260 Ga.App. 187, 581 S.E.2d 272, 3 FCDR 836

Court of Appeals of Georgia.
HARVEY et al.

v.

NICHOLS et al.

No. A03A0568.

Feb. 27, 2003.

Reconsideration Denied March 12, 2003.
Certiorari Denied July 14, 2003.

Parents of deceased jail inmate, individually, as next friends, and as representative of inmate's estate, filed wrongful death action against county sheriff, manager of county jail, and county detention officers, seeking to recover damages following inmate's suicide in jail cell. The Superior Court, Newton County, Mulherin, Senior Judge, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Parents appealed. The Court of Appeals, Blackburn, P.J., held that: (1) sheriff's duties of operating jail and supervising employees were discretionary acts, and thus sheriff was entitled to official immunity; (2) jail manager's decision regarding inmate's cell placement was a discretionary act, and thus jail manager was entitled to official immunity; (3) surveillance of inmate by detention officers was ministerial in nature; and (4) inmate's suicide was an unforeseen act that was not caused by failure of detention officers to conduct regular surveillance of cell.
Affirmed.

**274 *195 Lander & Osborne, Kenneth J. Lander, Decatur, Donald W. Osborne, for appellants.
Cook, Noell, Tolley, Bates & Michael, Edward D. Tolley, Athens, Robert C. Irwin, William T. Craig, Covington, for appellees.


*187 BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.
In this action for the wrongful death of a prison inmate, Patricia L. Harvey, individually, as next friend, and as representative of the estate of Thomas Alan Reagin, and Thomas Keith Reagin, individually and as next friend of Thomas Alan Reagin ("appellants") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellees Joe Nichols, Sheriff of Newton County, Leroy Blondeau, manager of the Newton County Jail, and Steven Ledford and George Gregory Gardner, Newton County detention officers, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in: (1) finding that the appellees acted in the performance of discretionary functions; (2) finding no evidence that the appellees acted with actual malice or an intent to cause injury to the deceased; (3) finding that there was no justiciable issue of causation; *188 and, (4) not finding a material issue of fact with regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence in the light of impeachment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The record shows that on the night of October 21, 1998, Lieutenant Marty Roberts of the Newton County Sheriff's Office informed Detective Ezell Brown that he had been contacted by agents of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation about the murder earlier in the day of a woman in Jasper County. The agents indicated that a suspect from Newton County had been among the last people to be seen with her and requested that Brown and Roberts assist them in going to the suspect's residence.
Brown, Roberts, and the GBI agents went to the location in question and found Thomas Alan Reagin, appellants' decedent, and his grandfather inside a camper on the property. The officers asked Reagin and his grandfather to come to the sheriff's office for questioning, and the two readily agreed to do so.
Reagin and his grandfather arrived at the sheriff's office shortly after midnight. Brown testified that Reagin, who was 17 years of age, appeared fine; that he was easygoing and cooperative; and that he "showed no real concern at the moment."
Reagin's grandfather was taken to an interview room by the GBI and county officers. He was given his Miranda rights, waived his right to an attorney, and denied any participation in the murder.
The officers took Reagin to the interview room. After being given his Miranda rights and waiving his right to an attorney, Reagin, without emotion or remorse, admitted to murdering the woman at his grandfather's direction.
During Reagin's booking at approximately 6:00 a.m., Officer Kimbrell asked Reagin if he had a history of psychiatric problems, and Reagin told him that as a boy he had had some problems and been through anger management. Because of the past treatment, Kimbrell circled the phrase "psychiatric problems" on the intake form. By circling this phrase, Kimbrell called Reagin's history to the attention of the nurse at the jail.
**275 Kimbrell testified that at the time he was booked, Reagin did not appear to be a danger either to himself or others, and that he gave no indication of unusual behavior. However, because of Reagin's age and the seriousness of the crime with which he was charged, Kimbrell wrote on the intake form that Reagin should be placed in an observation cell "due to high risk." After filling out the form, Kimbrell took Reagin to the observation cell. Reagin spent most of the day either talking with investigators or in the observation cell.
Captain Blondeau, as manager of the jail, was responsible for reviewing Reagin's cell placement and changing the assignment if appropriate. In reviewing the placement, Blondeau and Sergeant *189 Phillip Jackson spoke with Reagin for 30 to 45 minutes. When Blondeau asked Reagin if he would be all right in the general population with the other inmates, Reagin said he might "hurt somebody."
Blondeau testified that Reagin showed no embarrassment at his guilt but was, instead, calm and outgoing, even joking with Blondeau about the homicide, behavior which Blondeau found not at all characteristic, based on his experience, of one contemplating suicide. Jackson also testified that when he and Blondeau talked with Reagin, Reagin did not appear suicidal or give him any reason to believe that he should be placed on a suicide watch.
After talking at length with Reagin, Blondeau spoke with Detective Brown about his impressions of Reagin; he also reviewed the nurse's notes in Reagin's file. Based on these interviews and notes, Blondeau decided not to place Reagin in the general population but to move him from the observation cell, which did not have facilities and which was already housing a known suicide risk, to Holding Cell 3 (HC-3). Blondeau testified that he decided to move Reagin to HC 3 because of Reagin's age, the nature of his offense, Reagin's statement that he might hurt somebody, and Blondeau's own concern that it would be Reagin, not another inmate, who might be hurt.
Detention Officers Ledford and Gardner came on duty at 3:30 p. m. Reagin was moved to HC-3 by Gardner about 4:00 p.m. Shortly thereafter, both Blondeau and Jackson left for the day without any further contact with Reagin.
Gardner checked on Reagin around 4:45 p.m. At that time, Reagin said he was ready to go into the general population, but Gardner told Reagin that he was busy and would have to get back to him. Both Ledford and Gardner testified that they took Reagin his dinner, but the evidence was conflicting as to whether this was done at approximately 5:30 p.m. or 7:30 p.m. Ledford also testified that he checked on Reagin between 8:00 and 8:15 p.m., but no entry was made in the log book.
Brown and Roberts decided that they should request a DNA sample from Reagin, and Ledford was sent to bring Reagin from his cell. When Ledford opened Reagin's cell at 9:13 p. m., he found Reagin hanging by a bedsheet from a heating grate. Reagin had turned purple, he was stiff and cold to the touch, and blood had already pooled in his feet.
Appellants filed suit against the appellees, as well as two other police officers and the Newton County Board of Commissioners (collectively the "defendants"), in federal district court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, alleging that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the medical needs and personal safety of their son, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, when they failed to prevent his suicide. Appellants also asserted various state law *190 claims. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the appellants' federal claims, finding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity and that the appellants failed to show that the failure of the jail employees to identify a potentially suicidal detainee and their subsequent failure to take the necessary precautions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the appellants' state law claims.
Appellants filed an action on the state law claims in the superior court. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, and the superior court granted the motion, finding **276 that: sovereign immunity barred the appellants' claims against each of the appellees in his official capacity; official immunity barred prosecution against each of the appellees in his individual capacity because each was performing a discretionary function and had not acted with the requisite actual malice or intent to cause injury to the deceased; and, there was no justiciable issue of causation.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11- 56(c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. [FN1]
FN1. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997).


1. In two enumerations of error, the appellants argue that the trial court erred: in finding that the appellees were performing discretionary functions, and were thus protected by official immunity unless they acted with actual malice or intent to cause injury; and in also finding no evidence that the appellees acted with actual malice or an intent to cause injury to the deceased.
The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity. Qualified immunity protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts *191 negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Cameron v. Lang. [FN2]
FN2. Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 123(1), 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001).