



## Toward a New Professionalism in Policing

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### Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety

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### Introduction

Across the United States, police organizations are striving for a new professionalism. Their leaders are committing themselves to stricter *accountability* for both their effectiveness and their conduct while they seek to increase their *legitimacy* in the eyes of those they police and to encourage continuous *innovation* in police practices. The traffic in these ideas, policies and practices is now so vigorous across the nation that it suggests a fourth element of this new professionalism: its *national coherence*. These four principles — accountability, legitimacy, innovation and coherence — are not new in themselves, but together they provide an account of developments in policing during the last 20 years that distinguishes the policing of the present era from that of 30, 50 or 100 years ago.

Many U.S. police organizations have realized important aspects of the new professionalism and many more have adopted its underlying values. The ambitions for accountability, legitimacy and innovation unite police organizations in disparate contexts: urban, suburban and rural, municipal, county, state and federal. With

approximately 20,000 public police organizations in the United States, national coherence in American policing would be a signal achievement.<sup>1</sup> We do not see this new professionalism fully realized in any single department. We know how difficult it can be to narrow the gap between these ambitions and many deeply ingrained routines and practices. Much policing in the United States remains, in these terms, unprofessional, but professional ambition is itself a powerful force and it is at work almost everywhere.

We hear similar ambitions for accountability, legitimacy, innovation and coherence in other countries, from the state police organizations in Brazil and India to the South African Police Service, the French Gendarmerie and the Chilean Carabineros. A global police culture with these same four elements increasingly defines the ambitions of police leaders in most countries. In this paper, however, we focus on the trend in the United States.

To describe and illustrate the elements of this new professionalism, we draw on our own experiences working in and studying police organizations and on the deliberations of two Executive Sessions on Policing, both convened by the National Institute of Justice and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government: the first from 1985 to 1992 and the second commencing in 2008 and continuing today.

### **Why a New Professionalism?**

We offer the “New Professionalism” as a conceptual framework that can help chiefs, frontline police officers and members of the public alike understand and shape the work of police departments today and in the years ahead. Even as it remains a

work in progress, the New Professionalism can help police chiefs and commissioners keep their organizations focused on why they are doing what they do, what doing it better might look like, and how they can prioritize the many competing demands for their time and resources. On the front lines, the New Professionalism can help police officers work together effectively, connect their daily work to the larger project of building a better society, and share their successes and frustrations with the communities they serve. In communities everywhere, the New Professionalism can help citizens understand individual police actions as part of larger strategies, and assess the demands and requests that police make for more public money, more legal authority and more public engagement in keeping communities safe. From all of these vantage points, the New Professionalism helps all of us see what is happening in policing, how we got here and where we are going.

Each of the four elements of the New Professionalism — accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence — has something to offer police and the communities in which they work.

By a commitment to accountability we mean an acceptance of an obligation to account for police actions not only up the chain of command within police departments but also to civilian review boards, city councils and county commissioners, state legislatures, inspectors general, government auditors and courts. The obligation extends beyond these government entities to citizens directly: to journalists and editorial boards, resident associations, chambers of commerce — the whole range of community-based organizations.

By a commitment to legitimacy we mean a determination to police with the consent, cooperation and support of the people and communities being policed. Police receive their authority from the state and the law, but they also earn it from the public in each and every interaction. Although it is important to derive legitimacy from every part of the public, those citizens and groups most disfavored by past harms or present conditions have the greatest claims to attention on this score because their trust and confidence in the police is often weakest. Fortunately, research we discuss later in this paper suggests that police departments can strengthen their legitimacy among people of color in the United States and among young people of all races and ethnicities without compromising their effectiveness.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, effectiveness and legitimacy can be advanced together.

By a commitment to innovation we mean active investment of personnel and resources both in adapting policies and practices proven effective in other departments and in experimenting with new ideas in cooperation with a department's local partners. Empirical evidence is important here. Departments with a commitment to innovation look for evidence showing that practices developed elsewhere work, just as they embrace evaluation of the yet unproven practices they are testing.

By national coherence we mean that the departments exemplifying the New Professionalism are participating in national conversations about professional policing. They are training their officers, supervisors and leaders in practices and theories

applicable in jurisdictions across the country. Not long ago, it was common to hear police officers insist that they could police effectively in their city, county or state only if they had come up through the ranks there: good policing was inherently parochial. Such a belief belies a true professionalism. Inherent in the idea of the New Professionalism in policing is that police officers, supervisors and executives share a set of skills and follow a common set of protocols that have been accepted by the profession because they have been proven to be effective or legally required. That is not to say that local knowledge and understanding are unimportant — they are vital. But they are not everything. There is vital knowledge, understanding and practice common to good policing everywhere, and this common skill set defines police professionalism.

There are many definitions of professionalism and some debate about what it means for policing to be a profession. We take these up at the end of this paper, after putting the New Professionalism in historical context. For now, suffice it to say that for any profession to be worthy of that name, its members must not only develop transportable skills but also commit themselves both to a set of ethical precepts and to a discipline of continuous learning. A look back in history reveals how this meaning of “professional” contrasts with another use of the word employed in the early debates over community policing. The New Professionalism embraces and extends the best of community policing, whereas the “old professionalism” said to characterize policing in the 1960s and 1970s was seen as antithetical to community policing.

## Community Policing and the New Professionalism

Twenty-five years ago, when the elements of the New Professionalism began to emerge in urban American police departments, “community policing” was the organizing framework advanced to describe the new approach and new priorities. To most Americans who heard of the idea, community policing summoned up images of police walking the beat, riding on bicycles, or talking to groups of senior citizens and to young children in classrooms. These images adorn countless posters and brochures produced by individual police departments to explain community policing to local residents. They picture community policing as a specialized program: a few carefully selected officers taking pains to interact with “good” citizens while the rest of the police department does something else.

Inside police departments, however, and at the first Executive Session on Policing, community policing was being described as far more than the next new program. It was promoted as the organizing framework around which police departments were going to change everything they did. Community policing might look like a specialized program when a police department first adopts it, but that is “Phase One,” as Lee Brown, who led police departments in Atlanta, Houston and New York City before becoming mayor of Houston, wrote in a 1989 paper for the first Executive Session. Brown explained that “Phase Two”:

... involves more sweeping and more comprehensive changes ... . It is the department’s *style* that is being revamped

... . Although it is an operating style, community policing also is a *philosophy* of policing ... (emphasis in original).<sup>3</sup>

Brown went on to explain how, in Phase Two, community policing requires changes to every part of policing, including its supervision and management, training, investigations, performance evaluation, accountability and even its values. True community policing, Brown wrote, requires a focus on results rather than process; it forces decentralization, power sharing with community residents, the redesign of police beats, and giving a lower priority to calls for service. Malcolm Sparrow, a former Detective Chief Inspector in the English police service on the faculty of the Harvard Kennedy School, made the same point in even more dramatic language:

Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through the normal channels. It is not a mere restructuring of the force to provide the same service more efficiently. Nor is it a cosmetic decoration designed to impress the public and promote greater cooperation.

For the police it is an entirely different way of life. It is a new way for police officers to see themselves and to understand their role in society. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization.<sup>4</sup>

In this grand vision, the advent of community policing marked an epochal shift, replacing an earlier

organizing framework: professional crime-fighting. And this, finally, is why the field today needs a “new” professionalism, for the original professionalism was — as an organizing framework at least — discarded in favor of community policing.

In their promotion of community policing and a focus on problem solving, the proponents of reform roundly criticized what they saw as the professional crime-fighting model, or simply the “professional model” of policing.<sup>5</sup> They saw the professional model as hidebound: too hierarchical in its management, too narrow in its response to crime and too much at odds with what police did. Led during the first Executive Session on Policing by the scholarship of three academics — Professors Mark Moore of the Harvard Kennedy School, George Kelling of Northeastern University and Robert Trojanowicz of Michigan State University — the champions of community policing contrasted their principles and methods to this “traditional,” “classical,” “reform” or, most commonly, “professional” style of policing.<sup>6</sup>

The criticisms made by Moore, Kelling and Trojanowicz of the then-dominant form of policing in U.S. cities were right on the mark, but by labeling this dominant form “professional” crime-fighting, they needlessly tarnished the concept of professionalism itself.<sup>7</sup> Looking back on these debates, it is easy to see that this so-called professional model of policing was at best a quasi-professionalism and at worst an entirely false professionalism. At the time, however, the critique from Moore, Kelling, Trojanowicz and others succeeded in giving professional policing a bad name, so much so that reformers in countries

where policing was still entirely a matter of political patronage and a blunt instrument of political power began to ask if they could skip the professional stage of police evolution and proceed directly to community policing.<sup>8</sup>

Community policing was an important improvement on the style of policing it challenged in American cities, but it is time to correct two distortions inherited from that earlier debate. First, what community policing challenged in the 1980s was not a truly professional model of policing, but rather a technocratic, rigid, often cynical model of policing. Moreover, it reinforced pernicious biases deeply entrenched in the wider society. Both good and bad police work was performed in that mode, but it was hardly professional. Second, community policing was only part of the new model of policing emerging in the 1980s, with contemporaneous innovations occurring in technology, investigation and the disruption of organized crime. By reinterpreting the rise of community policing as part of a larger shift to a New Professionalism, we hope simultaneously to rescue the idea of professional policing from its frequently distorted form in the mid-20th century and to show how the elements of this New Professionalism might anchor a safer and more just society in the decades ahead.

### **The So-Called Professionalism of Mid-20th-Century Policing**

Proponents of community policing in the 1980s labeled its mid-century predecessor as “professional crime-fighting,” but what sort of policing were they describing? What were the

characteristics of the mid-century policing they hoped to replace?

First, in its relationship to citizens, the previous mode of policing was deliberately removed from communities, insisting that police understood better than local residents how their communities should be policed. As George Kelling described it in the first paper in the Perspectives on Policing series, the police had long been seen as “a community’s *professional* defense against crime and disorder: Citizens should leave control of crime and maintenance of order to police (emphasis added).”<sup>9</sup> Or, as a separate paper explained, “The proper role of citizens in crime control was to be relatively passive recipients of professional crime control services.”<sup>10</sup> In contrast, explained Kelling, under community policing, “the police are to stimulate and buttress a community’s ability to produce attractive neighborhoods and protect them against predators.”<sup>11</sup>

Second, in terms of tactics, the previous mode of policing relied on a limited set of routine activities. As another 1988 paper in the series explained, “Professional crime-fighting now relies predominantly on three tactics: (1) motorized patrol; (2) rapid response to calls for service; and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.”<sup>12</sup>

Third, the management structure of professional crime-fighting was centralized and top-down. Its management technique was command and control, aiming principally to keep police officers in line and out of trouble. As one paper described it, “the more traditional perspective of professional crime-fighting policing ... emphasizes the maintenance of

internal organizational controls.”<sup>13</sup> And as another paper explained in more detail:

In many respects, police organizations have typified the classical command-and-control organization that emphasized top-level decisionmaking: flow of orders from top-level executives down to line personnel, flow of information up from line personnel to executives, layers of dense supervision, unity of command, elaborate rules and regulations, elimination of discretion, and simplification of work tasks.<sup>14</sup>

This mid-century model of policing can be criticized as technocratic and rigid, but it was not all bad. The elevation of technical policing skills, the introduction of hiring standards, and the stricter supervision and discipline of police officers improved some police services and helped some police chiefs put distance between themselves and political ward bosses, corrupt mayors and local elites demanding special attention. Prioritizing 911 calls at least allocated police services to anyone with access to a telephone rather than only to those with political connections or in favor with the local police. But these were incremental gains, and policing remained (and remains) closely tied to politics.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, each of the three elements of so-called professional policing described here — its claim to technical expertise, its tactics and its management strategy — failed to produce adequate public safety. Rising crime and disorder in the 1960s and 1970s belied the technical expertise of the police, as did the repressive response to the civil rights and peace

movements and the persistence of brutality on the street and during interrogations. A growing body of research evidence demonstrated the ineffectiveness of random patrol, the irrelevance of shortened response times to the vast majority of calls for service, and the inability of retrospective investigation to solve most crimes. As for command-and-control management, the work of frontline police officers, operating outside of line-of-sight supervision, proved ill-suited to this form of supervision.

Ironically, the command-and-control management techniques identified with “professional crime-fighting” were the antithesis of the practices generally used to manage professionals. Instead of depending on continuous training, ethical standards and professional pride to guide behavior, command-and-control structures treated frontline police officers like soldiers or factory workers, yet most of the time the job of policing looked nothing like soldiering or assembly-line production.

Even then, the advocates for community policing recognized that mid-century policing was hardly professional in its treatment of the officers on the street. They minced no words here, explaining that by the 1960s and 1970s, line officers were still

managed in ways that were antithetical to professionalization ... patrol officers continued to have low status; their work was treated as if it were routinized and standardized; and petty rules governed issues such as hair length and off-duty behavior.

... the classical theory [of command-and-control management] ... denies too much of the real nature of police work, promulgates unsustainable myths about the nature and quality of police supervision, and creates too much cynicism in officers attempting to do creative problem solving. Its assumptions about workers are simply wrong.<sup>16</sup>

Of all the problems created by terming mid-century policing “professional,” none was more glaring than its dissonance with the experience of African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities. Former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy and former Newark (NJ) Police Director Hubert Williams coauthored a 1990 essay in which they argued that for black Americans, the so-called professional model was infused with the racism that had biased policing since the organization of the police during slavery:

The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for most of our Nation’s history — and the fact that the police were bound to uphold that order — set a pattern for police behavior and attitudes toward minority communities that has persisted until the present day. That pattern includes the idea that minorities have fewer civil rights, that the task of the police is to keep them under control, and that the police have little responsibility for protecting them from crime within their communities.<sup>17</sup>



Indeed, as Williams and Murphy pointed out, blacks were largely excluded from urban police departments in the same years that “professional” policing was taking hold, and those African-Americans who were hired as police officers were often given lesser powers than white officers. In New Orleans, the police department included 177 black officers in 1870, but this number fell to 27 by 1880, further fell to five by 1900, and to zero by 1910. New Orleans did not hire another black officer until 1950. Even by 1961, a third of U.S. police departments surveyed still limited the authority of black police officers to make felony arrests. By the end of that decade, anger at racial injustice had fueled riots in more than a dozen cities, and a Presidential commission had concluded that many of these riots, as Williams and Murphy underscored, “had been precipitated by police actions, often cases of insensitivity, sometimes incidents of outright brutality.”<sup>18</sup>

Today it is clear that the rise of community policing did not mark the end of professional policing, but rather its beginning. Little about policing in the mid-20th century was “professional.” Its expertise was flawed, its techniques crude, its management techniques more military than professional, and it reinforced rather than challenged the racism of the wider society. Community policing, with its emphases on quality of service, decentralization of authority and community partnership, was more professional than the style of policing it attempted to displace.

The phrase “community policing” does not, however, adequately describe what replaced mid-century law enforcement and what continues to propel the most promising developments in policing today. What

began to emerge in the 1980s was a new, truer, more robust professionalism of which community policing was and remains a part. The proponents of the term “community policing” were, in the 1980s, already aware of this problem with their language. They knew their “community policing” framework was merely a partial replacement for mid-century policing. Yet they resisted the broader labels suggested by their colleagues, clinging to their banner of community policing. Why?

### **The Attorney General and the Professors**

Among the participants in the first Executive Session on Policing was Edwin Meese, then-Attorney General of the United States. Two years into the session, during the discussion of a paper by Professors Moore and Kelling tracing the evolution of policing strategies over the previous 100 years, an exchange between the Attorney General and Professor Moore captured not only the state of the debate in the policing field, but the reason that Moore and his academic colleagues adopted the phrase “community policing” to describe the broad changes they were both charting and championing.

Emphasizing the historical significance of these changes, Kelling and Moore had argued in their paper that American policing since the 1840s had begun in a “political” era in which policing and local politics had been intimately connected and in which police carried out a wide range of social and political functions, only some of which related to law enforcement. Policing had then passed through a “reform” era, reaching its zenith in the 1950s, in which professional crime-fighting became the dominant organizational strategy. Then, just as



the many failures of professional crime-fighting became apparent in the 1960s and 1970s, police departments, according to Kelling and Moore, were achieving new successes with the reintroduction of foot patrol and with experiments in “problem solving.” Foot patrol proved both effective at reducing fear of crime and politically popular with residents, merchants and politicians, so much so that voters were willing to increase taxes to pay for it. At the same time, problem solving appeared to capture the imagination and enthusiasm of patrol officers, who liked working more holistically in partnership with residents to resolve neighborhood concerns. This led Kelling and Moore to the principal claim in their historical account: foot patrol, fear reduction, problem solving and partnerships with local residents were “not merely new police tactics.” Instead, they constituted “a new organizational approach, properly called a community strategy.”<sup>19</sup> Although some departments were introducing foot patrol or problem solving as mere add-ons to professional crime-fighting, their implications were far broader:

We are arguing that policing is in a period of transition from a reform strategy to what we call a community strategy. The change involves more than making tactical or organizational adjustments and accommodations. Just as policing went through a basic change when it moved from the political to the reform strategy, it is going through a similar change now.<sup>20</sup>

Attorney General Meese was sympathetic but skeptical. “I think the paper is good, but perhaps a

shade grandiose,” he told its authors. “Suggesting that we have ‘a whole new era’ to be compared with the reform era is too grand an approach.” Community policing, the Attorney General insisted, is “only one component of the whole picture.”<sup>21</sup> The then-director of the National Institute of Justice, James K. “Chips” Stewart, suggested a different term, “problem-oriented” policing, because police were taking many initiatives, not merely creating community partnerships, to affirmatively identify and solve problems rather than waiting to respond to reports of crime.<sup>22</sup> Attorney General Meese suggested “strategic policing” because the term embraced not only the work in communities but also the support that community work was going to require (especially the intelligence, surveillance and analysis functions) and the “specialist services that are going to focus on homicide, citywide burglary rings, car theft rings, and organized crime and terrorism.” The Attorney General said that his concerns would disappear if the professors talked about community policing as a *part* of a new era of policing, rather than defining the era itself. If they did that, he concluded:

Everybody would realize that this [community policing] is a very important contribution which, along with other things happening in the police field, marks a new era of strategic policing in which people are thinking about what they are doing.<sup>23</sup>

Not only did the professors continue to insist on using “community policing” to define the new era and its strategy, but they soon persuaded the field

to do the same. Community policing became the slogan around which reformers rallied, eventually including President Bill Clinton, who put “community policing” at the heart of his national strategy to deal with crime and to provide unprecedented federal assistance to local police.

In response to Attorney General Meese’s suggestion that the professors substitute the term “strategic policing,” Professor Moore responded with a four-part argument. First, he agreed that the many elements of strategic policing and problem solving were an important part of the new era. Second, he predicted that most of these new strategies would take hold even without encouragement from leaders in the field or academics. Third, he predicted that police would find most uncomfortable the building of true partnerships with communities. He concluded, therefore, that labeling the entire package of innovations as community policing would give special prominence to the very aspect that would be most difficult for the police to adopt. In short, the name was a dare. As Moore said to the Attorney General:

Let me say why we keep talking about this phrase “community policing.” Let us imagine ... that there are two different fronts on which new investments in policing are likely to be made. One lies in the direction of more thoughtful, more information-guided, more active attacks on particular crime problems. Some are local crime problems like robbery and burglary, and some turn out to be much bigger ... [including] organized crime, terrorism, and sophisticated frauds. That is one frontier.

In many respects it is a continuation of an increasingly thoughtful, professionalized, forensic, tactical-minded police department. The other front is ... how to strike up a relationship with the community so that we can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way to be accountable ... . The first strand is captured by notions of strategic and problem-solving policing. The second strand is captured by the concept of community policing. ... My judgment is that the problem solving, strategic thing will take care of itself because it is much more of a natural development in policing. If you are going to make a difference, you ought to describe a strategy that challenges the police in the areas in which they are least likely to make investments in repositioning themselves. That is this far more problematic area of fashioning a relationship with the community.<sup>24</sup>

The dare worked. Not everywhere, and not completely, but many American police departments took up the banner of community policing and found it possible to varying degrees to create partnerships with the communities they policed.<sup>25</sup> The successful marketing of community policing was solidified in the first presidential campaign and then the presidency of Bill Clinton, whose signature policing initiative — federal funding to add 100,000 cops to U.S. police departments — was managed by the newly created Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). With those funds, local police departments pursued hundreds of

varieties of community partnerships, and the public came to understand that modern policing was community policing.

But Attorney General Meese was right. Community policing was only one part of the new era in American policing, and police departments did not, indeed could not, transform their entire organizations in service of local community priorities. There were too many things to do that did not fit neatly within that frame. Instead, departments began to change on many fronts at once: incorporating new forensic science technology and new surveillance capabilities, building new information systems that allowed chiefs to hold local commanders accountable almost in real time for levels of crime in their districts, expanding the use of stop-and-search tactics, responding to criticisms of racial profiling, and managing heightened concern about terrorism. And every one of these innovations raised problems, at least in some departments, beyond the guidance that community policing principles provided.

As federal funding for community policing diminished after 2001, police leaders found themselves without a single organizing framework that could allow them to make sense of all of these developments. Soon the labels were proliferating: intelligence-led policing, evidence-based policing, pulling levers, hot-spot policing and predictive policing.<sup>26</sup> Some still argued that community policing, rightly understood, was a vessel capacious enough to contain all of these developments, but others believed that many of these tactics and strategies had become divorced

from community engagement and participation. Community policing, in short, lost its power as a comprehensive, organizing concept and again became a single element in the complex and contentious field of policing.

Moreover, even in the Clinton years, community policing succeeded as a political slogan and provided a framework for important changes in police practice, but did not serve as the transformative paradigm that Moore and others thought was needed. Police leaders remain uncertain even to this day what they should ask of their communities. Despite books, trainings, conferences and countless new community policing initiatives, police departments became only marginally better at building broad, trusting, active partnerships with community residents, especially in high-crime neighborhoods. By the time of Barack Obama's election in 2008, community policing had not only lost most of the federal funding and priority it had enjoyed in the 1990s, but the power of the slogan to focus police attention, catalyze public support for police reform, and serve as an overarching philosophy was exhausted as well.

The New Professionalism can restore to the field an overarching, organizing framework. It brings together the strategic, problem-oriented, community partnership strands from the 1980s and 1990s, and incorporates many additional developments in policing in the new century. Still, the exchange between Attorney General Meese and Professor Moore is worth recalling, for it reminds us that some elements of reform are easier than others for police to integrate into their tradition-bound organizations. As the New Professionalism

advances, reformers inside and outside police departments should focus on those aspects that will be most difficult for those departments to embrace.

## The New Professionalism in the 21st Century

All four elements of the New Professionalism are already apparent in the values espoused by many police leaders in the United States and in the operations of several of their departments: accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence. Indeed, the fourth is why the first three define a true professionalism: a collection of expertise, principles and practices that members of the profession recognize and honor.

### Increased Accountability

Police departments used to resist accountability; today, the best of them embrace it. Twenty years ago, the term “police accountability” generally referred to accountability for misconduct. To speak of police accountability was to ask who investigated civilian complaints, how chiefs disciplined officers for using excessive force, and so on — sensitive topics in policing. Police chiefs did not generally feel accountable for levels of crime.<sup>27</sup> The change today is dramatic, with increasing numbers of police chiefs feeling strong political pressure to reduce crime even as they contain costs. The best chiefs speak confidently about “the three C’s”: crime, cost and conduct. Police departments today are accountable for all three.

Consider accountability for crime. Originating in the New York Police Department (NYPD), the

CompStat accountability process, in which chiefs in headquarters hold precinct and other area commanders accountable for continuing reductions in crime and achievement of other goals, is now a staple of police management in most large departments. The CompStat process focuses most intensely on “index crimes”: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. At the same time, neighborhood residents in local community meetings question police commanders most commonly about other problems, such as open-air drug markets, disorderly youth, vehicle traffic and noise. In still other forums with more specialized advocates, police executives are expected to account for their responses to domestic violence complaints and hate crimes. In these and other ways, police agencies are now routinely accountable for their ability — or inability — to reduce the volume of crime.

Accountability for cost is hardly new, but the costs of policing are receiving intense scrutiny across the United States as state and local governments cut their budgets. Although some police departments are resorting to familiar cost-cutting strategies — reducing civilian staff, slowing officer recruitment, limiting opportunities for officers to earn overtime and eliminating special programs — others are urging a more fundamental re-examination of how police departments are staffed and what work they do.<sup>28</sup> In Los Angeles, Chief of Police Charles Beck eliminated an entire citywide unit of 130 officers known as Crime Reduction and Enforcement of Warrants (CREW), used for tactical crime suppression. This allowed the department to maintain

patrol officer levels in local police districts during a time of budget cuts, even though it deprived his executive team of a flexible resource for responding quickly to new crime hot spots. More than cost cutting, this is a serious bet on the value of district-level leadership, entailing a public accounting of how the department is managing costs in a tight fiscal environment.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, police leaders are taking responsibility for the conduct of their personnel: not only apologizing promptly for clear cases of misconduct, but also taking the initiative to explain controversial conduct that they consider legal and appropriate. For example, when the Los Angeles Police Department employed excessive force on a large scale at an immigrants-rights rally in MacArthur Park in May 2007, then-Police Chief William Bratton publicly confessed error within days, and followed up with strict discipline and reassignment of the top commander at the scene, who later resigned.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps a less obvious example is the NYPD's annual report on all firearms discharges, in which the department reports the facts and patterns in every discharge of a firearm by any of its officers. In the 2008 report, for example, the NYPD reported on 105 firearm discharges, the fewest in at least a decade. These included 49 discharges in "adversarial conflict" in which 12 subjects were killed and 18 injured. The report takes pains to put these police shootings in context, providing accounts of the incidents, information on the backgrounds of the officers and the subjects shot, and comparisons with earlier years.<sup>31</sup>

The embrace and expansion of accountability is likely to continue as part of the New Professionalism in policing, as it is in most professions. On crime, for example, we expect to see more police agencies conducting their own routine public surveys, as many do now, holding themselves accountable not only for reducing reported crime, but also for reducing fear and the perception that crime is a problem in particular neighborhoods or for especially vulnerable residents. The police department in Nashville has engaged a research firm to conduct surveys of residents and businesses every six months since 2005, tracking victimization as well as the percentage of respondents who consider crime their most serious problem, and sharing the results publicly.<sup>32</sup>

To decrease costs, police departments will likely accelerate the shifting of work to nonsworn, and therefore less expensive, specialist personnel, especially in crime investigation units that are currently staffed mostly with detectives. A range of new specialists, including civilian crime scene technicians, data analysts and victim liaisons, might well replace one-half or more of today's detectives. A wide range of new civilian roles could emerge, boosting the prominence of civilian police careers in much the same way that nurses and technicians have taken on many of the roles traditionally played by doctors within the medical profession. This move is already under way, but it proceeds haltingly and with frequent reversals because of the politics of police budgets in periods of fiscal constraint, when

retaining sworn officers becomes an especially high priority for elected officials.

On issues of conduct, the New Professionalism may bring substantial reductions in the use of force — already apparent in several jurisdictions — as police departments become more proficient in analyzing the tactical precursors to use-of-force incidents. Already, some departments are reviewing uses of force not only to determine if the officers were justified in the moment that they pulled their triggers or struck a blow, but also to discern earlier tactical missteps that may have unnecessarily escalated a situation to the point where force was legitimately used. By moving beyond a focus on culpability and discipline to smarter policing that relies less on physical force, more departments can demonstrate their professionalism and better account for the force that they deploy.

Finally, we see a growing appreciation among police executives for their own accountability to frontline officers and other members of the organization. This is the least developed form of accountability, with too many police managers still speaking about doing battle with their unions and too many unions bragging about their control over chiefs. This familiar, bruising fight between labor and management obscures the beginnings of a more professional, constructive engagement between police unions and police executives, where leaders at every level are committed to disciplinary systems that are fair and perceived as fair, the development of rules with robust participation of frontline officers and staff, and codes of ethics and statements of values that speak to the aspirations of men and women

throughout policing and are grounded in a participatory process.

### **Legitimacy**

Every public-sector department makes some claim to legitimacy, and policing is no exception. In their account of professional crime-fighting of the mid-20th century, Professors Kelling and Moore identified the sources of legitimacy for policing as “the law” and the “professionalism” of the police. They contrasted these sources of legitimacy with early sources of legitimacy in urban politics. To free themselves from the corruptions of political manipulation, the police of mid-century America, the professors explained, claimed their legitimacy from enforcing the law in ways that were properly entrusted to their professional expertise. By contrast, community policing emphasized the legitimacy that could be derived from community approval and engagement.

The legitimacy of policing under the New Professionalism embraces all of these, recognizing that legitimacy is both conferred by law and democratic politics and earned by adhering to professional standards and winning the trust and confidence of the people policed. The New Professionalism, however, puts a special emphasis on the sources of earned legitimacy: professional integrity and public trust. The last of these — public legitimacy — extends a long-established principle of democratic policing and a tenet of community policing: policing by consent of the governed.

In recent decades, police have had only the weakest means to measure erosion of public legitimacy,

mostly derived from the numbers of civilian complaints against the police. As every police officer and police scholar can agree, counting formal civilian complaints produces highly problematic statistics. Relatively few people who feel aggrieved in their encounters with the police make a formal complaint, so the complaints received are unlikely to be representative of wider patterns. Moreover, the police discount complaints from at least two categories of civilians: persistent offenders who use the complaint process to deter police from stopping them, and persistent complainers who file literally dozens of complaints annually. These complainants may be relatively few, but the stories about them circulate so widely among police officers that they undermine the ability of police commanders or outside oversight bodies to use numbers of civilian complaints as a credible measure of public dissatisfaction. Finally, adjudicating civilian complaints is so difficult that most complaints remain formally unsubstantiated, further undermining the process.

The problem is with the use of civilian complaints as the leading measure of public legitimacy, not with the goal of public legitimacy itself. Research conducted by New York University Professor Tom Tyler and others over the last two decades demonstrates that rigorous surveys can reliably measure legitimacy, and that doing so allows police departments to identify practices that can increase their legitimacy among those most disaffected: young people and members of ethnic and racial minority groups. Tyler and others demonstrate that police can employ even

forceful tactics such as stop-and-frisk in ways that leave those subject to these tactics feeling that the police acted fairly and appropriately.<sup>33</sup> It is through the pursuit of public legitimacy, guided by repeated surveys that disaggregate results for specific racial, ethnic and age groups, that the New Professionalism can directly address the persistent distrust between ethnic and racial minorities and the police in the United States.

As the New Professionalism develops further, police departments will be able to use better surveys than are common today to measure public legitimacy, allowing them to make more appropriate and modest use of civilian complaints statistics. In 2007, then-Senator Barack Obama underscored the importance of this pillar of the New Professionalism when he promised that, as President, he would work for a criminal justice system that enjoyed the trust and confidence of citizens of every race, ethnicity and age.<sup>34</sup> Public surveys that capture the satisfaction of people in these discrete groups in their encounters with police and in their broader confidence in the police can help measure progress toward that goal.<sup>35</sup>

### **Continuous Innovation**

One complaint about the old professionalism of mid-century policing is that it stifled innovation at the front lines of policing. Police managers were so concerned about the dangers of corruption and a loss of discipline that they suppressed the creative impulses of frontline officers who wanted to try new ways of solving crime problems and eliminating other conditions that caused



people grief. Conversely, a complaint about community policing in the 1990s was that it left problem solving to the variable skills of frontline officers, with only rare examples of senior management investing in departmentwide problem solving or developing responses beyond the “generic” solutions of “patrolling, investigating, arresting, and prosecuting ... without benefit of rigorously derived knowledge about the effectiveness of what they do.”<sup>36</sup>

Today, innovation at every level is essential for police agencies charged with preventing crimes and solving problems from terrorism to youth violence, vandalism, mortgage fraud, Internet gambling, drug dealing, extortion, drunk driving, intimate partner violence and so on. The last decade has seen innovation in the strategies, tactics and technologies that police employ against all of these, and in ways that police develop relationships within departments and with the public. Films and television series popularize innovations in forensic sciences, but equally dramatic are innovations in less-lethal weaponry, the use of “verbal judo” to control unruly people without physical force, direct engagement with neighborhood gangs and drug dealers to reduce crime, and recruiting techniques that can rapidly diversify the pool of applicants for police jobs. Other innovations boost attention to customer service at police stations, help supervisors identify officers at greater risk of engaging in misconduct, improve the outcomes of confrontations with mentally disturbed individuals, and provide more effective service to victims of persistent domestic violence and spousal abuse. It is a dizzying array.

The challenge of the New Professionalism is to encourage innovation within the bounds not only of the law but also of ethical values. The use of value statements to guide police behavior in place of the strict enforcement of detailed regulations continues to gain acceptance in the field, driven first by community policing and problem solving and more recently by reforms to disciplinary processes and closer collaborations between union leadership and police executives. As police departments reward innovators with recognition, resources and promotion, that trend will continue.

As part of the New Professionalism, departments can expand the range of incentives for innovation and build structures that encourage innovation as part of the routine work of police officers and senior management teams. These might include community partnerships that go beyond the neighborhood activities of community policing, and joint ventures with other government departments, national and international nonprofit organizations, and private-sector companies. Such partnerships encourage police to see crime and crime problems in new forms and new places, well beyond the narrow confines of those reported to the police and recorded in the Uniform Crime Reports.

But innovation alone will not prove valuable without a way to learn from the process. All professions are distinguished from mere trades by their commitment to continuous learning through innovation, whether it is experimentation in medicine, the development of the common law, or the application of engineering breakthroughs in architecture. As Herman Goldstein wrote a few years ago in urging the importance of developing knowledge

as part of police reform, “The building of a body of knowledge, on which good practice is based and with which practitioners are expected to be familiar, may be the most important element for acquiring truly professional status.”<sup>37</sup>

Knowledge — its creation, dissemination and practical application — is essential to genuine professionalism. Police organizations need not only to encourage innovation but also to measure their outcomes, and reward and sustain innovations that succeed. They should encourage independent evaluations of their policies and tactics. Working with researchers, they should design experiments that rigorously test new ideas. Police organizations must then communicate the reasons for their successes widely and quickly throughout the profession. Formal partnerships with universities and nonprofit think tanks can help, and many departments have already built such partnerships.

All this suggests a new way of learning within policing. The pace of innovation and knowledge development today is simply too fast for police organizations to rely on recruit training and occasional specialized courses. Rather, police departments need to become learning organizations of professionals. For example, analysts in police agencies should not only be studying crime patterns but also analyzing what the police are doing about them and to what effect, informing the development of tailor-made strategies to deal with the underlying problems, and then sharing their analyses widely within the department in forms that busy frontline officers and supervisors can easily digest, retain and apply. Another

example: frontline officers and rising managers should be rewarded for the professional habits of reading, learning and actively contributing to the expansion of knowledge in the field.<sup>38</sup>

### **National Coherence**

Achieving accountability for crime, cost and conduct; public legitimacy across social divisions; and continuous innovation and learning at every rank would mark a watershed in policing. These first three elements build on efforts begun with community policing, elevating them to a New Professionalism that infuses all of what police organizations do. To make that New Professionalism worthy of the name, however, requires one more step: achieving national coherence in this radically decentralized business. This element has not yet developed as far as the first three, but it has begun to grow.

Policing in the United States is notoriously parochial, entrusted to something close to 20,000 police departments — the precise number changes so quickly that there is no reliable count. Yet in the last three decades, policing has begun to develop features of a coherent field of professional work. The Police Foundation and Police Executive Research Forum have helped by nurturing national conversations among practitioners and researchers. These conversations took on greater intensity in the first Executive Session on Policing, and they became far more public when Bill Clinton, campaigning for the presidency in 1992, argued for using federal resources to spread community policing to every state. Since then, national discussions

and debates about police practices and strategies have become commonplace, thanks in large part to the efforts of the COPS Office, the Office on Violence Against Women and the Office of Justice Programs — all within the Department of Justice — and the conversations hosted by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and other professional associations.<sup>39</sup> Many of the best-known brands in policing practices — “CompStat Meetings,” “Fusion Centers” and even older brands like “Weed and Seed” programs — are national in name only, with each manifestation so different from the others that they contribute little to national coherence. Still, even these widely differing practices can create an appetite for more truly coherent practices in an extremely decentralized field.

Most other countries achieve at least some national coherence through a national police agency or a limited number of state police services. England, with only 43 local police services, has recently created the National Police Improvement Agency to assume a variety of shared functions and bring a greater degree of national coherence to policing. Canada uses a mixed model, in which municipalities and provinces contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to provide local or provincial police services according to local specifications aiming to achieve locally negotiated goals. Large jurisdictions, such as the provinces of Ontario and Quebec and the cities of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, still choose to field their own police services, but the other provinces and many smaller cities contract with the RCMP.

Local control over local policing is deeply ingrained in American political culture, and we do not expect

that to change. Some consolidation among the 80 percent of police agencies with fewer than 25 police officers could help residents of those communities receive more professional police services, but such consolidation will not do much for national coherence. Indeed, further progress toward national coherence through the New Professionalism may be necessary for this consolidation to be attractive.

Greater mobility among police departments for officers and professional staff could do more than consolidation to advance national coherence. True professionals are mobile across jurisdictions, even across national boundaries. Engineers, doctors and even lawyers can practice their professions and apply their skills and training almost anywhere. Many professions have local testing and licensing requirements, but reciprocity arrangements recognize that the training and skills of these licensed professionals are portable, and both individuals and organizations take advantage of this portability. Local experience has value in every profession, but local expertise can be balanced with wider knowledge and experience.

Only in the last few decades has it become common for big-city police chiefs to be recruited from outside of their departments and states, though even today most chiefs have spent their entire careers in the departments they lead. That trend needs to deepen, and the profession needs to find ways to encourage greater movement from place to place and across state lines at every stage of police careers. The obstacles are substantial. Police pension rules can create powerful disincentives for officers to move. In some states, such as California, the pension system does not block movement within the

state, but creates disincentives for wider moves. In Massachusetts, state laws and contracts make it difficult for veteran officers and supervisors to move even within the state without loss in rank.

If the values of policing are really professional, not local, then departments need not worry that a workforce enjoying geographic mobility will become unskilled or undisciplined. Officers who have worked in the same community for a decade or more and who know the local people and their customs will be invaluable members of any police service, but that is true in many professions. What is needed is a genuine national coherence in the skills, training and accreditation of police professionals.<sup>40</sup>

At stake here is much more than the ability for some police officers to move from one department to another. Citizens should be entitled to professional performance from U.S. police officers wherever they find them. Not only should the definition of professional performance be constantly evolving, but the public — itself mobile across the country — should expect police officers everywhere to keep up with these developments.

This kind of coherence implies the development of national norms of how the police respond to situations, particularly to criminal activity, public disorder, political dissent or even a traffic infraction. Consider, for example, a routine traffic stop. This can be a tense moment for a police officer who does not know if the car's occupants were merely speeding or escaping the scene of a crime, just as it is an anxious moment for most

drivers. A common protocol for how the police approach the vehicle, what they require of the driver, and how they respond as the encounter proceeds could not only save the lives of officers, but could help motorists as they drive from state to state avoid inadvertently alarming any officers who stop them. Such protocols have already begun to spread, but they could usefully be developed for a much wider range of situations.

The concept of a “protocol,” familiar in the medical field, could prove useful in professional policing. Some may become standard because of research findings, others because of judicial decisions, still others because of advances in forensic science. As in medicine, the danger is that protocols will, in the hands of busy police professionals, replace nuanced diagnosis and a plan to address the problems at hand. Careful analysis of local problems and the custom crafting of solutions continue to be necessary. Still, once a tool becomes part of that solution, its use according to standard protocols can save lives, improve effectiveness, reduce costs and let everyone benefit from the accumulation of professional knowledge. Just as systematic evaluation and rigorous research can discipline innovation, they can strengthen national protocols.<sup>41</sup>

Increased mobility and stronger protocols are only two ways in which national coherence can advance. The attraction of the new professionalism is likely to feed a flowering of specialist professional associations, bachelor's and master's degree programs, professional journals and other features of professional infrastructure.

### **Is the New Professionalism Really New?**

We return, finally, to the definitional question: What is professionalism? When an earlier generation of reformers described the police strategy of the mid-20th century as professional crime-fighting, they may have been using the term “professional” merely as the opposite of “amateur.” Perhaps they thought of professional police much as people think of professional athletes or professional actors. Through more rigorous selection, better training and tighter command, they had left the ranks of mere amateurs.

It is also likely that this earlier generation wanted to put distance between the police and partisan elected officials. Police departments live with a constant tension between serving the government leaders of the day, whether mayor, county executive or governor, and remaining independent of partisan politics. In the mid-20th century, reformers deployed the language of professionalism to help manage that tension, hoping to hold the local political machine at arm’s length. That aim was laudable, but the claim was false. These departments were not professional.

We describe today’s genuine police professionalism as “new” to distinguish it from the earlier rhetoric that mistakenly equated professionalism with an overreliance on technology, centralization of authority and insulation from the public. These features, found in much policing in the second half of the 20th century, do not define true professionalism.

Consider the parallel with the practice of medicine as a profession. In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. doctors were often criticized as overly reliant on technology

and distant from the patients whom they treated. A wave of reformers in medicine developed new specialties in family practice and championed medical education that trained doctors to communicate with patients respectfully, engaging patients more meaningfully in their own treatment. New roles for nurse practitioners and other health workers made the practice of medicine more humane. Family practice and other reforms aimed to build good relationships between medical practitioners and patients, just as community policing aimed to build good relationships between police and the people they served. But no one seriously suggests that doctors and nurses should abandon their identity as professionals. Instead, professionalism in medicine has come to embrace the respect for patients, accountability and innovations that are improving practice. Medicine has discovered its own new professionalism. So, too, has legal practice, in part through law school clinics that teach the importance of respectful client relationships alongside legal doctrine.

Similarly, in law enforcement, the New Professionalism embraces the respectful engagement of citizens and communities that lies at the core of community policing. Those who continue to champion the aspirations of community policing should understand the New Professionalism as aligned with their ambitions.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the New Professionalism is clear about its expectations, whereas community policing has become so vague a term that it has lost its operational meaning. As Moore advised two decades ago, the New Professionalism focuses police attention on the very things that are most difficult to achieve:

accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence. Community engagement is essential at least to the first two of those and perhaps all four.

Much can be gained from a truer police professionalism. For the public, policing promises to become more effective, more responsive to the opinions of residents and less forceful, less brusque. For members of the police profession themselves, the work promises to become more stimulating with a greater emphasis on learning, innovation, ethics and professional mobility. But the greatest gains are for democratic societies generally and the American experiment in democracy more specifically.

A certain amount of force will always be a part of police work; a degree of coercion is necessary to keep order and enforce the law. What matters is whether policing — when it forcefully asserts its authority — makes democratic progress possible or impedes it. Professional policing enhances democratic progress when it accounts for what it does, achieves public support, learns through innovation and transcends parochialism. That is the promise of the New Professionalism.

## Endnotes

1. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as of September 2004, 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies with the equivalent of at least one full-time officer were operating in the United States. Reaves, Brian A., *Census of Law Enforcement Agencies*, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007), p. 1.
2. See the discussion on pp. 14-15 and note 33 and the sources referenced therein.
3. Brown, Lee P., *Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 12 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, September 1989). Hereinafter, publications in this series are identified by their number in the series, Perspectives on Policing. The entire set is available at: [www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive\\_sessions/policing.htm](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive_sessions/policing.htm).
4. Sparrow, Malcolm K., *Implementing Community Policing*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 9 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, November 1988), p. 2.
5. See, for example, Kelling, George L., and Mark H. Moore, *The Evolving Strategy of Policing*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 4 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, November 1988), p. 6 (where the authors write specifically of “the professional model”).

6. The first Executive Session on Policing convened 31 officials and scholars, but its 16 published papers were authored by only 13 participants. Mark Moore and George Kelling were authors or co-authors on six papers each; Robert Trojanowicz was co-author on three; Malcolm Sparrow, Robert Wasserman and Hubert Williams were authors or co-authors on two each. No one else appeared on more than one. Of the first six papers issued, all were authored or co-authored by Moore, Kelling and Trojanowicz, with no other co-authors; and through the end of 1992, the Executive Session published only three papers that were not authored or co-authored by Moore, Kelling or Trojanowicz. Other scholars played at least as great a role in the formulation of community policing during these years, including Herman Goldstein (who was a member of the first Executive Session) and David Bayley (who is a member of the second Executive Session), but neither wrote for the first Executive Session on Policing.

7. More recently, the Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices convened by the National Research Council of the National Academies recounted the story in the same way, although choosing in its own analysis to refer to the professional model of policing as the “standard” model. See National Research Council, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*, Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, editors, Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2004), p. 85. (Community policing “is characterized as something that transforms the ‘professional’

model of policing, dominant since the end of World War II ... .”)

8. Police officials in Kenya, eager to implement a version of community policing, put this question to one of the authors of this paper in 2000, as did a leader in the military police of Rio de Janeiro in 2001.

9. Kelling, George L., *Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 1 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, June 1988), pp. 2-3.

10. Kelling and Moore, *The Evolving Strategy of Policing* (note 5).

11. Kelling, *Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution* (note 9), pp. 2-3.

12. Moore, Mark H., Robert C. Trojanowicz and George L. Kelling, *Crime and Policing*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 2 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, June 1988).

13. Wasserman, Robert, and Mark H. Moore, *Values in Policing*, Perspectives on Policing, no. 8 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program



in *Criminal Justice Policy and Management*, November 1988), p. 5.

14. Kelling, George L., Robert Wasserman and Hubert Williams, *Police Accountability and Community Policing*, *Perspectives on Policing*, no. 7 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, November 1988), p. 2.

15. Daryl Gates, then-Police Chief in Los Angeles, explained more fully: “Chiefs today are unfortunately deeply tied to politics and politicians. It’s a very sad commentary on local policing. How do chiefs refer to their mayor? ‘My mayor.’ ‘Is your mayor going to win this election?’ ... And if they do not, that is the last time we see that commissioner or chief. Gone, because of political whim, not his or her performance as a chief. So, if you do not think politics are tied into policing today, you are being very, very foolish.” See Hartmann, Francis X. ed., *Debating the Evolution of American Policing*, *Perspectives on Policing*, no. 5 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, November 1988), p. 6.

16. Kelling and Moore, *The Evolving Strategy of Policing* (note 5), pp. 9, 14.

17. Williams, Hubert, and Patrick V. Murphy, *The Evolving Strategy of Policing: A Minority View*,

*Perspectives on Policing*, no. 13 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, January 1990), p. 2. The significance of this particular publication is especially great as Murphy had served as president of the Police Foundation from 1973 to 1985, succeeded by Hubert Williams, who continues in that position today.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 11.

19. Kelling and Moore, *The Evolving Strategy of Policing* (note 5), p. 13.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

21. Quoted in Hartmann, *Debating the Evolution of American Policing* (note 15), p. 3.

22. Problem solving was discussed frequently at the Executive Session, often as a component of community policing, but its importance as an independent thrust in police reform has been more widely recognized since then. Herman Goldstein, who coined the term “problem-oriented policing,” was careful to write at the time of the Executive Session that it “connects with the current move to redefine relationships between the police and community.” Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), p. 3. Looking back on these discussions in 2003, Goldstein explained that in the years of the Executive Session, “the community policing movement grew rapidly in policing.

One element of that movement supported the police becoming less legalistically-oriented: that police should redefine their role in ways that sought to achieve broader outcomes for those, especially victims, who turned to the police for help. Beat-level ‘problem solving’ was seen as supporting these efforts and therefore often incorporated into the community policing movement. As community policing and problem-oriented policing evolved alongside each other, the two concepts were intermingled. I contributed to some of the resulting confusion.” Goldstein, Herman, “On Further Developing Problem-Oriented Policing: The Most Critical Need, The Major Impediments, and a Proposal,” *Crime Prevention Studies* 15 (2003): 13-47, at p. 45, note 2 (citation omitted), available at [http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume\\_15/01Goldstein.pdf](http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume_15/01Goldstein.pdf).

23. Quoted in Hartmann, *Debating the Evolution of American Policing* (note 15), p. 3.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 5. In a later paper, Moore suggested, likely in jest, that one could term the new strategy “professional, strategic, community, problem-solving policing.” Moore, Mark H., and Robert C. Trojanowicz, *Corporate Strategies for Policing, Perspectives on Policing*, no. 6 (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, November 1988), p. 14.

25. See, for example, Skogan, Wesley G., *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

26. See, for example, Weisburd, David L., and Anthony A. Braga, eds., *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

27. See Kelling, Wasserman, and Williams, *Police Accountability and Community Policing* (note 14), p. 1. (“Rising crime or fear of crime may be problematic for police administrators, but rarely does either threaten their survival.”)

28. See Gascón, George, and Todd Foglesong, *Making Policing More Affordable: Managing Costs and Measuring Value in Policing* (Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, and Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, December 2010), NCJ 231096.

29. Beck disbanded the Crime Reduction and Enforcement of Warrants task force (CREW), weathering criticism that this vital unit “comprised quick-strike troops that former Chief William Bratton used to focus on problem gangs and neighborhoods.” Beck also reduced the size of other specialized, central units focused on gangs and drugs by 170 officers to maintain patrol levels in the districts. See Romero, Dennis, “LAPD’s Beck Shuffles Cops To Deal With Budget Crisis: No New Cars, No Unused Vacation Pay Possible,” *LA Weekly*, February 17, 2010, available at: <http://blogs.laweekly.com/ladaily/city-news/lapd-metro-transfers>.

30. See Los Angeles Police Department, “An Examination of May Day 2007,” Report to the Board of Police Commissioners, October 7, 2007.

31. Three police officers were injured by subject gunfire, and none were killed in those incidents. See New York Police Department, "2008 Annual Firearms Discharge Report," 2009.

32. Personal communication from then-Police Chief Ronald Serpas, November 2009. A copy of the June 2009 survey report is on file with the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Harvard Kennedy School.

33. See, for example, Tyler, Tom R., "Enhancing Police Legitimacy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593 (10) (2004): 84-99. See also Tyler, Tom R., ed., *Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007).

34. See Obama, Barack, Remarks at Howard University Convocation, September 28, 2007, available at [http://www.barackobama.com/2007/09/28/remarks\\_of\\_senator\\_barack\\_obam\\_26.php](http://www.barackobama.com/2007/09/28/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_26.php). Accessed October 14, 2010.

35. At a national level, the *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics* annually reports levels of "confidence" in the police as an institution by age, income, racial and ethnic group, and political affiliation. The results in 2009 showed that 63 percent of white adults had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the police, in contrast to 38 percent of black adults. If individual departments track the exact language of these national surveys, they can compare themselves with these national benchmarks. See Pastore, Ann L., and Kathleen Maguire, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal*

*Justice Statistics*, Table 2.12.2009 [Online], available at <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2122009.pdf>. Accessed August 2, 2010.

36. Goldstein, "On Further Developing Problem-Oriented Policing" (note 22), p. 21.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 46, note 3. Goldstein here describes it as "especially troubling" that the 20th century "professionalization" of policing had not included this element.

38. The idea of a "learning organization" goes well beyond what we expect of all professional organizations. For more about learning organizations, see Garvin, David A., *Learning in Action: Putting the Learning Organization to Work* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).

39. The Major Cities Chiefs Association comprises the chiefs of the 63 largest police departments in the United States and Canada (56 of the departments are in the United States; seven more are in Canada). Members include the chief executive officers of law enforcement agencies in U.S. cities with populations greater than 500,000, the chief executive officer of the largest law enforcement agency in each U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area with a population greater than 1.5 million, and the chiefs of police in the seven largest Canadian cities. For more information about the association, see the association's website, <http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org>.

40. The issues of national coherence and professionalism can raise questions about minimum standards for police, especially educational

standards. Should police officers be required to have a college degree? Should there be educational qualifications for promotion? In light of racial and ethnic differences in formal educational attainment, standards might be more appropriately focused on knowledge rather than years of schooling or formal degrees. Many professions allow apprenticeships to substitute for formal classroom education. The issues also raise questions of pension portability for line officers, which some states are beginning to address with the support of police unions. In general, we have been impressed that many police unions share the ambitions of the New Professionalism.

41. The recently created National Network for Safe Communities, which links more than 50 jurisdictions that are implementing a gang violence reduction strategy piloted in Boston and a drug market reduction strategy piloted in High Point, N.C., represents one such effort to move police practice from experimentation to application and adaptation of common, national protocols. See <http://www.nnscommunities.org>. A similar national effort, the Policing Research Platform Project, is collecting comprehensive data from new recruits, supervisors and entire

police agencies to expand understanding of the career paths of police professionals and of quality policing. See <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/administration/policing-platform/welcome.htm>.

42. See, for example, Sklansky, David, *The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism*, to be published in this series. Sklansky continues to identify “professionalism” in policing with the desire to centralize police authority, make use of the latest technology, and keep the public at a distance. He decries such professionalism and longs to engage police in questions of genuine partnership with communities. We agree with his ambition but disagree that he needs to strip police of their professional identity to achieve it. We believe the New Professionalism is a more accurate and more attractive banner for this effort than his “advanced community policing.”

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**Chief Ella Bully-Cummings**, Detroit Police Department (retired)

**Ms. Christine Cole** (Facilitator), Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

**Commissioner Edward Davis**, Boston Police Department

**Chief Ronald Davis**, East Palo Alto Police Department

**Chief Edward Flynn**, Milwaukee Police Department

**Colonel Rick Fuentes**, Superintendent, New Jersey State Police

**Chief George Gascón**, San Francisco Police Department

**Mr. Gil Kerlikowske**, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy

**Chief Cathy Lanier**, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

**Dr. John H. Laub**, Director, National Institute of Justice

**Ms. Adrian Nicole LeBlanc**, Visiting Scholar, New York University

**Professor Tracey Meares**, Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School

**Chief Constable Peter Neyroud**, Chief Executive, National Policing Improvement Agency (U.K.)

**Ms. Christine Nixon**, Chair, Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (Australia)

**Chief Richard Pennington**, Atlanta Police Department

**Mayor Jerry Sanders**, City of San Diego

**Professor David Sklansky**, Professor of Law, Faculty Co-Chair of the Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

**Mr. Sean Smoot**, Director and Chief Legal Counsel, Police Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois

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**Chief Darrel Stephens**, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (retired)

**Professor Christopher Stone**, Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

**Mr. Jeremy Travis**, President, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

**Mr. Rick VanHouten**, President, Fort Worth Police Association

**Professor David Weisburd**, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law and Criminal Justice; Director, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University; and Distinguished Professor, Department of Criminology, Law and Society, George Mason University

**Dr. Chuck Wexler**, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

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