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Failure to Notify Warrants New Parole Hearing for Washington Prisoner

On December 27, 2004, a Washington appeals court granted a prisoner's
personal restraint petition in which he alleged that the Sentencing Review
Board (SRB) failed to provide him with proper notification of his parole
revocation hearing.

Rudolph Renfro was convicted of murder in 1979 and paroled in 1996. His
parole was revoked in 1997, and he was paroled again in 2001. In November
2002 and February 2003 Renfro had additional revocation hearings but his
parole was not revoked. His parole was eventually revoked again in a
September 2003 hearing.

On February 19, 2004, Renfro filed a pro se personal restraint petition
claiming the SRB did not follow the procedural rules outlined in WAC
380-70-120 and 380-70-130. He specifically contended the SRB failed to
notify him of the factual allegations against him or of the time and place
of the hearing.

In its response, the State provided documents relating to Renfro's earlier
parole hearings but not the hearing held in September 2003. On the Court's
order the State supplemented the record with additional exhibits, but these
also failed to counter Renfro's allegations. "The State has failed to
provide any proof that Renfro was in fact given the proper notice, even
when given the opportunity to submit supplemental exhibits," the Court
concluded.

Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the SRB with instructions to
provide Renfro with a new hearing. See: In re PRP of Renfro, 124 Wash.App.
1051 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2004) (Not Reported in P.3d).

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Related legal case

In re PRP of Renfro

[U] State v. Harris, 124 Wash.App. 1051 (Wash.App.Div.1 12/27/2004)

[1] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE


[2] No. 53816-1-I


[3] 124 Wash.App. 1051, 2004.WA


[4] December 27, 2004


[5] STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT,
v.
TAUSHA LENEE HARRIS, AKA TAUSHA LENEE MCMILLON, APPELLANT.


[6] SOURCE OF APPEAL Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 03-1-00933-1 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 01/26/2004 Judge signing: Hon. Gain Brian D


[7] Counsel OF Record


[8] Counsel for Appellant(s) Washington Appellate Project Attorney at Law Cobb Building 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802 Seattle, WA 98101


[9] David L. Donnan Washington Appellate Project 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701 Seattle, WA 98101-3635


[10] T Harris - Informational Only (Appearing Pro Se) 4307 S. Cedar Tacoma, WA 98409


[11] Thomas Michael Kummerow Washington Appellate Project 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701 Seattle, WA 98101-3635


[12] Counsel for Respondent(s) Dana Cashman King County Prosecutor's Office 516 3rd Ave Ste W554 Seattle, WA 98104-2390


[13] Prosecuting Atty King County King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor W554 King County Courthouse 516 Third Avenue Seattle, WA 98104


[14] William W. Baker, C. Kenneth Grosse, H Joseph Coleman


[15] Per curiam.


[16] UNPUBLISHED OPINION


[17] Tausha Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she knowingly attempted to cash a forged check, relying on her explanation that on July 15 a friend-of-a-friend asked whether she would cash his payroll check if he arranged to have his employer issue the check payable to her. But the 'payroll' check payable to Harris was dated July 12 and lacked any typical payroll information. And when the bank delayed cashing the check, Harris walked away leaving the check at the bank. Under the applicable viewed-in-a-light-most-favorable-to-the-state standard,*fn1 there is sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris knew the check was a forgery.*fn2


[18] In her opening brief, Harris challenged the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial, but the trial court belatedly entered findings prepared by the trial deputy prosecutor who drafted the findings without reviewing the opening appellate brief. The findings mirror the oral ruling by the trial court, Harris has not assigned error to those findings in an amended or reply brief, and there is no showing that the findings were tailored to address issues raised in her opening brief. The delayed entry of the findings does not entitle Harris to any relief on appeal.*fn3


[19] Harris also contends RCW 43.43.754 and the portion of her sentence requiring her to provide a biological sample for DNA identification violates both her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and the article I, section 7 restriction on searches without well founded suspicion. These arguments were rejected in, and are controlled by, our decision in State v. Surge.*fn4 The Ninth Circuit has also recently rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a requirement to provide a biological sample for DNA identification.*fn5


[20] We affirm.


[21] COLEMAN, J.


[22] GROSSE, J.


[23] BAKER, J.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[24] *fn1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).


[25] *fn2 RCW 9A.60.020(1)(b); State v. Scoby, 117 Wn.2d 55, 61-62, 810 P.2d 1358 (1991). (Bare possession of a forged instrument alone is insufficient to justify a theft or forgery conviction. However, possession together with corroborating evidence of knowledge may be sufficient to justify a theft or forgery conviction.)


[26] *fn3 State v. Portomene, 79 Wn. App. 863, 905 P.2d 1234 (1995) (delayed entry of findings under CrR 6.1).


[27] *fn4 122 Wn. App. 448, 94 P.3d 345 (2004) (holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is controlling on the Fourth Amendment issue).


[28] *fn5 U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).