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Disenfranchisement of Felons Constitutional; Claim Frivolous
The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that disenfranchisement of
Wyoming's convicted felons does not violate the Constitution, that the
dismissal provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) do not
violate due process, and that prisoners can be assessed a "strike" under
the PLRA's "three strikes" provision even when the claim does not involve
prison conditions.
David Woodruff and Bryon Six are state prisoners in Wyoming. They sued the
State of Wyoming under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging Wyoming Statute
§6-10-106, which denies the right to vote to convicted felons. The
plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and damages. They argued that the
statute violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, their right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and their right to due process. They also brought claims under
the Wyoming Constitution.
The district court cited Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) to
conclude that disenfranchisement of felons does not violate Equal
Protection. The court concluded further "that Plaintiffs had provided no
support for their claims." The district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous, 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B). Each plaintiff was assessed a strike under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(g), the "three strikes" rule.
Woodruff and Six appealed, but Six did not sign the notice of appeal due to
a failure of the prison mail system to deliver the mail timely. Following
an extension of time, Mr. Six finally signed the notice of appeal but
failed to move to proceed without prepayment of fees or to pay the filing
fees. The appeals court dismissed Mr. Six's appeal and held Mr. Woodruff
entirely responsible for the filing fees.
Woodruff argued on appeal that denying felons the right to vote violates
Equal Protection, that the district court's sua sponte dismissal violated
due process, and that he should not have been given a strike under 28
U.S.C. §1915(g) because his §1983 complaint did not involve prison conditions.
The Court of Appeals rejected Woodruff's Equal Protection claim. Prisoners
are not a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes, and well-settled law
from Richardson and Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), to Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996), holds that disenfranchisement of convicted
felons violates no law nor any Constitutional right. The appellate court
held that Woodruff's argument had no merit.
The appeals court peremptorily rejected Woodruff's challenge to the PLRA's
dismissal law, 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), holding that the statute was
constitutional. Further, the Tenth Circuit rejected his argument that
"strikes" under 28 U.SC. §1915(g) should be limited to frivolous suits
filed regarding prison conditions. The appeals court held that the plain
language of §1915(g) does not limit itself to prison conditions litigation,
"nor does it provide any exception."
The district court's dismissal was affirmed. The strikes assessed against
Woodruff and Six by the district court were also affirmed. This case is
published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing
unpublished cases. See: Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed.Appx. 199 (10th Cir. 2002).
Wyoming's convicted felons does not violate the Constitution, that the
dismissal provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) do not
violate due process, and that prisoners can be assessed a "strike" under
the PLRA's "three strikes" provision even when the claim does not involve
prison conditions.
David Woodruff and Bryon Six are state prisoners in Wyoming. They sued the
State of Wyoming under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging Wyoming Statute
§6-10-106, which denies the right to vote to convicted felons. The
plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and damages. They argued that the
statute violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, their right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and their right to due process. They also brought claims under
the Wyoming Constitution.
The district court cited Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) to
conclude that disenfranchisement of felons does not violate Equal
Protection. The court concluded further "that Plaintiffs had provided no
support for their claims." The district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous, 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B). Each plaintiff was assessed a strike under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(g), the "three strikes" rule.
Woodruff and Six appealed, but Six did not sign the notice of appeal due to
a failure of the prison mail system to deliver the mail timely. Following
an extension of time, Mr. Six finally signed the notice of appeal but
failed to move to proceed without prepayment of fees or to pay the filing
fees. The appeals court dismissed Mr. Six's appeal and held Mr. Woodruff
entirely responsible for the filing fees.
Woodruff argued on appeal that denying felons the right to vote violates
Equal Protection, that the district court's sua sponte dismissal violated
due process, and that he should not have been given a strike under 28
U.S.C. §1915(g) because his §1983 complaint did not involve prison conditions.
The Court of Appeals rejected Woodruff's Equal Protection claim. Prisoners
are not a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes, and well-settled law
from Richardson and Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), to Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996), holds that disenfranchisement of convicted
felons violates no law nor any Constitutional right. The appellate court
held that Woodruff's argument had no merit.
The appeals court peremptorily rejected Woodruff's challenge to the PLRA's
dismissal law, 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), holding that the statute was
constitutional. Further, the Tenth Circuit rejected his argument that
"strikes" under 28 U.SC. §1915(g) should be limited to frivolous suits
filed regarding prison conditions. The appeals court held that the plain
language of §1915(g) does not limit itself to prison conditions litigation,
"nor does it provide any exception."
The district court's dismissal was affirmed. The strikes assessed against
Woodruff and Six by the district court were also affirmed. This case is
published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing
unpublished cases. See: Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed.Appx. 199 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Related legal case
Woodruff v. Wyoming
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 49 Fed.Appx. 199 10th Cir. 2002 |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
[U] Woodruff v. State of Wyoming, 49 Fed.Appx. 199 (10th Cir. 10/07/2002)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 01-8078
[3] 49 Fed.Appx. 199, 2002
[4] October 7, 2002
[5] DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF; BRYON SIX, PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF WYOMING; JIM GERINGER, WYOMING GOVERNOR, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES.
[6] (D.C. No. 01-CV-87-J) (D. Wyoming)
[7] Before Kelly, McKAY, and Murphy, Circuit Judges. *fn2
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
[9] ORDER AND JUDGMENT *fn1
[10] Plaintiffs-Appellants David Woodruff and Bryon Six, inmates appearing pro se, seek to appeal the district court's order dismissing their civil rights complaint brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs asserted that Wyo. Stat. § 6-10-106, which denies the right to vote to convicted felons, violated their constitutional rights and sought damages and declaratory relief for such violations. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and as frivolous. See 28 U. S. C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). We affirm as to Mr. Woodruff and dismiss Mr. Six's appeal.
[11] Section 6-10-106 provides that "[a] person convicted of a felony is incompetent to be an elector [defined in § 22-1-102(a)(xxvi) as, generally, all Wyoming citizens of voting age not otherwise disqualified]." A Wyoming statute does provide a mechanism for convicted felons to re-qualify as electors, see Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-105, but that statute only applies after the prison term has ended or after probation. The Plaintiffs brought their § 1983 action challenging § 106 on the ground that it violates: (1) their Eighth Amendment right and their Wyoming constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Wyoming Constitution; (3) their federal and state rights to due process; and (4) various other provisions of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.
[12] The district court dismissed the claim after concluding that Plaintiffs had provided no support for their claims. In addition, the district court relied on Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 56 (1974), to conclude that disenfranchising felons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[13] Before addressing the issues the Plaintiffs raise in this appeal, we must address two jurisdictional issues that have been referred to us. We first address whether Mr. Woodruff timely filed an initial notice of appeal. The district court's order dismissing the action was entered on August 24, 2001. The district court docketed Mr. Woodruff's notice of appeal as being filed on September 26, 2001, two days beyond the thirty-day deadline for filing the notice. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In their opening brief, the Plaintiffs state that Mr. Woodruff placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mailbox on September 24, 2001, and note that this was sworn to in the initial notice of appeal. In a separate order granting the Plaintiffs' motion to file a belated notice of appeal, discussed infra, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodruff placed the notice of appeal in the prison mailbox on September 24, 2001. Given that no contrary facts appear in the record, we conclude that Mr. Woodruff did deposit the notice of appeal in the prison mailbox on September 24, 2001, and, as a result, he timely filed his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) (stating that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is deemed filed when it is delivered to prison officials for forwarding to the district court).
[14] The second jurisdictional issue involves Mr. Six's failure to sign the notice of appeal that Mr. Woodruff filed on September 24, 2001. On October 3, 2001, we granted Mr. Six a fourteen day extension to file a signed notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) (allowing a party to file a notice of appeal within fourteen days after the date another party files a notice of appeal). On November 1, 2001, Mr. Woodruff filed a Motion to File Belated Notice of Appeal on behalf of himself and Mr. Six alleging that delay in the prison mail system prevented Mr. Woodruff from receiving a signed notice of appeal from Mr. Six. The district court granted the motion and allowed Mr. Six to file a signed notice of appeal by December 17, 2001, which Mr. Six filed.
[15] Putting aside the extension of t ime we granted on October 3, Mr. Six had until October 10 to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(2) (allowing an inmate to file a notice of appeal within fourteen days from the date when the district court dockets the notice of appeal of another party). Mr. Six therefore had until November 9 to file for an extension of t ime to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)( 5)(A) (providing for a 30-day extension of t ime where excusable neglect or good cause is shown). The district court concluded that Mr. Six showed good cause for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal; thus, Mr. Six met the requirements of Rule 4(a)(5)(A). We agree with the district court. However, Mr. Six has not paid the appellate filing fee or filed a motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal. Absent payment of the full filing fee, where there are multiple inmates who sign a notice of appeal, at a minimum each must file a motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. *fn3 28 U. S. C. § 1915(a)(2); (b)(1).
[16] Mr. Woodruff raises the following issues on appeal: (1) Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be construed to allow disenfranchisement of the Appellants in violation of their equal protection rights; (2) the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the complaint violated his right to due process; and (3) because the complaint did not address prison conditions, the dismissal of his case should not count as a strike under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(g).
[17] Mr. Woodruff challenges the district court's reliance on Richardson in concluding that Wyoming could constitutionally disenfranchise them. In Richardson, the Supreme Court stated that "the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that,
[18] [section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement. Richardson, 418 U. S. at 54-55. *fn4
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 01-8078
[3] 49 Fed.Appx. 199, 2002
[4] October 7, 2002
[5] DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF; BRYON SIX, PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF WYOMING; JIM GERINGER, WYOMING GOVERNOR, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES.
[6] (D.C. No. 01-CV-87-J) (D. Wyoming)
[7] Before Kelly, McKAY, and Murphy, Circuit Judges. *fn2
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
[9] ORDER AND JUDGMENT *fn1
[10] Plaintiffs-Appellants David Woodruff and Bryon Six, inmates appearing pro se, seek to appeal the district court's order dismissing their civil rights complaint brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs asserted that Wyo. Stat. § 6-10-106, which denies the right to vote to convicted felons, violated their constitutional rights and sought damages and declaratory relief for such violations. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and as frivolous. See 28 U. S. C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). We affirm as to Mr. Woodruff and dismiss Mr. Six's appeal.
[11] Section 6-10-106 provides that "[a] person convicted of a felony is incompetent to be an elector [defined in § 22-1-102(a)(xxvi) as, generally, all Wyoming citizens of voting age not otherwise disqualified]." A Wyoming statute does provide a mechanism for convicted felons to re-qualify as electors, see Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-105, but that statute only applies after the prison term has ended or after probation. The Plaintiffs brought their § 1983 action challenging § 106 on the ground that it violates: (1) their Eighth Amendment right and their Wyoming constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Wyoming Constitution; (3) their federal and state rights to due process; and (4) various other provisions of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.
[12] The district court dismissed the claim after concluding that Plaintiffs had provided no support for their claims. In addition, the district court relied on Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 56 (1974), to conclude that disenfranchising felons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[13] Before addressing the issues the Plaintiffs raise in this appeal, we must address two jurisdictional issues that have been referred to us. We first address whether Mr. Woodruff timely filed an initial notice of appeal. The district court's order dismissing the action was entered on August 24, 2001. The district court docketed Mr. Woodruff's notice of appeal as being filed on September 26, 2001, two days beyond the thirty-day deadline for filing the notice. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In their opening brief, the Plaintiffs state that Mr. Woodruff placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mailbox on September 24, 2001, and note that this was sworn to in the initial notice of appeal. In a separate order granting the Plaintiffs' motion to file a belated notice of appeal, discussed infra, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodruff placed the notice of appeal in the prison mailbox on September 24, 2001. Given that no contrary facts appear in the record, we conclude that Mr. Woodruff did deposit the notice of appeal in the prison mailbox on September 24, 2001, and, as a result, he timely filed his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) (stating that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is deemed filed when it is delivered to prison officials for forwarding to the district court).
[14] The second jurisdictional issue involves Mr. Six's failure to sign the notice of appeal that Mr. Woodruff filed on September 24, 2001. On October 3, 2001, we granted Mr. Six a fourteen day extension to file a signed notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) (allowing a party to file a notice of appeal within fourteen days after the date another party files a notice of appeal). On November 1, 2001, Mr. Woodruff filed a Motion to File Belated Notice of Appeal on behalf of himself and Mr. Six alleging that delay in the prison mail system prevented Mr. Woodruff from receiving a signed notice of appeal from Mr. Six. The district court granted the motion and allowed Mr. Six to file a signed notice of appeal by December 17, 2001, which Mr. Six filed.
[15] Putting aside the extension of t ime we granted on October 3, Mr. Six had until October 10 to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(2) (allowing an inmate to file a notice of appeal within fourteen days from the date when the district court dockets the notice of appeal of another party). Mr. Six therefore had until November 9 to file for an extension of t ime to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)( 5)(A) (providing for a 30-day extension of t ime where excusable neglect or good cause is shown). The district court concluded that Mr. Six showed good cause for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal; thus, Mr. Six met the requirements of Rule 4(a)(5)(A). We agree with the district court. However, Mr. Six has not paid the appellate filing fee or filed a motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal. Absent payment of the full filing fee, where there are multiple inmates who sign a notice of appeal, at a minimum each must file a motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. *fn3 28 U. S. C. § 1915(a)(2); (b)(1).
[16] Mr. Woodruff raises the following issues on appeal: (1) Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be construed to allow disenfranchisement of the Appellants in violation of their equal protection rights; (2) the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the complaint violated his right to due process; and (3) because the complaint did not address prison conditions, the dismissal of his case should not count as a strike under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(g).
[17] Mr. Woodruff challenges the district court's reliance on Richardson in concluding that Wyoming could constitutionally disenfranchise them. In Richardson, the Supreme Court stated that "the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that,
[18] [section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement. Richardson, 418 U. S. at 54-55. *fn4