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Prisoner's Dismissed § 1983 Assault Claim Against TransCor America Reinstated
Prisoner's Dismissed § 1983 Assault Claim Against TransCor America Reinstated
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, vacating a Tennessee federal
district dismissal, reinstated a prisoner's civil rights lawsuit against
TransCor America for Eighth Amendment violations.
Juan Castillo, a California prisoner, was being transported from a jail in
Nevada to one in California by way of Oregon. TransCor America officers M.
Grogan and D. Watkins supervised the prisoners. TransCor is headquartered
in Tennessee. Castillo alleges that on June 27, 2000, while passing through
Oregon, Grogan and Watkins beat him, sprayed him with pepper spray, and
threatened to shoot him, thus violating his Eighth Amendment rights.
Castillo sued Grogan and Watkins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in December 2001 in
federal district court in Tennessee. The district court dismissed the
complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), holding that Tennessee's
one-year statute of limitations applied and that Castillo was barred from
suit. Castillo appealed, arguing that because the assault took place in
Oregon, Oregon's two-year statute of limitations applied, and his complaint
was, therefore, timely.
The Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he general rule is that federal courts
apply state personal injury statutes of limitations to claims brought under
§1983." However, the law is not settled as to whether the state law where
the action arose or the state law where the case was filed controls. Thus,
the appeals court held, dismissal of the case as frivolous was
inappropriate. Castillo's complaint would be timely if Oregon law controlled.
The district court decision was vacated and the case remanded for
consideration of the timeliness question. This is not a ruling on the
merits of the case. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is
subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Castillo v. Grogan, 52
Fed.Appx. 750 (6th Cir. 2002).
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, vacating a Tennessee federal
district dismissal, reinstated a prisoner's civil rights lawsuit against
TransCor America for Eighth Amendment violations.
Juan Castillo, a California prisoner, was being transported from a jail in
Nevada to one in California by way of Oregon. TransCor America officers M.
Grogan and D. Watkins supervised the prisoners. TransCor is headquartered
in Tennessee. Castillo alleges that on June 27, 2000, while passing through
Oregon, Grogan and Watkins beat him, sprayed him with pepper spray, and
threatened to shoot him, thus violating his Eighth Amendment rights.
Castillo sued Grogan and Watkins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in December 2001 in
federal district court in Tennessee. The district court dismissed the
complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), holding that Tennessee's
one-year statute of limitations applied and that Castillo was barred from
suit. Castillo appealed, arguing that because the assault took place in
Oregon, Oregon's two-year statute of limitations applied, and his complaint
was, therefore, timely.
The Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he general rule is that federal courts
apply state personal injury statutes of limitations to claims brought under
§1983." However, the law is not settled as to whether the state law where
the action arose or the state law where the case was filed controls. Thus,
the appeals court held, dismissal of the case as frivolous was
inappropriate. Castillo's complaint would be timely if Oregon law controlled.
The district court decision was vacated and the case remanded for
consideration of the timeliness question. This is not a ruling on the
merits of the case. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is
subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Castillo v. Grogan, 52
Fed.Appx. 750 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Related legal case
Castillo v. Grogan
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 52 Fed.Appx. 750 (6th Cir. 2002). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
JUAN CASTILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. GROGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-5294
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
52 Fed. Appx. 750; 2002 U.S. App.
December 11, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
PRIOR HISTORY: Middle District of Tennessee. 01-01558. Echols. 12-18-01.
DISPOSITION: District court's order was vacated and case was remanded.
COUNSEL: JUAN CASTILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Crescent City, CA.
For M. GROGAN, Defendant-Appellee: Kimberly J. Dean, Deputy Attorney Gen, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN.
JUDGES: Before: MERRITT and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
OPINION:
[*751] ORDER
Before: MERRITT and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
[**2]
Juan Castillo, a California prisoner, appeals the district court order dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary and declaratory relief, Castillo sued transportation officers M. Grogan and D. Watkins, and their employer TransCor America (TransCor), a Tennessee corporation, in December 2001. Castillo alleged that on June 27, 2000, the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they beat him, sprayed him with pepper spray, and threatened to shoot him while transporting him from a jail in Nevada to one in California. The alleged attack took place in Oregon. The district court granted Castillo in forma pauperis status, screened the complaint, and dismissed the complaint as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court held that Castillo's complaint was barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. [**3]
In his appeal, Castillo argues that the district court should have applied Oregon's two-year statute of limitations and found his complaint timely.
This court reviews de novo a district court's decision to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). Upon review, we conclude that the district court erred by sua sponte dismissing Castillo's action as barred by Tennessee's statute of limitations. When a meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint as frivolous is appropriate. Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1995). In this case, however, there is some question as to which state's statute of limitations should be applied.
The general rule is that federal courts apply state personal injury statutes of limitations to claims brought under § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). Although this case was filed in Tennessee, the action arose in Oregon. At least one circuit has held that "the law of the state in which the alleged [**4] action arose controls." Glover v. Johnson, 831 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1987). The same court later recognized an apparent conflict between this holding and 42 U.S.C. § 1988: "the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 suggest that the relevant law is that of 'the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held.'" Davis v. Louisiana State Univ., 876 F.2d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 1989). The court did not resolve the issue because it held that the case in question arose in the forum state. Id.
Sua sponte dismissal of Castillo's complaint as frivolous was not appropriate because the statute of limitations defense is not obvious from the face of the complaint. See Pino, 49 F.3d at 53-54. The statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the [*752] federal civil rights statutes is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Oregon is two years. Oregon Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); Cooper v. City of Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1989). [**5] Thus, Castillo's complaint would be untimely under Tennessee law but timely under Oregon law. While the Tennessee statute of limitations may ultimately be found to apply, its application is not sufficiently obvious to merit sua sponte dismissal under § 1915.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's order and remand the case for further proceedings. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
No. 02-5294
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
52 Fed. Appx. 750; 2002 U.S. App.
December 11, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
PRIOR HISTORY: Middle District of Tennessee. 01-01558. Echols. 12-18-01.
DISPOSITION: District court's order was vacated and case was remanded.
COUNSEL: JUAN CASTILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Crescent City, CA.
For M. GROGAN, Defendant-Appellee: Kimberly J. Dean, Deputy Attorney Gen, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN.
JUDGES: Before: MERRITT and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
OPINION:
[*751] ORDER
Before: MERRITT and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
[**2]
Juan Castillo, a California prisoner, appeals the district court order dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary and declaratory relief, Castillo sued transportation officers M. Grogan and D. Watkins, and their employer TransCor America (TransCor), a Tennessee corporation, in December 2001. Castillo alleged that on June 27, 2000, the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they beat him, sprayed him with pepper spray, and threatened to shoot him while transporting him from a jail in Nevada to one in California. The alleged attack took place in Oregon. The district court granted Castillo in forma pauperis status, screened the complaint, and dismissed the complaint as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court held that Castillo's complaint was barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. [**3]
In his appeal, Castillo argues that the district court should have applied Oregon's two-year statute of limitations and found his complaint timely.
This court reviews de novo a district court's decision to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). Upon review, we conclude that the district court erred by sua sponte dismissing Castillo's action as barred by Tennessee's statute of limitations. When a meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint as frivolous is appropriate. Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1995). In this case, however, there is some question as to which state's statute of limitations should be applied.
The general rule is that federal courts apply state personal injury statutes of limitations to claims brought under § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). Although this case was filed in Tennessee, the action arose in Oregon. At least one circuit has held that "the law of the state in which the alleged [**4] action arose controls." Glover v. Johnson, 831 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1987). The same court later recognized an apparent conflict between this holding and 42 U.S.C. § 1988: "the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 suggest that the relevant law is that of 'the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held.'" Davis v. Louisiana State Univ., 876 F.2d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 1989). The court did not resolve the issue because it held that the case in question arose in the forum state. Id.
Sua sponte dismissal of Castillo's complaint as frivolous was not appropriate because the statute of limitations defense is not obvious from the face of the complaint. See Pino, 49 F.3d at 53-54. The statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the [*752] federal civil rights statutes is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Oregon is two years. Oregon Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); Cooper v. City of Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1989). [**5] Thus, Castillo's complaint would be untimely under Tennessee law but timely under Oregon law. While the Tennessee statute of limitations may ultimately be found to apply, its application is not sufficiently obvious to merit sua sponte dismissal under § 1915.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's order and remand the case for further proceedings. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.