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Sex Offender Can Be Compelled to Admit Crimes for Entry to Prison Program
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a prison program for sex
offenders, which requires the prisoner to admit guilt to crimes convicted
upon, does not violate the prisoner's rights to equal protection and
against compelled self-incrimination.
Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., a prisoner at New York's Auburn Correctional
Facility, was denied entry into the Family Reunion Program, which permits
prisoners to spend extended periods of time with their spouses and
families, because he had refused to admit to the commission of the sexual
offenses he had been convicted upon. The district court granted prison
officials' motion to dismiss.
The Second Circuit Court found no basis for the equal protection claim.
As to claim under the Fifth Amendment for compelled incrimination, the
court held that state officials are permitted to take adverse
administrative action for failure to respond to inquiries, even where the
answers might lead to incriminate, so long as the adverse "consequence is
imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not for refusal to
give up a constitutional right."
Because Johnson failed to allege prison officials took any of the above
steps, their actions are proper. Moreover, the court found the inquiries
seeking a prisoner's admission to an alleged sexual offense are relevant
to the proper function of a rehabilitative program. The court found
Johnson's arguments without merit and affirmed the district court's order.
See: Johnson v. Baker, 108 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1997).
offenders, which requires the prisoner to admit guilt to crimes convicted
upon, does not violate the prisoner's rights to equal protection and
against compelled self-incrimination.
Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., a prisoner at New York's Auburn Correctional
Facility, was denied entry into the Family Reunion Program, which permits
prisoners to spend extended periods of time with their spouses and
families, because he had refused to admit to the commission of the sexual
offenses he had been convicted upon. The district court granted prison
officials' motion to dismiss.
The Second Circuit Court found no basis for the equal protection claim.
As to claim under the Fifth Amendment for compelled incrimination, the
court held that state officials are permitted to take adverse
administrative action for failure to respond to inquiries, even where the
answers might lead to incriminate, so long as the adverse "consequence is
imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not for refusal to
give up a constitutional right."
Because Johnson failed to allege prison officials took any of the above
steps, their actions are proper. Moreover, the court found the inquiries
seeking a prisoner's admission to an alleged sexual offense are relevant
to the proper function of a rehabilitative program. The court found
Johnson's arguments without merit and affirmed the district court's order.
See: Johnson v. Baker, 108 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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Related legal case
Johnson v. Baker
| Year | 1997 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 108 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1997) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Johnson v. Baker, 108 F.3D 10 (2d Cir. 02/26/1997)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 1996
[2] No. 1246
[3] Docket No. 96-2388
[4] 108 F.3d 10, 1997
[5] Decided: February 26, 1997
[6] Before: Van Graafeiland, Meskill, and Cabranes, Circuit Judges.
[7] Submitted : February 25, 1997
[8] Earnest L. Johnson, Jr.,
[9] Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley R. Baker, Coordinator of Family Services & Ministerial Services; Lynn Anderson, Present Family Reunion Program Coordinator & Correctional Counsel, John Dillon, Coordinator for Sex Offender Group; Carolyn Steingerwald, Correctional Counselor; Superintendent; Ronald F. Nelson, Deputy Superintendent-Program, Defendants-Appellees.
[10] Plaintiff Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 challenging prison policy requiring him to admit to alleged sexual offenses as basis for admission to Sex Offender Program which, in turn, is itself prerequisite for participation in Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff argues, primarily, that the requirement that he admit to his alleged offenses contravenes his equal protection rights and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Rosemary S. Pooler, Judge) granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
[11] Affirmed.
[12] Per Curiam:
[13] Plaintiff Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., is an inmate at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn"). In a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on May 22, 1995, he challenges Auburn's decision denying him admission to the Family Reunion Program, which permits inmates to spend extended periods of time with their spouses and families, because he had refused to admit to the commission of the sexual offenses of which he had been convicted. Specifically, plaintiff was informed that he would have to admit to his alleged wrongdoing in order to participate in Auburn's Sex Offender Program, membership in which is itself required for participation in the Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff's direct appeal to his conviction on sexual offense charges was pending at the time of his attempted admission into the Family Reunion Program, and he refused to admit to his alleged crimes. Consequently, he was removed from the Sex Offender Program and was denied admission into the Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983, alleging that the confession requirement for participation in the Family Reunion Program violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel Scanlon, Jr., who filed an Order and Report-Recommendation on January 3, 1996, recommending that defendants' motions be granted. On review in light of plaintiff's objections to the Report-Recommendation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Rosemary S. Pooler, Judge) granted defendants' motions to dismiss on different grounds. See Johnson v. Baker, 1996 WL 191982 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The plaintiff filed his notice of appeal from the District Court's decision on May 2, 1996. We affirm.
[14] As we understand plaintiff's primary claims, he argues that the requirement that he admit to his alleged wrongdoing violated his equal protection rights and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. While we find no basis for plaintiff's equal protection claim, his Fifth Amendment claim raises an issue that this Court resolved only relatively recently, in our in banc decision in Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992). In Asherman, we rejected an inmate's Fifth Amendment challenge to an order removing him from Supervised Home Release because he refused to submit to any psychiatric examination that included questioning about his alleged crimes. Id. at 980. We held that state officials are permitted to take adverse administrative action for failure to respond to inquiries, even where the answers might tend to incriminate, so long as the adverse "consequence is imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not for refusal to give up a constitutional right." Id. at 982. The state may not seek a court order compelling answers to its questions about an alleged offense, require a waiver of immunity, or insist that answers be used in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 983.
[15] Plaintiff has not alleged that Auburn officials took any of these steps, forbidden by our decision in Asherman, to compel him to admit to the alleged offenses. Moreover, we have no doubt that inquiries seeking an inmate's admission to an alleged sexual offense are "relevant" to the proper functioning of a rehabilitative program. Cf. Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that equal protection "rationality review" is appropriate in motion to dismiss on pleadings where "it takes but momentary reflection to arrive at a [governmental] purpose that is both legitimate beyond dispute and rationally related to the state's classification" (internal quotation marks omitted)). An inmate who is unwilling to admit to particular criminal activity is unlikely to benefit from a rehabilitative process aimed at helping those guilty of that activity. Likewise, participation in such a rehabilitative program is itself a rational requirement for membership in the Family Reunion Program.
[16] We have considered all of the plaintiffs' contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 1996
[2] No. 1246
[3] Docket No. 96-2388
[4] 108 F.3d 10, 1997
[5] Decided: February 26, 1997
[6] Before: Van Graafeiland, Meskill, and Cabranes, Circuit Judges.
[7] Submitted : February 25, 1997
[8] Earnest L. Johnson, Jr.,
[9] Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley R. Baker, Coordinator of Family Services & Ministerial Services; Lynn Anderson, Present Family Reunion Program Coordinator & Correctional Counsel, John Dillon, Coordinator for Sex Offender Group; Carolyn Steingerwald, Correctional Counselor; Superintendent; Ronald F. Nelson, Deputy Superintendent-Program, Defendants-Appellees.
[10] Plaintiff Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 challenging prison policy requiring him to admit to alleged sexual offenses as basis for admission to Sex Offender Program which, in turn, is itself prerequisite for participation in Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff argues, primarily, that the requirement that he admit to his alleged offenses contravenes his equal protection rights and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Rosemary S. Pooler, Judge) granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
[11] Affirmed.
[12] Per Curiam:
[13] Plaintiff Earnest L. Johnson, Jr., is an inmate at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn"). In a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on May 22, 1995, he challenges Auburn's decision denying him admission to the Family Reunion Program, which permits inmates to spend extended periods of time with their spouses and families, because he had refused to admit to the commission of the sexual offenses of which he had been convicted. Specifically, plaintiff was informed that he would have to admit to his alleged wrongdoing in order to participate in Auburn's Sex Offender Program, membership in which is itself required for participation in the Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff's direct appeal to his conviction on sexual offense charges was pending at the time of his attempted admission into the Family Reunion Program, and he refused to admit to his alleged crimes. Consequently, he was removed from the Sex Offender Program and was denied admission into the Family Reunion Program. Plaintiff commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983, alleging that the confession requirement for participation in the Family Reunion Program violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel Scanlon, Jr., who filed an Order and Report-Recommendation on January 3, 1996, recommending that defendants' motions be granted. On review in light of plaintiff's objections to the Report-Recommendation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Rosemary S. Pooler, Judge) granted defendants' motions to dismiss on different grounds. See Johnson v. Baker, 1996 WL 191982 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The plaintiff filed his notice of appeal from the District Court's decision on May 2, 1996. We affirm.
[14] As we understand plaintiff's primary claims, he argues that the requirement that he admit to his alleged wrongdoing violated his equal protection rights and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. While we find no basis for plaintiff's equal protection claim, his Fifth Amendment claim raises an issue that this Court resolved only relatively recently, in our in banc decision in Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992). In Asherman, we rejected an inmate's Fifth Amendment challenge to an order removing him from Supervised Home Release because he refused to submit to any psychiatric examination that included questioning about his alleged crimes. Id. at 980. We held that state officials are permitted to take adverse administrative action for failure to respond to inquiries, even where the answers might tend to incriminate, so long as the adverse "consequence is imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not for refusal to give up a constitutional right." Id. at 982. The state may not seek a court order compelling answers to its questions about an alleged offense, require a waiver of immunity, or insist that answers be used in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 983.
[15] Plaintiff has not alleged that Auburn officials took any of these steps, forbidden by our decision in Asherman, to compel him to admit to the alleged offenses. Moreover, we have no doubt that inquiries seeking an inmate's admission to an alleged sexual offense are "relevant" to the proper functioning of a rehabilitative program. Cf. Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that equal protection "rationality review" is appropriate in motion to dismiss on pleadings where "it takes but momentary reflection to arrive at a [governmental] purpose that is both legitimate beyond dispute and rationally related to the state's classification" (internal quotation marks omitted)). An inmate who is unwilling to admit to particular criminal activity is unlikely to benefit from a rehabilitative process aimed at helping those guilty of that activity. Likewise, participation in such a rehabilitative program is itself a rational requirement for membership in the Family Reunion Program.
[16] We have considered all of the plaintiffs' contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit.