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Ninth Circuit: Kicking Shackled Prisoner In Genitals Is Cruel And Unusual Punishment
When California Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) prisoner Christopher Watts filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against guards J. McKinney and S.J. Steinberg for kicking Watts in the genitals after an unsuccessful interrogation regarding PBSP guards bringing in drugs or knives, the U.S. District Court (N.D. Cal.) ruled that this physical abuse amounted to cruel and unusual punishment." State defendants appealed, asserting that no reasonable [guard] would have believed that his conduct was unlawful.
In a brief published opinion, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed Watts' sworn statement. On Oct. 10, 1995, Watts was escorted from his administration segregation cell for an interrogation." There, Watts said he wanted his attorney present. Instead, the guards repeatedly threatened Watts and his family for not cooperating and told him repeatedly he'd be sorry." Thereafter, guard McKinney took Watts to a holding cell, slammed Watts' face into a wall causing a nose bleed and swollen eye. Then, while Watts lay on the floor, McKinney kicked Watts several times in his penis and in his back, while Watts' hands were cuffed behind his back.
From these facts the district court had found that a triable issue of fact was stated, i.e., whether McKinney had maliciously and sadistically caused harm" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit scoffed at the California Attorney General's appeal of the question of a triable issue of fact. While an attorney's representation of his client should be zealous, it needs to tempered by commonsense." It held that to suppose that any reasonable person, let alone a trained prison officer, would not know that kicking a helpless prisoner's genitals was cruel and unusual conduct is beyond belief." The court added that if the Supreme Court made a catalogue of acts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest, McKinney's acts would be near the top of the list.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and ordered that the case must go trial." See: Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2005).
In a brief published opinion, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed Watts' sworn statement. On Oct. 10, 1995, Watts was escorted from his administration segregation cell for an interrogation." There, Watts said he wanted his attorney present. Instead, the guards repeatedly threatened Watts and his family for not cooperating and told him repeatedly he'd be sorry." Thereafter, guard McKinney took Watts to a holding cell, slammed Watts' face into a wall causing a nose bleed and swollen eye. Then, while Watts lay on the floor, McKinney kicked Watts several times in his penis and in his back, while Watts' hands were cuffed behind his back.
From these facts the district court had found that a triable issue of fact was stated, i.e., whether McKinney had maliciously and sadistically caused harm" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit scoffed at the California Attorney General's appeal of the question of a triable issue of fact. While an attorney's representation of his client should be zealous, it needs to tempered by commonsense." It held that to suppose that any reasonable person, let alone a trained prison officer, would not know that kicking a helpless prisoner's genitals was cruel and unusual conduct is beyond belief." The court added that if the Supreme Court made a catalogue of acts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest, McKinney's acts would be near the top of the list.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and ordered that the case must go trial." See: Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Related legal case
Watts v. McKinney
| Year | 2005 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 394 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2005). |
| Level | State Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
394 F.3d 710, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 224, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 251
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Christopher L. WATTS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
J. McKINNEY, Defendant-Appellant,
and
S.J. Steinberg, Defendant.
No. 03-16665.
Submitted Nov. 3, 2004. [FN*]
FN* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
Filed Jan. 10, 2005.
Background: State inmate filed civil rights action alleging that prison guard had violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Susan Yvonne Illston, J., denied guard's motion for summary judgment, and guard appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Noonan, Circuit Judge, held that guard was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
Affirmed.
*711 Jennifer G. Perkell, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellant.
Christopher Watts, in pro per.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-03328-SI.
Before B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
In his handwritten declaration under oath in his opposition as plaintiff to defendant John McKinney's motion for summary judgment, Christopher Watts stated the following:
During the course of October 10, 1995, the plaintiff was escorted from his cell in punitive segregation and was interrogated by defendant McKinney and other officers at Pelican Bay State Prison (Here after P.B.S.P.). During this interrogation plaintiff stated he did not know of any officers bringing in drugs or knives into the prison and plaintiff repeatedly stated he wanted his attorney present during this interrogation. Defendant McKinney repeatedly threatened plaintiff and his family for not cooperating and stated plaintiff will be sorry. Defendant McKinney immediately escorted plaintiff to a holding cell, and without warning slammed plaintiff face into the wall causing a nose bleed, and swollen eye, and kicked plaintiff in his penis and several times in his back while plaintiff was lying on the cell floor with cuffs on and with his hands behind his back. During these events, plaintiff did not resist or threaten the defendant McKinney in any fashion or break any prison rules.
In the light of this declaration, the district court held that a triable issue of fact was raised, i.e., whether McKinney had applied force "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). As to McKinney's claim of qualified immunity, the district court followed Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The act attributed to McKinney violated a clearly established constitutional right "of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1981).
McKinney, represented by the attorney general of California, appeals, contending that Watts' declaration if accepted as true states no violation of the Eighth Amendment and that "a reasonable officer in defendant McKinney's position would not necessarily have believed" that his conduct was unlawful. McKinney blunts Watts' precise delineation of the assault upon him by describing it as a kick in "the groin."
A lawyer must be zealous on behalf of his client. But zeal needs to be tempered by commonsense. The Supreme Court in Hudson proscribed the use of force for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm. Watts' declaration, describing the vengeful acts of a frustrated investigator, identifies the unconstitutional *712 purpose and deeds. To suppose that any reasonable person, let alone a trained prison officer, would not know that kicking a helpless prisoner's genitals was cruel and unusual conduct is beyond belief. The Supreme Court did not need to create a catalogue of all the acts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest; but if it had, such act would be near the top of the list. The case must go to trial.
AFFIRMED.
394 F.3d 710, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 224, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 251
END OF DOCUMENT
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Christopher L. WATTS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
J. McKINNEY, Defendant-Appellant,
and
S.J. Steinberg, Defendant.
No. 03-16665.
Submitted Nov. 3, 2004. [FN*]
FN* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
Filed Jan. 10, 2005.
Background: State inmate filed civil rights action alleging that prison guard had violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Susan Yvonne Illston, J., denied guard's motion for summary judgment, and guard appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Noonan, Circuit Judge, held that guard was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
Affirmed.
*711 Jennifer G. Perkell, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellant.
Christopher Watts, in pro per.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-03328-SI.
Before B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
In his handwritten declaration under oath in his opposition as plaintiff to defendant John McKinney's motion for summary judgment, Christopher Watts stated the following:
During the course of October 10, 1995, the plaintiff was escorted from his cell in punitive segregation and was interrogated by defendant McKinney and other officers at Pelican Bay State Prison (Here after P.B.S.P.). During this interrogation plaintiff stated he did not know of any officers bringing in drugs or knives into the prison and plaintiff repeatedly stated he wanted his attorney present during this interrogation. Defendant McKinney repeatedly threatened plaintiff and his family for not cooperating and stated plaintiff will be sorry. Defendant McKinney immediately escorted plaintiff to a holding cell, and without warning slammed plaintiff face into the wall causing a nose bleed, and swollen eye, and kicked plaintiff in his penis and several times in his back while plaintiff was lying on the cell floor with cuffs on and with his hands behind his back. During these events, plaintiff did not resist or threaten the defendant McKinney in any fashion or break any prison rules.
In the light of this declaration, the district court held that a triable issue of fact was raised, i.e., whether McKinney had applied force "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). As to McKinney's claim of qualified immunity, the district court followed Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The act attributed to McKinney violated a clearly established constitutional right "of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1981).
McKinney, represented by the attorney general of California, appeals, contending that Watts' declaration if accepted as true states no violation of the Eighth Amendment and that "a reasonable officer in defendant McKinney's position would not necessarily have believed" that his conduct was unlawful. McKinney blunts Watts' precise delineation of the assault upon him by describing it as a kick in "the groin."
A lawyer must be zealous on behalf of his client. But zeal needs to be tempered by commonsense. The Supreme Court in Hudson proscribed the use of force for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm. Watts' declaration, describing the vengeful acts of a frustrated investigator, identifies the unconstitutional *712 purpose and deeds. To suppose that any reasonable person, let alone a trained prison officer, would not know that kicking a helpless prisoner's genitals was cruel and unusual conduct is beyond belief. The Supreme Court did not need to create a catalogue of all the acts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest; but if it had, such act would be near the top of the list. The case must go to trial.
AFFIRMED.
394 F.3d 710, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 224, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 251
END OF DOCUMENT