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Second Circuit Addresses Time Claim Accrues

The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in
part a district court order granting summary judgment to the New York City
Police Department (NYPD) and various individual defendants for false arrest.

Clifton Morris was arrested in 1990 by various NYPD officers. He claimed
the arrest was false and malicious. Morris was never prosecuted, but
charges were not dropped until January 1998. That same year, Morris sued
the NYPD, various officers, a district attorney, and the State of New York
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charging that his arrest violated his constitutional
rights.

The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants in December
1999. Specifically, the court held that (1) Morris' claims accrued on the
date of his arrest and were time-barred under New York State's three-year
statute of limitations; (2) he failed to state a claim for malicious
prosecution; (3) the NYPD must be dismissed as a defendant because it is
not a "suable entity"; (4) claims against the State of New York were barred
by the Eleventh Amendment; and (5) the district attorney was immune from
suit by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Morris appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed on all points except the issue of a time bar.
The appeals court, citing Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946, 120 S.Ct. 363, 145 L.Ed.2d 284 (1999),
held that Morris could not file a § 1983 claim against the defendants until
the charges were dropped, because success in the suit would necessarily
imply the invalidity of the arrest. Consequently, Morris' claims did not
accrue until January 1998, when charges were dropped. Since Morris filed
his complaint in 1998, he was not time barred. Summary judgment on this
point was vacated.

On remand, the district court was instructed to allow Morris to amend his
complaint to substitute the City of New York for the NYPD. Morris was
instructed that he must make factual allegations showing that the City's
"'deliberate indifference' to proper, adequate training [of the police
officers] was the 'moving force' behind his alleged injuries."
The district court judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded with instructions. This case is published in the Federal Appendix
and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Morris v. New
York City Police Department, 59 Fed.Appx. 421 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Related legal case

Morris v. New York City Police Department

[U] Morris v. New York City Police Dep't, 59 Fed.Appx. 421 (2d Cir. 03/11/2003)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


[2] 00-0007


[3] 59 Fed.Appx. 421, 2003


[4] March 11, 2003


[5] CLIFTON MORRIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; P.O. JOHN DOE #1; P.O. JOHN DOE # 2; P.O. JOHN DOE # 3; HON. ROBERT MORGENTHAU, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK; AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.


[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge).


[7] Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: Clifton Morris, Pro Se, Greenhaven, Ny.


[8] Appearing for Defendants-Appellants, Paul L. Herzfeld, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York, Ny.


[9] Present: Rosemary Pooler, Barrington D. Parker, Circuit Judges, Janet C. Hall, *fn1 District Judge.


[10] SUMMARY ORDER


[11] THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.


[12] At a stated Term of the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of March two thousand and three.


[13] ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.


[14] Plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action in 1998 alleging violations of his civil rights arising from a 1990 arrest. In its December 17, 1999 opinion and order the District Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b). Specifically, the District Court determined that (1) plaintiff's claims of excessive force and false arrest were time-barred pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 actions; (2) plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution; (3) plaintiff's claims against the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") must be dismissed because it is not a suable entity; (4) plaintiff's claims against the State of New York are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (5) plaintiff's claims against District Attorney Morgenthau are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.


[15] We affirm the District Court in all respects except for its holding that plaintiff's false arrest claim is time-barred. This Court held in Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) (citation omitted), that "if success on a Section 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, such a claim does not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending prosecution continues to exist." That is, if plaintiff can show that a conviction obtained against him would have depended upon a false arrest, a Section 1983 claim arising from the false arrest does not accrue until such a conviction is no longer a possibility.


[16] The District Court held that because plaintiff was not convicted for the crimes charged as a result of his arrest in 1990, his false arrest claim began to accrue from the date of the arrest, not from the date in January 1998 when the state dropped its prosecution of plaintiff on these charges. As defendants concede, the District Court misconstrued our holding in Covington. The potential for a conviction continued to exist until the state dropped its prosecution in January 1998. Accordingly, plaintiff's false arrest claim did not accrue until this date if he can show that "recovery on [his] Section 1983 false arrest claim in this case would necessary imply the invalidity of any conviction or sentence arising from the criminal proceedings." 171 F.3d at 122. Because this is an inherently factual inquiry, id., we vacate the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's false arrest claim and remand for further proceedings.


[17] Because we affirm the District Court's holding that plaintiff's claims against the NYPD must fail because it is not a suable entity, the District Court is directed to allow plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to name the City of New York as a defendant. For the City to be properly named as a defendant, plaintiff must properly allege that his arrest took place pursuant to some unconstitutional custom or policy of the City's. See Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's appellate brief contains allegations that he was arrested by police officers "known for" engaging in harassment and that the City failed to properly train these officers. A claim of inadequate training may properly serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability if plaintiff can demonstrate that the City's "deliberate indifference" to proper adequate training was the "moving force" behind his alleged injuries. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997). Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to file an amended complaint which sets forth factual allegations sufficient to make such demonstration.


[18] Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the instant appeal is hereby AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART for further factual findings in accordance with this order.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[19] *fn1 The Honorable Janet C. Hall, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.