×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Disciplinary Findings Do Not Preclude Subsequent Factual Litigation; QI Denied
A Federal District Court in Michigan has held that findings made in
prisoner disciplinary hearings should not be given preclusive effect when
litigating factual issues in § 1983 claims. Qualified immunity was denied
as untimely.
Arthur Johnson claimed James Freeburn, a prison guard, threatened his life.
When Johnson complained to the resident unit manager later that day,
Freeburn overheard Johnson's complaint and request for transfer and called
the gun tower claiming Johnson refused to return to his cell and to shoot
him if he moved. Freeburn then filed disciplinary charges against Johnson
for refusing to lock down which resulted in several days in administrative
segregation.
Johnson filed a § 1983 complaint for retaliation in violation of his First
Amendment right to seek redress of grievances. All defendants were
dismissed except Freeburn and two motions for summary judgment and/or
dismissal for Freeburn were denied. See: Johnson v. Freeburn, 29 F.Supp.2d
764 (E.D. Mich. 1998) [PLN, 07/99]. Freeburn then filed a third motion for
dismissal and a motion in limine.
In his third motion to dismiss, Freeburn claimed that Johnson did not state
a claim for retaliation under Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.
1999). The magistrate had previously held that a retaliation claim was
stated under the former "shocks the conscience" standard. In Thaddeus-X,
the Sixth Circuit overturned this standard and a new three-prong standard
now applies. Here, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff to deter
protected conduct; and (3) a causal connection exists between (1) and (2),
meaning the adverse action was motivated by the plaintiff's protected conduct.
Under this standard, Freeburn claims Johnson fails the first prong because
he was convicted in a prison disciplinary proceeding of disobeying a valid
order to return to his cell and was thus not engaged in protected conduct.
Freeburn claims this finding is preclusive on this issue and the
retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. The Court found the
administrative finding was not preclusive and that this is nothing more
than a factual dispute for a trier of fact to resolve.
In a related matter, the magistrate denied Freeburn's motion in limine to
preclude Johnson from entering evidence at trial regarding disobeying a
lawful order. The District Judge denied Freeburn's appeal finding that a
federal court may give preclusive effect to state court judgments, and
state agency fact-findings, "when state law so requires." However,
Michigan's law of collateral estoppel does not preclude federal courts from
litigating factual issues raised in an agency proceeding. The Court based
this decision primarily on Couch v. Schultz, 176 Mich.App. 167, 439 N.W.2d
296 (1989) (Couch I) finding this remains established precedent. Couch I
does not bar a prisoner "from litigating the truth or falsity" of a
disciplinary proceeding wherein he was convicted.
Finally, Freeburn now claims he was entitled to qualified immunity. Finding
that this claim was not raised in all of Freeburn's previous motions, the
Court held he does not get a "fourth bite at the apple" and dismissed the
claim as untimely. See: Johnson v. Freeburn, 144 F.Supp.2d 817 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
prisoner disciplinary hearings should not be given preclusive effect when
litigating factual issues in § 1983 claims. Qualified immunity was denied
as untimely.
Arthur Johnson claimed James Freeburn, a prison guard, threatened his life.
When Johnson complained to the resident unit manager later that day,
Freeburn overheard Johnson's complaint and request for transfer and called
the gun tower claiming Johnson refused to return to his cell and to shoot
him if he moved. Freeburn then filed disciplinary charges against Johnson
for refusing to lock down which resulted in several days in administrative
segregation.
Johnson filed a § 1983 complaint for retaliation in violation of his First
Amendment right to seek redress of grievances. All defendants were
dismissed except Freeburn and two motions for summary judgment and/or
dismissal for Freeburn were denied. See: Johnson v. Freeburn, 29 F.Supp.2d
764 (E.D. Mich. 1998) [PLN, 07/99]. Freeburn then filed a third motion for
dismissal and a motion in limine.
In his third motion to dismiss, Freeburn claimed that Johnson did not state
a claim for retaliation under Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.
1999). The magistrate had previously held that a retaliation claim was
stated under the former "shocks the conscience" standard. In Thaddeus-X,
the Sixth Circuit overturned this standard and a new three-prong standard
now applies. Here, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff to deter
protected conduct; and (3) a causal connection exists between (1) and (2),
meaning the adverse action was motivated by the plaintiff's protected conduct.
Under this standard, Freeburn claims Johnson fails the first prong because
he was convicted in a prison disciplinary proceeding of disobeying a valid
order to return to his cell and was thus not engaged in protected conduct.
Freeburn claims this finding is preclusive on this issue and the
retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. The Court found the
administrative finding was not preclusive and that this is nothing more
than a factual dispute for a trier of fact to resolve.
In a related matter, the magistrate denied Freeburn's motion in limine to
preclude Johnson from entering evidence at trial regarding disobeying a
lawful order. The District Judge denied Freeburn's appeal finding that a
federal court may give preclusive effect to state court judgments, and
state agency fact-findings, "when state law so requires." However,
Michigan's law of collateral estoppel does not preclude federal courts from
litigating factual issues raised in an agency proceeding. The Court based
this decision primarily on Couch v. Schultz, 176 Mich.App. 167, 439 N.W.2d
296 (1989) (Couch I) finding this remains established precedent. Couch I
does not bar a prisoner "from litigating the truth or falsity" of a
disciplinary proceeding wherein he was convicted.
Finally, Freeburn now claims he was entitled to qualified immunity. Finding
that this claim was not raised in all of Freeburn's previous motions, the
Court held he does not get a "fourth bite at the apple" and dismissed the
claim as untimely. See: Johnson v. Freeburn, 144 F.Supp.2d 817 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Johnson v. Freeburn
| Year | 2001 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 144 F.Supp.2d 817 (E.D. Mich. 2001). |
| Level | District Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. JAMES FREEBURN, Defendant.
Case No. 96-CV-74996-DT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION
144 F. Supp. 2d 817; 2001 U.S. Dist.
March 30, 2001, Decided
March 30, 2001, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Johnson v. Freeburn, 2000 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2000)
DISPOSITION: [**1] Accepted. Defendant's third Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 70, filed April 13, 2000) GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's Appeal (Docket No. 91, filed August 3, 2000) DENIED and DISMISSED. Magistrate Judge's Order dated July 18, 2000 AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: ARTHUR JOHNSON, plaintiff, Pro se, Ionia, MI.
For ARTHUR JOHNSON, plaintiff: Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, MI.
For JAMES FREEBURN, defendant: Patrick J. Wright, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
For JAMES FREEBURN, LYNDA GRADOVILLE, KENNETH L. MCGINNIS, THOMAS TAYLOR, RAY TAMINGA, LINDA BECKWITH, defendants: Terry L. Norton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: DENISE PAGE HOOD, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: DENISE PAGE HOOD
OPINION: [*818]
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER DENYING APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated July 18, 2000 recommending to grant in part and deny in part Defendant Freeburn's third Motion to Dismiss. Defendant filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. This matter is also before the Court on Defendant's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Order denying [**2] Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration of an Order denying Defendant's Motion in Limine.
DEFENDANT'S THIRD MOTION TO DISMISS
The only remaining defendant in this matter is Defendant James Freeburn. On September 29, 1997, the Court entered an Order accepting the Magistrate Judge's [*819] August 28, 1997 Report and Recommendation dismissing all of the defendants except Defendant James Freeburn. The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff has stated a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights against Defendant Freeburn. Defendant Freeburn filed a second Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment which was denied by the Court on September 30, 1998. Defendant has now filed a third Motion to Dismiss which is now before the Court.
The Court has had an opportunity to review the matter and finds that the Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the issue of whether Plaintiff violated a valid order by Defendant to return to his cell is a factual question. The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the findings by the administrative [**3] hearing officer are not preclusive on this issue. Plaintiff's retaliation claim remains.
As to Plaintiff's claim involving the Major Misconduct ticket, that claim is dismissed based on Plaintiff's admission.
Regarding the qualified immunity issue, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.
APPEAL BY DEFENDANT
Defendant appeals the Magistrate Judge's Order denying Defendant's Motion in Limine. The Motion in Limine sought to bar Plaintiff and his counsel from offering or introducing at trial any evidence, testimony, remarks, questions or arguments, either directly or indirectly, with respect to the claim that Plaintiff did not disobey a direct order on August 28, 1995. Defendant based his motion on the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion claiming that because a state administrative hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of the major misconduct, Plaintiff should be precluded from relitigating the issue.
The decision and order of the Magistrate Judge will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Court has carefully reviewed the matter [**4] and finds that Defendant has failed to show that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in its July 18, 2000 Order. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish that the Magistrate Judge's ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Michigan law on collateral estoppel does not preclude a plaintiff from litigating factual issues raised in an earlier correctional disciplinary proceeding. The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that based on policy considerations, findings made in disciplinary hearings should be given preclusive effect.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated July 18, 2000 is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's third Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 70, filed April 13, 2000) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as more fully set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Appeal (Docket No. 91, filed August 3, 2000) is DENIED and DISMISSED. The Magistrate Judge's Order dated July 18, 2000 is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Final Pretrial [**5] Conference is scheduled for Monday, May 21, 2001, 2:30 p.m. The parties must submit their Joint Final Pretrial Order in accordance with E.D. Mich. LR 16.2 [*820] to the Court by Monday, May 14, 2001.
DENISE PAGE HOOD
United States District Judge
DATED: MAR 30 2001
Case No. 96-CV-74996-DT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION
144 F. Supp. 2d 817; 2001 U.S. Dist.
March 30, 2001, Decided
March 30, 2001, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Johnson v. Freeburn, 2000 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2000)
DISPOSITION: [**1] Accepted. Defendant's third Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 70, filed April 13, 2000) GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's Appeal (Docket No. 91, filed August 3, 2000) DENIED and DISMISSED. Magistrate Judge's Order dated July 18, 2000 AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: ARTHUR JOHNSON, plaintiff, Pro se, Ionia, MI.
For ARTHUR JOHNSON, plaintiff: Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, MI.
For JAMES FREEBURN, defendant: Patrick J. Wright, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
For JAMES FREEBURN, LYNDA GRADOVILLE, KENNETH L. MCGINNIS, THOMAS TAYLOR, RAY TAMINGA, LINDA BECKWITH, defendants: Terry L. Norton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: DENISE PAGE HOOD, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: DENISE PAGE HOOD
OPINION: [*818]
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER DENYING APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated July 18, 2000 recommending to grant in part and deny in part Defendant Freeburn's third Motion to Dismiss. Defendant filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. This matter is also before the Court on Defendant's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Order denying [**2] Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration of an Order denying Defendant's Motion in Limine.
DEFENDANT'S THIRD MOTION TO DISMISS
The only remaining defendant in this matter is Defendant James Freeburn. On September 29, 1997, the Court entered an Order accepting the Magistrate Judge's [*819] August 28, 1997 Report and Recommendation dismissing all of the defendants except Defendant James Freeburn. The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff has stated a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights against Defendant Freeburn. Defendant Freeburn filed a second Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment which was denied by the Court on September 30, 1998. Defendant has now filed a third Motion to Dismiss which is now before the Court.
The Court has had an opportunity to review the matter and finds that the Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the issue of whether Plaintiff violated a valid order by Defendant to return to his cell is a factual question. The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the findings by the administrative [**3] hearing officer are not preclusive on this issue. Plaintiff's retaliation claim remains.
As to Plaintiff's claim involving the Major Misconduct ticket, that claim is dismissed based on Plaintiff's admission.
Regarding the qualified immunity issue, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.
APPEAL BY DEFENDANT
Defendant appeals the Magistrate Judge's Order denying Defendant's Motion in Limine. The Motion in Limine sought to bar Plaintiff and his counsel from offering or introducing at trial any evidence, testimony, remarks, questions or arguments, either directly or indirectly, with respect to the claim that Plaintiff did not disobey a direct order on August 28, 1995. Defendant based his motion on the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion claiming that because a state administrative hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of the major misconduct, Plaintiff should be precluded from relitigating the issue.
The decision and order of the Magistrate Judge will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Court has carefully reviewed the matter [**4] and finds that Defendant has failed to show that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in its July 18, 2000 Order. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish that the Magistrate Judge's ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Michigan law on collateral estoppel does not preclude a plaintiff from litigating factual issues raised in an earlier correctional disciplinary proceeding. The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that based on policy considerations, findings made in disciplinary hearings should be given preclusive effect.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated July 18, 2000 is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's third Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 70, filed April 13, 2000) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as more fully set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Appeal (Docket No. 91, filed August 3, 2000) is DENIED and DISMISSED. The Magistrate Judge's Order dated July 18, 2000 is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Final Pretrial [**5] Conference is scheduled for Monday, May 21, 2001, 2:30 p.m. The parties must submit their Joint Final Pretrial Order in accordance with E.D. Mich. LR 16.2 [*820] to the Court by Monday, May 14, 2001.
DENISE PAGE HOOD
United States District Judge
DATED: MAR 30 2001