[21] So, too, with the allegation relative to the alleged directive to Morgan that he tell his correspondents not to send him postage stamps.*fn7 If this restriction on an inmate's receiving stamps were fully enforced, it could materially impede the inmate's ability to communicate with the outside world since the institution itself provides only one stamp per week. A prison inmate's rights to communicate with family and friends are essentially First Amendment rights subject to § 1983 protection, Corby v. Conboy, supra; see Procunier v. Martinez, supra, and may not be infringed without good cause. Collins v. Schoonfield, supra. See also Adams v. Carlson,352 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Ill.), rev'd in parts not here relevant, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 896 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291, 1313-14 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Brown v. Hartness, 485 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1973) (restriction on mailing Christmas cards invalidated). Again, there must be a showing of a substantial governmental interest serving the legitimate and reasonable needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539, 574-77, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974), to warrant such limitations upon an individual inmate's rights to communicate.

[22] The allegations in the complaint as to being subjected to penalties for political beliefs stand on another footing, however. Neither militant political ideas nor past or threatened litigation on the part of the inmate will authorize prison discipline by way of segregation or otherwise. United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald,510 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1975); Sostre v. McGinnis, supra, 442 F.2d at 189. At the same time allegations of infringement of rights must have some specificity. The only "belief" alluded to in appellant's complaint is his objection to, or "refusal to partake in," the "neo slavery program that emanates from Unit 14 . . . ." The complaint goes on to allege that this program, among other things, consists of "washing bowls, stripping before exchanging linen, and standing at your door when talking to an officer." While the complaint alleges that appellant has found no support for these practices in applicable correction law, rules or regulations, to us they seem to be well within the superintendent's general authority of supervision and management of the institution, New York Correction Law § 18.2, subject always to overriding standards or rules of the State Commission of Correction, id. § 46. Absent specific allegations of (a) unjustifiably discriminatory administration of these correctional practices or (b) use of them as punishment without procedural due process, no federal question is raised. An ordinary work assignment that is not unduly onerous or afflictive does not constitute involuntary servitude. Laaman v. Hancock,351 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D.N.H. 1972); Wilkinson v. McManus, 299 Minn. 112, 216 N.W.2d 264 (1974); cf. Banks v. Norton, 346 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Conn. 1972). Nor, absent such allegations, are we to invade the administrator's province in respect to the facially reasonable regulations which affect the health of inmates (stripping before exchange of linen)*fn8 or the safety of guards or ease of visual inspection of cells (standing at the cell door when talking to a guard), as the regulations complained of in this case are plainly directed toward. The conclusory allegations here made are insufficient to raise a constitutional claim. Cf. Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Board of the State of New York,327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964). Our views would be quite otherwise, of course, were we to read the complaint as alleging the imposition of segregation without procedural due process.

[23] By the reversal of the judgment below in part, we remand for trial only after the State has had opportunity to demonstrate through the usual device of a motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits that there are no genuine issues of material fact and no substantial constitutional rights involved under these facts. Since the district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte without requiring an answer by the State, we thought we should make this clear.

[24] Judgment reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

[25] Disposition

[26] Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.


Opinion Footnotes

[27] *fn1 Appellant unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for censorship of his correspondence with counsel, Morgan v. Montanye,516 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir. 1974), rehearing en banc denied, 521 F.2d 693 (1975) (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial).

[28] *fn2 Administrative Bulletin #60, New York Commission of Corrections (May 30, 1972), provides for a screening of mail by a "Correctional Facility Media Review Committee." If it decides a particular media article is to be suppressed under criteria set forth in Bulletin #60, it is to notify the affected inmate. He may submit a statement in opposition to the suppression. If the decision to suppress is supported by the local correctional superintendent, the literature and the inmate's statement are forwarded to a Departmental Media Review Committee, along with a statement of reasons justifying the suppression.

[29] *fn3 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Parts 250 through 270 deal with procedures for implementing standards of inmate behavior, and for review of disciplinary decisions taken to enforce such standards.

[30] *fn4 The Steffel statement is relied on by the Fourth Circuit to buttress its en banc decision in McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), that administrative remedies need not be exhausted by a prison inmate in a § 1983 suit relative to conditions of incarceration.

[31] *fn5 McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 1975).

[32] *fn6 [We] think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).

[33] *fn7 The trial court should rather readily be able to dispose of the factual contentions of the parties; the State says it never gave Morgan such a directive and has no such regulation in effect.

[34] *fn8 But see Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1975), slip op. at 4207, 4210, contrariwise on rectal searches of inmates in segregation when used as a form of punishment. Genuine health regulations, however, are properly the concern of prison authorities: hygienic clothing and bedding is a goal sought indeed by most minimum standards of prison administration that have been proposed. See, e.g., United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Rules 17, 18 and 19.