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Sixth Circuit Vacates Dismissal of § 1983 Suit

Sixth Circuit Vacates Dismissal of § 1983 Suit

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, has vacated
and remanded a Michigan District Court's grant of summary judgment to
prison officials on grounds that the prisoner-plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Raheem Muhammad, a Michigan state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, raising a number of civil rights violations which he claims were
done to him by prison officials at the State Prison of Southern Michigan
(SPSM) in retaliation for grievances Muhammad filed. The complaint was
filed June 11, 1996, and related to events occurring at SPSM in September
1995.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) took effect April 26, 1996. Under
the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires that a prisoner exhaust all
administrative remedies prior to filing suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The
defendants moved for, and the district court granted, summary judgment for
failure to exhaust remedies. Muhammad appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that, because Muhammad's complaint related to
events prior to April 26, 1996, he was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies but only "to effect substantial compliance with"
42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). The district court decision was vacated and remanded
with instruction to the lower court to permit Muhammad to demonstrate
substantial compliance with §1997e

This decision is published in the Federal Appendix, not the Federal
Reporter, and is not considered precedential. See: Muhammad v Martins, 23
Fed, Appx 207 (6th Cir. 2001).

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Related legal case

Muhammad v. Martins

RAHEEM A. MUHAMMAD, as known as Alex Scott, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY MARTENS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-1116

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

23 Fed. Appx. 207; 2001 U.S. App.

August 7, 2001, Filed


NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.

PRIOR HISTORY: Eastern District of Michigan. 96-72419. Duggan. 01-05-00.

DISPOSITION: All pending motions denied, Judgment vacated and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.


COUNSEL: RAHEEM A. MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff - Appellant, Pro se, Baraga, MI.

For NANCY MARTENS, Defendant - Appellee: Kevin M. Thom, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.

JUDGES: Before: CLAY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; WISEMAN, District Judge. *

* The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

OPINION: [*208]
ORDER
This is an appeal from a district court's judgment for the defendants in this prisoner civil rights case. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument [**2] is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
On June 11, 1996, Michigan inmate Raheem Muhammad (also known as Alex Scott) filed a civil rights complaint in which he sought monetary damages and other relief from four corrections employees and officials in their official and individual capacities. The matter was eventually referred to a magistrate judge who concluded that the defendants were entitled [*209] to summary judgment. The district court adopted this recommendation, over Muhammad's objections, and this appeal followed.
This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. See EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1999). A de novo examination of the record and law supports the defendants' argument that they are entitled to have the present judgment vacated and the case remanded for Muhammad's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
On May 23, 1996, the district court received a prisoner civil rights complaint from Muhammad, an inmate at the State Prison of Southern Michigan ("SPSM"). In the complaint, filed on June 11, 1996, Muhammad claims that he suffered a series of First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations at the [**3] hands of the defendants, SPSM officials and employees, during the last quarter of 1995. Muhammad contends, in part, that defendants Frederick and Barber destroyed Muhammad's personal property and issued false misconduct tickets in September 1995 to Muhammad in retaliation for Muhammad's prison grievances. Muhammad also contends that SPSM Assistant Warden Pratt-Stephens failed to correct the situation when informed of the actions. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended that the defendants were entitled to have some of the claims dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief and to be awarded summary judgment on the remainder of the claims on the merits. The district court adopted these reports and recommendations, over Muhammad's objections, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Muhammad asks this court to review the judgment in its entirety. The Michigan appellees defend the district court's decision in the alternative, but only after arguing with some force that they are entitled to have the judgment vacated and the matter returned to the district court for Muhammad to comply with the exhaustion provisions of Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").
After [**4] April 26, 1996, the effective date of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires that a prisoner must exhaust all of his available administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action in federal court, see Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998), and the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating that he has exhausted these remedies. See id. at 1104. The prisoner must exhaust his remedies as to all claims arising from his confinement, including excessive force, equal protection, and other constitutional claims. See Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1999). The prisoner is required to exhaust even if the only remedy he seeks, e.g., monetary damages, is unavailable in the administrative process. See Booth v. Churner, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001). To establish that he has exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, a prisoner should attach to his § 1983 complaint any decision demonstrating the administrative disposition of his claims. See Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999); Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104. [**5] In the case at bar, Muhammad's complaint was received and filed after April 26, 1996, and he does not argue otherwise on appeal. Thus, the administrative exhaustion provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) would normally apply to his complaint.
While the administrative exhaustion requirement set forth in § 1997e(a) applies to Muhammad's case because he filed his complaint after April 26, 1996, he is required only to effect substantial compliance with that section because the events giving rise to his claim occurred before the effective date of the PLRA. See [*210] Wolff v. Moore, 199 F.3d 324, 327-29 (6th Cir. 1999); Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 879-80. This means that Muhammad must show that he made a good faith attempt to reach the appropriate prison official or officials in an effort to resolve his complaints internally. See Wolff, 199 F.3d at 327. The case will therefore be remanded to the district court so that it may dismiss the complaint without prejudice in order to give Muhammad a chance to demonstrate his substantial compliance with the administrative exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. See Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). [**6]
Accordingly, all pending motions are denied, the judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.