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Prison's Spending Cap Policy May State First Amendment Claim

The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part pre-
service dismissal of a prisoner's civil rights complaint in which he
claimed that a prison policy capping the amount of money prisoners can
spend monthly from their accounts violates prisoners' rights of access to
courts and free speech.

Lansing Correctional Facility (Lansing), a Kansas Department of
Corrections (KDOC) prison, has a policy, Lansing Internal Management
Policy and Procedure 11-101, that prohibits prisoners from spending more
than $30 from their prison accounts in any given month. Stephen Bloom, a
Lansing prisoner, needed $4.00 above the $30 limit in September 2001 "to
obtain copies of legal authority from the Kansas University Law Library."
He submitted requests for release from the spending limits on September
24, 2001 and October 1, 2001, claiming that the $4.00 was a legal expense
exempt from the cap. Prison officials denied Bloom's application.

After exhausting administrative remedies, Bloom sued KDOC, KDOC
Administrator K. Ruhnke and the State of Kansas under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
claiming that Lansing's $30 spending cap policy violated his right of
access to courts and his right of free speech. The federal district court
in Kansas dismissed prior to service for failure to state a claim. Bloom
appealed.

The Court of Appeals agreed that dismissal was warranted on the
access to court claim, citing Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10
Cir. 1996), because Bloom failed to state why he needed copies of the
legal cases, "nor does he allege that Lansing's spending cap hindered his
efforts to plead a non-frivolous legal claim." The Tenth Circuit, though,
reversed on the free speech claim. Citing Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 937,
959 (9th Cir. 1999) and Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1986),
the court held that limitations on "the flow of information to
prisoners ... must reasonably relate to a legitimate penological
interest." Since the record before the court was "limited to the
plaintiff's complaint, which we must accept as true," the claim was
reversed for further proceedings.

The district court's dismissal was affirmed in part and reversed
in part and remanded for further proceedings. This is not a ruling on the
merits of the surviving claim. This case is published in the Federal
Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Bloom
v. Ruhnke, 42 Fed.Appx. 365 (10th Cir. 2002).

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Related legal case

Bloom v. Ruhnke

[U] Bloom v. Ruhnke, 42 Fed.Appx. 365 (10th Cir. 07/10/2002)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT


[2] No. 02-3032


[3] 42 Fed.Appx. 365, 2002


[4] July 10, 2002


[5] STEVEN KENT BLOOM, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
K. RUHNKE, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATOR, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND STATE OF KANSAS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.


[6] (D.C. No. 01-CV-3450-GTV) (D. Kansas)


[7] Before Ebel, Lucero, and Hartz, Circuit Judges.


[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harris L Hartz, Circuit Judge.


[9] ORDER AND JUDGMENT*fn1


[10] After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.


[11] Pro se Plaintiff Stephen Bloom, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas ("Lansing"), appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U. S. C. § 1983 complaint. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.


[12] Plaintiff's complaint centers around Lansing's Internal Management Policy and Procedures 11-101, which restricts inmates from spending more than $30 per month from their prisoner accounts. By the end of September 2001, Plaintiff had reached his monthly limit but found himself needing $4.00 to obtain copies of legal authority from the Kansas University Law Library. On September 24, 2001, he submitted a Special Purchase Order for the expense, stating that he felt the $4.00 was a legal expense and therefore exempt from the monthly spending cap. Prison officials disagreed with Plaintiff's characterization of the expense and denied his request. On October 1, 2001, he submitted a second request, which was denied. He appealed the decision to the Lansing Warden and then the Kansas Secretary of Corrections. The initial denial was affirmed.


[13] Plaintiff filed the present civil action in the District of Kansas on November 20, 2001, alleging deprivations of his right to free access to the courts and freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Such sua sponte dismissal is permitted under 28 U. S. C. § 1915A, although the district court cited to 28 U. S. C. § 1915 (which did not apply to Plaintiff because he did not file in forma pauperis).


[14] We review § 1915A dismissals de novo. Cf. Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that, because the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels that found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissals under that section are also reviewed de novo). "[W]e must liberally construe the allegations of a pro se complaint." Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999).


[15] We agree with the district court that Plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996), we held that a prisoner raising a denial-of-access claim must show "that the denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim." Nowhere in Plaintiff's complaint does he mention the purpose for which he requires the copies of legal cases, nor does he allege that Lansing's spending cap hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. His claim therefore fails to satisfy Penrod.


[16] We must reverse, however, on Plaintiff's free speech claim. "It is well settled that the First Amendment protects the flow of information to prisoners; any limitation must reasonably relate to a legitimate penological interest." Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); see Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1986). Defendants may well have a reasonable justification for limiting how much a prisoner can spend each month on reading materials. They may be able to demonstrate that justification at trial or through a motion for summary judgment. But the record is now limited to Plaintiff's complaint, which we must accept as true. Therefore, we must reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings.


[17] We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court with respect to Plaintiff's claim of denial of free access to the courts. We REVERSE the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for violation of his right of free speech and REMAND for further proceedings. We also DENY both Appellant's Motion to Strike Appellees' Notice of Service of Amendment to Appellees' Brief and Appellee's request to dismiss the appeal.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[18] *fn1 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.