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No Liberty Interest in Sex Offender Classification
A prisoner plaintiff said he had no internal procedure available to
challenge his sex offender classification. Defendants said that the
grievance system permitted classification matters to be aired. The court
decides the question in favor of defendants and dismisses for
non-exhaustion, noting that under Ninth Circuit law it can decide contested
factual issues on papers.
Another plaintiff who was not a prisoner when he filed suit was not
required to exhaust under the plain meaning of the statute. The court
rejects the contrary conclusion in Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d
985 (D.Ariz. 2003). There are good policy reasons for the opposite
conclusion (1048), but the Ninth Circuit in dictum and other circuits have
followed the statute's plain language.
Classification as a sex offender does not create a constitutionally based
liberty interest. It caused the plaintiff to be confined in a higher
security prison and to lose the opportunity to go to a work camp and obtain
early release credit. However, none of this exceeded his sentence in an
unexpected manner (he served five years of a ten-year sentence). Nor was
there a state-created liberty interest. Defendants cite pre-Sandin liberty
interest cases. However, the Supreme Court has now "curtailed the focus on
the mandatory language analysis of Hewitt . . . by limiting liberty
interests." Now, the focus is on whether the challenged condition is
atypical and significant relative to ordinary prison life. (1049-50)
There's nothing in the record to show that sex offenders are treated
atypically and significantly compared to the general population; being
excluded from minimum custody doesn't tell the court anything. The
plaintiff is given a chance to amend.
Denial of eligibility for work camp and earning release credits does not
bring the case within the Heck/Preiser favorable termination rule, since
the plaintiff might not have earned the credits even if eligible.
The plaintiff's allegation of "general denial of procedural due process
outside of the contours of Sandin" (whatever that could possibly mean in a
prison case) fails because he had an available grievance remedy.
The plaintiff, released on parole, lacks standing to seek an injunction
because he doesn't allege facts showing that he is realistically likely to
return to prison and be subjected to a repetition of the violation. See:
Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F.Supp.2d 1043
challenge his sex offender classification. Defendants said that the
grievance system permitted classification matters to be aired. The court
decides the question in favor of defendants and dismisses for
non-exhaustion, noting that under Ninth Circuit law it can decide contested
factual issues on papers.
Another plaintiff who was not a prisoner when he filed suit was not
required to exhaust under the plain meaning of the statute. The court
rejects the contrary conclusion in Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d
985 (D.Ariz. 2003). There are good policy reasons for the opposite
conclusion (1048), but the Ninth Circuit in dictum and other circuits have
followed the statute's plain language.
Classification as a sex offender does not create a constitutionally based
liberty interest. It caused the plaintiff to be confined in a higher
security prison and to lose the opportunity to go to a work camp and obtain
early release credit. However, none of this exceeded his sentence in an
unexpected manner (he served five years of a ten-year sentence). Nor was
there a state-created liberty interest. Defendants cite pre-Sandin liberty
interest cases. However, the Supreme Court has now "curtailed the focus on
the mandatory language analysis of Hewitt . . . by limiting liberty
interests." Now, the focus is on whether the challenged condition is
atypical and significant relative to ordinary prison life. (1049-50)
There's nothing in the record to show that sex offenders are treated
atypically and significantly compared to the general population; being
excluded from minimum custody doesn't tell the court anything. The
plaintiff is given a chance to amend.
Denial of eligibility for work camp and earning release credits does not
bring the case within the Heck/Preiser favorable termination rule, since
the plaintiff might not have earned the credits even if eligible.
The plaintiff's allegation of "general denial of procedural due process
outside of the contours of Sandin" (whatever that could possibly mean in a
prison case) fails because he had an available grievance remedy.
The plaintiff, released on parole, lacks standing to seek an injunction
because he doesn't allege facts showing that he is realistically likely to
return to prison and be subjected to a repetition of the violation. See:
Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F.Supp.2d 1043
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