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Eighth Circuit Reverses Dismissal for Consideration Under McKune v. Lile

The U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a
Missouri prisoner's suit, holding that qualified immunity does not shield
officials from equitable relief and that the prisoner's suit raised issues
that must be considered in light of McKune v. Lile, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153
L.Ed.2d 47 (2002).

William Bradford is a prisoner in the Missouri Department of Corrections
(MODOC) and a participant in the Missouri Sex Offender Program (MOSOP).
MOSOP personnel demanded that Bradford disclose incriminating instances of
past sexual and criminal conduct. Bradford invoked his Fifth Amendment
right. MOSOP terminated him from the program, extended his conditional
release date, referred him for indefinite commitment as a sexually violent
predator, denied him contact with his children, and changed his custody level.

Bradford sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking damages and equitable relief,
including reinstatement in MOSOP and an order prohibiting disclosure of his
past sexual and criminal history (or, alternatively, immunity from use of
the information in legal proceedings), an injunction prohibiting referral
to the sexually violent predator program, and prohibiting interference with
visits with his children. The district court dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B) prior to service of process. The district court held that
Bradford had not stated a Fifth Amendment violation and that defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity. Bradford appealed.

The appeals court held that "qualified immunity does not shield officials
from equitable relief," and was thus an inappropriate basis for dismissal.
Further, unlike McKune v. Lile, which involved non-punitive sanctions,
MOSOP's actions against Bradford may be deemed punitive. The appellate
court ordered the district court to consider that issue.

The district's court decision was reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings. This was not a ruling on the merits of the case. This
case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing
unpublished cases. See: Bradford v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 46
Fed.Appx. 857 (8th Cir. 2002).

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Related legal case

Bradford v. Missouri Department of Corrections

[U] Bradford v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 46 Fed.Appx. 857 (8th Cir. 09/17/2002)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT


[2] No. 02-1803


[3] 46 Fed.Appx. 857, 2002


[4] September 17, 2002


[5] WILLIAM BRADFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION SERVICES AND MISSOURI SEXUAL OFFENDER PROGRAM; DIVISION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE; LARRY SLATER; JAMES LABUNDY; JONATHAN ROSENBOOM; DORA SCHRIRO; CRANSTON MITCHELL; FANNIE GAW; BOB NEWSOME; JAMES MITCHELL; JANDRA GARTER, APPELLEES.


[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.


[7] Before Bowman, Murphy, and Riley, Circuit Judges.


[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam


[9] [UNPUBLISHED]


[10] Submitted: September 12, 2002


[11] Missouri inmate William Bradford appeals the district court's pre-service dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. He also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.


[12] Bradford claimed in his complaint that state entities and officials were violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He alleged that while he was a participant in the Missouri Sex Offender Program (MoSOP), MoSOP personnel demanded that he disclose potentially incriminating instances of past sexual and criminal conduct or suffer termination from MoSOP, extension of his conditional release date, referral for indefinite civil commitment as a sexually violent predator, and denial of parole eligibility, contact with his children, and reduction of his custody level; when he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, defendants began carrying out these threats. Bradford sought damages and equitable relief, including reinstatement in MoSOP, an order directing that he not be required to disclose his past sexual and criminal history (or alternatively, immunity from the use of such disclosures in legal proceedings), a lower custody level, and an injunction prohibiting defendants from referring him to the predator program or interfering with his ability to visit with his children.


[13] The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and denied Bradford's subsequent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion, on the basis that Bradford had not stated a Fifth Amendment violation, and, in any case, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court then denied Bradford's request to proceed IFP on appeal.


[14] We grant Bradford IFP status, leaving to the district court the details of calculating the initial partial appellate filing fee and the collection of the balance. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Upon de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we also remand the action to the district court. We note that qualified immunity does not shield officials from equitable relief. See Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1994). Further, we believe Bradford has raised potentially significant constitutional issues that should be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's recent plurality decision in McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2023, 2026-27 (2002) (where prisoner who refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to participate in sexual offender program faced transfer to maximum-security unit, as well as reduced access to privileges such as canteen expenditures, personal television, visitation, and work opportunities, consequences were not so severe as to amount to compelled self-incrimination; noting consequences were not punitive, and did not extend term of incarceration or affect eligibility for good-time credits or parole). Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.