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Municipal Judge Not Policy Maker in Arrestee's Toilet Denial Suit
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a municipal judge does not
act as a policy maker to impute liability against a city. The pro se
plaintiff in this case filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations relating to his arrest and an invalid warrant
for failing to have proof of registration or vaccination for his dog. The
district court dismissed the action brought against officials in Topeka,
Kansas.
The plaintiff brought an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claim for being placed in a cell without a toilet, in his bare feet, for
five hours. The Tenth Circuit held a cruel and unusual punishment claim
must establish (1) officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
his health and safety, and (2) the alleged deprivation was "sufficiently
serious." The Court held conditions may be "restrictive and even harsh"
without violating the constitution. The Court found the conditions the
plaintiff alleged were not a sufficiently serious deprivation.
The Court also found a claim against a municipal judge for allowing the
clerk to sign the arrest warrant, which rendered the arrest unlawful, may
have been a violation of state law but the judge enjoyed absolute
immunity. Such immunity is permitted in a § 1983 action unless the
judicial officer acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." The
Court found the judge in this case did not act in absence of all
jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court found that the judge's allowance of the clerk's
signature on the unlawful warrant did not make him a municipal policy
maker that would allow the city to be held liable. The authority to issue
arrest warrants was circumscribed by his judicial duty to follow state
law, and his procedural "trailblazing" of allowing a signature stamp
without personally reviewing the warrant "was not done under the auspices
of the city and could not be interpreted as promulgating municipal
policy." The district court's order of dismissal was affirmed. See:
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kansas, 318 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003).
act as a policy maker to impute liability against a city. The pro se
plaintiff in this case filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations relating to his arrest and an invalid warrant
for failing to have proof of registration or vaccination for his dog. The
district court dismissed the action brought against officials in Topeka,
Kansas.
The plaintiff brought an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claim for being placed in a cell without a toilet, in his bare feet, for
five hours. The Tenth Circuit held a cruel and unusual punishment claim
must establish (1) officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
his health and safety, and (2) the alleged deprivation was "sufficiently
serious." The Court held conditions may be "restrictive and even harsh"
without violating the constitution. The Court found the conditions the
plaintiff alleged were not a sufficiently serious deprivation.
The Court also found a claim against a municipal judge for allowing the
clerk to sign the arrest warrant, which rendered the arrest unlawful, may
have been a violation of state law but the judge enjoyed absolute
immunity. Such immunity is permitted in a § 1983 action unless the
judicial officer acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." The
Court found the judge in this case did not act in absence of all
jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court found that the judge's allowance of the clerk's
signature on the unlawful warrant did not make him a municipal policy
maker that would allow the city to be held liable. The authority to issue
arrest warrants was circumscribed by his judicial duty to follow state
law, and his procedural "trailblazing" of allowing a signature stamp
without personally reviewing the warrant "was not done under the auspices
of the city and could not be interpreted as promulgating municipal
policy." The district court's order of dismissal was affirmed. See:
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kansas, 318 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kansas
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 318 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 02/06/2003)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
[2] No. 02-3202
[3] 318 F.3d 1183, 2003
[4] February 06, 2003
[5] JOSEPH R. LEDBETTER, PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS; MAYOR JOAN WAGNON; MUNICIPAL JUDGE NEIL ROACH; POLICE CHIEF DEAN FORESTER; JOHN DOE-AN UNNAMED POLICE OFFICER-TOPEKA POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER MARK GRAYSON; LISA PINKLEY; AND CITY ATTORNEY LINDA P. JEFFREY, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES.
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D.C. NO. 00- CV-1153-DES)
[7] Joseph R. Ledbetter, Pro Se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
[8] Gregory A. Lee, of Davis, Unrein, McCalister, Biggs, & Head, Llp, Topeka, Kansas, for the Defendants-Appellees.
[9] Before Seymour, Henry, and Briscoe, Circuit Judges.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henry, Circuit Judge
[11] PUBLISH
Opinion Footnotes
[12] *fn1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the disposition of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
[13] *fn2 When a plaintiff fails to serve a defendant within the 120-day period, the district court "shall dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time." See Espinosa, 52 F.3d at 841 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)). Accordingly, we read the district court's dismissal of Mr. Ledbetter's claims against the defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forrester as a dismissal without prejudice.
[14] *fn3 Kansas law requires that all warrants issued by the municipal court "shall be signed by a judge of the municipal court." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-4208 (2000).
[15] *fn4 Because Mr. Ledbetter did not name as a defendant the clerk who stamped Judge Roach's signature on the warrant, we do not consider the actions of that official here.
[16] *fn5 As noted above, we view the district court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forrester as one without prejudice.
[17] *fn6 We note that even though Mr. Ledbetter cites cases involving the Kansas Tort Claims Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6101 et seq., see Aplt's Br. at 3 (citing, inter alia, Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 80 F.Supp.2d 1175 (D. Kan. 1999)), the parties and the district court read his complaint as alleging only federal law claims. We interpret his claims similarly and thus do not address any potential state law claims arising out of these facts.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
[2] No. 02-3202
[3] 318 F.3d 1183, 2003
[4] February 06, 2003
[5] JOSEPH R. LEDBETTER, PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS; MAYOR JOAN WAGNON; MUNICIPAL JUDGE NEIL ROACH; POLICE CHIEF DEAN FORESTER; JOHN DOE-AN UNNAMED POLICE OFFICER-TOPEKA POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER MARK GRAYSON; LISA PINKLEY; AND CITY ATTORNEY LINDA P. JEFFREY, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES.
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D.C. NO. 00- CV-1153-DES)
[7] Joseph R. Ledbetter, Pro Se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
[8] Gregory A. Lee, of Davis, Unrein, McCalister, Biggs, & Head, Llp, Topeka, Kansas, for the Defendants-Appellees.
[9] Before Seymour, Henry, and Briscoe, Circuit Judges.
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henry, Circuit Judge
[11] PUBLISH
Opinion Footnotes
[12] *fn1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the disposition of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
[13] *fn2 When a plaintiff fails to serve a defendant within the 120-day period, the district court "shall dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time." See Espinosa, 52 F.3d at 841 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)). Accordingly, we read the district court's dismissal of Mr. Ledbetter's claims against the defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forrester as a dismissal without prejudice.
[14] *fn3 Kansas law requires that all warrants issued by the municipal court "shall be signed by a judge of the municipal court." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-4208 (2000).
[15] *fn4 Because Mr. Ledbetter did not name as a defendant the clerk who stamped Judge Roach's signature on the warrant, we do not consider the actions of that official here.
[16] *fn5 As noted above, we view the district court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forrester as one without prejudice.
[17] *fn6 We note that even though Mr. Ledbetter cites cases involving the Kansas Tort Claims Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6101 et seq., see Aplt's Br. at 3 (citing, inter alia, Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 80 F.Supp.2d 1175 (D. Kan. 1999)), the parties and the district court read his complaint as alleging only federal law claims. We interpret his claims similarly and thus do not address any potential state law claims arising out of these facts.