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FL Ad-Seg Rules May Create Liberty Interest
The court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that regulations at the
Florida State Prison in Starke may create a due process liberty interest.
The regulations at issue provided for the placement of a prisoner on Close
Management (CM) confinement. The prisoner plaintiff who brought this suit
was placed on CM, or administrative segregation, without a hearing or
being informed of the reasons for his placement.
The appellate court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit
with instructions that that lower court determine if a state created
liberty interest had, in fact, been created. See: Mitchell v. Hicks, 614
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980).
Florida State Prison in Starke may create a due process liberty interest.
The regulations at issue provided for the placement of a prisoner on Close
Management (CM) confinement. The prisoner plaintiff who brought this suit
was placed on CM, or administrative segregation, without a hearing or
being informed of the reasons for his placement.
The appellate court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit
with instructions that that lower court determine if a state created
liberty interest had, in fact, been created. See: Mitchell v. Hicks, 614
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Related legal case
Mitchell v. Hicks
| Year | 1980 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 614 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Mitchell v. Hicks, 614 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 04/02/1980)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 78-3840
[3] 614 F.2d 1016
[4] April 2, 1980
[5] HENRY J. MITCHELL, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
MILTON R. HICKS ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
[7] Peter D. Webster, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
[8] Martin S. Friedman, Shirley A. Walker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
[9] Before Tuttle, Brown and Tate, Circuit Judges.
[10] Author: Tuttle
[11] This case is an appeal from an order of the district court for the Middle District of Florida dismissing the plaintiff's pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We reverse and remand.
[12] Henry J. Mitchell, Jr. is an inmate at the Florida State Prison. From 1973 until the present time, Mitchell has been confined in various units in prison, including the general population, maximum security, and close management units. The maximum security and close management units are used as housing for inmates placed in segregated confinement under the prison classification system.
[13] Section 945.09(4) of the Florida Statutes authorizes the Florida Department of Corrections to establish a classification scheme for prisoners:
[14] Pursuant to such regulations as it may provide, the department is authorized to transfer prisoners from one institution to another institution in the correctional system and to classify and reclassify prisoners as circumstances may require.
[15] Fla.Stat.Ann. § 945.09(4). Pursuant to this authorization, the Florida Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20, which sets out rules governing the placement of inmates in "administrative confinement." Administrative confinement is defined as "confinement, other than disciplinary confinement, which results in a loss of some privileges which the inmate would have if assigned to general population." Id. Section XII of the directive lists eight reasons for placing inmates in administrative confinement and sets out procedures to be followed prior to placing an inmate in administrative confinement. An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement: (A) awaiting disciplinary action; (B) for investigation; (C) for protection; (D) at his own request; (E) pending trial; (F) in death row cases; (G) if he is a custody risk; or (H) if he has been in disciplinary confinement and appears to the classification team to be potentially disruptive. Section XII then states that, at Florida State Prison, inmates falling under (G) or (H) will be housed under close management status. The procedural rule of directive 4.07.20 requires that, prior to placing an inmate in administrative confinement, a report must be filed, the inmate must be informed of the reason for his reclassification, and any statement that the inmate wishes to make must be included in the report. The report must then be reviewed by the classification team and approved by the Superintendent. This procedure is not required prior to the transfer if the inmate poses an immediate threat of violence or disruption, but must be completed at the earliest practical time.
[16] After this directive was issued, the Florida State Prison Superintendent published Florida State Prison Policy Memorandum Number 33, entitled "Close Management Procedures." Section 33.4 of the memorandum defines close management as follows:
[17] Close Management is a sub-category of Administrative Confinement and is designed for housing: A. Custody risks who cannot be held in the regular inmate population. B. Inmates who after disciplinary confinement appear to the Classification Team to be potentially assaultive or disruptive and who still cannot reasonably and safely be returned to the regular inmate population.
[18] Section 33.6 of the memorandum, "Assignment To Close Management," states that, before an inmate can be placed on close management status, the case must be reviewed by the classification team. The classification team is to recommend close management status "(i)f it is felt that the inmate's circumstances are consistent with any of the criteria specified in Section 33.4." Id. § 33.6.
[19] On September 20, 1978, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against David H. Brierton, superintendent of Florida State Prison, Milton R. Hicks, assistant superintendent in charge of operations at Florida State Prison, and Louis L. Wainwright, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. Mitchell's pro se complaint included the following allegations:
[20] (1) Mitchell was placed in P-Wing, the close management housing area of Florida State Prison, without being informed of the reason for the transfer and without being afforded a hearing to challenge the transfer.
[21] (2) Close management is a subcategory of Administrative Confinement, created by Florida Department of Corrections' Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20. The only rationale for using close management status is found in this directive.
[22] (3) By placing the plaintiff in close management without notice and a fair hearing, the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
[23] Seven days after Mitchell's complaint was filed, and without requiring a response from the defendants, the district court entered an order dismissing the case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court cited Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that the requirements of procedural due process do not apply to transfers of prisoners unless state law creates a justifiable expectation that a prisoner will not be transferred except upon occurrence of certain specified events. Relying on Franklin v. Fortner,541 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1976), the court below held that section 945.05 of the Florida Statutes allows prison officials to transfer prisoners "as circumstances may require," and does not condition transfer upon a finding of misconduct or the occurrence of specified events. Thus, Florida prison inmates have no Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in a particular placement within the prison system. The court stated that "the plaintiff has entirely failed to allege that a recognized "liberty' interest was taken from him without due process of law."
[24] Mitchell appeals, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim, and urging this Court to hold that the Florida prison directives and regulations discussed above create an expectation that prisoners will not be placed in close management except for the reasons listed. We hold that Mitchell's complaint adequately stated a claim, and remand to the district court for a determination of the second question.
[25] Any claim that a prisoner has a federally created liberty interest in remaining in a particular prison or a particular unit within a prison is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976). In Meachum, the Court rejected a prisoner's argument that he was entitled to federal procedural due process in connection with his transfer from one prison in Massachusetts to another prison in the state.
[26] (W)e cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. . . . Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.
[27] Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 78-3840
[3] 614 F.2d 1016
[4] April 2, 1980
[5] HENRY J. MITCHELL, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
MILTON R. HICKS ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
[7] Peter D. Webster, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
[8] Martin S. Friedman, Shirley A. Walker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
[9] Before Tuttle, Brown and Tate, Circuit Judges.
[10] Author: Tuttle
[11] This case is an appeal from an order of the district court for the Middle District of Florida dismissing the plaintiff's pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We reverse and remand.
[12] Henry J. Mitchell, Jr. is an inmate at the Florida State Prison. From 1973 until the present time, Mitchell has been confined in various units in prison, including the general population, maximum security, and close management units. The maximum security and close management units are used as housing for inmates placed in segregated confinement under the prison classification system.
[13] Section 945.09(4) of the Florida Statutes authorizes the Florida Department of Corrections to establish a classification scheme for prisoners:
[14] Pursuant to such regulations as it may provide, the department is authorized to transfer prisoners from one institution to another institution in the correctional system and to classify and reclassify prisoners as circumstances may require.
[15] Fla.Stat.Ann. § 945.09(4). Pursuant to this authorization, the Florida Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20, which sets out rules governing the placement of inmates in "administrative confinement." Administrative confinement is defined as "confinement, other than disciplinary confinement, which results in a loss of some privileges which the inmate would have if assigned to general population." Id. Section XII of the directive lists eight reasons for placing inmates in administrative confinement and sets out procedures to be followed prior to placing an inmate in administrative confinement. An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement: (A) awaiting disciplinary action; (B) for investigation; (C) for protection; (D) at his own request; (E) pending trial; (F) in death row cases; (G) if he is a custody risk; or (H) if he has been in disciplinary confinement and appears to the classification team to be potentially disruptive. Section XII then states that, at Florida State Prison, inmates falling under (G) or (H) will be housed under close management status. The procedural rule of directive 4.07.20 requires that, prior to placing an inmate in administrative confinement, a report must be filed, the inmate must be informed of the reason for his reclassification, and any statement that the inmate wishes to make must be included in the report. The report must then be reviewed by the classification team and approved by the Superintendent. This procedure is not required prior to the transfer if the inmate poses an immediate threat of violence or disruption, but must be completed at the earliest practical time.
[16] After this directive was issued, the Florida State Prison Superintendent published Florida State Prison Policy Memorandum Number 33, entitled "Close Management Procedures." Section 33.4 of the memorandum defines close management as follows:
[17] Close Management is a sub-category of Administrative Confinement and is designed for housing: A. Custody risks who cannot be held in the regular inmate population. B. Inmates who after disciplinary confinement appear to the Classification Team to be potentially assaultive or disruptive and who still cannot reasonably and safely be returned to the regular inmate population.
[18] Section 33.6 of the memorandum, "Assignment To Close Management," states that, before an inmate can be placed on close management status, the case must be reviewed by the classification team. The classification team is to recommend close management status "(i)f it is felt that the inmate's circumstances are consistent with any of the criteria specified in Section 33.4." Id. § 33.6.
[19] On September 20, 1978, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against David H. Brierton, superintendent of Florida State Prison, Milton R. Hicks, assistant superintendent in charge of operations at Florida State Prison, and Louis L. Wainwright, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. Mitchell's pro se complaint included the following allegations:
[20] (1) Mitchell was placed in P-Wing, the close management housing area of Florida State Prison, without being informed of the reason for the transfer and without being afforded a hearing to challenge the transfer.
[21] (2) Close management is a subcategory of Administrative Confinement, created by Florida Department of Corrections' Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20. The only rationale for using close management status is found in this directive.
[22] (3) By placing the plaintiff in close management without notice and a fair hearing, the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
[23] Seven days after Mitchell's complaint was filed, and without requiring a response from the defendants, the district court entered an order dismissing the case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court cited Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that the requirements of procedural due process do not apply to transfers of prisoners unless state law creates a justifiable expectation that a prisoner will not be transferred except upon occurrence of certain specified events. Relying on Franklin v. Fortner,541 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1976), the court below held that section 945.05 of the Florida Statutes allows prison officials to transfer prisoners "as circumstances may require," and does not condition transfer upon a finding of misconduct or the occurrence of specified events. Thus, Florida prison inmates have no Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in a particular placement within the prison system. The court stated that "the plaintiff has entirely failed to allege that a recognized "liberty' interest was taken from him without due process of law."
[24] Mitchell appeals, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim, and urging this Court to hold that the Florida prison directives and regulations discussed above create an expectation that prisoners will not be placed in close management except for the reasons listed. We hold that Mitchell's complaint adequately stated a claim, and remand to the district court for a determination of the second question.
[25] Any claim that a prisoner has a federally created liberty interest in remaining in a particular prison or a particular unit within a prison is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976). In Meachum, the Court rejected a prisoner's argument that he was entitled to federal procedural due process in connection with his transfer from one prison in Massachusetts to another prison in the state.
[26] (W)e cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. . . . Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.
[27] Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.