×
You have 2 more free articles available this month. Subscribe today.
Sixth Circuit Upholds $54,750 ETS Damage Award
The Sixth Circuit US Court of Appeals upheld the district court's bench trial findings of fact and law, $54,750 damages award and $51,786 attorney fees award in a state prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit claiming injury from environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS" - second-hand cigarette smoke).
As reported in PLN (Aug. 2000), Jamie Reilly, a prisoner at Southern Michigan State Prison ("Parnell"), was a severe asthmatic who had doctors' orders to be housed in an ETS-free environment. Nonetheless, for five years, Reilly continued to be subjected to ETS in his prison housing.
Reilly sued Parnell warden Henry Grayson and deputy wardens Chris Daniels and Joseph Cross for thus willfully and knowingly violating his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Even though Reilly was housed in a so-called "non-smoking" cell block, smoking was rife.
In the bench trial findings reported extensively in Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F.Supp.2d 762 (ED Mich. 2001), the court found ample evidence of the defendants' deliberate indifference to Reilly's serious medical needs. It awarded $20/day damages for 1,825 days, or $36,500, plus $18,250 in punitive damages - a first for a prison ETS suit. On appeal, the defendants merely reiterated their trial assertions - that at most Reilly had a right only to a non-smoking cellmate, that he had no serious medical needs and that the defendants had not acted with deliberate indifference.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the cellmate limitation, observing that the language of controlling case law (Helling v. McKinney (1993) 509 US 25; Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1992)) was broader, encompassing the right to be free from "exposure" to ETS, i.e., whether such smoke "hovers" or not (citing Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991)). Reviewing the facts, the court found no clear error. It further agreed that there was ample evidence of "reckless disregard" for Reilly's constitutional rights sufficient to sustain both the damage and punitive damage awards. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the calculation of attorney fees, and affirmed the district court in every respect. The plaintiffs were represented by Daniel Manville [see p.2]. See: Reilly v. Grayson, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002).
As reported in PLN (Aug. 2000), Jamie Reilly, a prisoner at Southern Michigan State Prison ("Parnell"), was a severe asthmatic who had doctors' orders to be housed in an ETS-free environment. Nonetheless, for five years, Reilly continued to be subjected to ETS in his prison housing.
Reilly sued Parnell warden Henry Grayson and deputy wardens Chris Daniels and Joseph Cross for thus willfully and knowingly violating his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Even though Reilly was housed in a so-called "non-smoking" cell block, smoking was rife.
In the bench trial findings reported extensively in Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F.Supp.2d 762 (ED Mich. 2001), the court found ample evidence of the defendants' deliberate indifference to Reilly's serious medical needs. It awarded $20/day damages for 1,825 days, or $36,500, plus $18,250 in punitive damages - a first for a prison ETS suit. On appeal, the defendants merely reiterated their trial assertions - that at most Reilly had a right only to a non-smoking cellmate, that he had no serious medical needs and that the defendants had not acted with deliberate indifference.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the cellmate limitation, observing that the language of controlling case law (Helling v. McKinney (1993) 509 US 25; Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1992)) was broader, encompassing the right to be free from "exposure" to ETS, i.e., whether such smoke "hovers" or not (citing Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991)). Reviewing the facts, the court found no clear error. It further agreed that there was ample evidence of "reckless disregard" for Reilly's constitutional rights sufficient to sustain both the damage and punitive damage awards. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the calculation of attorney fees, and affirmed the district court in every respect. The plaintiffs were represented by Daniel Manville [see p.2]. See: Reilly v. Grayson, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Reilly v. Grayson
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 310 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2002) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
| Attorney Fees | 51786 |
| Damages | 54750 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
JAMIE REILLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY GRAYSON, CHRIS DANIELS, and JOSEPH CROSS, Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 01-1993/01-2189
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
310 F.3d 519; 2002 U.S. App. ; 2002 FED App. 0397P (6th Cir.)
September 17, 2002, Argued
November 18, 2002, Decided
November 18, 2002, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Rehearing En Banc Denied January 24, 2003, Reported at: 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1276.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 95-76362. Avern Cohn, Senior District Judge.
Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL: ARGUED: Kevin R. Himebaugh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants.
Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Kevin R. Himebaugh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants.
Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Before: SILER, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY
OPINION: [***2]
[*520] MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from the judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor following a four-day bench trial in the district court. The action was brought by Michigan prison inmate Jamie Reilly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and charged various state prison officials with violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Reilly, suffering from asthma, claimed that the defendants' repeated failure to house him in a prison unit free of environmental (second-hand) tobacco smoke exposed him to an unreasonable [**2] risk of harm to his health and constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Based on evidence presented at trial, the district court agreed, awarding $ 36,500 in compensatory damages, $ 18,250 in punitive damages, and $ 51,786 in attorney's fees. We affirm on the basis of the district court's opinion, reported as Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
The primary issues on appeal are reiterations of the defenses raised at trial. First, the defendants contend as a legal matter that they should have been granted [*521] qualified immunity because the plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a "completely smoke-free environment," but only the right not to be celled with an active smoker, and because, even if there is a broader right to be housed in a smoke-free facility, it was not clearly established at the time of the plaintiff's complaints in this case. Second, they argue as a factual matter that the plaintiff failed to establish that he had a "serious medical need" to which the defendants were "deliberately indifferent." We find no merit to either of these contentions. [***3]
Although the leading Supreme Court and Sixth [**3] Circuit decisions at the time of Reilly's incarceration, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993), and Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1992), involved a prisoner's right not to be housed with a smoker, the language of the opinions is broader than those facts would indicate, repeatedly emphasizing the right to be free from exposure to second-hand smoke. As we said in Hunt, prisoners have a right not to be exposed to environmental smoke that presents a serious risk to health and to be removed "from places where smoke hovers." Id. at 735 (quoting Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1991)). The district court's reliance on those cases was obviously not misplaced. Moreover, we find no clear error in connection with the court's findings that Reilly suffered from a serious medical condition that was exacerbated by exposure to second-hand smoke and, moreover, that the defendants deliberately failed to respond to the repeated recommendations by medical personnel that he be removed to a smoke-free environment in order to avoid further detriment to his health. [**4]
Nor do we find reversible error in the district court's calculation of damages in this case. The defendants argue that at most only nominal damages should have been awarded because Reilly failed to prove actual injury and causation. However, we conclude from our review of the record that there was sufficient evidence from which the district court could find that Reilly suffered both an increase in the severity of his asthma and an increase in the risk of future damage to his health as a direct result of his exposure to second-hand smoke. Moreover, there was ample evidence to support the district court's conclusion that punitive damages were justified by the defendants' "reckless . . . disregard of Reilly's rights." Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 774. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the calculation of attorney's fees.
Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and in awarding damages and [***4] attorney's fees. Because the reasons why judgment should be entered for the plaintiff have been fully articulated [**5] by the district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Nos. 01-1993/01-2189
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
310 F.3d 519; 2002 U.S. App. ; 2002 FED App. 0397P (6th Cir.)
September 17, 2002, Argued
November 18, 2002, Decided
November 18, 2002, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Rehearing En Banc Denied January 24, 2003, Reported at: 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1276.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 95-76362. Avern Cohn, Senior District Judge.
Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL: ARGUED: Kevin R. Himebaugh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants.
Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Kevin R. Himebaugh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants.
Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Before: SILER, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY
OPINION: [***2]
[*520] MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from the judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor following a four-day bench trial in the district court. The action was brought by Michigan prison inmate Jamie Reilly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and charged various state prison officials with violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Reilly, suffering from asthma, claimed that the defendants' repeated failure to house him in a prison unit free of environmental (second-hand) tobacco smoke exposed him to an unreasonable [**2] risk of harm to his health and constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Based on evidence presented at trial, the district court agreed, awarding $ 36,500 in compensatory damages, $ 18,250 in punitive damages, and $ 51,786 in attorney's fees. We affirm on the basis of the district court's opinion, reported as Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
The primary issues on appeal are reiterations of the defenses raised at trial. First, the defendants contend as a legal matter that they should have been granted [*521] qualified immunity because the plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a "completely smoke-free environment," but only the right not to be celled with an active smoker, and because, even if there is a broader right to be housed in a smoke-free facility, it was not clearly established at the time of the plaintiff's complaints in this case. Second, they argue as a factual matter that the plaintiff failed to establish that he had a "serious medical need" to which the defendants were "deliberately indifferent." We find no merit to either of these contentions. [***3]
Although the leading Supreme Court and Sixth [**3] Circuit decisions at the time of Reilly's incarceration, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993), and Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1992), involved a prisoner's right not to be housed with a smoker, the language of the opinions is broader than those facts would indicate, repeatedly emphasizing the right to be free from exposure to second-hand smoke. As we said in Hunt, prisoners have a right not to be exposed to environmental smoke that presents a serious risk to health and to be removed "from places where smoke hovers." Id. at 735 (quoting Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1991)). The district court's reliance on those cases was obviously not misplaced. Moreover, we find no clear error in connection with the court's findings that Reilly suffered from a serious medical condition that was exacerbated by exposure to second-hand smoke and, moreover, that the defendants deliberately failed to respond to the repeated recommendations by medical personnel that he be removed to a smoke-free environment in order to avoid further detriment to his health. [**4]
Nor do we find reversible error in the district court's calculation of damages in this case. The defendants argue that at most only nominal damages should have been awarded because Reilly failed to prove actual injury and causation. However, we conclude from our review of the record that there was sufficient evidence from which the district court could find that Reilly suffered both an increase in the severity of his asthma and an increase in the risk of future damage to his health as a direct result of his exposure to second-hand smoke. Moreover, there was ample evidence to support the district court's conclusion that punitive damages were justified by the defendants' "reckless . . . disregard of Reilly's rights." Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 774. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the calculation of attorney's fees.
Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and in awarding damages and [***4] attorney's fees. Because the reasons why judgment should be entered for the plaintiff have been fully articulated [**5] by the district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).