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South Carolina: Liberty Interest Not Implicated by Denial of Rehabilitation
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the denial of a prisoner's
grievance requesting immediate enrollment in the second phase of a sex
offender treatment program (SOTP) did not create a liberty interest
entitling him to have the decision reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge
Division (ALJD).
After successfully completing Phase I of the SOTP, convicted sex offender
Charles Sullivan sought to enroll in Phase II of the program. When he
received no response, Sullivan requested immediate enrollment in the
program through the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC)
prisoner grievance process. His grievance was denied saying that due to
limited bed space prisoners requesting SOTP Phase II would be placed on a
waiting list and interviewed to determine their eligibility.
Sullivan appealed to the ALJD, which granted the SCDC's motion to dismiss
contending that it did not have jurisdiction, and a circuit court affirmed.
Sullivan appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which certified
the matter to the state Supreme Court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held: 1) The ALJD only had jurisdiction to
review the SCDC's denial of Sullivan's grievance if it implicated a
state-created liberty interest. 2) Denying Sullivan's grievance did not
implicate a state-created liberty interest, since "denying Sullivan access
to SOTP II or any other sex offender program does not impose an 'atypical
or significant hardship' on Sullivan as all other inmates designated as sex
offenders are afforded the same access to treatment." 3) Sullivan was not
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis because the case did not involve a
fundamental right; therefore, access to the courts was not constitutionally
required.
See: Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437,
586 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 2003).
grievance requesting immediate enrollment in the second phase of a sex
offender treatment program (SOTP) did not create a liberty interest
entitling him to have the decision reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge
Division (ALJD).
After successfully completing Phase I of the SOTP, convicted sex offender
Charles Sullivan sought to enroll in Phase II of the program. When he
received no response, Sullivan requested immediate enrollment in the
program through the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC)
prisoner grievance process. His grievance was denied saying that due to
limited bed space prisoners requesting SOTP Phase II would be placed on a
waiting list and interviewed to determine their eligibility.
Sullivan appealed to the ALJD, which granted the SCDC's motion to dismiss
contending that it did not have jurisdiction, and a circuit court affirmed.
Sullivan appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which certified
the matter to the state Supreme Court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held: 1) The ALJD only had jurisdiction to
review the SCDC's denial of Sullivan's grievance if it implicated a
state-created liberty interest. 2) Denying Sullivan's grievance did not
implicate a state-created liberty interest, since "denying Sullivan access
to SOTP II or any other sex offender program does not impose an 'atypical
or significant hardship' on Sullivan as all other inmates designated as sex
offenders are afforded the same access to treatment." 3) Sullivan was not
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis because the case did not involve a
fundamental right; therefore, access to the courts was not constitutionally
required.
See: Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437,
586 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 2003).
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Related legal case
Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Correctio
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 355 S.C 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 2003). |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Denial of Sullivan's grievance did not arise in any of the "typical" ways enumerated in Al-Shabazz; it is not the result of a disciplinary proceeding and does not involve sentence-related credits or custody status. Sullivan's claim is most accurately described as a "condition of confinement claim." Under Wolff; Sandin; Al-Shabazz, and Furtick, to determine whether Sullivan is entitled to review of the SCDC's decision, the Court must decide whether Sullivan's request for access to SOTP II implicates a liberty interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process guarantees. The only way for the ALJ Division to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over Sullivan's claim is if it implicates a state-created liberty interest. See Sandin; Furtick.
*444 Sullivan contends that the South Carolina Constitution guarantees him a right to rehabilitation, which requires the SCDC to give him access to sex offender treatment while incarcerated. The South Carolina Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall establish institutions for the confinement of all persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the inmates.
S.C. Const. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added).
In McLamore v. State, this Court declined to impose a duty of education or rehabilitation on the prison system. 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972). Instead, the Court held that "[e]fforts to rehabilitate and educate are to be commended; to require that every prisoner be treated exactly alike might discourage rather than encourage the programs." Id. at 423, 186 S.E.2d at 255. Even if this provision is read to require some rehabilitation for inmates, it does not mandate any specific programs that must be provided by the General Assembly or the SCDC and, more importantly, it does not mandate any particular timetable for the furnishing of any rehabilitative services.
Sullivan has already received some rehabilitation; he successfully completed Phase I of the SOTP. Further, in denying Sullivan's grievance request for "immediate" enrollment in Phase II of the SOTP, the SCDC simply stated that there was no space in the program, but indicated that there was a waiting list. If room becomes available, it may even become possible for Sullivan to enroll in Phase II.
In our opinion, the South Carolina Constitution does not require that the SCDC grant Sullivan enrollment in SOTP II. To interpret the constitutional mandate in Article XII, § 2, as requiring the SCDC to provide this specific program, would make the ALJD and then the judicial branch micro-managers of the prison system. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68- 69, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (1999) (holding that S.C. Const. Art. XI, § 3, which requires the General Assembly "to provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public education," guarantees only a "minimally adequate education," and does not call for this Court to dictate *445 what programs are to be used in this State's public schools). In addition, such a holding would conflict with the **128 hands-off approach that this Court has taken towards internal prison matters. Al-Shabazz. Finally, recognizing a liberty interest in a specific course of rehabilitation does not comport with Sandin's standard; denying Sullivan access to SOTP II or any other sex offender program does not impose an "atypical or significant hardship" on Sullivan as all other inmates designated as sex offenders are afforded the same access to treatment.
Because the SCDC's denial of enrollment in SOTP II does not implicate a liberty interest, we find that Sullivan's grievance is not entitled to review by the ALJD. [FN5]
FN5. The en banc decision of the ALJD in McNeil formed the basis for the ALJD's and the circuit court's dismissal of Sullivan's claim. For this reason, and because we know McNeil has been relied upon by the ALJ in other cases to deny jurisdiction, the ALJD and the circuit court are instructed to look to this opinion, not McNeil, for guidance in future cases. Although much of McNeil's analysis is accurate, we believe Wolff requires minimal due process when for state-created liberty interests, which are not necessarily limited to sentence credit issues and major disciplinary decisions. We recognize that a condition of confinement could implicate a state created liberty interest under Wolff. However, we adhere to Sandin's pronouncement that "these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical or significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d at 430.
II. In Forma Pauperis
Sullivan maintains that indigent inmates should be entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in appeals from the decision of the ALJ under the APA. We disagree.
In Ex Parte: Martin v. State, 321 S.C. 533, 471 S.E.2d 134 (1995), the Court addressed when an inmate may proceed in forma pauperis. This Court held, "[i]n the absence of a statutory provision allowing the general waiver of filing fees, we conclude motions to proceed in forma pauperis may only be granted where specifically authorized by statute or required by constitutional provisions." Id. at 535, 471 S.E.2d at 134-35 (citations omitted). There is no statutory provision that permits the waiver of filing fees for an appeal brought under the APA, and S.C.Code Ann. § 8-21-310(11)(a) provides *446 that a clerk of court must collect a filing fee of $100.00 for any complaint or petition.
Sullivan urges the Court to make an exception for appeals from the ALJD that would have been brought as PCRs prior to Al-Shabazz. Alternatively, Sullivan contends that the waiver of the filing fees for cases like his is constitutionally required. See Martin, 321 S.C. at 535, 471 S.E.2d at 135 (noting that "where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Constitution requires that an indigent be allowed access to the courts.").
The General Assembly is the body charged with the power to waive filing fees, and they have not created a waiver for this set of cases. Further, this is not a case involving "fundamental rights," so access to the courts is not constitutionally required in this case. Therefore, Sullivan is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis on his appeal from the ALJ's dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM AS MODIFIED.
MOORE, WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.
S.C.,2003.
Sullivan v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124
END OF DOCUMENT
*444 Sullivan contends that the South Carolina Constitution guarantees him a right to rehabilitation, which requires the SCDC to give him access to sex offender treatment while incarcerated. The South Carolina Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall establish institutions for the confinement of all persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the inmates.
S.C. Const. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added).
In McLamore v. State, this Court declined to impose a duty of education or rehabilitation on the prison system. 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972). Instead, the Court held that "[e]fforts to rehabilitate and educate are to be commended; to require that every prisoner be treated exactly alike might discourage rather than encourage the programs." Id. at 423, 186 S.E.2d at 255. Even if this provision is read to require some rehabilitation for inmates, it does not mandate any specific programs that must be provided by the General Assembly or the SCDC and, more importantly, it does not mandate any particular timetable for the furnishing of any rehabilitative services.
Sullivan has already received some rehabilitation; he successfully completed Phase I of the SOTP. Further, in denying Sullivan's grievance request for "immediate" enrollment in Phase II of the SOTP, the SCDC simply stated that there was no space in the program, but indicated that there was a waiting list. If room becomes available, it may even become possible for Sullivan to enroll in Phase II.
In our opinion, the South Carolina Constitution does not require that the SCDC grant Sullivan enrollment in SOTP II. To interpret the constitutional mandate in Article XII, § 2, as requiring the SCDC to provide this specific program, would make the ALJD and then the judicial branch micro-managers of the prison system. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68- 69, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (1999) (holding that S.C. Const. Art. XI, § 3, which requires the General Assembly "to provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public education," guarantees only a "minimally adequate education," and does not call for this Court to dictate *445 what programs are to be used in this State's public schools). In addition, such a holding would conflict with the **128 hands-off approach that this Court has taken towards internal prison matters. Al-Shabazz. Finally, recognizing a liberty interest in a specific course of rehabilitation does not comport with Sandin's standard; denying Sullivan access to SOTP II or any other sex offender program does not impose an "atypical or significant hardship" on Sullivan as all other inmates designated as sex offenders are afforded the same access to treatment.
Because the SCDC's denial of enrollment in SOTP II does not implicate a liberty interest, we find that Sullivan's grievance is not entitled to review by the ALJD. [FN5]
FN5. The en banc decision of the ALJD in McNeil formed the basis for the ALJD's and the circuit court's dismissal of Sullivan's claim. For this reason, and because we know McNeil has been relied upon by the ALJ in other cases to deny jurisdiction, the ALJD and the circuit court are instructed to look to this opinion, not McNeil, for guidance in future cases. Although much of McNeil's analysis is accurate, we believe Wolff requires minimal due process when for state-created liberty interests, which are not necessarily limited to sentence credit issues and major disciplinary decisions. We recognize that a condition of confinement could implicate a state created liberty interest under Wolff. However, we adhere to Sandin's pronouncement that "these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical or significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d at 430.
II. In Forma Pauperis
Sullivan maintains that indigent inmates should be entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in appeals from the decision of the ALJ under the APA. We disagree.
In Ex Parte: Martin v. State, 321 S.C. 533, 471 S.E.2d 134 (1995), the Court addressed when an inmate may proceed in forma pauperis. This Court held, "[i]n the absence of a statutory provision allowing the general waiver of filing fees, we conclude motions to proceed in forma pauperis may only be granted where specifically authorized by statute or required by constitutional provisions." Id. at 535, 471 S.E.2d at 134-35 (citations omitted). There is no statutory provision that permits the waiver of filing fees for an appeal brought under the APA, and S.C.Code Ann. § 8-21-310(11)(a) provides *446 that a clerk of court must collect a filing fee of $100.00 for any complaint or petition.
Sullivan urges the Court to make an exception for appeals from the ALJD that would have been brought as PCRs prior to Al-Shabazz. Alternatively, Sullivan contends that the waiver of the filing fees for cases like his is constitutionally required. See Martin, 321 S.C. at 535, 471 S.E.2d at 135 (noting that "where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Constitution requires that an indigent be allowed access to the courts.").
The General Assembly is the body charged with the power to waive filing fees, and they have not created a waiver for this set of cases. Further, this is not a case involving "fundamental rights," so access to the courts is not constitutionally required in this case. Therefore, Sullivan is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis on his appeal from the ALJ's dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM AS MODIFIED.
MOORE, WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.
S.C.,2003.
Sullivan v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124
END OF DOCUMENT