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Iowa: Prior Sex Offenses Not Grounds For Prisoner's Continued Confinement
The Iowa Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who had prior
convictions for sex offenses but was not currently imprisoned on sex-
related charges was ineligible for commitment as a sexually violent
predator.
Jessie J. Gonzalez was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree in
1981 and indecent contact with a child in 1994. Gonzalez served prison
time in Iowa on both convictions and was released from prison on the
latter charge in 1997.
In 1999 Gonzalez was again imprisoned, this time for operating a motor
vehicle without the owner's consent. Gonzales was scheduled to be released
for that offense on June 15, 2001. However, on May 2, 2001, the State
petitioned for Gonzales' commitment as a sexually violent predator
pursuant to Iowa Code 229A (2001).
A district court, following a jury trial, ordered Gonzales' continued
confinement as a sexual predator, and he appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court
reversed the order for confinement, holding:
1) Under 229A, specific provisions exist for confined and non-confined
persons. The significant difference between the provisions is that for non-
confined persons "the State must show the person has committed a recent
overt act, while this is not expressly required as to a person who is
confined."
2) The term "confinement" used in 229A, the court held, "means confinement
for a sexually violent offense," which would satisfy the "recent overt
act" requirement.
3) "Because Gonzales was not confined for a sexually violent offense at
the time the petition was filed, and the State failed to prove, or even
allege, a recent overt act that meets the definition of the statute," the
court reversed the trial court's commitment order and remanded for
dismissal of the petition. See: In re Detention of Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d
102 (IA 2003).
convictions for sex offenses but was not currently imprisoned on sex-
related charges was ineligible for commitment as a sexually violent
predator.
Jessie J. Gonzalez was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree in
1981 and indecent contact with a child in 1994. Gonzalez served prison
time in Iowa on both convictions and was released from prison on the
latter charge in 1997.
In 1999 Gonzalez was again imprisoned, this time for operating a motor
vehicle without the owner's consent. Gonzales was scheduled to be released
for that offense on June 15, 2001. However, on May 2, 2001, the State
petitioned for Gonzales' commitment as a sexually violent predator
pursuant to Iowa Code 229A (2001).
A district court, following a jury trial, ordered Gonzales' continued
confinement as a sexual predator, and he appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court
reversed the order for confinement, holding:
1) Under 229A, specific provisions exist for confined and non-confined
persons. The significant difference between the provisions is that for non-
confined persons "the State must show the person has committed a recent
overt act, while this is not expressly required as to a person who is
confined."
2) The term "confinement" used in 229A, the court held, "means confinement
for a sexually violent offense," which would satisfy the "recent overt
act" requirement.
3) "Because Gonzales was not confined for a sexually violent offense at
the time the petition was filed, and the State failed to prove, or even
allege, a recent overt act that meets the definition of the statute," the
court reversed the trial court's commitment order and remanded for
dismissal of the petition. See: In re Detention of Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d
102 (IA 2003).
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Related legal case
In re Detention of Gonzales
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 658 N.W.2d 102 (IA 2003). |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
In re Detention of Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 01/23/2003)
[1] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
[2] No. 159 / 01-2066
[3] 658 N.W.2d 102, 2003
[4] January 23, 2003
[5] IN RE DETENTION OF JESSIE J. GONZALES
STATE OF IOWA, APPELLEE,
v.
JESSIE J. GONZALES, APPELLANT.
[6] Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, Judge.
[7] Mark Smith, First Assistant Public Defender, and Greg Bal, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
[8] Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Roxann M. Ryan, Andrew B. Prosser, and Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Larson, Justice
[10] Respondent in proceeding under Sexually Violent Predator Act, Iowa Code ch. 229A (2001), appeals from order of confinement. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
[11] This is an appeal by Jessie J. Gonzales from a district court order, following a jury trial, for his confinement as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2001). We conclude Gonzales did not meet the statutory criteria for adjudication as a sexually violent predator and therefore reverse the order for confinement.
[12] I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
[13] In 1981 Gonzales pled guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree and was sentenced to prison. In 1994 he pled guilty to two counts of indecent contact with a child and was placed on probation. His probation was revoked, and he was sent to prison. Gonzales was released from this confinement in 1997.
[14] In 1999 Gonzales was sentenced to prison for operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. His scheduled release date for that offense was June 15, 2001. On May 2, 2001, the State filed this petition for Gonzales' commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 229A.
[15] II. Issues.
[16] Gonzales contends (1) he was denied due process by the court's refusal to instruct the jury that it must find he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; (2) Iowa Code chapter 229A violates his substantive due process rights because it did not expressly provide the State must prove he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; and (3) chapter 229A, as interpreted by the State and the district court, denies him his right to substantive due process and denies him equal protection because it treats him differently from other alleged predators who are charged under different subdivisions of chapter 229A by not requiring proof of a "recent overt act." We do not address the constitutional questions raised in the second and third issues because, for the reasons we discuss later, we interpret chapter 229A as requiring both a showing of a lack of control and a recent overt act.
[17] III. Disposition.
[18] A. The court's instruction.
[19] Gonzales contends the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, as an element of proving he is a sexually violent predator under chapter 229A, the State must prove he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. In In re Detention of Barnes, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2003), filed today, we held it was necessary to establish difficulty in controlling behavior to conform chapter 229A to the constitutional requirements set out by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 862 (2002). Barnes controls the present case on this issue, and we need not discuss the instruction issue further. However, Gonzales raises another issue that goes to the heart of his case: whether the facts here provide a basis for a finding of sexually violent-predator status under chapter 229A. We hold they do not.
[20] B. The statute. Under the statutory scheme of chapter 229A, a person is subject to commitment proceedings if the person is a "sexually violent predator," which
[21] means a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility. Iowa Code § 229A.2(9). "Likely to engage in predatory acts," in turn, is defined in section 229A.2(3):
[22] "Likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence" means that the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually violent nature. If a person is not confined at the time that a petition is filed, a person is "likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence" only if the person commits a recent overt act.
[23] A "recent overt act" "means any act that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm." Iowa Code § 229A.2(6). "Recent" is not defined in the statute.
[24] At the time the petition was filed against Gonzales, he was in prison under the driving-without-consent charge. Section 229A.3(1), the basis for the State's petition, provides for notice of discharge of a person who is confined:
[25] When it appears that a person who is confined may meet the definition of a sexually violent predator, the agency with jurisdiction shall give written notice to the attorney general and the multidisciplinary team established in subsection 4, no later than ninety days prior to any of the following events:
[26] a. The anticipated discharge of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense from total confinement, except that in the case of a person who is returned to prison for no more than ninety days as a result of revocation of parole, written notice shall be given as soon as practicable following the person's readmission to prison.
[27] Section 229A.4(2) establishes the procedure for filing a petition for the commitment of a person who is not presently confined:
[28] A prosecuting attorney of the county in which the person was convicted or charged, or the attorney general if requested by the prosecuting attorney, may file a petition alleging that a person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation, if it appears that a person who has committed a recent overt act meets any of the following criteria:
[29] a. The person was convicted of a sexually violent offense and has been discharged after the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense. (Emphasis added.)
[1] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
[2] No. 159 / 01-2066
[3] 658 N.W.2d 102, 2003
[4] January 23, 2003
[5] IN RE DETENTION OF JESSIE J. GONZALES
STATE OF IOWA, APPELLEE,
v.
JESSIE J. GONZALES, APPELLANT.
[6] Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, Judge.
[7] Mark Smith, First Assistant Public Defender, and Greg Bal, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
[8] Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Roxann M. Ryan, Andrew B. Prosser, and Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Larson, Justice
[10] Respondent in proceeding under Sexually Violent Predator Act, Iowa Code ch. 229A (2001), appeals from order of confinement. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
[11] This is an appeal by Jessie J. Gonzales from a district court order, following a jury trial, for his confinement as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2001). We conclude Gonzales did not meet the statutory criteria for adjudication as a sexually violent predator and therefore reverse the order for confinement.
[12] I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
[13] In 1981 Gonzales pled guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree and was sentenced to prison. In 1994 he pled guilty to two counts of indecent contact with a child and was placed on probation. His probation was revoked, and he was sent to prison. Gonzales was released from this confinement in 1997.
[14] In 1999 Gonzales was sentenced to prison for operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. His scheduled release date for that offense was June 15, 2001. On May 2, 2001, the State filed this petition for Gonzales' commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 229A.
[15] II. Issues.
[16] Gonzales contends (1) he was denied due process by the court's refusal to instruct the jury that it must find he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; (2) Iowa Code chapter 229A violates his substantive due process rights because it did not expressly provide the State must prove he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; and (3) chapter 229A, as interpreted by the State and the district court, denies him his right to substantive due process and denies him equal protection because it treats him differently from other alleged predators who are charged under different subdivisions of chapter 229A by not requiring proof of a "recent overt act." We do not address the constitutional questions raised in the second and third issues because, for the reasons we discuss later, we interpret chapter 229A as requiring both a showing of a lack of control and a recent overt act.
[17] III. Disposition.
[18] A. The court's instruction.
[19] Gonzales contends the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, as an element of proving he is a sexually violent predator under chapter 229A, the State must prove he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. In In re Detention of Barnes, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2003), filed today, we held it was necessary to establish difficulty in controlling behavior to conform chapter 229A to the constitutional requirements set out by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 862 (2002). Barnes controls the present case on this issue, and we need not discuss the instruction issue further. However, Gonzales raises another issue that goes to the heart of his case: whether the facts here provide a basis for a finding of sexually violent-predator status under chapter 229A. We hold they do not.
[20] B. The statute. Under the statutory scheme of chapter 229A, a person is subject to commitment proceedings if the person is a "sexually violent predator," which
[21] means a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility. Iowa Code § 229A.2(9). "Likely to engage in predatory acts," in turn, is defined in section 229A.2(3):
[22] "Likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence" means that the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually violent nature. If a person is not confined at the time that a petition is filed, a person is "likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence" only if the person commits a recent overt act.
[23] A "recent overt act" "means any act that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm." Iowa Code § 229A.2(6). "Recent" is not defined in the statute.
[24] At the time the petition was filed against Gonzales, he was in prison under the driving-without-consent charge. Section 229A.3(1), the basis for the State's petition, provides for notice of discharge of a person who is confined:
[25] When it appears that a person who is confined may meet the definition of a sexually violent predator, the agency with jurisdiction shall give written notice to the attorney general and the multidisciplinary team established in subsection 4, no later than ninety days prior to any of the following events:
[26] a. The anticipated discharge of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense from total confinement, except that in the case of a person who is returned to prison for no more than ninety days as a result of revocation of parole, written notice shall be given as soon as practicable following the person's readmission to prison.
[27] Section 229A.4(2) establishes the procedure for filing a petition for the commitment of a person who is not presently confined:
[28] A prosecuting attorney of the county in which the person was convicted or charged, or the attorney general if requested by the prosecuting attorney, may file a petition alleging that a person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation, if it appears that a person who has committed a recent overt act meets any of the following criteria:
[29] a. The person was convicted of a sexually violent offense and has been discharged after the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense. (Emphasis added.)