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Licensed Attorney Acting Pro Se Not Entitled Attorney Fee Award
The United States Supreme Court held that an attorney who represents
himself pro se in a civil rights action may not receive an award of
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for that self-representation. The
Petitioner was a Florida attorney who requested the Kentucky Board of
Elections to place his name on the presidential ballot. The Board refused
because he was not a "generally advocated and nationally recognized"
candidate as required by Kentucky statute. The petitioner filed a
successful action on his own behalf challenging the statute. See: Kay v.
Mills, 490 F.Supp. 844 (E.D. KY. 1980). Six years later, the Kentucky
General Assembly enacted an identically worded statute.
The petitioner again sought to be placed on the presidential ballot and,
after he was refused, again successfully litigated a civil rights action
in the district court. This time he sought attorney fees, which the
district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed at 900 F.2d 967 (6th
Cir. 1990), and the attorney appealed.
The Supreme Court held there is no question that a pro se litigant who is
not an attorney cannot receive attorney fees. The Court held it would
extend that holding to an attorney litigant acting pro se, for to hold
otherwise would provide a disincentive to employ counsel whenever a bar
member considered himself to be competent to litigate on his own behalf.
The Court found that § 1988's main purpose was to interest counsel to
prosecute meritorious claims, and an attorney acting on his own behalf is
at a disadvantage by not having objective counsel.
The Court affirmed the denial of attorney fees. See: Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432, 1l1 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991).
himself pro se in a civil rights action may not receive an award of
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for that self-representation. The
Petitioner was a Florida attorney who requested the Kentucky Board of
Elections to place his name on the presidential ballot. The Board refused
because he was not a "generally advocated and nationally recognized"
candidate as required by Kentucky statute. The petitioner filed a
successful action on his own behalf challenging the statute. See: Kay v.
Mills, 490 F.Supp. 844 (E.D. KY. 1980). Six years later, the Kentucky
General Assembly enacted an identically worded statute.
The petitioner again sought to be placed on the presidential ballot and,
after he was refused, again successfully litigated a civil rights action
in the district court. This time he sought attorney fees, which the
district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed at 900 F.2d 967 (6th
Cir. 1990), and the attorney appealed.
The Supreme Court held there is no question that a pro se litigant who is
not an attorney cannot receive attorney fees. The Court held it would
extend that holding to an attorney litigant acting pro se, for to hold
otherwise would provide a disincentive to employ counsel whenever a bar
member considered himself to be competent to litigate on his own behalf.
The Court found that § 1988's main purpose was to interest counsel to
prosecute meritorious claims, and an attorney acting on his own behalf is
at a disadvantage by not having objective counsel.
The Court affirmed the denial of attorney fees. See: Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432, 1l1 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991).
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Related legal case
Kay v. Ehrler
| Year | 1991 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (199 |
| Level | Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
KAY v. EHRLER ET AL., 111 S. Ct. 1435, 499 U.S. 432 (U.S. 04/16/1991)
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] No. 90-79
[3] 111 S. Ct. 1435, 499 U.S. 432, 113 L. Ed. 2d 486, 1991
[4] decided: April 16, 1991.
[5] KAY
v.
EHRLER ET AL.
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
[7] Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert H. Klonoff and Richard B. Kay, pro se.
[8] Ann M. Sheadel, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General.
[9] Robert A. Long, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Leonard Schaitman, and Marc Richman.*fn*
[10] Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
[11] Author: Stevens
[12] The question is whether an attorney who represents himself in a successful civil rights action may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.*fn1
[13] Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Florida. In 1980, he requested the Kentucky Board of Elections (Board) to place his name on the Democratic Party's primary ballot for the office of President of the United States. Because the members of the Board concluded that he was not a candidate who was "generally advocated and nationally recognized" within the meaning of the controlling Kentucky statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118.580 (Michie 1982) (repealed in 1982), the Board refused his request.
[14] Petitioner filed a successful action on his own behalf in the District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Kentucky statute. Kay v. Mills,490 F. Supp. 844, 852-853 (ED Ky. 1980). The District Court held that the statute was invalid and entered an injunction requiring that petitioner's name appear on the ballot. Id., at 855. Two years later, the Kentucky General Assembly repealed the statute. In 1986, however, it enacted an identically worded statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118.581 (Michie 1982 and Supp. 1988). In 1987, petitioner again requested that his name appear on the primary ballot, and when the Board initially refused his request, petitioner again brought suit in the District Court, and prevailed.*fn2 This time, however, he requested a fee award under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.*fn3
[15] The District Court denied petitioner's request for attorney's fees under § 1988 based on Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (CA6 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984).*fn4 App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 900 F.2d 967 (1990). The majority read the language of the statute as assuming the existence of "a paying relationship between an attorney and a client." Id., at 971. Moreover, it concluded that the purpose of the statute was best served when a plaintiff hired an objective attorney -- rather than serving as both claimant and advocate -- to provide a "filtering of meritless claims." Ibid. The dissenting judge emphasized the statutory goals of promoting lawsuits that protect civil rights and relieving the prevailing party of the burdens of litigation. Id., at 972-973.
[16] We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 807 (1990), to resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the question whether a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988. The Circuits are in agreement, however, on the proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees.*fn5 Petitioner does not disagree with these cases, see Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4, and we are also satisfied that they were correctly decided. The question then is whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney.
[17] We do not think either the text of the statute or its legislative history provides a clear answer. On the one hand, petitioner is an "attorney," and has obviously handled his professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner. On the other hand, the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship, *fn6 and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.*fn7 Although this section was no doubt intended to encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights.*fn8 In the end, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the overriding statutory concern is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations. We do not, however, rely primarily on the desirability of filtering out meritless claims. Rather, we think Congress was interested in ensuring the effective prosecution of meritorious claims.
[18] Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness.*fn9 He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.
[19] A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants -- even if limited to those who are members of the bar -- would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.
[20] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
[21] It is so ordered.
[22] Disposition
[23] 900 F.2d 967, affirmed.
[24] Counsel FOOTNOTES
[25] * Brian Wolfman and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Public Citizen as amicus curiae urging reversal.
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] No. 90-79
[3] 111 S. Ct. 1435, 499 U.S. 432, 113 L. Ed. 2d 486, 1991
[4] decided: April 16, 1991.
[5] KAY
v.
EHRLER ET AL.
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
[7] Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert H. Klonoff and Richard B. Kay, pro se.
[8] Ann M. Sheadel, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General.
[9] Robert A. Long, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Leonard Schaitman, and Marc Richman.*fn*
[10] Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
[11] Author: Stevens
[12] The question is whether an attorney who represents himself in a successful civil rights action may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.*fn1
[13] Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Florida. In 1980, he requested the Kentucky Board of Elections (Board) to place his name on the Democratic Party's primary ballot for the office of President of the United States. Because the members of the Board concluded that he was not a candidate who was "generally advocated and nationally recognized" within the meaning of the controlling Kentucky statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118.580 (Michie 1982) (repealed in 1982), the Board refused his request.
[14] Petitioner filed a successful action on his own behalf in the District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Kentucky statute. Kay v. Mills,490 F. Supp. 844, 852-853 (ED Ky. 1980). The District Court held that the statute was invalid and entered an injunction requiring that petitioner's name appear on the ballot. Id., at 855. Two years later, the Kentucky General Assembly repealed the statute. In 1986, however, it enacted an identically worded statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118.581 (Michie 1982 and Supp. 1988). In 1987, petitioner again requested that his name appear on the primary ballot, and when the Board initially refused his request, petitioner again brought suit in the District Court, and prevailed.*fn2 This time, however, he requested a fee award under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.*fn3
[15] The District Court denied petitioner's request for attorney's fees under § 1988 based on Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (CA6 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984).*fn4 App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 900 F.2d 967 (1990). The majority read the language of the statute as assuming the existence of "a paying relationship between an attorney and a client." Id., at 971. Moreover, it concluded that the purpose of the statute was best served when a plaintiff hired an objective attorney -- rather than serving as both claimant and advocate -- to provide a "filtering of meritless claims." Ibid. The dissenting judge emphasized the statutory goals of promoting lawsuits that protect civil rights and relieving the prevailing party of the burdens of litigation. Id., at 972-973.
[16] We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 807 (1990), to resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the question whether a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988. The Circuits are in agreement, however, on the proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees.*fn5 Petitioner does not disagree with these cases, see Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4, and we are also satisfied that they were correctly decided. The question then is whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney.
[17] We do not think either the text of the statute or its legislative history provides a clear answer. On the one hand, petitioner is an "attorney," and has obviously handled his professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner. On the other hand, the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship, *fn6 and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.*fn7 Although this section was no doubt intended to encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights.*fn8 In the end, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the overriding statutory concern is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations. We do not, however, rely primarily on the desirability of filtering out meritless claims. Rather, we think Congress was interested in ensuring the effective prosecution of meritorious claims.
[18] Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness.*fn9 He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.
[19] A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants -- even if limited to those who are members of the bar -- would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.
[20] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
[21] It is so ordered.
[22] Disposition
[23] 900 F.2d 967, affirmed.
[24] Counsel FOOTNOTES
[25] * Brian Wolfman and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Public Citizen as amicus curiae urging reversal.