×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Habeas Corpus Appropriately Challenges 'Fact Or Duration' Of Confinement
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
held that habeas corpus was not the proper forum for challenging the
frequency of segregation review hearings or the limitation of telephone
privileges.
John Sinde, a federal prisoner at the Low Security Correctional Institution
at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, was charged with violating prison rules by
using a hidden cell phone. An FBI investigation (completed eight months
later) revealed that one of the numbers dialed from the phone was on
Sinde's (and only Sinde's) approved telephone list. Two other prisoners,
also charged with using the phone, admitted that all three of them had used
it. Sinde was ultimately found guilty and was "sanctioned twenty-seven days
good conduct time; twenty-one days of disciplinary segregation, (which was
suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct); and one year loss of
telephone privileges."
In response, Sinde petitioned "for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241" challenging "the process provided to him at a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer, ('DHO') hearing ... [and the] sufficiency of the evidence
relied upon." Sinde further complained that "he did not receive a hearing
every thirty days while he was in segregation, and that, after his release
from segregation, and before the DHO hearing, his phone calls were unjustly
limited to one call per week."
The district court dismissed in part, and denied in part, Sinde's habeas
petition, holding: 1) Habeas corpus is the "proper mechanism for a prisoner
to challenge the 'fact or duration' of his confinement." Since Sinde's
challenge to the frequency of segregation review hearings and limitation of
telephone privileges did not "'challenge the very fact or duration of the
confinement itself,"' a habeas petition was not the appropriate avenue;
rather, "these claims relate to the 'conditions of his prison life' and may
be raised by way of a civil rights action." 2) Sinde was afforded
appropriate due process even though the hearing was delayed eight months
while the FBI conducted their investigation. While "The Code of Federal
Regulations provides that staff will 'ordinarily' provide the inmate with a
copy of the incident report within twenty-four hours of writing it," it is
not mandatory. 3) "Some evidence" supported the disciplinary hearing
officer's findings.
See: Sinde v. Gerlinski 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (MD PA 2003).
held that habeas corpus was not the proper forum for challenging the
frequency of segregation review hearings or the limitation of telephone
privileges.
John Sinde, a federal prisoner at the Low Security Correctional Institution
at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, was charged with violating prison rules by
using a hidden cell phone. An FBI investigation (completed eight months
later) revealed that one of the numbers dialed from the phone was on
Sinde's (and only Sinde's) approved telephone list. Two other prisoners,
also charged with using the phone, admitted that all three of them had used
it. Sinde was ultimately found guilty and was "sanctioned twenty-seven days
good conduct time; twenty-one days of disciplinary segregation, (which was
suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct); and one year loss of
telephone privileges."
In response, Sinde petitioned "for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241" challenging "the process provided to him at a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer, ('DHO') hearing ... [and the] sufficiency of the evidence
relied upon." Sinde further complained that "he did not receive a hearing
every thirty days while he was in segregation, and that, after his release
from segregation, and before the DHO hearing, his phone calls were unjustly
limited to one call per week."
The district court dismissed in part, and denied in part, Sinde's habeas
petition, holding: 1) Habeas corpus is the "proper mechanism for a prisoner
to challenge the 'fact or duration' of his confinement." Since Sinde's
challenge to the frequency of segregation review hearings and limitation of
telephone privileges did not "'challenge the very fact or duration of the
confinement itself,"' a habeas petition was not the appropriate avenue;
rather, "these claims relate to the 'conditions of his prison life' and may
be raised by way of a civil rights action." 2) Sinde was afforded
appropriate due process even though the hearing was delayed eight months
while the FBI conducted their investigation. While "The Code of Federal
Regulations provides that staff will 'ordinarily' provide the inmate with a
copy of the incident report within twenty-four hours of writing it," it is
not mandatory. 3) "Some evidence" supported the disciplinary hearing
officer's findings.
See: Sinde v. Gerlinski 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (MD PA 2003).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Sinde v. Gerlinski
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 252 F.Supp.2d 144 (MD PA 2003). |
| Level | District Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
SINDE v. GERLINSKI, No. Civil Action No. 3:02-1043 (M.D.Pa. 03/26/2003)
[1] United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
[2] Civil Action No. 3:02-1043
[4] March 26, 2003
[5] JOHN SINDE, PETITIONER
v.
SUSAN GERLINSKI, WARDEN, LSCI-ALLENWOOD, RESPONDENT.
[6] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Malachy E. Mannion, United States Magistrate Judge.
[7] MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
[8] I. BACKGROUND
[9] On June 17, 2002, the petitioner, an inmate at the Low Security Correctional Institution at Allenwood, ("Allenwood"), White Deer, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenges the process provided to him at a Disciplinary Hearing Officer, ("DHO"), hearing, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the DHO to find him guilty. The petitioner further complains that he did not receive a hearing every thirty days while he was in segregation, and that, after his release from segregation and before the DHO hearing, his phone calls were unjustly limited to one call per week. The petitioner is seeking expungement of the institutional incident report and restoration of privileges and good conduct time credits lost as a result of the action taken against him by the DHO. (Doc. No. 1).
[10] On July 17, 2002, a show cause order was issued. (Doc. No. 7). A response to the show cause order, along with supporting exhibits, were filed by the respondent on August 5, 2002. (Doc. Nos. 9 & 10).
[11] By way of background, the documents submitted by the parties indicate that on February 13, 2001, the petitioner was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, ("FBI"), which was conducting an investigation into telephone calls made from a black Nokia pre-paid cellular telephone found hidden inside a tractor, during a search of an equipment barn at Allenwood. During the investigation, the telephone numbers dialed from the Nokia cellphone were cross-referenced with the list of inmate approved telephone numbers kept at Allenwood.
[12] In performing this cross-reference, it was determined that one of the telephone numbers called from the Nokia cellphone was on the petitioner's "approved list." Further investigation revealed that the telephone number was only on petitioner's approved list. In other words, no other inmate had this telephone number on his approved list. In addition, the investigation revealed that two other inmates were interviewed concerning use of the cellphone. Both of those inmates admitted to authorities that all three men (including petitioner) had used the cellphone. (Doc. No. 10, p. 11).
[13] On the same day, February 13, 2001, an incident report was written accusing the petitioner of "Use of Telephone for Abuses Other Than Criminal Activity," in violation of Bureau of Prisons, ("BOP"), Code 297, and for "Conduct Which Disrupts or Interferes With the Security of the Facility," in violation of BOP Code 399. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5). BOP staff did not serve the incident report upon the petitioner at that time as it deferred the administrative investigation of the incident pending a criminal investigation by the FBI. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). On November 8, 2001, the FBI, having concluded the investigation (and apparently declined criminal prosecution), referred the matter back to the institution for administrative action. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). The following day, November 9, 2001, a copy of the incident report was served upon the petitioner. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5).
[14] The Unit Discipline Committee's, ("UDC"), hearing on the matter was delayed because the UDC requested additional documents from the investigating lieutenant. After acquiring the additional documents, on November 29, 2001, the investigating lieutenant returned the matter to the UDC. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). On December 4, 2001, the petitioner received a memo from the respondent, Warden Gerlinski, which advised the plaintiff that the delay in holding his hearing was due to the incident being referred to the FBI for possible prosecution and the request for additional information. (Id.). In compliance with Program Statement 5270.07*fn1, the warden at FPC-Allenwood granted an extension of time for the UDC hearing. (Id.).
[15] A UDC hearing, on the charges, was held on December 5, 2001. The charges, however, were then referred to the DHO for disposition, because of their seriousness. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5). On the same day, the petitioner received notice of the DHO hearing. (Doc. No. 10, p. 7). On this form notice, the petitioner requested that Mr. Steimling, a General Foreman, represent him at his hearing before the DHO. In addition, he requested that a fellow inmate testify as a witness on his behalf. (Id.). This form notice was signed by the petitioner on December 5, 2001. (Id.). On the same day, the petitioner received, signed and dated an "Inmate Rights at Disciplinary Hearing" form which advised him of his rights at the DHO hearing. (Doc. No. 10, p. 8).
[16] On December 18, 2001, the DHO hearing was held. (Doc. No. 10, p. 9). The petitioner was present at the hearing, along with his staff representative, Mr. Steimling, and his inmate witness. Both Mr. Steimling and the inmate testified on the petitioner's behalf. (Doc. No. 10, pp. 9-10). After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, including the incident and investigation reports, photocopies of pictures of the tractor and cellphone, and the testimony of the petitioner and his witnesses, the DHO determined that the petitioner had violated Code 297, "Use of Telephone for Abuses Other Than Criminal Activity." (Doc. No. 10, pp. 10-11).
[17] The petitioner was sanctioned twenty-seven days good time conduct; twenty-one days of disciplinary segregation, (which was suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct); and, one year loss of telephone privileges. (Doc. No. 10, p. 11). On December 21, 2001, the petitioner received a copy of the written report of the DHO, the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary sanctions administered. (Doc. No. 10, p. 12).
[18] II. DISCUSSION
[19] "(A federal) court, . . . will raise . . . subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion." Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 1998). Hence, this court has an obligation to raise questions of jurisdiction even when not disputed by the parties. In the instant case, the petitioner filed a "Consent to Jurisdiction by United States Magistrate Judge" on June 8, 2002. The consent was docketed on June 24, 2002. The respondent also submitted a consent which was docketed on July 23, 2002. As a result of these consents, the district court entered an "order of reference" (Doc. No. 8) on July 31, 2002, referring the matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, to the undersigned.
[20] In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) states:
[21]
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
[22]
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States Magistrate (Judge) . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves . . .
[23] Habeas corpus proceedings are "civil proceeding(s, where) someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 433 (1995).
[24] Recently, two circuit courts have offered differing opinions concerning whether a magistrate judge has jurisdiction over a "habeas corpus" proceeding. More specifically, whether a delegation of judicial power under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to adjudicate habeas corpus proceedings is an unconstitutional delegation in violation of Article III. In Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2002), the court held that habeas corpus proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 do not implicate the constitutional division between Article III judges and non-Article III judges. The court came to this result, inter alia, because § 2254 petitions involve attack on state court judgments and not those of Article III federal judges.
[25] However, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Fifth Circuit held that magistrate judges do not have the authority, even with consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to adjudicate these petitions. United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). Because a § 2255 motion normally "questions the validity of a prior federal court ruling" a magistrate judge could improperly attack the validity of an Article III judge's rulings. Id. at 368. According to the court, "such an act clearly raises Article III concerns because judges without lifetime tenure and undiminishable compensation would have controlling authority." Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted). As such, that court held that "the consentual delegation of 2255 motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the constitution. Id. at 372.*fn2
[26] Our case is not a § 2255, nor a § 2254, but rather a § 2241 petition. It does not appear that our Circuit has ruled on whether an inmate may consent to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for purposes of adjudicating a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In reviewing the above case law, the court finds that a § 2241 petition, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, is more analogous to a § 2254 petition than it is to a § 2255 petition. A review of Mr. Sinde's petition indicates that he is not challenging a sentencing decision of a district court, but rather is challenging the DHO's ability to sanction him good time credits for violations of prison rules. Whether this court finds in favor of the petitioner and directs the warden to reinstate his good time credits, or whether the court finds in favor of the warden and affirms the decision of the DHO, neither decision implicates the validity, sentence or judgment of a prior district court ruling. As such, this court finds no constitutional infirmity in allowing a magistrate judge to render a final decision in a "habeas corpus" proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
[27] Other circuits have "implicitly held that magistrate judges could adjudicate petitions under § 2241 and 2254 via § 636(c)." Id. at 364. (Citing U.S. v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1992.) For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it does have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant § 2241 petition.
[28] Initially, the respondent argues the claims relating to the frequency of segregation review hearings or the number of telephone calls an inmate is permitted are not properly brought before the court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 9, pp. 7-10). The court agrees.
[29] A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-499 (1973). To the extent that the plaintiff challenges the frequency of his segregation review hearings or the number of telephone calls he is permitted to make, these claims do not "challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement itself." Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). As such, they are inappropriately raised by way of a habeas corpus petition. Instead, these claims relate to the "conditions of his prison life" and may be raised by way of a civil rights action. Id. at 541. Thus, the petitioner's claims relating to the frequency of segregation review hearings and the number of telephone calls he is permitted to make will be dismissed from this habeas corpus action.
[30] The respondent further argues that the petitioner's due process claims should be denied as he was afforded all required due process protections throughout the disciplinary process. (Doc. No. 9, pp. 10-13). With respect to the petitioner's claim of a denial of due process at his DHO hearing, the Supreme Court has stated that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the following procedures must be followed in an institution disciplinary hearing: (1) the inmate must receive no less than twenty-four hours advance written notice of the claimed violations; (2) the inmate must receive a written statement of the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; (3) the inmate must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) the inmate must be allowed to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or staff member; and (5) the disciplinary hearings must be impartial. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974). According to the Court, however, confrontation and cross-examination are not constitutional requirements in a disciplinary hearing. Id. at 567.
[1] United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
[2] Civil Action No. 3:02-1043
[4] March 26, 2003
[5] JOHN SINDE, PETITIONER
v.
SUSAN GERLINSKI, WARDEN, LSCI-ALLENWOOD, RESPONDENT.
[6] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Malachy E. Mannion, United States Magistrate Judge.
[7] MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
[8] I. BACKGROUND
[9] On June 17, 2002, the petitioner, an inmate at the Low Security Correctional Institution at Allenwood, ("Allenwood"), White Deer, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenges the process provided to him at a Disciplinary Hearing Officer, ("DHO"), hearing, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the DHO to find him guilty. The petitioner further complains that he did not receive a hearing every thirty days while he was in segregation, and that, after his release from segregation and before the DHO hearing, his phone calls were unjustly limited to one call per week. The petitioner is seeking expungement of the institutional incident report and restoration of privileges and good conduct time credits lost as a result of the action taken against him by the DHO. (Doc. No. 1).
[10] On July 17, 2002, a show cause order was issued. (Doc. No. 7). A response to the show cause order, along with supporting exhibits, were filed by the respondent on August 5, 2002. (Doc. Nos. 9 & 10).
[11] By way of background, the documents submitted by the parties indicate that on February 13, 2001, the petitioner was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, ("FBI"), which was conducting an investigation into telephone calls made from a black Nokia pre-paid cellular telephone found hidden inside a tractor, during a search of an equipment barn at Allenwood. During the investigation, the telephone numbers dialed from the Nokia cellphone were cross-referenced with the list of inmate approved telephone numbers kept at Allenwood.
[12] In performing this cross-reference, it was determined that one of the telephone numbers called from the Nokia cellphone was on the petitioner's "approved list." Further investigation revealed that the telephone number was only on petitioner's approved list. In other words, no other inmate had this telephone number on his approved list. In addition, the investigation revealed that two other inmates were interviewed concerning use of the cellphone. Both of those inmates admitted to authorities that all three men (including petitioner) had used the cellphone. (Doc. No. 10, p. 11).
[13] On the same day, February 13, 2001, an incident report was written accusing the petitioner of "Use of Telephone for Abuses Other Than Criminal Activity," in violation of Bureau of Prisons, ("BOP"), Code 297, and for "Conduct Which Disrupts or Interferes With the Security of the Facility," in violation of BOP Code 399. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5). BOP staff did not serve the incident report upon the petitioner at that time as it deferred the administrative investigation of the incident pending a criminal investigation by the FBI. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). On November 8, 2001, the FBI, having concluded the investigation (and apparently declined criminal prosecution), referred the matter back to the institution for administrative action. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). The following day, November 9, 2001, a copy of the incident report was served upon the petitioner. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5).
[14] The Unit Discipline Committee's, ("UDC"), hearing on the matter was delayed because the UDC requested additional documents from the investigating lieutenant. After acquiring the additional documents, on November 29, 2001, the investigating lieutenant returned the matter to the UDC. (Doc. No. 10, p. 6). On December 4, 2001, the petitioner received a memo from the respondent, Warden Gerlinski, which advised the plaintiff that the delay in holding his hearing was due to the incident being referred to the FBI for possible prosecution and the request for additional information. (Id.). In compliance with Program Statement 5270.07*fn1, the warden at FPC-Allenwood granted an extension of time for the UDC hearing. (Id.).
[15] A UDC hearing, on the charges, was held on December 5, 2001. The charges, however, were then referred to the DHO for disposition, because of their seriousness. (Doc. No. 10, p. 5). On the same day, the petitioner received notice of the DHO hearing. (Doc. No. 10, p. 7). On this form notice, the petitioner requested that Mr. Steimling, a General Foreman, represent him at his hearing before the DHO. In addition, he requested that a fellow inmate testify as a witness on his behalf. (Id.). This form notice was signed by the petitioner on December 5, 2001. (Id.). On the same day, the petitioner received, signed and dated an "Inmate Rights at Disciplinary Hearing" form which advised him of his rights at the DHO hearing. (Doc. No. 10, p. 8).
[16] On December 18, 2001, the DHO hearing was held. (Doc. No. 10, p. 9). The petitioner was present at the hearing, along with his staff representative, Mr. Steimling, and his inmate witness. Both Mr. Steimling and the inmate testified on the petitioner's behalf. (Doc. No. 10, pp. 9-10). After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, including the incident and investigation reports, photocopies of pictures of the tractor and cellphone, and the testimony of the petitioner and his witnesses, the DHO determined that the petitioner had violated Code 297, "Use of Telephone for Abuses Other Than Criminal Activity." (Doc. No. 10, pp. 10-11).
[17] The petitioner was sanctioned twenty-seven days good time conduct; twenty-one days of disciplinary segregation, (which was suspended pending 180 days of clear conduct); and, one year loss of telephone privileges. (Doc. No. 10, p. 11). On December 21, 2001, the petitioner received a copy of the written report of the DHO, the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary sanctions administered. (Doc. No. 10, p. 12).
[18] II. DISCUSSION
[19] "(A federal) court, . . . will raise . . . subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion." Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 1998). Hence, this court has an obligation to raise questions of jurisdiction even when not disputed by the parties. In the instant case, the petitioner filed a "Consent to Jurisdiction by United States Magistrate Judge" on June 8, 2002. The consent was docketed on June 24, 2002. The respondent also submitted a consent which was docketed on July 23, 2002. As a result of these consents, the district court entered an "order of reference" (Doc. No. 8) on July 31, 2002, referring the matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, to the undersigned.
[20] In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) states:
[21]
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
[22]
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States Magistrate (Judge) . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves . . .
[23] Habeas corpus proceedings are "civil proceeding(s, where) someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 433 (1995).
[24] Recently, two circuit courts have offered differing opinions concerning whether a magistrate judge has jurisdiction over a "habeas corpus" proceeding. More specifically, whether a delegation of judicial power under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to adjudicate habeas corpus proceedings is an unconstitutional delegation in violation of Article III. In Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2002), the court held that habeas corpus proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 do not implicate the constitutional division between Article III judges and non-Article III judges. The court came to this result, inter alia, because § 2254 petitions involve attack on state court judgments and not those of Article III federal judges.
[25] However, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Fifth Circuit held that magistrate judges do not have the authority, even with consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to adjudicate these petitions. United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). Because a § 2255 motion normally "questions the validity of a prior federal court ruling" a magistrate judge could improperly attack the validity of an Article III judge's rulings. Id. at 368. According to the court, "such an act clearly raises Article III concerns because judges without lifetime tenure and undiminishable compensation would have controlling authority." Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted). As such, that court held that "the consentual delegation of 2255 motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the constitution. Id. at 372.*fn2
[26] Our case is not a § 2255, nor a § 2254, but rather a § 2241 petition. It does not appear that our Circuit has ruled on whether an inmate may consent to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for purposes of adjudicating a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In reviewing the above case law, the court finds that a § 2241 petition, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, is more analogous to a § 2254 petition than it is to a § 2255 petition. A review of Mr. Sinde's petition indicates that he is not challenging a sentencing decision of a district court, but rather is challenging the DHO's ability to sanction him good time credits for violations of prison rules. Whether this court finds in favor of the petitioner and directs the warden to reinstate his good time credits, or whether the court finds in favor of the warden and affirms the decision of the DHO, neither decision implicates the validity, sentence or judgment of a prior district court ruling. As such, this court finds no constitutional infirmity in allowing a magistrate judge to render a final decision in a "habeas corpus" proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
[27] Other circuits have "implicitly held that magistrate judges could adjudicate petitions under § 2241 and 2254 via § 636(c)." Id. at 364. (Citing U.S. v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1992.) For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it does have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant § 2241 petition.
[28] Initially, the respondent argues the claims relating to the frequency of segregation review hearings or the number of telephone calls an inmate is permitted are not properly brought before the court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 9, pp. 7-10). The court agrees.
[29] A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-499 (1973). To the extent that the plaintiff challenges the frequency of his segregation review hearings or the number of telephone calls he is permitted to make, these claims do not "challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement itself." Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). As such, they are inappropriately raised by way of a habeas corpus petition. Instead, these claims relate to the "conditions of his prison life" and may be raised by way of a civil rights action. Id. at 541. Thus, the petitioner's claims relating to the frequency of segregation review hearings and the number of telephone calls he is permitted to make will be dismissed from this habeas corpus action.
[30] The respondent further argues that the petitioner's due process claims should be denied as he was afforded all required due process protections throughout the disciplinary process. (Doc. No. 9, pp. 10-13). With respect to the petitioner's claim of a denial of due process at his DHO hearing, the Supreme Court has stated that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the following procedures must be followed in an institution disciplinary hearing: (1) the inmate must receive no less than twenty-four hours advance written notice of the claimed violations; (2) the inmate must receive a written statement of the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; (3) the inmate must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) the inmate must be allowed to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or staff member; and (5) the disciplinary hearings must be impartial. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974). According to the Court, however, confrontation and cross-examination are not constitutional requirements in a disciplinary hearing. Id. at 567.