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Delaware Life Sentence = 45 years; Ruling May Affect 200 Prisoners; Court Reverses Self After Prosecutors Whine
Delaware Life Sentence = 45 years; Ruling May Affect 200 Prisoners; Court
Reverses Self After Prosecutors Whine
The Delaware Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, held that its
decision in Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003) requires that a
prisoner's life sentence for first-degree rape be calculated as a 45-year
term for purposes of determining his qualification for conditional
release. The decision may have freed nearly 200 prisoners serving life
terms for murder, rape and kidnapping, according to government officials.
On September 29, 1982 Ward T. Evans was convicted of first-degree
rape and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. In
1993, 1996, and 1999, the Board of Parole (Board) denied Evans' request
for parole.
On January 8, 2004, Evans filed a motion to correct his sentence
in the Superior Court. He argued that his sentence was illegal
because under the conditional release statute he was entitled to have a
conditional release date calculated as if his life sentence were a 45-year
term." The Superior Court denied the motion and Evans appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that 11 Del.C. §§ 4346 and
4348 establish the rules for the Parole and the conditional release of
[prisoners]. For purposes of determining eligibility for parole, Section
4346(c) expressly states that a life sentence should be considered a
fixed term of 45 years.' Section 4348 provides that [a prisoner] is
entitled to conditional release at the expiration of the maximum term
sentence, less any merit in good time credits earned." Additionally, the
Court noted that in Crosby it held that Sections 4346(c) and 4348 must be
read in pari material, and that as so & read, Section 4348 incorporates
Section 4346(c)'s definition of a life sentence as a 45-year term.
The Court then held that its ruling in Crosby controls Evans'
life sentence. As such, that sentence is illegal because Evans' maximum
release date does not reflect that 45-year term." The Court limited its
ruling to crimes committed before June 30, 1990, the effective date of
the Truth in Sentencing Act of 1989." The Court then reversed the
judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for a determination of
whether Evans has earned any good time or mere credits, and for an
appropriate adjustment of his maximum release date.'" See: Ward T. Evans
v. State of Delaware, WL 2743546 (2004) (unpublished, not reported in
A.2d). rev'd, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 120 (2005).
The Evans decision sparked intense outrage by lawmakers and families of
victims because it could free as many as 200 prisoners serving life
sentences for murder, rape and kidnapping; prisoners whom prosecutors had
previously maintained could be held until they died in prison, if
repeatedly denied parole, but who could now be released in as little as
26 years despite a denial of parole," according to Delaware Attorney
General M. Jane Brady.
On January 14, 2005 the Court refused to reconsider its ruling,
setting off a legal battle with the Governor and the Legislature. On
January 25, 2005 the Delaware House voted 40 to 0 to pass a bill declaring
the Court's decision null and void." The Senate also passed the bill
unanimously.
I have some severe doubts about the constitutionality of this
piece of legislation," said Representative Robert Valihura (R-
Wilmington). That said, I rise in support of this legislation because we
have to do something ... if this is unconstitutional, we have bought
ourselves some time." In passing the measure, legislators claimed
that the court erroneously applied the 45-year criteria to the
conditional release statute and misinterpreted the intent of the
Legislature."
Delaware Governor Ruth Ann Minner signed the bill,
thereby voiding" the Evans holding, but she also asked the Court to issue
an advisory opinion on the measure's constitutionality.
The Delaware supreme court then proceeded to reverse its prior
decision and held that that life sentences do not have a presumptive 45
year term. Pressure politics trump the rule of law and the separation of
powers. See: Evans v. Delaware, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S.Ct. 120 (2005).
Sources: New York Times
Los Angeles Times
Associated Press
Reverses Self After Prosecutors Whine
The Delaware Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, held that its
decision in Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003) requires that a
prisoner's life sentence for first-degree rape be calculated as a 45-year
term for purposes of determining his qualification for conditional
release. The decision may have freed nearly 200 prisoners serving life
terms for murder, rape and kidnapping, according to government officials.
On September 29, 1982 Ward T. Evans was convicted of first-degree
rape and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. In
1993, 1996, and 1999, the Board of Parole (Board) denied Evans' request
for parole.
On January 8, 2004, Evans filed a motion to correct his sentence
in the Superior Court. He argued that his sentence was illegal
because under the conditional release statute he was entitled to have a
conditional release date calculated as if his life sentence were a 45-year
term." The Superior Court denied the motion and Evans appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that 11 Del.C. §§ 4346 and
4348 establish the rules for the Parole and the conditional release of
[prisoners]. For purposes of determining eligibility for parole, Section
4346(c) expressly states that a life sentence should be considered a
fixed term of 45 years.' Section 4348 provides that [a prisoner] is
entitled to conditional release at the expiration of the maximum term
sentence, less any merit in good time credits earned." Additionally, the
Court noted that in Crosby it held that Sections 4346(c) and 4348 must be
read in pari material, and that as so & read, Section 4348 incorporates
Section 4346(c)'s definition of a life sentence as a 45-year term.
The Court then held that its ruling in Crosby controls Evans'
life sentence. As such, that sentence is illegal because Evans' maximum
release date does not reflect that 45-year term." The Court limited its
ruling to crimes committed before June 30, 1990, the effective date of
the Truth in Sentencing Act of 1989." The Court then reversed the
judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for a determination of
whether Evans has earned any good time or mere credits, and for an
appropriate adjustment of his maximum release date.'" See: Ward T. Evans
v. State of Delaware, WL 2743546 (2004) (unpublished, not reported in
A.2d). rev'd, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 120 (2005).
The Evans decision sparked intense outrage by lawmakers and families of
victims because it could free as many as 200 prisoners serving life
sentences for murder, rape and kidnapping; prisoners whom prosecutors had
previously maintained could be held until they died in prison, if
repeatedly denied parole, but who could now be released in as little as
26 years despite a denial of parole," according to Delaware Attorney
General M. Jane Brady.
On January 14, 2005 the Court refused to reconsider its ruling,
setting off a legal battle with the Governor and the Legislature. On
January 25, 2005 the Delaware House voted 40 to 0 to pass a bill declaring
the Court's decision null and void." The Senate also passed the bill
unanimously.
I have some severe doubts about the constitutionality of this
piece of legislation," said Representative Robert Valihura (R-
Wilmington). That said, I rise in support of this legislation because we
have to do something ... if this is unconstitutional, we have bought
ourselves some time." In passing the measure, legislators claimed
that the court erroneously applied the 45-year criteria to the
conditional release statute and misinterpreted the intent of the
Legislature."
Delaware Governor Ruth Ann Minner signed the bill,
thereby voiding" the Evans holding, but she also asked the Court to issue
an advisory opinion on the measure's constitutionality.
The Delaware supreme court then proceeded to reverse its prior
decision and held that that life sentences do not have a presumptive 45
year term. Pressure politics trump the rule of law and the separation of
powers. See: Evans v. Delaware, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S.Ct. 120 (2005).
Sources: New York Times
Los Angeles Times
Associated Press
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Related legal case
Crosby v. State
| Year | 2005 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 824 A.2d 894 (Del.2003). |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 05/30/2003)
[1] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
[2] No. 8, 2002
[3] 824 A.2d 894, 2003
[4] May 30, 2003
[5] CHRIS A. CROSBY, DEFENDANT BELOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE, PLAINTIFF BELOW, APPELLEE.
[6] Court Below - Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN01-06-1203 and IN01-06-1206
[7] Todd E. Conner, Esquire and James D. Nutter, Esquire, Assistant Public Defenders, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
[8] Kim E. Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee.
[9] Before Veasey, Chief Justice, Walsh, *fn1 Holland, Berger and Steele, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per curiam
[11] Submitted: April 8, 2003
[12] Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED.
[13] The defendant-appellant, Chris A. Crosby, has challenged his life sentence as a habitual offender, following his conviction for Forgery in the Second Degree. According to Crosby, that sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of his offense, and, therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court remanded Crosby's appeal to the Superior Court twice for additional proceedings.
[14] In response to the most recent remand, the Superior Court concluded that "Crosby is serving a life sentence calculated on the basis of 45 years." The Superior Court reached that determination on the basis that a life sentence under section 4214(a)*fn2 of the habitual offender statute is to be considered as a fixed term of 45 years, pursuant to section 4346(c).*fn3 We have concluded that the Superior Court's construction of section 4214(a) is correct.
[15] We have also concluded that Crosby's life sentence of 45 years violates the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, we have considered the most recent opinions on that subject, which were issued by the United States Supreme Court within the last few months.*fn4 Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.
[16] Facts
[17] On May 31, 2001, Crosby was arrested on several misdemeanor drug offenses. When he was being questioned by a police officer, he provided a false name, John Crosby, and a false date of birth. He also signed a State Bureau of Identification fingerprint card, an official document, using the name John Crosby. When the police officer subsequently learned that the defendant's real name was Chris Crosby, he arrested him for Forgery in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation.*fn5
[18] On September 17, 2001, Crosby, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to Forgery in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation. During the guilty plea colloquy, Crosby acknowledged that the forgery conviction qualified him as a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code. Crosby also indicated he was aware that he could be sentenced up to life imprisonment.
[19] The State subsequently filed a motion to have Crosby declared a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code. The State cited five previous felonies: (1) Burglary in the Third Degree (IN98-11-0691) in 1999; (2) Forgery in the Second Degree (IN94-06-0144) in 1995; (3) Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (IN88-11-1556) in 1989; (4) Possession with Intent to Deliver (IN89-07-0672) in 1989; and (5) Burglary in the Second Degree (IN86-02-0421) in 1986. The Superior Court declared Crosby a habitual offender by order dated October 1, 2001.
[20] At the sentencing hearing on December 7, 2001, the State recommended a sentence "close to the ten-year range." The Superior Court instead sentenced Crosby to life on the forgery conviction, as a habitual offender, under section 4214(a); followed by six months at Level III supervision; and one year at Level V on the criminal impersonation conviction, suspended for one year at Level II. This is Crosby's direct appeal.
[21] Crosby's Sentence
[22] Natural Life or 45 Years
[23] The sentencing judge's first remand report to this Court reflected that Crosby's life sentence was based, in part, on the judge's belief that Crosby would be "eligible for a significant sentence diminution by earning good time." The sentencing judge stated that Delaware law equates Crosby's life sentence, as a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code, to a sentence of 45 years. Therefore, the sentencing judge concluded that the availability of earning good time credit means that Crosby will be eligible for conditional release before the expiration of the sentence, i.e., before the end of Crosby's natural life. The sentencing judge reported that he relied on this interpretation of the applicable statutes when he sentenced Crosby to life in prison, expressly stating: "Delaware's statute permitting good/time conditional release was a factor I took into account."
[24] Because of an apparent conflict with this Court's prior holding in Jackson, we remanded Crosby's case a second time and asked the sentencing judge to state whether Crosby's sentence was either a life sentence or a 45-year sentence. In response to that second remand, the sentencing judge wrote that the question could not be answered "either or" because "Crosby is serving a life sentence calculated on the basis of 45 years." The sentencing judge also concluded that Crosby's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated.
[25] This Court's ultimate resolution of Crosby's Eighth Amendment argument is dependent, in part, upon whether Crosby's life sentence as a habitual offender under section 4514(a) is considered to be a term of 45 years, with the possibility of earning a substantial sentence diminution through good time credits; or is considered to be a natural life sentence with no possibility of reduction or release prior to death. The sentencing provisions of the Delaware criminal justice system are found in several different statutes that have been separately enacted and amended on numerous occasions over the last few decades. Thus, this Court must apply and, if possible, reconcile two fundamental principles of statutory construction. First, we must read all of the statutes, as amended, in pari materia to accomplish the intentions of the General Assembly. Second, we must, if possible, construe the applicable statutes in a manner that causes them to operate in a manner that comports with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[26] Habitual Criminal Statutory History
[27] We begin our inquiry with an examination of the applicable sentencing statutes' legislative history. Delaware's first habitual criminal statute was enacted in 1953. It provided a single basis for a habitual criminal designation. The statute applied only to four-time convicted felons. That statute made no distinction as to the seriousness of either the prior convictions or the most recent triggering felony conviction. Enacted effective July 15, 1953, 49 Del.Laws, c. 413 provided:
[28] Section 1. Chapter 1, Title 11, Delaware Code of 1953 is amended by adding the following new section: 107. Habitual criminal; fourth offense; life sentence may be imposed.
[29] Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is hereby declared to be a habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted.*fn6
[30] Accordingly, in Oney, this Court recognized that habitual criminal status in Delaware was originally predicated solely upon the commission of any four felonies, without regard to the nature of either the three prior felonies or the fourth triggering felony.*fn7
[31] The Delaware habitual criminal statute*fn8 remained unchanged until 1970 when section 3911 was rewritten.*fn9 Old section 3911 was redesignated subsection (a) of new section 3911, but restated to provide as follows: (a) Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) hereunder, under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be a habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted. The italicized words in subsection (a) represented new language not found in old section 3911. Subsection (b) was also added and provided in part:
[32] (b) Any person who has been two times convicted of a felony hereinafter specifically named,... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, hereinafter specifically named, of this State is declared to be a habitual criminal....
[33] Subsection (b) was a completely new statutory enactment and made habitual criminal status applicable to a person two times convicted of specifically named felonies. The habitual offender statute remained basically the same for the next two decades.
[34] Parole and Conditional Release
[35] Life Sentence Considered 45 Years
[36] In 1964, the General Assembly enacted section 4348 and section 4346.*fn10 Section 4348 entitled, Release Upon Merit and Good Behavior Credits, provides in pertinent part:
[37] A person having served that person's term or terms in incarceration, less merit and good behavior credits as having been earned, shall, upon release, be deemed as released on parole until the expiration of the maximum term or term for which the person is sentenced.*fn11
[38] Section 4346 is entitled Eligibility for Parole. Section 4346(a) provided that for purposes of parole eligibility, the term of a sentence was to be reduced by merit and good behavior credits. Subsection (a) provided:
[39] A person confined to any correctional facility administered by the Department may be released on parole by the Board if the person has served 1/3 of the term imposed by the court, such term to be reduced by such merit and good behavior credits as have been earned, or 120 days, whichever is greater. For the purpose this subchapter, "court" shall include any court committing an offender to the Department. Section 4346(c) provided, in part:
[40] For all purposes of this section, a person sentenced to imprisonment for life shall be considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years.
[41] When the section 4346 parole statute and the section 4348 conditional release statute were both enacted in 1964 they were within the same chapter of the Delaware Code. Each statute permitted the reduction of an inmate's sentence through earned merit and good time credits.*fn12
[42] The General Assembly provided in 4346(c) that a life sentence was considered to be a fixed term of 45 years for purposes of reduction by merit and good behavior credits in determining parole eligibility under section 4346(a). The General Assembly further provided in section 4348 that conditional release upon the basis of earning merit and good behavior credits shall "be deemed as on parole." When those two 1964 statutory enactments are read in pari materia,*fn13 we hold that section 4348 incorporates section 4346(c)'s definition of a life sentence as a fixed term of 45 years. To the extent that Jackson is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.*fn14
[43] Parole Abolished
[44] Conditional Release Retained
[45] Prior to 1990, an inmate could obtain early release in two ways: from the Parole Board under section 4346(a) or by conditional release pursuant to section 4348. Release of an inmate on parole under section 4346 is a matter of discretion for the Parole Board.*fn15 Conditional release under section 4348 is non-discretionary. If an inmate has accumulated sufficient good behavior and merit credits, he or she must be released from incarceration on his or her short-term release date, i.e., the maximum period of incarceration less accumulated good behavior and merit credits.*fn16 This Court has recognized that there is little practical difference between release on parole under section 4346 and conditional release under section 4348.*fn17
[46] The General Assembly has now prospectively abolished parole as a basis for early release. Pursuant to the Truth-in-Sentencing Act of 1989,*fn18 a sentence of Level V incarceration for any crime committed after June 29, 1990 is no longer subject to the parole provisions of section 4346.*fn19 Although the 1989 Truth-in-Sentencing Act completely eliminated parole, that statutory enactment continues to generally permit conditional release for good time credit. The Truth-in-Sentencing Act provides that:
[47] All sentences imposed for any offenses other than a life sentence imposed for class A felonies may be reduced by earned good time under the provisions of this section and rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Corrections.*fn20
[48] The enactment of section 4381(a) reflects the General Assembly's understanding, consistent with our holding in this opinion, that prior to the Truthin-Sentencing Act, a life sentence for class A felonies was considered to be a term of 45 years under section 4346(c) and subject to conditional release pursuant to section 4348. By eliminating parole completely and then eliminating good time credit that would lead to conditional release for class A felonies, the General Assembly intended that a life sentence for class A felonies would no longer be considered a term of 45 years but would, in fact, be a natural life sentence.
[49] The General Assembly also created classifications for felonies when the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was adopted. It did not, however, reclassify section 4214(a) life sentences for habitual offenders as class A felonies. Accordingly, we must examine the amendments that were made to the habitual offender statute as part of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act to ascertain the General Assembly's current intent with regard to a section 4214(a) life sentence.
[50] Habitual Offender Dichotomy
[51] We have already noted that in 1970, the General Assembly drew a distinction between a habitual offender designation under section 4214(a) and habitual offender status pursuant to subsection (b). In 1970, a life sentence under (a) could receive the benefit of parole and was considered to be a fixed term of 45 years.*fn21 In 1970, a person serving a life sentence imposed under subsection (b) was not eligible for parole.
[52] The General Assembly's intention to retain the distinction that was first made in 1970 between habitual offenders serving life sentences under section 4214(a) and 4214(b) remains clear. In the 1990 amendments to the habitual offender statute, as part of the Truth-In-Sentencing statutory remedial process, section 4214 was amended as follows:
[53] a) Amend subsection (a) by deleting the words "may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted" and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
[54] "may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted. Notwithstanding any provision of this Title to the contrary, any sentence so imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by the Court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V institutional setting without benefit of probation or parole, except that any such sentence shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 4205(h), 4217, 4381, and 4382 of this Title."*fn22
[55] These statutory changes to subsection (a) reflect the unambiguous intent of the General Assembly. First, a sentence under subsection 4214(a) can now be up to life, not just life. Second, no sentence under subsection (a) is eligible for probation or parole. Third, as amended, any sentence in subsection (a) - including a life sentence - is subject to reduction by earned good time credit pursuant to section 4381(a).
[56] The General Assembly's intention of providing good time reduction could be accomplished for a life sentence imposed under section 4214(a) only by continuing to "consider it to be a fixed term of 45 years."*fn23 Therefore, section 4346(c) was not repealed or amended. Consequently, after passage of the Truthin-Sentencing Act, persons sentenced to life as a habitual offender under section 4214(a) are not eligible for release on parole but such persons are still eligible for conditional release pursuant to section 4348, since subsection (a) specifically incorporates section 4381 by reference.
[57] Conversely, the General Assembly's simultaneous amendment to section 4214(b) demonstrates its intention for a life sentence under subsection (b) to mean natural life. That amendment states:
[58] (b) Amend Subsection (b) by adding the following language at the end thereof:
[59] "Notwithstanding any provision of this Title to the contrary, any sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by the Court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V institutional setting without benefit of probation, parole, earned good time or any other reduction."*fn24
[60] The overall intention of the General Assembly is set forth in the language that amended both sections 4214(a) and (b) of the habitual offender statute in 1990 and is manifest when viewed in two contexts. First, section 4381 is the section that provides for good time credit. A discretionary life sentence imposed under subsection (a) is not eligible for parole but remains subject to the earning of good time credit because the amended statute makes any subsection (a) sentence expressly subject to section 4381. Second, with the 1990 amendments, a mandatory life sentence imposed under subsection (b) is not eligible for parole and is also not subject to "earned good time or any other reduction." Consequently, in the context of promulgating the Truth-In-Sentencing Act, the General Assembly has retained the distinction between life sentences under section 4214(a) and (b) that was first legislated in 1970.
[61] A life sentence under section 4214(a) of the habitual offender statute is now unique in comparison to the General Assembly's statutory scheme for other life sentences. It differs by express statutory language from any of the following types of life sentences:
[62] " A life sentence for murder in the first degree is "life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction."*fn25
[63] " A life sentence for a class A felony is not subject to the statute authorizing the award of good time.*fn26
[64] " A life sentence for a three-time violent offender is not subject to the probation or parole of Title 11, Chapter 43, which, includes, 4381.*fn27
[65] Accordingly, when the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was adopted, the General Assembly's intent to treat a life sentence under section 4214(a) differently, from other life sentences, by making it eligible for conditional release, is clearly reflected in all of its carefully crafted statutes and amendments. The General Assembly accomplished that intention by not repealing section 4346(c) and continuing to consider a life sentence for a habitual offender under section 4214(a) to be a fixed term of 45 years under section 4346(c). Therefore, we hold that a person sentenced to life as a habitual offender pursuant to section 4214(a) is to be "considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years"*fn28 and qualifies for conditional release pursuant to section 4348, based upon good time credits earned pursuant to section 4381.
[66] Crosby's Sentencing Decision
[67] The Superior Court held that Crosby's life sentence as a habitual offender under section 4214(a) was equivalent to a fixed term of 45 years and that Crosby's eligibility for conditional release should be computed on that basis under section 4348 as he earned merit and good behavior credits under section 4381. We have concluded that the Superior Court's ruling is correct. Before we can properly decide Crosby's Eighth Amendment claim, however, we must review the basis for the Superior Court's decision to sentence Crosby to a life sentence that was equivalent to a fixed term of 45 years.
[68] Under Delaware law, Forgery in the Second Degree is classified as a class G felony.*fn29 That is the lowest category of felony-level offenses in Delaware. Except as provided by the habitual criminal statute, class G felonies carry a maximum sentence of up to two years incarceration.*fn30
[69] Our first remand order directed the sentencing judge to consider Crosby's life sentence in light of the relevant case law interpreting the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and to file a report identifying the documentary basis and reasoning behind the decision to impose a life sentence on Crosby. The sentencing judge submitted his report to this Court on January 30, 2003. That report identified and subdivided ten "salient points," as follows:
[70] 1. First and foremost, Crosby committed the forgery charge, for which he received the life sentence, about 26 months after having been previously declared a habitual offender.
[71] 2. The forgery charge was committed less than two years after his release from his 1999 burglary third degree/habitual offender sentence.
[72] 3. When he committed the forgery offense he was on probation. Though discharged as unimproved, he was on probation when he committed the burglary charge.
[73] 4. Crosby has numerous proceedings in this Court for violation of probation covering a span in excess of 12 years. Many violations of probation reports are in the Presentence report.
[74] 5. Those reports manifest a continuing pattern of disregard of the conditions of probation and orders of this Court and a complete lack of amenability to sanctions other than jail.
[75] 6. One essential pattern revealed in those reports is Crosby's years-longs refusal, despite many opportunities and orders, to engage in substance abuse treatment. For example:
[1] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
[2] No. 8, 2002
[3] 824 A.2d 894, 2003
[4] May 30, 2003
[5] CHRIS A. CROSBY, DEFENDANT BELOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE, PLAINTIFF BELOW, APPELLEE.
[6] Court Below - Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN01-06-1203 and IN01-06-1206
[7] Todd E. Conner, Esquire and James D. Nutter, Esquire, Assistant Public Defenders, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
[8] Kim E. Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee.
[9] Before Veasey, Chief Justice, Walsh, *fn1 Holland, Berger and Steele, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per curiam
[11] Submitted: April 8, 2003
[12] Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED.
[13] The defendant-appellant, Chris A. Crosby, has challenged his life sentence as a habitual offender, following his conviction for Forgery in the Second Degree. According to Crosby, that sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of his offense, and, therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court remanded Crosby's appeal to the Superior Court twice for additional proceedings.
[14] In response to the most recent remand, the Superior Court concluded that "Crosby is serving a life sentence calculated on the basis of 45 years." The Superior Court reached that determination on the basis that a life sentence under section 4214(a)*fn2 of the habitual offender statute is to be considered as a fixed term of 45 years, pursuant to section 4346(c).*fn3 We have concluded that the Superior Court's construction of section 4214(a) is correct.
[15] We have also concluded that Crosby's life sentence of 45 years violates the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, we have considered the most recent opinions on that subject, which were issued by the United States Supreme Court within the last few months.*fn4 Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.
[16] Facts
[17] On May 31, 2001, Crosby was arrested on several misdemeanor drug offenses. When he was being questioned by a police officer, he provided a false name, John Crosby, and a false date of birth. He also signed a State Bureau of Identification fingerprint card, an official document, using the name John Crosby. When the police officer subsequently learned that the defendant's real name was Chris Crosby, he arrested him for Forgery in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation.*fn5
[18] On September 17, 2001, Crosby, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to Forgery in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation. During the guilty plea colloquy, Crosby acknowledged that the forgery conviction qualified him as a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code. Crosby also indicated he was aware that he could be sentenced up to life imprisonment.
[19] The State subsequently filed a motion to have Crosby declared a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code. The State cited five previous felonies: (1) Burglary in the Third Degree (IN98-11-0691) in 1999; (2) Forgery in the Second Degree (IN94-06-0144) in 1995; (3) Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (IN88-11-1556) in 1989; (4) Possession with Intent to Deliver (IN89-07-0672) in 1989; and (5) Burglary in the Second Degree (IN86-02-0421) in 1986. The Superior Court declared Crosby a habitual offender by order dated October 1, 2001.
[20] At the sentencing hearing on December 7, 2001, the State recommended a sentence "close to the ten-year range." The Superior Court instead sentenced Crosby to life on the forgery conviction, as a habitual offender, under section 4214(a); followed by six months at Level III supervision; and one year at Level V on the criminal impersonation conviction, suspended for one year at Level II. This is Crosby's direct appeal.
[21] Crosby's Sentence
[22] Natural Life or 45 Years
[23] The sentencing judge's first remand report to this Court reflected that Crosby's life sentence was based, in part, on the judge's belief that Crosby would be "eligible for a significant sentence diminution by earning good time." The sentencing judge stated that Delaware law equates Crosby's life sentence, as a habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code, to a sentence of 45 years. Therefore, the sentencing judge concluded that the availability of earning good time credit means that Crosby will be eligible for conditional release before the expiration of the sentence, i.e., before the end of Crosby's natural life. The sentencing judge reported that he relied on this interpretation of the applicable statutes when he sentenced Crosby to life in prison, expressly stating: "Delaware's statute permitting good/time conditional release was a factor I took into account."
[24] Because of an apparent conflict with this Court's prior holding in Jackson, we remanded Crosby's case a second time and asked the sentencing judge to state whether Crosby's sentence was either a life sentence or a 45-year sentence. In response to that second remand, the sentencing judge wrote that the question could not be answered "either or" because "Crosby is serving a life sentence calculated on the basis of 45 years." The sentencing judge also concluded that Crosby's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated.
[25] This Court's ultimate resolution of Crosby's Eighth Amendment argument is dependent, in part, upon whether Crosby's life sentence as a habitual offender under section 4514(a) is considered to be a term of 45 years, with the possibility of earning a substantial sentence diminution through good time credits; or is considered to be a natural life sentence with no possibility of reduction or release prior to death. The sentencing provisions of the Delaware criminal justice system are found in several different statutes that have been separately enacted and amended on numerous occasions over the last few decades. Thus, this Court must apply and, if possible, reconcile two fundamental principles of statutory construction. First, we must read all of the statutes, as amended, in pari materia to accomplish the intentions of the General Assembly. Second, we must, if possible, construe the applicable statutes in a manner that causes them to operate in a manner that comports with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[26] Habitual Criminal Statutory History
[27] We begin our inquiry with an examination of the applicable sentencing statutes' legislative history. Delaware's first habitual criminal statute was enacted in 1953. It provided a single basis for a habitual criminal designation. The statute applied only to four-time convicted felons. That statute made no distinction as to the seriousness of either the prior convictions or the most recent triggering felony conviction. Enacted effective July 15, 1953, 49 Del.Laws, c. 413 provided:
[28] Section 1. Chapter 1, Title 11, Delaware Code of 1953 is amended by adding the following new section: 107. Habitual criminal; fourth offense; life sentence may be imposed.
[29] Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is hereby declared to be a habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted.*fn6
[30] Accordingly, in Oney, this Court recognized that habitual criminal status in Delaware was originally predicated solely upon the commission of any four felonies, without regard to the nature of either the three prior felonies or the fourth triggering felony.*fn7
[31] The Delaware habitual criminal statute*fn8 remained unchanged until 1970 when section 3911 was rewritten.*fn9 Old section 3911 was redesignated subsection (a) of new section 3911, but restated to provide as follows: (a) Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) hereunder, under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be a habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted. The italicized words in subsection (a) represented new language not found in old section 3911. Subsection (b) was also added and provided in part:
[32] (b) Any person who has been two times convicted of a felony hereinafter specifically named,... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, hereinafter specifically named, of this State is declared to be a habitual criminal....
[33] Subsection (b) was a completely new statutory enactment and made habitual criminal status applicable to a person two times convicted of specifically named felonies. The habitual offender statute remained basically the same for the next two decades.
[34] Parole and Conditional Release
[35] Life Sentence Considered 45 Years
[36] In 1964, the General Assembly enacted section 4348 and section 4346.*fn10 Section 4348 entitled, Release Upon Merit and Good Behavior Credits, provides in pertinent part:
[37] A person having served that person's term or terms in incarceration, less merit and good behavior credits as having been earned, shall, upon release, be deemed as released on parole until the expiration of the maximum term or term for which the person is sentenced.*fn11
[38] Section 4346 is entitled Eligibility for Parole. Section 4346(a) provided that for purposes of parole eligibility, the term of a sentence was to be reduced by merit and good behavior credits. Subsection (a) provided:
[39] A person confined to any correctional facility administered by the Department may be released on parole by the Board if the person has served 1/3 of the term imposed by the court, such term to be reduced by such merit and good behavior credits as have been earned, or 120 days, whichever is greater. For the purpose this subchapter, "court" shall include any court committing an offender to the Department. Section 4346(c) provided, in part:
[40] For all purposes of this section, a person sentenced to imprisonment for life shall be considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years.
[41] When the section 4346 parole statute and the section 4348 conditional release statute were both enacted in 1964 they were within the same chapter of the Delaware Code. Each statute permitted the reduction of an inmate's sentence through earned merit and good time credits.*fn12
[42] The General Assembly provided in 4346(c) that a life sentence was considered to be a fixed term of 45 years for purposes of reduction by merit and good behavior credits in determining parole eligibility under section 4346(a). The General Assembly further provided in section 4348 that conditional release upon the basis of earning merit and good behavior credits shall "be deemed as on parole." When those two 1964 statutory enactments are read in pari materia,*fn13 we hold that section 4348 incorporates section 4346(c)'s definition of a life sentence as a fixed term of 45 years. To the extent that Jackson is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.*fn14
[43] Parole Abolished
[44] Conditional Release Retained
[45] Prior to 1990, an inmate could obtain early release in two ways: from the Parole Board under section 4346(a) or by conditional release pursuant to section 4348. Release of an inmate on parole under section 4346 is a matter of discretion for the Parole Board.*fn15 Conditional release under section 4348 is non-discretionary. If an inmate has accumulated sufficient good behavior and merit credits, he or she must be released from incarceration on his or her short-term release date, i.e., the maximum period of incarceration less accumulated good behavior and merit credits.*fn16 This Court has recognized that there is little practical difference between release on parole under section 4346 and conditional release under section 4348.*fn17
[46] The General Assembly has now prospectively abolished parole as a basis for early release. Pursuant to the Truth-in-Sentencing Act of 1989,*fn18 a sentence of Level V incarceration for any crime committed after June 29, 1990 is no longer subject to the parole provisions of section 4346.*fn19 Although the 1989 Truth-in-Sentencing Act completely eliminated parole, that statutory enactment continues to generally permit conditional release for good time credit. The Truth-in-Sentencing Act provides that:
[47] All sentences imposed for any offenses other than a life sentence imposed for class A felonies may be reduced by earned good time under the provisions of this section and rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Corrections.*fn20
[48] The enactment of section 4381(a) reflects the General Assembly's understanding, consistent with our holding in this opinion, that prior to the Truthin-Sentencing Act, a life sentence for class A felonies was considered to be a term of 45 years under section 4346(c) and subject to conditional release pursuant to section 4348. By eliminating parole completely and then eliminating good time credit that would lead to conditional release for class A felonies, the General Assembly intended that a life sentence for class A felonies would no longer be considered a term of 45 years but would, in fact, be a natural life sentence.
[49] The General Assembly also created classifications for felonies when the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was adopted. It did not, however, reclassify section 4214(a) life sentences for habitual offenders as class A felonies. Accordingly, we must examine the amendments that were made to the habitual offender statute as part of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act to ascertain the General Assembly's current intent with regard to a section 4214(a) life sentence.
[50] Habitual Offender Dichotomy
[51] We have already noted that in 1970, the General Assembly drew a distinction between a habitual offender designation under section 4214(a) and habitual offender status pursuant to subsection (b). In 1970, a life sentence under (a) could receive the benefit of parole and was considered to be a fixed term of 45 years.*fn21 In 1970, a person serving a life sentence imposed under subsection (b) was not eligible for parole.
[52] The General Assembly's intention to retain the distinction that was first made in 1970 between habitual offenders serving life sentences under section 4214(a) and 4214(b) remains clear. In the 1990 amendments to the habitual offender statute, as part of the Truth-In-Sentencing statutory remedial process, section 4214 was amended as follows:
[53] a) Amend subsection (a) by deleting the words "may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted" and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
[54] "may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted. Notwithstanding any provision of this Title to the contrary, any sentence so imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by the Court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V institutional setting without benefit of probation or parole, except that any such sentence shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 4205(h), 4217, 4381, and 4382 of this Title."*fn22
[55] These statutory changes to subsection (a) reflect the unambiguous intent of the General Assembly. First, a sentence under subsection 4214(a) can now be up to life, not just life. Second, no sentence under subsection (a) is eligible for probation or parole. Third, as amended, any sentence in subsection (a) - including a life sentence - is subject to reduction by earned good time credit pursuant to section 4381(a).
[56] The General Assembly's intention of providing good time reduction could be accomplished for a life sentence imposed under section 4214(a) only by continuing to "consider it to be a fixed term of 45 years."*fn23 Therefore, section 4346(c) was not repealed or amended. Consequently, after passage of the Truthin-Sentencing Act, persons sentenced to life as a habitual offender under section 4214(a) are not eligible for release on parole but such persons are still eligible for conditional release pursuant to section 4348, since subsection (a) specifically incorporates section 4381 by reference.
[57] Conversely, the General Assembly's simultaneous amendment to section 4214(b) demonstrates its intention for a life sentence under subsection (b) to mean natural life. That amendment states:
[58] (b) Amend Subsection (b) by adding the following language at the end thereof:
[59] "Notwithstanding any provision of this Title to the contrary, any sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by the Court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V institutional setting without benefit of probation, parole, earned good time or any other reduction."*fn24
[60] The overall intention of the General Assembly is set forth in the language that amended both sections 4214(a) and (b) of the habitual offender statute in 1990 and is manifest when viewed in two contexts. First, section 4381 is the section that provides for good time credit. A discretionary life sentence imposed under subsection (a) is not eligible for parole but remains subject to the earning of good time credit because the amended statute makes any subsection (a) sentence expressly subject to section 4381. Second, with the 1990 amendments, a mandatory life sentence imposed under subsection (b) is not eligible for parole and is also not subject to "earned good time or any other reduction." Consequently, in the context of promulgating the Truth-In-Sentencing Act, the General Assembly has retained the distinction between life sentences under section 4214(a) and (b) that was first legislated in 1970.
[61] A life sentence under section 4214(a) of the habitual offender statute is now unique in comparison to the General Assembly's statutory scheme for other life sentences. It differs by express statutory language from any of the following types of life sentences:
[62] " A life sentence for murder in the first degree is "life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction."*fn25
[63] " A life sentence for a class A felony is not subject to the statute authorizing the award of good time.*fn26
[64] " A life sentence for a three-time violent offender is not subject to the probation or parole of Title 11, Chapter 43, which, includes, 4381.*fn27
[65] Accordingly, when the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was adopted, the General Assembly's intent to treat a life sentence under section 4214(a) differently, from other life sentences, by making it eligible for conditional release, is clearly reflected in all of its carefully crafted statutes and amendments. The General Assembly accomplished that intention by not repealing section 4346(c) and continuing to consider a life sentence for a habitual offender under section 4214(a) to be a fixed term of 45 years under section 4346(c). Therefore, we hold that a person sentenced to life as a habitual offender pursuant to section 4214(a) is to be "considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years"*fn28 and qualifies for conditional release pursuant to section 4348, based upon good time credits earned pursuant to section 4381.
[66] Crosby's Sentencing Decision
[67] The Superior Court held that Crosby's life sentence as a habitual offender under section 4214(a) was equivalent to a fixed term of 45 years and that Crosby's eligibility for conditional release should be computed on that basis under section 4348 as he earned merit and good behavior credits under section 4381. We have concluded that the Superior Court's ruling is correct. Before we can properly decide Crosby's Eighth Amendment claim, however, we must review the basis for the Superior Court's decision to sentence Crosby to a life sentence that was equivalent to a fixed term of 45 years.
[68] Under Delaware law, Forgery in the Second Degree is classified as a class G felony.*fn29 That is the lowest category of felony-level offenses in Delaware. Except as provided by the habitual criminal statute, class G felonies carry a maximum sentence of up to two years incarceration.*fn30
[69] Our first remand order directed the sentencing judge to consider Crosby's life sentence in light of the relevant case law interpreting the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and to file a report identifying the documentary basis and reasoning behind the decision to impose a life sentence on Crosby. The sentencing judge submitted his report to this Court on January 30, 2003. That report identified and subdivided ten "salient points," as follows:
[70] 1. First and foremost, Crosby committed the forgery charge, for which he received the life sentence, about 26 months after having been previously declared a habitual offender.
[71] 2. The forgery charge was committed less than two years after his release from his 1999 burglary third degree/habitual offender sentence.
[72] 3. When he committed the forgery offense he was on probation. Though discharged as unimproved, he was on probation when he committed the burglary charge.
[73] 4. Crosby has numerous proceedings in this Court for violation of probation covering a span in excess of 12 years. Many violations of probation reports are in the Presentence report.
[74] 5. Those reports manifest a continuing pattern of disregard of the conditions of probation and orders of this Court and a complete lack of amenability to sanctions other than jail.
[75] 6. One essential pattern revealed in those reports is Crosby's years-longs refusal, despite many opportunities and orders, to engage in substance abuse treatment. For example: