	N/A	N/A	N/A
	battery on staff were reported during the time period of July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at		provided for discussion only.			
	Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The					
	institution reports that over 40 staff members					
	were victims of battery or were injured during incidents:					
	Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of					
1	correctional officers (C/O's) and two were sergeants. The remaining ten victims included					
	five Medical Technical Assistant's (MTA's) and					
	five health care workers.					
	The average age of the victims was					
	approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of service.		· · ·			
	Twenty-nine of the victims were male and ten					
	were female.					
	Twenty-six of victims were white, six were black,					
	six were Hispanic, and two were reported as					
	"othe r" .					

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	he corrections Standards Authority Staff	Salety Evaluatio	ntecommends (hat (MCSP)) are the cllowing:	actions:		
		Action Required		Date To Be	Current	
Item	Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #2: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies.

2.	The Return to Work Coordinator provided statistics showing a category described as "Responding to Alarms" as being the third leading category of frequencies of staff injury, with 15 reported injuries during the last fiscal year. These statistics would support the need for training ways to safely respond to incidents.	Training (IST) Manager	Emergency Alarm Response Training is in place for Off Post Training Sessions (OPTS). In addition, effective July 1, 2005 Mule Creek began monthly training on the facilities for alarm response. Alarm response identifies safety issues for responding to emergencies.	training.	Training and Safety Meetings are being completed on a monthly basis.	
		Return To Work Coordinator	In monthly safety meetings, MCSP will continue to review all reported injuries to determine trends and identify training needs as warranted.		N/A	August 9, 2005 Safety Meeting Minutes (Attachment C).

Finding # 3: Race and age do not appear to be significant assault factors.

3.	No significant variances were noted when	N/A	No corrective action necessary as this is information	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	comparing the race, age or county of		provided for discussion only.			
	commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of					
}	the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic					
	and white inmates were responsible for 29					
	incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed					
	among the other races. The inmates had been					
	committed from twelve counties with none being					
	unusually represented.			!		
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	The Corrections Standards Authority - Staff	Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions		
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lter	n Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff.

4.	Enhanced Outpatient (EOP) inmates, while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care.	IST Manager	IST provides awareness training concerning the potential of assaultive behavior of this population to all custody and non-custody staff during OPTS.	Continuous training.	Training is being completed on a monthly basis.	IST records, Mental Health Services Overview/Update (Attachment D), Recognizing the Signs and Symptoms of Mental Disorders Student Handbook (Attachment E) and Post Quiz (Attachment F).
		Health Care Manager	During Mental Health staff meetings, safety and security topics are consistently discussed. These topics include personal alarm, emergency response, personal whistle, reporting unusual inmate behavior and inmate staff relations. Medication requirements are frequently reviewed by Mental Health staff and they do use the Keyhea Injunction for inmates who are not medication compliant and are determined to be a danger to himself and others. Violence risks or assault risk inmate/patients are addressed in each Inter-Disciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT) and an appropriate treatment plan is developed. When assaultive tendencies are identified, staff are made aware of those individuals and a review for appropriate housing is conducted. Medication management Quality Improvement Teams (QITS) are conducted in an effort to ensure inmates receive prescribed medications in a timely manner.		Ongoing.	Keyhea Involuntary Medication List "Confidential" (Attachment G) EOP IDTT Schedule (Attachment H).

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	he Corrections Standards Authority Staff.	Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions:		
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Item	Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff (continued).

4.	Facility "B", Building 6, has been housing approximately fifty Level IV EOP/SNY inmates. The institution has just activated an EOP Unit in a Level IV building in Facility "A", housing 6 inmates as of this review date.	"B" Captains	Facility "B" will continue to refer the Level IV EOP inmates to the C&PR for endorsement to Facility "A", Level IV EOP.		As of August 19, 2005, sixteen Level IV EOP inmates have been transferred to Facility "A". Thirty- three Level IV EOP inmates are in Level III housing and are being evaluated for Level IV EOP housing.	Change (Attachment I).
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Finding #5: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor in assaults on staff.

5.	Inmate manufactured weapons were not	N/A	No corrective action necessary as this information for	N/A	N/A	N/A
	involved in any of the incidents reviewed.		discussion only. Institution will continue to conduct			
1	Inmates threw or attempted to throw an		program yard and housing searches.			
	unknown liquid substance on staff in 6 of the					
	incidents. In the remainder of the cases					
	reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to					
	batter staff by head-butting, kicking or unlawful					
	touching with their hands. In the incident					
	resulting in the most serious injury to staff, the					
	inmate was able to head butt the C/O, knock					
	him off balance, kick him several times and					
}	finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred					
	during escorts and three during meal service					
	when C/O' opened food ports.					

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T	he Corrections Standards Authority Staff	Safety Evaluation	nirecommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions;		
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Finding #6: Custody staff appears to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non- custody staff; however, receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in attending training (continued).

6.	MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training	IST Manager	Non-Custody staff receives Block Training, which is					llock Training
	based on the employee's birthday. Each		a required annual course of training at MCSP. It	2005	by August 10,	2005 and	memorandum	dated
	employee's training year begins on their		incorporates the requirements listed in DOM for all		distributed to all	Non-Custody	August 10, 2005	(Attachment J)
	birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year; therefore,		employees except those with OPTS responsibilities		supervisors.		IST Deficiency N	lotice – Annual
	using the current IST tracking program, we were		and is held once a month. Non-Custody supervisors				(Attachment K) ar	nd IST records.
	unable to confirm that all of the training		receive an IST deficiency notice two (2) months prior					-
	mandates were being met.		to their annual performance evaluation which					
1	······································		identifies needed training.					
1	Non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive							
1	8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are related							
	to staff safety. The training manager reported							
	that 80% of the non-custody personnel were							
	compliant with the training mandates. The				ļ			
	sample files reviewed and supported that						· · ·	
	percentage.							
	perocintage.							
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Finding #7: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff interviewed identified the need for more meaningful training.

	Staff need hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) inmates.		Cell extraction and mental health training is given on a monthly basis during OPTS per departmental lesson plans. Based on departmental funding hands-on cell extraction training is not provided at MCSP. Mental Health training is also provided during OPTS along with on-site training in Buildings #5 and #6 (EOP) on how to interact with EOP inmates. Draft memorandum to all supervisors identifying the aforementioned training advising supervisors to attend training.	2005	10,	Monthly training during OPTS	Memorandum dated August 10, 2005 (Attachment L). IST records and OJT records for EOP Building #6. Cell Extraction Lesson Outline (Attachment M).
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l	The Corrections Standards Authority -	Staff Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions:			
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		Action Required		Date To Be	Current		
	Item Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice	

Finding #8: Correctional Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment.

8.	The C/O assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance cells was not equipped with a personal alarm, intercom capabilities or radio (although post orders reflect a personal alarm is to be worn). The camera did not monitor the hall where the staff person is stationed, but positioned to monitor the inmate.	Captain Watch Commander	Memorandum regarding equipment to be worn dated July 6, 2005. Post order instructing staff to wear personal alarm device will be revised. The camera is positioned to monitor the inmate only.	Post Order completed.	Memorandum dated July 6, 2005 Body Cavity Surveillance (BCS) Cells/CTC Overflow (Attachment N), Post order (Attachment O) and Operational Procedure MC 48-52050, Quarantine BCS (Attachment P).
	Only 1 radio is issued to 2 C/O's working inside the housing unit as floor officer's. Typically the position designated as "floor one" is assigned to maintain the radio. This position is also designated as the primary respondent, during Code I and Code II emergencies. This process results in the second C/O remaining in the unit without radio communication. A radio was assigned to the Facility "A" Gym. In an effort to maximize the use of a single radio, staff had secured the radio to the podium as a point of centralized use. The evaluation team agreed that the institution should consider providing all floor officers with a radio.	Captain Facility Captain Armory Sgt.	MCSP is currently utilizing all the radios we have been authorized. MCSP will prepare an Issue Memorandum to Operations Review Committee, via chain of command, regarding the feasibility of issuing radios to all housing unit officers.	In process.	N/A

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	The Corrections Standards Authority - Staff Safety Evaluation recommends that (MCSP) take the following actions:									
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Item	Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice				

Finding #9: There are 87 Correctional Officers and many Medical Technical Assistant's (MTA's) and Correctional Counselor's (CC's) that have not been issued a stab-resistant vest.

9.	The Armory Sgt. informed us that 651 C/O's have been designated to be issued a stab resistant vest. The records reflect that 54 C/O's within the ranks of C/O, sergeant, and lieutenant have been fitted for vests; however, the vests have yet to be issued. Thirty-three C/O's have not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of the evaluation. Sufficient vests are available at the facility for those C/O's to check out for use during their shift until their personal vests are	Captain Armory Sgt.	Pool vests are assigned to each facility and are to be used in the absence of personal vests. MCSP has continued to stay current with Departmental policies and procedures pertaining to this issue.		members who do not have a vest. Twelve are out on extended sick or workers compensation to bring the total to 87. Fifty eight of the 87 have been fitted and are waiting for their vests. The	2005 (Attachment Q). Memorandums dated November 20, 2003, January 14, 2005, February 10, 2005, email dated March 28, 2005, and memorandum dated June 2,
	available. C/O's reported a reluctance to wear these vests, saying that the vests were not cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that the remaining 564 C/O's have been fitted and have been issued a vest.		Cleaning procedures are being written for the cleaning of pool vests on all facilities.	September 1, 2005	N/A	N/A
	MTA's and CC's, who were custody staff, are not included in the above numbers. The team was informed that many of these personnel have been fitted for vests but have not received vests. The team was further informed that the		Warden's memorandum dated February 9, 2005 instructs all C/O's, sergeants and lieutenants issued vests, the requirement to mandatorily wear the Stab Resistant Vests.		N/A	Memorandum dated February 9, 2005 (Attachment W).
	bargaining unit representing MTA's and CC's has filed a grievance (with the agency, not the institution) over this matter.		A representative from Second Chance Vest has been contacted and is scheduling a new date to fit the remaining staff.		Second Chance will be on site for fitting, approximately on September 30, 2005.	N/A
			MCSP is following the Departmental directive issued by Deputy Director, Institutions Division, identifying which custody classifications are required to wear the Stab Resistant Vest.	N/A	N/A	Memorandum dated March 4, 2004 (Attachment X).

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	The Corrections Standards Authority - Staff Safety Evaluation recommends that (MCSP) take the following actions:								
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Finding #10: Specific to Facilities "A", "B" & "C".

 The gymnasium was observed by the staff safety audit team to have towels, blankets and clothing draped from bunks. Such coverings obscure visibility. 	and "C"	Post Orders for all facilities has special instructions regarding bed covering removal. Gymnasium rules are provided to inmates.	N/A	N/A	Post Orders for Facility "A", "B", & "C" (Attachments Y, Z, & AA).
		Gym staff will be provided training on expectations that inmates do not hang/drape any item that reduces visibility.		On-going training being provided.	N/A
		First, Second and Third line supervisors conduct daily/weekly/monthly inspections and provide training to staff.	Ongoing.	N/A	Inspection sheets example. (Attachment BB).
	Facility "C" Captain	Facility "C" to submit work order for installation of drying racks.	August 19, 2005	Facility "C" gymnasium has problems with clothing, towels, blankets, etc, being hung on the bunks as there is currently no drying rack. Facility "A" and "B" currently have drying racks.	

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<u> </u>	he Corrections Standards Authority - Staff	Safety Evaluation	n recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions		
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Finding #10: Specific to Facilities "A", "B" & "C" (continued).

	namy #10. opecine to racinties A, D & C					
10.	Padlocks are applied to each cell during the sleeping hours to prevent inmates from lifting the sliding door off the track.		Over five years ago it was discovered inmates could open cell doors. As a result, the Warden ordered "boot locks" to be installed until the problem could be resolved. The Deputy State Fire Marshal for this district was advised and subsequently toured the site. The determination was made that the security of the institution took precedence. Faulty locking devices have been discovered at other institutions creating a state-wide funding issue.	pending	The practice of padlocking cell doors during sleeping hours will continue.	February 2001 electromechanical door operator repairs and schedule (Attachment DD) and COBCP.
			A Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposal (COBCP) was initiated by the Security Operations Management Branch in August of 2000. A majority of institutions were affected. MCSP is in Phase II behind California Correctional Institution and Wasco State Prison.			
	recommended at the end of the dayroom of	Associate Warden, Programs / Housing and Plant Manager	Emergency Beds (E-Beds) on the dayroom floors are anticipated to deactivate in September-October 2005. With this action, blind spots in the buildings will be reduced. C/O's, as part of their daily assignments, rove the dayroom floors in the buildings, and work in conjunction with the control booth officers to ensure blind spots are covered and activities monitored. Because various buildings have different missions, vantage points and convex mirror needs will differ. All facility buildings have a minimum of 3 mirrors which can be adjusted to address blind spots. MCSP convex mirrors are sufficient for C/O coverage. We will continue to monitor the need for mirrors.	N/A	N/A	N/A

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T	he Corrections Standards Authority - Staff	Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions:		
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1		Action Required		Date To Be	Current	
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Finding #11: Specific to Facility "A".

	numy #11. opecific to Facility A .						
11.	The inmate exercise yard is very large for Level IV operations and only three C/O's assigned to yard coverage. Additionally, supervisory staff were not able to locate assigned yard staff.		Due to the SNY designation of the facility, the size of the yard is mitigated by the nature of the inmates assigned to the facility. Yard staff have been given training regarding their obligation to remain within their assignment area unless authorized to leave by their supervisor.		19,	Training is on-going. Yard C/O's remain at their assigned post until relieved.	IST Sign-In sheets and Post Orders (Attachments EE, FF and GG)
	Responses from staff regarding incident response procedures were inconsistent.	Facility Lieutenant	All Facility staff will be provided specific training regarding their individual obligation during incident response. Contained within each Post Order is the specific Code Response designation. All staff are required to read and acknowledge their individual obligation during Code Response. Staff routinely participate in prison alarm response training drills scheduled by In-Service Training.		22,	Training is on-going. Staff are reading and acknowledging their Code Response Obligations	IST Records and Alarm Response Memorandum (Attachment A).
	Building five has in the dayroom area, various office furniture items to facilitate the EOP treatment program. This furniture and equipment may pose a staff safety issue, as it could be used as a weapon or used to make weapons. The team recommends that the office furniture to be replaced with detention grade furnishings.	N/A	This is a temporary program setting designed to deliver Mental Health Service to approximately 35 inmates. Currently a permanent treatment facility is being planned for construction within this year. Once completed, this temporary treatment facility will be dismantled and removed. At this time, the need for detention furnishings is not warranted. This rationale is based upon the short term projected use of this treatment area. In similar program settings throughout the Department, there have been no negative behavioral trends, which justify the use of this type of furniture. However, through routine security checks, the ability to use or make weapons will be minimized.	N/A		Office furnishings continued in use for this program.	N/A

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	e Corrections Standards Authority - Staff	Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions:		
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Finding #12: Specific to Facility "B".

12.	Only two officers were assigned to this exercise yard. The team agreed this was an insufficient number of yard officers. The evaluation team suggests that the institution consider assigning an additional C/O to this yard.	Captain	Facility B has two yard officers, two Search and Escort officers and one yard observation post officer for the exercise yard. Additionally, there are two sergeants and one lieutenant. MCSP is within established budgetary authority at 190% overcrowding, 160 gym beds and 144 emergency dayroom beds. Based on the very low violence level, this current staffing appears adequate to maintain staff and inmate safety.	N/A -	N/A	N/A
	E-beds contained in Building 7, 8, 9 and 10 present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to inmates draping items between the bunks and inability to secure these inmates contribute to this concern.	Captain	C/O's are expected to remove any draping items in bed areas as indicated in their Post Orders. Supervisors and Managers conduct inspections. (Sergeants daily, Lieutenants weekly, Captains monthly, AW's quarterly). Additionally, C/O's, as part of their daily assignments, are expected to rove the day room floors in the buildings and work in conjunction with the control booth officers to ensure blind spots are covered and activities monitored.	Ongoing.	N/A	Inspection sheet example and Post Order (Attachments BB and Z) and Operational Procedure MC 72 – Daily Housing Inspections of the Housing Units for Supervisors and Managers (Attachment HH).

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	he Corrections Standards Authority Staff	Safety Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following:	actions;		
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Iten	Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #13: Specific to Facility "C".

13.	C/O's in Building 14 stated the inmates have the ability to control the TV volume and the volume becomes loud enough to hinder verbal communication between C/O's.		With the addition of E-beds in the housing units, the institution agreed to install receivers on the TV that broadcasts on FM reception thus eliminating the sound from the TV speakers. These receivers have been ordered. Pending the installation, C/O's have been instructed to order inmates to turn the volume	2005	C/O's will monitor and correct any TV volume issues impacting their ability to communicate. The parts are on order.	IST sheet on TV Volume (Attachment II) Memorandum to staff dated August 19, 2005 on TV Volume (Attachment JJ).
	C/O's in Building 11, 14 & 15 reported that work orders are not addressed consistently. Team members observed lights that were burned out and doors located near the showers with locks		down or off if warranted. C/O's have always had the ability and discretion to monitor TV volume. Current process allows for approval of each work order by the Facility Captain. If urgent, the Facility Secretary faxes the work order to Plant Operations, then submits original. Submit work orders for lights		N/A ·	Work orders dated August 19, 2005. (Attachments KK and LL).
	that were sticking.	Plant Manager	and door repairs. MCSP will initiate a Work Order Report for all pending work orders to the respective areas.	October 2005	N/A	N/A
	Staff in Building 11, 14 & 15 reporting concerns about not having adequate coverage during the a.m. feeding release and recall.		A total of twelve custody staff are at the Facility Dining Hall to monitor inmates as they enter and exit the Dining Hall. This is adequate coverage for a 270 design Level III Facility. MCSP is within established budgetary authority.	N/A	N/A	N/A

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s Th	e Corrections Standards Authority Staff	Safety Evaluation	irecommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions 1 - 2 - 3			
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Finding #14: Specific to Central Services, Correctional Treatment Center (CTC).

14.	The institutional fire identification system alarm is not working properly. Staff reported that the system has historically not functioned correctly and that during the rainy season, the problem with the system is exacerbated.		In September 2005 MCSP will again submit a Special Repair Project (SRP) to the Facilities Management Section.		Fire identification alarm system still not working properly.	SRP request originally submitted in April 1999 was denied. SRP resubmitted in August 2001 was denied. Equipment Budget Request submitted September 2004 was not approved. Headquarters Operational Assessment Team (HOAT) funding requested January 2005, no response from Office of Financial Management. Section 6.00 submitted February 2005, no response yet by Facilities Management Section. MCSP will resubmit again in September 2005.
	CTC Officer did not have a personal alarm.	Correctional Captain	Draft memorandum advising staff that wearing their personal alarm device (PAD) is mandatory.	August 8, 2005	Memorandum has been drafted and issued to Managers and Supervisors.	
ĺ			Watch Commander will provide training to CTC C/O's.	August 25, 2005	N/A	N/A
	In the CTC, an electrical room has been converted into a staff break room/inmate clerk office. The room contained cleaning supplies and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk was not being directly supervised and had access to C/O food.	Warden, Medical	The electrical room is no longer being used by inmate clerks and the staff refrigerator is no longer inside the room. The inmate workers are only allowed in the room under direct supervision of the Building Maintenance Worker.		Completed.	N/A

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	The Corrections Standards Authority - Staff Safety Evaluation recommends that (MCSP) take the following actions:								
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Finding #15: Level IV inmates with mental health issues and sensitive needs are being housed in inappropriate facilities (270 vs. 180 design).

	indulig #10. Lever 14 miniates with mental health issues and sensitive needs are being noused in inappropriate lacinities (27 v 45. 100 design).									
15.	Staff shared with us that MCSP is considered	Associate	The Level IV EOP MCSP inmates have been	September	N/A	On occasion, inmates released				
	the "hub" for EOP/SNY inmates, designating it	Warden-	evaluated through the current classification process	30, 2005		from Psychiatric Security Unit to				
	as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY	Housing /	and endorsed Level IV 270 design. MCSP will initiate			SNY/EOP's have very assaultive				
1	inmates. Compounding the situation, many of	Programs	an Issue Memorandum to the Operations Review			past behavior. After received and				
	the SNY inmates have Level IV classification	_	Committee to determine feasibility of activation of a			reviewed at MCSP, they have				
	points requiring 180 design housing; however,		180 design unit.			subsequently been re-endorsed				
	this institution was designed as Level III with		-			for an Indeterminate Security				
	270 design housing. As a result, staff safety					Housing Unit (SHU) term due to				
	becomes a concern when SNY inmates, with					their inability to program within a				
1 I	assaultive histories, are housed in these					270 design building program.				
	facilities. The team was informed that the					General Population inmates are				
	Department has no 180 design facilities to					required to go to a 180 design				
1	house these Level IV SNY inmates.					after serving a SHU, though				
						EOP's nor SNY's have that same				
					l	requirement.				

Finding #16: Crowding leads to a potentially unsafe environment.

	i mang # 10. Crowding leads to a potentiany unsale environment.										
16.	A second concern is the overcrowding in the		E-beds and dormitories in the facilities meet	N/A	N/A	N/A					
	facilities, which result in Emergency beds (E-	Warden,	departmental security requirements as it pertains to								
í	beds), or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit	Programs /	custody.								
1	dayrooms, and double and triple bunking of the	Housing									
	gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up		August 8, 2005 memorandum authored by Mike	October 24,	N/A	August 8, 2005 memorandum					
	to 40 inmates sleeping in E-beds. While an		Knowles, Deputy Director (A), Division of Adult	2005		(Attachment OO)					
	additional floor officer is assigned to supervise		Institutions, advised institution's that the conversion								
	these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to		of 950 Level IV beds to 950 Level III (SNY) beds at								
	supervise these inmates due to obstructed		Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) is tentatively								
	sightlines. Gymnasium "A" uses triple bunks,		scheduled to begin in September 2005. Based on]					
	and Gymnasium "B" and "C" use double bunks		this information MCSP would deactivate 228 E-beds								
1	to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium "A"		by the week of October 24, 2005.								
	has two floor officers and one gunner, and										
	Gymnasium "B" and "C" have two floor officers					l I					
1	but no gunner, because the inmates are										
	classified as Level I-II. These gymnasiums are										
	perceived as staff safety issues, as it is difficult					1					
	to supervise the inmates due to the large					1					
L	number of beds and diminished sightlines.				<u> </u>						

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	he Corrections Standards Authority Staff	Safety/Evaluation	recommends that (MCSP) take the following	actions:		
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Finding #17: Post and Bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.

17.	Additionally, the captains believe that Post and		MCSP follows Departmental policy as it pertains to		N/A	Personnel	Action	on	file
	Bid (a process in which lieutenant's, sergeants	Warden, Central	Post and Bid for supervisors and the Memorandum			(Confidential)	•		1
1	and C/O's request to work a specific post based		of Understanding for C/O's. Training and corrective						1
	on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure		action will occur for these personnel who fail to						1
	a high level of institutional and staff safety. The		perform.						1
í	best qualified individual is not always placed in a]
	position, based solely on seniority.								1
1									
					1				
				•			-		

Finding #18: Supervisor concerns mirrored those of the managers in the following:

	Crowding with E-beds and using gymnasiums		See comments for Findings #16 and #17.	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	Crowding with E-beds and doing gynnasiums			ן האיו	IN/A	
	as dormitories.	Warden,				
		Programs /				
	Post and Bid – supervisors were restricted from	Housing	· ·			
	diverting an C/O from one position to another					
	based on operational needs.					

Finding #19: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training.

Supervisors said that correctional staff needed	See comments for Finding # 7	N/A	N/A	N/A
hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of				
cell extraction equipment), and mental health				
techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS				
inmates.				

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The Corrections Standards Authority - Staff Safety Evaluation recommends that (MCSP) take the following actions:						
		Action Required		Date To Be	Current	
Iten	Recommendations/Description	By Whom	Proposed Action Plan	Completed	Status	Comments/Proof Of Practice

_Finding #20: Staff reported that safety equipment is adequate for performing their duties and rated the equipment as "good" to "okay".

Line staff said the type of safety equipment	No corrective action necessary as this is information	N/A	N/A
issued to them includes personal alarms, radios	provided for discussion only.		
in designated positions, handcuffs, side-handle			
batons, and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray.			
They indicated that equipment could be			
obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths,			
or from the person being relieved at shift			
change.			

Finding #21: Not all custody staff have been issued stab resistant vests and are reluctant to wear vests from the "vest pool".

21.	Of staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab	Armory	See comments from Finding # 9	N/A	N/A	N/A
ļ	resistant vests, but not all had been issued	Sergeant				
	vests. The evaluation team reviewed the body	-				
	armor report, and noted that 567 custody staff					
1	had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had					
	not. Staff indicated that if they were assigned to			ł		
	a position which required a vest, they would not					
	wear a vest from the "vest pool" as they					
1	believed that these vests are not maintained in a					
	sanitary condition, and they were concerned				· · · · · ·	
	with the integrity of the material to withstand an					
	attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with					
	department policy which requires that a vest be					
	worn by staff in specified positions, but did not					
	always comply.					

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: