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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is Precondition to Prisoner Suit in Federal Court Before Release
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is Precondition to Prisoner Suit in
Federal Court Before Release
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held a Wisconsin ex-prisoner, who
filed his suit while incarcerated, must exhaust all administrative
remedies even if the process could not result in the prisoner's desired
form of relief. The amended complaint alleged three counts: (1) failure to
protect the prisoner from a gang assault; (2) failure to protect from
assault and harassment by other prisoners; and (3) guards beat him for
filing grievances.
Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed upon defendant's motion for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Count 1 resulted in a trial, which was
resolved by a motion for judgment as a matter of law in defendant's favor
at the close of the prisoner's case-in-chief.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in all respects, noting that although the
plaintiff was no longer a prisoner, 42 U.S.C. §1997(e) applied to him
because the suit was filed while he was imprisoned. Note: It has been held
that administrative exhaustion is not required when a suit is filed after
release from prison. See: Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2002).
Federal Court Before Release
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held a Wisconsin ex-prisoner, who
filed his suit while incarcerated, must exhaust all administrative
remedies even if the process could not result in the prisoner's desired
form of relief. The amended complaint alleged three counts: (1) failure to
protect the prisoner from a gang assault; (2) failure to protect from
assault and harassment by other prisoners; and (3) guards beat him for
filing grievances.
Counts 2 and 3 were dismissed upon defendant's motion for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Count 1 resulted in a trial, which was
resolved by a motion for judgment as a matter of law in defendant's favor
at the close of the prisoner's case-in-chief.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in all respects, noting that although the
plaintiff was no longer a prisoner, 42 U.S.C. §1997(e) applied to him
because the suit was filed while he was imprisoned. Note: It has been held
that administrative exhaustion is not required when a suit is filed after
release from prison. See: Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Related legal case
Dixon v. Page
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2002). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 05/28/2002)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
[2] No. 01-1973
[3] 291 F.3d 485, 2002
[4] May 28, 2002
[5] As amended July 3, 2002.
[6] MARCUS DIXON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS PAGE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[7] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 97-323-GPM--G. Patrick Murphy, Chief Judge.
[8] Before Cudahy, Easterbrook and Evans, Circuit Judges.
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cudahy, Circuit Judge
[10] Argued December 6, 2001
[11] In this appeal, Marcus Dixon argues that the district court erred in dismissing without prejudice Counts II and III of his complaint because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.
[12] I.
[13] Because Dixon's complaint was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), all statements of fact in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of Dixon. Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). Dixon, a former Illinois prisoner, now released, was an inmate at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"). Upon arriving at Menard on December 13, 1995, he immediately asked to be placed in segregation because of a "hit" placed upon him by a gang called the Vice Lords. On January 8, 1996, Dixon was beaten up by three members of the Vice Lords after the prison ended a lockdown that had prevented prisoners from moving about outside their cells. The failure of prison officials to prevent this beating formed the basis of Count I of Dixon's complaint.
[14] In Count II of his complaint, Dixon asserts that prison officials failed to protect him from assault and harassment by several inmates. He alleged that after the January 8, 1995 incident, he asked for protection again and was moved to the protective custody unit on Gallery 7. However, Dixon found that he was also in danger in Gallery 7 because there were Vice Lords there, who frequently threatened him. Despite repeatedly asking for assistance from prison officials, he received none. On February 22, 1996, Dixon was stabbed by Tyrone Jackson, a Vice Lord who had been placed in the cell with him. Dixon wrote several more letters asking for help but continued to receive no assistance. On May 28, 1996, Dixon was attacked and struck by another inmate, and he continued to be harassed by various inmates. He filed written grievances after each incident. In July, in response to his grievances, the Administrative Review Board told Dixon to contact his counselor. Dixon made repeated attempts to obtain a transfer to another prison through his counselor and through the other defendants but was told that he was ineligible at that time.
[15] In Count III of his complaint, Dixon alleged that he had been beaten by prison officials in retaliation for his filing of an administrative complaint against these same officials. He filed several more grievances and was subsequently granted a transfer to another prison. However, he was never transferred.
[16] On April 16, 1997, Dixon filed an initial two-count complaint in federal court under sec. 1983. He filed an amended complaint on February 23, 1998, adding Count III, and the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Proud. The defendants moved for dismissal on the ground that Dixon had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Dixon then filed a second amended complaint adding that he had filed written grievances on specified dates. Magistrate Judge Proud issued an order and recommendation that the motion to dismiss be denied. This order and recommendation was approved and adopted by the district court in March 1999.
[17] In August 1999, the defendants asked the district court (and by implication, Magistrate Judge Proud) to reconsider the order in light of Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999), which held that administrative exhaustion was a precondition even for a suit seeking money damages. Upon reconsideration, Magistrate Judge Proud recommended that the defendants' motion to reconsider be granted.
[18] Specifically, Judge Proud recommended the dismissal of most of Count II and all of Count III for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court then adopted this new order and recommendation, and most of Count II and all of Count III were dismissed without prejudice. In October 2000, a trial was held on all of the remaining claims. At the close of Dixon's case-in- chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion from the bench and later issued a written order outlining its reasoning. Dixon now appeals from the dismissal of most of Count II and all of Count III of his second amended complaint.
[19] II.
[20] Dixon argues that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 636(c)(3). However, that provision applies only to appeals from a final judgment of a magistrate judge, not to appeals from a final judgment of a district court. Here, the dismissal was by a district court, and sec. 636(c)(3) does not apply. Instead, we have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of a district court under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291. Although the counts in question were dismissed without prejudice, and on that basis, narrowly viewed, the dismissals would not be appealable, it is clear that there is nothing that Dixon can do to amend his complaint "that would permit it to go forward." Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2001). The reason is that since Dixon is not currently a prisoner, the prison grievance system is not available to him, and he cannot exhaust his administrative remedies. He therefore cannot cure the defect in his complaint on which the district court based its dismissal of Counts II and III. Thus, under the circumstances, the dismissal of his claims is final for purposes of appellate review. See id. ("If it is clear, for example, that the plaintiff will not be able to amend her complaint, the dismissal [without prejudice] is final for purposes of appellate review."); see also Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002) (exercising appellate jurisdiction when "both parties agree that the time is long past for [the inmate-appellant] to pursue his normal administrative remedies [preventing him from] curing the defect in his complaint on which the District Court based its dismissal").*fn1 This court reviews a dismissal of a com-plaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2001).
[21] A.
[22] The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), provides in pertinent part that
[23] [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a) (1996).
[24] Exhaustion of administrative remedies, as required by sec. 1997e, is a condition precedent to suit. See Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). sec. 1997e applies to "all inmate suits, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002).
[25] Dixon first argues that he does not have to exhaust his administrative remedies because it would be futile for him to do so when he is seeking money damages, and he cannot be awarded money damages in the administrative system. However, this precise argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001), which was issued the day before Dixon filed his appeal. Booth held that administrative exhaustion was required even if the process could not result in a prisoner's desired form of relief.
[26] B.
[27] Dixon also argues that sec. 1997e does not apply to him because he is no longer a prisoner within the meaning of sec. 1997e. sec. 1997e applies only to prisoners, and a plaintiff's status as a "prisoner" is to be determined as of the time he brought the lawsuit. Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, when Dixon filed his complaint, he was a prisoner, who had access to Menard's administrative grievance system. That he is no longer a prisoner at the time of this appeal does not excuse him from the exhaustion requirement since exhaustion is a precondition to the filing of a complaint in federal court. See Perez, 185 F.3d at 535. Therefore, sec. 1997e still applies to this lawsuit.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
[2] No. 01-1973
[3] 291 F.3d 485, 2002
[4] May 28, 2002
[5] As amended July 3, 2002.
[6] MARCUS DIXON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS PAGE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[7] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 97-323-GPM--G. Patrick Murphy, Chief Judge.
[8] Before Cudahy, Easterbrook and Evans, Circuit Judges.
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cudahy, Circuit Judge
[10] Argued December 6, 2001
[11] In this appeal, Marcus Dixon argues that the district court erred in dismissing without prejudice Counts II and III of his complaint because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.
[12] I.
[13] Because Dixon's complaint was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), all statements of fact in the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of Dixon. Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). Dixon, a former Illinois prisoner, now released, was an inmate at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"). Upon arriving at Menard on December 13, 1995, he immediately asked to be placed in segregation because of a "hit" placed upon him by a gang called the Vice Lords. On January 8, 1996, Dixon was beaten up by three members of the Vice Lords after the prison ended a lockdown that had prevented prisoners from moving about outside their cells. The failure of prison officials to prevent this beating formed the basis of Count I of Dixon's complaint.
[14] In Count II of his complaint, Dixon asserts that prison officials failed to protect him from assault and harassment by several inmates. He alleged that after the January 8, 1995 incident, he asked for protection again and was moved to the protective custody unit on Gallery 7. However, Dixon found that he was also in danger in Gallery 7 because there were Vice Lords there, who frequently threatened him. Despite repeatedly asking for assistance from prison officials, he received none. On February 22, 1996, Dixon was stabbed by Tyrone Jackson, a Vice Lord who had been placed in the cell with him. Dixon wrote several more letters asking for help but continued to receive no assistance. On May 28, 1996, Dixon was attacked and struck by another inmate, and he continued to be harassed by various inmates. He filed written grievances after each incident. In July, in response to his grievances, the Administrative Review Board told Dixon to contact his counselor. Dixon made repeated attempts to obtain a transfer to another prison through his counselor and through the other defendants but was told that he was ineligible at that time.
[15] In Count III of his complaint, Dixon alleged that he had been beaten by prison officials in retaliation for his filing of an administrative complaint against these same officials. He filed several more grievances and was subsequently granted a transfer to another prison. However, he was never transferred.
[16] On April 16, 1997, Dixon filed an initial two-count complaint in federal court under sec. 1983. He filed an amended complaint on February 23, 1998, adding Count III, and the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Proud. The defendants moved for dismissal on the ground that Dixon had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Dixon then filed a second amended complaint adding that he had filed written grievances on specified dates. Magistrate Judge Proud issued an order and recommendation that the motion to dismiss be denied. This order and recommendation was approved and adopted by the district court in March 1999.
[17] In August 1999, the defendants asked the district court (and by implication, Magistrate Judge Proud) to reconsider the order in light of Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999), which held that administrative exhaustion was a precondition even for a suit seeking money damages. Upon reconsideration, Magistrate Judge Proud recommended that the defendants' motion to reconsider be granted.
[18] Specifically, Judge Proud recommended the dismissal of most of Count II and all of Count III for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court then adopted this new order and recommendation, and most of Count II and all of Count III were dismissed without prejudice. In October 2000, a trial was held on all of the remaining claims. At the close of Dixon's case-in- chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion from the bench and later issued a written order outlining its reasoning. Dixon now appeals from the dismissal of most of Count II and all of Count III of his second amended complaint.
[19] II.
[20] Dixon argues that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 636(c)(3). However, that provision applies only to appeals from a final judgment of a magistrate judge, not to appeals from a final judgment of a district court. Here, the dismissal was by a district court, and sec. 636(c)(3) does not apply. Instead, we have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of a district court under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291. Although the counts in question were dismissed without prejudice, and on that basis, narrowly viewed, the dismissals would not be appealable, it is clear that there is nothing that Dixon can do to amend his complaint "that would permit it to go forward." Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2001). The reason is that since Dixon is not currently a prisoner, the prison grievance system is not available to him, and he cannot exhaust his administrative remedies. He therefore cannot cure the defect in his complaint on which the district court based its dismissal of Counts II and III. Thus, under the circumstances, the dismissal of his claims is final for purposes of appellate review. See id. ("If it is clear, for example, that the plaintiff will not be able to amend her complaint, the dismissal [without prejudice] is final for purposes of appellate review."); see also Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2002) (exercising appellate jurisdiction when "both parties agree that the time is long past for [the inmate-appellant] to pursue his normal administrative remedies [preventing him from] curing the defect in his complaint on which the District Court based its dismissal").*fn1 This court reviews a dismissal of a com-plaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2001).
[21] A.
[22] The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), provides in pertinent part that
[23] [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a) (1996).
[24] Exhaustion of administrative remedies, as required by sec. 1997e, is a condition precedent to suit. See Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). sec. 1997e applies to "all inmate suits, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002).
[25] Dixon first argues that he does not have to exhaust his administrative remedies because it would be futile for him to do so when he is seeking money damages, and he cannot be awarded money damages in the administrative system. However, this precise argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001), which was issued the day before Dixon filed his appeal. Booth held that administrative exhaustion was required even if the process could not result in a prisoner's desired form of relief.
[26] B.
[27] Dixon also argues that sec. 1997e does not apply to him because he is no longer a prisoner within the meaning of sec. 1997e. sec. 1997e applies only to prisoners, and a plaintiff's status as a "prisoner" is to be determined as of the time he brought the lawsuit. Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, when Dixon filed his complaint, he was a prisoner, who had access to Menard's administrative grievance system. That he is no longer a prisoner at the time of this appeal does not excuse him from the exhaustion requirement since exhaustion is a precondition to the filing of a complaint in federal court. See Perez, 185 F.3d at 535. Therefore, sec. 1997e still applies to this lawsuit.