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Minnesota Supreme Court: Comparative Fault Analysis Inappropriate in Jail Suicide Case
Minnesota Supreme Court: Comparative Fault Analysis Inappropriate in Jail
Suicide Case
by Matthew T. Clarke
The Minnesota Supreme Court (MSC) has held that it is inappropriate to
perform a comparative fault analysis in the case of a prisoner who
committed suicide.
Carlyn Sandborg, mother of a Blue Earth County Jail prisoner, Robert
Sandborg, who committed suicide while awaiting trial, sued the county and
jail officials in state court for wrongful death. The trial court
instructed the jury that, if the defendants and the deceased were found at
fault for the prisoner's death, such fault should be compared and
apportioned between them. The jury found that the defendants were not at
fault but that the prisoner was at fault. The trial court denied
plaintiff's motion for new trial based upon an alleged error in allowing
the jury to apportion fault. An appeal followed..
Reversing on separate ground, the court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err in instructing the jury to apportion fault. Sandborg v.
Blue Earth County, 60 N.W.2d 192 (Minn.App. 1999). Plaintiff appealed to
the MSC.
The MSC held that absent a special relationship with the deceased, a
person has no duty to prevent a suicide. However, the relationship between
jailer and prisoner is such a special relationship. In most special
relationship cases, comparative fault will be applicable. The jailer-
prisoner relationship is an exceptional circumstance in which the duty to
protect against a known possibility of self-inflicted harm transfers
entirely to the jailer. Therefore, comparing the fault of jailer and
prisoner is inappropriate. This reasoning is based both on the similar
concept of a mental health hospital's duty to protect a known suicidal
patent from harm (Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation, 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990))
and the fact that a jailer is in total control of a prisoner's physical
and medical needs (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
The prisoner's fault is encompassed in the forseeability determination
that establishes the jailer's duty. If the suicide risk is foreseeable,
then all of the fault shifts to the jailer. If the suicide risk is not
foreseeable, then the jailer is not at fault. This reasoning follows the
Second Restatement of Torts § 449 (denying liability because of the risk
that the actor was supposed to protect the other from would be to deprive
the other of all protection and make the duty to protect a nullity).
"Therefore, comparative fault is not applicable when one party has a duty
to protect another party from committing the very harm to be protected
against in this case self-inflicted harm The MSC rejected the defendants'
argument that they were imposing strict liability on all jailer for any
prisoner suicide. The plaintiffs must still prove that the jail breached
the reasonable standard of care. The jury may still find that the jail
took actions which constituted reasonable care under the circumstances.
Therefore, this is not strict liability.
The case was returned to the trial court for retrial with instructions for
the trial court not to instruct the jury to determine, compare, or
apportion Sandborg's fault. See: Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d
61 (Minn. 2000)
Suicide Case
by Matthew T. Clarke
The Minnesota Supreme Court (MSC) has held that it is inappropriate to
perform a comparative fault analysis in the case of a prisoner who
committed suicide.
Carlyn Sandborg, mother of a Blue Earth County Jail prisoner, Robert
Sandborg, who committed suicide while awaiting trial, sued the county and
jail officials in state court for wrongful death. The trial court
instructed the jury that, if the defendants and the deceased were found at
fault for the prisoner's death, such fault should be compared and
apportioned between them. The jury found that the defendants were not at
fault but that the prisoner was at fault. The trial court denied
plaintiff's motion for new trial based upon an alleged error in allowing
the jury to apportion fault. An appeal followed..
Reversing on separate ground, the court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err in instructing the jury to apportion fault. Sandborg v.
Blue Earth County, 60 N.W.2d 192 (Minn.App. 1999). Plaintiff appealed to
the MSC.
The MSC held that absent a special relationship with the deceased, a
person has no duty to prevent a suicide. However, the relationship between
jailer and prisoner is such a special relationship. In most special
relationship cases, comparative fault will be applicable. The jailer-
prisoner relationship is an exceptional circumstance in which the duty to
protect against a known possibility of self-inflicted harm transfers
entirely to the jailer. Therefore, comparing the fault of jailer and
prisoner is inappropriate. This reasoning is based both on the similar
concept of a mental health hospital's duty to protect a known suicidal
patent from harm (Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation, 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990))
and the fact that a jailer is in total control of a prisoner's physical
and medical needs (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
The prisoner's fault is encompassed in the forseeability determination
that establishes the jailer's duty. If the suicide risk is foreseeable,
then all of the fault shifts to the jailer. If the suicide risk is not
foreseeable, then the jailer is not at fault. This reasoning follows the
Second Restatement of Torts § 449 (denying liability because of the risk
that the actor was supposed to protect the other from would be to deprive
the other of all protection and make the duty to protect a nullity).
"Therefore, comparative fault is not applicable when one party has a duty
to protect another party from committing the very harm to be protected
against in this case self-inflicted harm The MSC rejected the defendants'
argument that they were imposing strict liability on all jailer for any
prisoner suicide. The plaintiffs must still prove that the jail breached
the reasonable standard of care. The jury may still find that the jail
took actions which constituted reasonable care under the circumstances.
Therefore, this is not strict liability.
The case was returned to the trial court for retrial with instructions for
the trial court not to instruct the jury to determine, compare, or
apportion Sandborg's fault. See: Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d
61 (Minn. 2000)
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Related legal case
Sandborg v. Blue Earth County
| Year | 2000 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 615 N. W.2d 61 (Minn. 2000). |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d 61, 615 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 07/27/2000)
[1] Minnesota Supreme Court
[2] No. C6-99-243
[3] 615 N.W.2d 61, 615 N.W.2d 61, 2000
[4] July 27, 2000
[5] CARLYN M. SANDBORG, TRUSTEE FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF ROBERT H. SANDBORG, JR., PETITIONER, APPELLANT,
V.
BLUE EARTH COUNTY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Comparative fault is not applicable to a wrongful death action where the risk of a jail detainee's suicide is reasonably foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect the detainee from the risk of suicide.
[8] Reversed in part and remanded for new trial.
[9] Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anderson, Russell A., Justice.
[11] Anderson, Russell A., J.
[12] OPINION
[13] When a jailer has a legal duty to protect a detainee from a reasonably foreseeable risk of suicide and the detainee commits suicide, is the fault, if any, of the detainee for his death to be determined and apportioned with the fault, if any, of the jailer?
[14] Appellant sued Blue Earth County and two jail employees for wrongful death after her son, Robert Sandborg (Sandborg),*fn1 committed suicide while in custody at the Blue Earth County Jail. At trial the jury was instructed that if the employees of the county and Sandborg were found at fault and the fault of each caused Sandborg's death, then such fault was to be compared and apportioned between the parties. The jury found that the county and its employees were not at fault, but that Sandborg was at fault and that his fault caused his death. Appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, claiming the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine and apportion Sandborg's fault with that of the county. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed on a separate ground,*fn2 but concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on comparative fault. See Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 198. We reverse and hold that comparative fault*fn3 is not applicable to a wrongful death action where the risk of a detainee's suicide is reasonably foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect the detainee from the risk of suicide.
[15] On Friday, May 14, 1993, 24-year-old Sandborg called Mankato police and admitted that earlier that day he had sexually touched an 11-year-old girl. He was shaking and had been crying when the officer arrived to arrest him.
[16] Once in custody Sandborg told the arresting officer that he either had to tell someone about the incident or get a gun and use it on himself. He said that he really thought about killing himself. The arresting officer asked him if he was still thinking about killing himself and he replied, "A little, not as much as before."
[17] The arresting officer completed a personal history form that included the question "Does inmate exhibit behavior suggesting suicide or assault?" The arresting officer answered "yes" because of Sandborg's comments about killing himself and because of the nature of the offense to which he confessed. The arresting officer turned Sandborg over to the custody officer with the personal history form. She told the custody officer of the crime Sandborg said he committed.
[18] The custody officer testified he asked Sandborg if he was suicidal and Sandborg answered, "No, not at this time" or "No, I was, but not now." The arresting officer testified that Sandborg answered that he was more serious about it at one point, but now it "comes and goes." The arresting officer left the booking area and told a second custody officer that Sandborg had made suicidal comments during the interview.
[19] Sandborg was placed alone in a cell with a solid door, walls and viewing ports. After he was placed in the cell a custody officer asked him if he was going to do anything stupid or foolish and he answered no. The custody officer thought Sandborg was okay. Custody officers testified that they kept a close eye on Sandborg and told the next shift about him. However, custodial supervising officers were not told that Sandborg was a potentially suicidal detainee.
[20] County policy required that any unusual medical screening information be transmitted in writing to the jail supervisor. The policy also required that a mental health professional be consulted if a detainee was suspected of being suicidal. Two area hospitals were designated to hold detainees who may be mentally ill or a health risk to themselves or staff.
[21] Sandborg was calm through the weekend. On Sunday, May 16, appellant visited him for a half hour and she did not find him suicidal. Twenty minutes after appellant left, when the custody officer could not relay a message from appellant to Sandborg by intercom, the officer went to the cell and found Sandborg hanging from bed sheets. Two days later he died. A suicide note, an obituary and a drawing of a gallows were found among his personal effects.
[22] We granted review solely on the issue of whether Sandborg's fault, if any, is to be determined and apportioned with the fault, if any, of the county. Accordingly, we do not review the court of appeals' conclusion that the county had a legal duty to protect Sandborg against self-inflicted harm. We turn then to the question whether it is appropriate, where the court has determined that a risk of self-inflicted harm is foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect against that risk, to allow the jury to determine the fault of the detainee and compare the detainee's fault to the fault, if any, of the jailer. Because this issue is one of law, our review is de novo. See Hamilton v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn. 1999).
[23] The court of appeals held that because of the special relationship between a jailer and a detainee arising from the jailer's custody and control over the detainee, the jailer has a duty to protect a detainee from harm, and where, as here, self-inflicted harm is foreseeable, to protect the detainee from that particular harm. As the court of appeals noted, it is only when a person is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon a second person who holds considerable power over the first person's welfare, and the risk of harm to the first person is reasonably foreseeable, that this special relationship imposes a legal duty on the part of the second person to protect the first from the expected harm. See Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 196-97; see also Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995) (noting that absent a special relationship a person has no legal duty to act for the protection of another, even if the person realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary).
[24] In most special relationship cases comparative fault will be applicable. Comparative fault is applicable where the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable care for his own protection. See Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. Co., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1966). In a special relationship the defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care consistent with that relationship to prevent harm to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff ordinarily retains his own duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to himself. Each party has a separate duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the plaintiff. Because both parties' breach of their respective duties contributed to the harm, their faults can be compared.
[25] However, the Restatement of Torts recognizes that there are exceptional relationships where:
[1] Minnesota Supreme Court
[2] No. C6-99-243
[3] 615 N.W.2d 61, 615 N.W.2d 61, 2000
[4] July 27, 2000
[5] CARLYN M. SANDBORG, TRUSTEE FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF ROBERT H. SANDBORG, JR., PETITIONER, APPELLANT,
V.
BLUE EARTH COUNTY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Comparative fault is not applicable to a wrongful death action where the risk of a jail detainee's suicide is reasonably foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect the detainee from the risk of suicide.
[8] Reversed in part and remanded for new trial.
[9] Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anderson, Russell A., Justice.
[11] Anderson, Russell A., J.
[12] OPINION
[13] When a jailer has a legal duty to protect a detainee from a reasonably foreseeable risk of suicide and the detainee commits suicide, is the fault, if any, of the detainee for his death to be determined and apportioned with the fault, if any, of the jailer?
[14] Appellant sued Blue Earth County and two jail employees for wrongful death after her son, Robert Sandborg (Sandborg),*fn1 committed suicide while in custody at the Blue Earth County Jail. At trial the jury was instructed that if the employees of the county and Sandborg were found at fault and the fault of each caused Sandborg's death, then such fault was to be compared and apportioned between the parties. The jury found that the county and its employees were not at fault, but that Sandborg was at fault and that his fault caused his death. Appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, claiming the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine and apportion Sandborg's fault with that of the county. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed on a separate ground,*fn2 but concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on comparative fault. See Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 198. We reverse and hold that comparative fault*fn3 is not applicable to a wrongful death action where the risk of a detainee's suicide is reasonably foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect the detainee from the risk of suicide.
[15] On Friday, May 14, 1993, 24-year-old Sandborg called Mankato police and admitted that earlier that day he had sexually touched an 11-year-old girl. He was shaking and had been crying when the officer arrived to arrest him.
[16] Once in custody Sandborg told the arresting officer that he either had to tell someone about the incident or get a gun and use it on himself. He said that he really thought about killing himself. The arresting officer asked him if he was still thinking about killing himself and he replied, "A little, not as much as before."
[17] The arresting officer completed a personal history form that included the question "Does inmate exhibit behavior suggesting suicide or assault?" The arresting officer answered "yes" because of Sandborg's comments about killing himself and because of the nature of the offense to which he confessed. The arresting officer turned Sandborg over to the custody officer with the personal history form. She told the custody officer of the crime Sandborg said he committed.
[18] The custody officer testified he asked Sandborg if he was suicidal and Sandborg answered, "No, not at this time" or "No, I was, but not now." The arresting officer testified that Sandborg answered that he was more serious about it at one point, but now it "comes and goes." The arresting officer left the booking area and told a second custody officer that Sandborg had made suicidal comments during the interview.
[19] Sandborg was placed alone in a cell with a solid door, walls and viewing ports. After he was placed in the cell a custody officer asked him if he was going to do anything stupid or foolish and he answered no. The custody officer thought Sandborg was okay. Custody officers testified that they kept a close eye on Sandborg and told the next shift about him. However, custodial supervising officers were not told that Sandborg was a potentially suicidal detainee.
[20] County policy required that any unusual medical screening information be transmitted in writing to the jail supervisor. The policy also required that a mental health professional be consulted if a detainee was suspected of being suicidal. Two area hospitals were designated to hold detainees who may be mentally ill or a health risk to themselves or staff.
[21] Sandborg was calm through the weekend. On Sunday, May 16, appellant visited him for a half hour and she did not find him suicidal. Twenty minutes after appellant left, when the custody officer could not relay a message from appellant to Sandborg by intercom, the officer went to the cell and found Sandborg hanging from bed sheets. Two days later he died. A suicide note, an obituary and a drawing of a gallows were found among his personal effects.
[22] We granted review solely on the issue of whether Sandborg's fault, if any, is to be determined and apportioned with the fault, if any, of the county. Accordingly, we do not review the court of appeals' conclusion that the county had a legal duty to protect Sandborg against self-inflicted harm. We turn then to the question whether it is appropriate, where the court has determined that a risk of self-inflicted harm is foreseeable and the jailer has a duty to protect against that risk, to allow the jury to determine the fault of the detainee and compare the detainee's fault to the fault, if any, of the jailer. Because this issue is one of law, our review is de novo. See Hamilton v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn. 1999).
[23] The court of appeals held that because of the special relationship between a jailer and a detainee arising from the jailer's custody and control over the detainee, the jailer has a duty to protect a detainee from harm, and where, as here, self-inflicted harm is foreseeable, to protect the detainee from that particular harm. As the court of appeals noted, it is only when a person is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon a second person who holds considerable power over the first person's welfare, and the risk of harm to the first person is reasonably foreseeable, that this special relationship imposes a legal duty on the part of the second person to protect the first from the expected harm. See Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 196-97; see also Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995) (noting that absent a special relationship a person has no legal duty to act for the protection of another, even if the person realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary).
[24] In most special relationship cases comparative fault will be applicable. Comparative fault is applicable where the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable care for his own protection. See Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. Co., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1966). In a special relationship the defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care consistent with that relationship to prevent harm to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff ordinarily retains his own duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to himself. Each party has a separate duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the plaintiff. Because both parties' breach of their respective duties contributed to the harm, their faults can be compared.
[25] However, the Restatement of Torts recognizes that there are exceptional relationships where: