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Dismissal of Grooming Rule Challenge Precluded; Evidentiary Burden on Prison Officials

Dismissal of Grooming Rule Challenge Precluded; Evidentiary Burden on Prison
Officials


The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded a district court's dismissal of prisoners' actions challenging a
prison grooming policy. Arizona prisoners who adhered to the "Vow of the
Nazarite," a biblical principle which forbids cutting one's hair or beard,
brought §1983 actions challenging a prison grooming policy requiring them
to do so. Certain religious groups are exempted from the policy but
prison officials refused to exempt plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeals found that prison officials failed to show
that the policy was related to a "legitimate penological interest," the
standard for determining the validity of prison regulations under Turner
v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2554, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
Moreover, prison officials provided no justification for exempting other
religious groups but not plaintiffs. The appellate court further held
that the district court should also reconsider whether the defendants are
immune from damage liability." See: Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.
1990).

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Related legal case

Swift v. Lewis

Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 04/06/1990)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[2] Nos. 88-15435, 89-15207

[3] 901 F.2d 730, 1990

[4] April 6, 1990. *fn*

[5] CARL DEAN SWIFT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
SAMUEL LEWIS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; PAUL J. SCHRINER, DEP. WARDEN, SANTA CRUZ UNIT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ALEX MACHAIN, SR. CHAPLAIN, PERRYVILLE COMPLEX, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; GEORGE TICHY, SENIOR SECURITY OFFICER FOR THE SANTA CRUZ UNIT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; GEORGE HERMAN, WARDEN, ASPC, DOUGLAS, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. DAVID RAYMOND GREN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, V. SAMUEL LEWIS, DIRECTOR OF ADOC; SANTOK SINGH KHALSA, SIKH REPRESENTATIVE, ASPC, TUCSON SANTA RITA UNIT; CAPTAIN GARVIN, CAPTAIN, ASPC, TUCSON SANTA RITA UNIT; RICHARD TANGUAY, CHAPLAIN, ASPC, TUCSON SANTA RITA UNIT; DEPUTY WARDEN HALLAHAN, DEPUTY WARDEN, ASPC, TUCSON SANTA RITA UNIT, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, D.C. No. CV-88-0335-ACM, Alfredo C. Marquez, District Judge, Presiding. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, D.C. No. CV-88-0402-RMB, Richard M. Bilby, Chief Judge, Presiding.

[7] David Raymond Gren, Pro Se, Douglas, Arizona, for the plaintiff-appellant.

[8] Bruce L. Skolnik, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona, for the defendants-appellees.

[9] Carl Dean Swift, Pro Se, Douglas, Arizona, for the plaintiff-appellant.

[10] Mariannina E. Preston, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendants-appellees.

[11] Cecil F. Poole, Dorothy W. Nelson and Charles Wiggins, Circuit Judges.

[12] Author: Wiggins

[13] WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

[14] David R. Gren and Carl D. Swift, Arizona state prisoners, appeal the district courts' summary judgments for defendants in their section 1983 actions against officers of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse and remand.*fn1

[15] Appellants claim to be Christians who as part of their religion adhere to the "Vow of the Nazarite." This biblical vow proscribes, among other things, one's cutting his hair and beard. ADOC's grooming policy prohibits long hair and beards. Although ADOC exempts from this policy inmates of certain religious groups (such as Sikhs and American Indians), ADOC refused to exempt appellants. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.

[16] Appellants contend that in refusing to exempt them from its grooming policy, ADOC has violated the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution. The district courts granted summary judgment for ADOC based on their findings that, whether or not the free exercise clause protects the Nazarite Vow, there are legitimate penological justifications for the prison grooming policy.

[17] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants, we review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment to determine whether there exist material issues of fact for trial and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Levin v. Knight,780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1986).

[18] Prison regulations that infringe on an inmate's practice of his religion are valid if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." McCabe v. Arave,827 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987)). ADOC asserts the following justifications for its grooming policy: (1) quick inmate identification; (2) preventing sanitary problems; (3) reducing contact between prisoners and guards during body searches; and (4) reducing homosexual attractiveness of inmates. Cases from other courts have recognized the reasonableness of long hair regulations to promote all of these interests.

[19] ADOC has, however, failed to provide any evidence that the interests they have asserted are the actual bases for their grooming policy. Nor has ADOC provided evidence that any of these interests justifies treating appellants differently from members of other religious groups. See Cruz v. Beto,405 U.S. 319, 322, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263, 92 S. Ct. 1079 (1972) (per curiam) (prisoner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to that afforded fellow prisoners).

[20] Prison officials are not required to prove that their policy is the least restrictive method of furthering relevant penological interests, although "the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable." Turner,482 U.S. at 90-91. But prison officials must at least produce some evidence that their policies are based on legitimate penological justifications. See Wilson v. Schillinger,761 F.2d 921, 926-928 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d 895, 106 S. Ct. 1494 (1986). If it were otherwise, judicial review of prison policies would not be meaningful. Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1986). In every case cited by ADOC in which legitimate penological interests justified a prison policy, the prison had produced some evidence concerning those justifications. See, e.g., Turner,482 U.S. at 91 (upholding restriction on inmate-to-inmate correspondence on the basis of security concerns); Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897, 109 S. Ct. 239, 102 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1988) (upholding hair length restriction in part on the basis of identification concerns).