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Enlisted Military Personnel Cannot Sue Superior Officers for Constitutional Violations
Enlisted Military Personnel Cannot Sue Superior Officers for
Constitutional Violations
The United States Supreme Court has held that enlisted military
personnel may not maintain a Bivens suit to recover damages from a
superior officer for alleged constitutional violations. The Plaintiffs in
this action were five enlisted men who serve in the United States Navy on
board a combat naval vessel. Petitioners and defendants were the
commanding officers of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three non-
commissioned officers. The Respondents alleged that because of their
minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties,
threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed
penalties of unusual severity. A California district court dismissed the
complaint on grounds that the actions complained of were non-reviewable
military decisions, the defendants were entitled to immunity, and
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit
Court of appeals reversed. See: 661 F. 2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Ninth Circuit reversed based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 91 S. Ct. 1999. The Supreme Court reversed and held
Bivens does not allow an award when special factors counseling
hesitation" are present. The Court said the need for special regulations
in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is
too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can
function without strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting. The Constitution allowed Congress to
have authority over the military, enact statutes regulating military life,
and establish a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate
military life. The resulting system provides for the review and remedy of
complaints and grievances such as those presented by the respondents.
The Court said it must be concerned with the disruption of the
peculiar and special relationship of the solider to his superiors that
might result if the soldier were allowed to haul his supervisors into
court." The Court said Congress has not provided a damages remedy for
claims by military personnel whose constitutional rights has been violated
by superior officers. The Court held the unique disciplinary structure of
the military establishment and Congress' activity in the field
constitute special factors" that dictate it would be inappropriate to
provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their
superior officers.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. See: Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983).
Constitutional Violations
The United States Supreme Court has held that enlisted military
personnel may not maintain a Bivens suit to recover damages from a
superior officer for alleged constitutional violations. The Plaintiffs in
this action were five enlisted men who serve in the United States Navy on
board a combat naval vessel. Petitioners and defendants were the
commanding officers of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three non-
commissioned officers. The Respondents alleged that because of their
minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties,
threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed
penalties of unusual severity. A California district court dismissed the
complaint on grounds that the actions complained of were non-reviewable
military decisions, the defendants were entitled to immunity, and
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit
Court of appeals reversed. See: 661 F. 2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Ninth Circuit reversed based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 91 S. Ct. 1999. The Supreme Court reversed and held
Bivens does not allow an award when special factors counseling
hesitation" are present. The Court said the need for special regulations
in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is
too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can
function without strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting. The Constitution allowed Congress to
have authority over the military, enact statutes regulating military life,
and establish a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate
military life. The resulting system provides for the review and remedy of
complaints and grievances such as those presented by the respondents.
The Court said it must be concerned with the disruption of the
peculiar and special relationship of the solider to his superiors that
might result if the soldier were allowed to haul his supervisors into
court." The Court said Congress has not provided a damages remedy for
claims by military personnel whose constitutional rights has been violated
by superior officers. The Court held the unique disciplinary structure of
the military establishment and Congress' activity in the field
constitute special factors" that dictate it would be inappropriate to
provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their
superior officers.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. See: Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983).
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Related legal case
Chappell v. Wallace
| Year | 1983 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 462 U.S. 296, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1 |
| Level | Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
CHAPPELL ET AL. v. WALLACE ET AL., 103 S. Ct. 2362, 462 U.S. 296 (U.S. 06/13/1983)
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] No. 82-167
[3] 103 S. Ct. 2362, 462 U.S. 296, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1983
[4] Decided: June 13, 1983.
[5] CHAPPELL ET AL
v.
WALLACE ET AL.
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
[7] Assistant Attorney General McGrath argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Robert E. Kopp, and John F. Cordes.
[8] John Murcko, by appointment of the Court, 459 U.S. 1068, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.*fn*
[9] Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
[10] Author: Burger
[ 462 U.S. Page 297]
[11] CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
[12] We granted certiorari to determine whether enlisted military personnel may maintain suits to recover damages from superior officers for injuries sustained as a result of violations of constitutional rights in the course of military service.
[13] I
[14] Respondents are five enlisted men who serve in the United States Navy on board a combat naval vessel. Petitioners are the commanding officer of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three noncommissioned officers.
[15] Respondents brought action against these officers seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Respondents alleged that because of their minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. App. 5-16. Respondents claimed, inter alia, that the actions complained of "deprived [them] of [their] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the right not to be discriminated against because of [their] race, color or previous condition of servitude . . . ." Id., at 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Respondents also alleged a conspiracy among petitioners to deprive them of rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985.
[ 462 U.S. Page 298]
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the actions respondents complained of were non-reviewable military decisions, that petitioners were entitled to immunity, and that respondents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
[16] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 661 F.2d 729 (1981). The Court of Appeals assumed that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), authorized the award of damages for the constitutional violations alleged in their complaint, unless either the actions complained of were not reviewable or petitioners were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals set out certain tests for determining whether the actions at issue are reviewable by a civilian court and, if so, whether petitioners are nonetheless immune from suit. The case was remanded to the District Court for application of these tests.
[17] We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 966 (1982), and we reverse.
[18] II
[19] This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, authorized a suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated an individual's constitutional rights, even though Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, that such a remedy will not be available when "special factors counseling hesitation" are present. Id., at 396. See also Carlson v. Green,446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). Before a Bivens remedy may be fashioned, therefore, a court must take into account any "special factors counseling hesitation." See Bush v. Lucas, post, at 378.
[20] The "special factors" that bear on the propriety of respondents' Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court's decision in Feres v. United States,340 U.S. 135 (1950). There
[ 462 U.S. Page 299]
the Court addressed the question "whether the [Federal] Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to [military] service' what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong." Id., at 138. The Court held that, even assuming the Act might be read literally to allow tort actions against the United States for injuries suffered by a soldier in service, Congress did not intend to subject the Government to such claims by a member of the Armed Forces. The Court acknowledged "that if we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases," id., at 142, the Government would have waived its sovereign immunity under the Act and would be subject to liability. But the Feres Court was acutely aware that it was resolving the question of whether soldiers could maintain tort suits against the Government for injuries arising out of their military service. The Court focused on the unique relationship between the Government and military personnel -- noting that no such liability existed before the Federal Tort Claims Act -- and held that Congress did not intend to create such liability. The Court also took note of the various "enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in the armed services." Id., at 144. As the Court has since recognized, "[in] the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .'" United States v. Muniz,374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-744 (1974); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). Although this case concerns the limitations on the type of non-statutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court's analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case.
[ 462 U.S. Page 300]
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting. See Parker v. Levy, supra, at 743-744; Orloff v. Willoughby,345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel "without counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman,420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection. The Court has often noted "the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," United States v. Brown, supra, at 112; see In re Grimley,137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890), and has acknowledged that "the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . ." Burns v. Wilson,346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). This becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.
[21] Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors of military life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian life. In drafting the
[ 462 U.S. Page 301]
Constitution they anticipated the kinds of issues raised in this case. Their response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress "To raise and support Armies"; "To provide and maintain a Navy"; and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14. It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that view.
[22] Congress' authority in this area, and the distance between military and civilian life, was summed up by the Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 93-94:
[23] "[Judges] are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which . . . grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."
[24] Only recently we restated this principle in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981):
[25] "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
[26] In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973), we addressed the question of whether Congress' analogous power over the militia, granted by Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, would be impermissibly compromised by a suit seeking to have a Federal District Court examine the "pattern of training, weaponry and orders"
[ 462 U.S. Page 302]
of a State's National Guard. In denying relief we stated:
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] No. 82-167
[3] 103 S. Ct. 2362, 462 U.S. 296, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1983
[4] Decided: June 13, 1983.
[5] CHAPPELL ET AL
v.
WALLACE ET AL.
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
[7] Assistant Attorney General McGrath argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Robert E. Kopp, and John F. Cordes.
[8] John Murcko, by appointment of the Court, 459 U.S. 1068, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.*fn*
[9] Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
[10] Author: Burger
[ 462 U.S. Page 297]
[11] CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
[12] We granted certiorari to determine whether enlisted military personnel may maintain suits to recover damages from superior officers for injuries sustained as a result of violations of constitutional rights in the course of military service.
[13] I
[14] Respondents are five enlisted men who serve in the United States Navy on board a combat naval vessel. Petitioners are the commanding officer of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three noncommissioned officers.
[15] Respondents brought action against these officers seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Respondents alleged that because of their minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. App. 5-16. Respondents claimed, inter alia, that the actions complained of "deprived [them] of [their] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the right not to be discriminated against because of [their] race, color or previous condition of servitude . . . ." Id., at 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Respondents also alleged a conspiracy among petitioners to deprive them of rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985.
[ 462 U.S. Page 298]
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the actions respondents complained of were non-reviewable military decisions, that petitioners were entitled to immunity, and that respondents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
[16] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 661 F.2d 729 (1981). The Court of Appeals assumed that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), authorized the award of damages for the constitutional violations alleged in their complaint, unless either the actions complained of were not reviewable or petitioners were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals set out certain tests for determining whether the actions at issue are reviewable by a civilian court and, if so, whether petitioners are nonetheless immune from suit. The case was remanded to the District Court for application of these tests.
[17] We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 966 (1982), and we reverse.
[18] II
[19] This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, authorized a suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated an individual's constitutional rights, even though Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, that such a remedy will not be available when "special factors counseling hesitation" are present. Id., at 396. See also Carlson v. Green,446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). Before a Bivens remedy may be fashioned, therefore, a court must take into account any "special factors counseling hesitation." See Bush v. Lucas, post, at 378.
[20] The "special factors" that bear on the propriety of respondents' Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court's decision in Feres v. United States,340 U.S. 135 (1950). There
[ 462 U.S. Page 299]
the Court addressed the question "whether the [Federal] Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to [military] service' what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong." Id., at 138. The Court held that, even assuming the Act might be read literally to allow tort actions against the United States for injuries suffered by a soldier in service, Congress did not intend to subject the Government to such claims by a member of the Armed Forces. The Court acknowledged "that if we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases," id., at 142, the Government would have waived its sovereign immunity under the Act and would be subject to liability. But the Feres Court was acutely aware that it was resolving the question of whether soldiers could maintain tort suits against the Government for injuries arising out of their military service. The Court focused on the unique relationship between the Government and military personnel -- noting that no such liability existed before the Federal Tort Claims Act -- and held that Congress did not intend to create such liability. The Court also took note of the various "enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in the armed services." Id., at 144. As the Court has since recognized, "[in] the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .'" United States v. Muniz,374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-744 (1974); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). Although this case concerns the limitations on the type of non-statutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court's analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case.
[ 462 U.S. Page 300]
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting. See Parker v. Levy, supra, at 743-744; Orloff v. Willoughby,345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel "without counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman,420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection. The Court has often noted "the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," United States v. Brown, supra, at 112; see In re Grimley,137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890), and has acknowledged that "the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . ." Burns v. Wilson,346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). This becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.
[21] Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors of military life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian life. In drafting the
[ 462 U.S. Page 301]
Constitution they anticipated the kinds of issues raised in this case. Their response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress "To raise and support Armies"; "To provide and maintain a Navy"; and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14. It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that view.
[22] Congress' authority in this area, and the distance between military and civilian life, was summed up by the Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 93-94:
[23] "[Judges] are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which . . . grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."
[24] Only recently we restated this principle in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981):
[25] "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
[26] In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973), we addressed the question of whether Congress' analogous power over the militia, granted by Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, would be impermissibly compromised by a suit seeking to have a Federal District Court examine the "pattern of training, weaponry and orders"
[ 462 U.S. Page 302]
of a State's National Guard. In denying relief we stated: