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Summary Judgment Vacated and Remanded in Part on Religious Free Exercise Claim
Summary Judgment Vacated and Remanded in Part on Religious Free Exercise
Claim
The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated and
remanded in part summary judgment to prison officials in a free exercise
of religion case.
Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate and avowed practitioner of the
religion known as Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo, sued officials of the
Augusta Correctional Center (ACC) under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that
prison officials denied his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion by denying him the right to possess prayer oil, religious powder,
incense, candles and a lodestone. The district court granted summary
judgment to ACC officials. Young appealed.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Young's claims under Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-879 (1990), and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987). The court held that prison officials cited legitimate
security concerns in denying Young possession of incense, candles and a
lodestone. However, the appeals court ruled that no legitimate penological
interests were given for denying Young possession of prayer oil and
religious powder. Further, the record was devoid of any information
regarding the demands of Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo. Thus, it was
premature for the district court to grant summary judgment to prison
officials.
The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment with respect to the
incense, candles and lodestone, but vacated with respect to the prayer oil
and religious powder. The case was remanded for further factual
development on the record. Readers should note that Young raised no claims
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. §§2000cc, et. seq. This case is published in the Federal
Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Young v.
Saunders, 34 Fed.Appx. 925 (4th Cir. 2002).
Claim
The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated and
remanded in part summary judgment to prison officials in a free exercise
of religion case.
Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate and avowed practitioner of the
religion known as Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo, sued officials of the
Augusta Correctional Center (ACC) under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that
prison officials denied his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion by denying him the right to possess prayer oil, religious powder,
incense, candles and a lodestone. The district court granted summary
judgment to ACC officials. Young appealed.
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Young's claims under Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-879 (1990), and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987). The court held that prison officials cited legitimate
security concerns in denying Young possession of incense, candles and a
lodestone. However, the appeals court ruled that no legitimate penological
interests were given for denying Young possession of prayer oil and
religious powder. Further, the record was devoid of any information
regarding the demands of Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo. Thus, it was
premature for the district court to grant summary judgment to prison
officials.
The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment with respect to the
incense, candles and lodestone, but vacated with respect to the prayer oil
and religious powder. The case was remanded for further factual
development on the record. Readers should note that Young raised no claims
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. §§2000cc, et. seq. This case is published in the Federal
Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Young v.
Saunders, 34 Fed.Appx. 925 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Related legal case
Young v. Saunders
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 34 Fed.Appx. 925 (4th Cir. 2002). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
[U] Young v. Saunders, 34 Fed.Appx. 925 (4th Cir. 05/20/2002)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 01-7782
[3] 34 Fed.Appx. 925, 2002
[4] May 20, 2002
[5] CLYDE YOUNG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
LONNIE M. SAUNDERS; LARRY W. HUFFMAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-00-837-7)
[7] Counsel
[8] Clyde Young, Appellant Pro Se.
[9] Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
[10] Before Niemeyer, Williams, and Gregory, Circuit Judges.
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[12] UNPUBLISHED
[13] Submitted: April 23, 2002
[14] Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
[15] Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
[16] OPINION
[17] Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001), claiming that officials responsible for policies at the Augusta Correctional Center (ACC) violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when they denied him access to items necessary to practice his religion (Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo). These items include prayer oil, religious powder, incense, candles, and a lodestone.
[18] The Supreme Court has held that a neutral, generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the law has an incidental effect on religious practice. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990). See also Hines v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 1998); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining Smith). In the context of regulations that affect inmates, the Supreme Court has held, prior to Smith, that the regulation must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O'Lone, the Supreme Court provided the following factors for lower courts to weigh when evaluating constitutional challenges to prison regulations: (1) a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it; (2) the inmates should have alternative means of exercising their religious rights; and, (3) accommodating the inmates' rights should not severely impact other inmates, prison officials, and allocation of prison resources generally. Id. at 350-52. Relying heavily upon O'Lone, the district court found that the regulations restricting Young's possession of these items were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and granted summary judgment to Saunders.
[19] The penological interests enumerated by Saunders to limit access to candles, incense, and a lodestone survive both the Smith and O'Lone tests. Significantly, the regulations that limit Young's access to these items are general in their applicability and do not target the religious practice of Voodoo. Furthermore, Saunders' concerns over the safety and security of the facility and its inhabitants provide adequate support for the conclusion that accommodating Young's request for these items would have undesirable results in ACC. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to Young's claims for candles, incense, and a lodestone.
[20] On appeal, however, Young provides several counter-arguments to the penological interests enumerated by the Appellees in denying access to prayer oil and religious powder that warrant further review. Although Appellees claim a compelling interest in protecting the safety and security of the facility, they have failed to articulate the manner in which these legitimate goals are advanced by restricting the purchase of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder. Second, although the district court accepted for purposes of decision that Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo is a valid religious practice and that Young needed prayer oils and religious powder to practice that religion, the record fails to provide any information about the demands of this religion. Without this factual finding, the second prong of the O'Lone test, whether Young is able to participate in other religious observances of his faith, cannot be considered. Finally, the record provides no insight as to how the allowance of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder, subject to inspection, would affect other inmates, prison personnel, or prison resources.
[21] Because crucial factual issues remain, summary judgment was premature and Young's claims regarding his requests for prayer oil and religious powder should be allowed to proceed. For this reason, we vacate the district court's order as it relates to prayer oil and religious powder, and, without indicating any view as to any other procedural or substantive issue presented by Young, remand the matter for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
[22] AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 01-7782
[3] 34 Fed.Appx. 925, 2002
[4] May 20, 2002
[5] CLYDE YOUNG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
LONNIE M. SAUNDERS; LARRY W. HUFFMAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-00-837-7)
[7] Counsel
[8] Clyde Young, Appellant Pro Se.
[9] Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
[10] Before Niemeyer, Williams, and Gregory, Circuit Judges.
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[12] UNPUBLISHED
[13] Submitted: April 23, 2002
[14] Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
[15] Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
[16] OPINION
[17] Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001), claiming that officials responsible for policies at the Augusta Correctional Center (ACC) violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when they denied him access to items necessary to practice his religion (Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo). These items include prayer oil, religious powder, incense, candles, and a lodestone.
[18] The Supreme Court has held that a neutral, generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the law has an incidental effect on religious practice. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990). See also Hines v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 1998); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining Smith). In the context of regulations that affect inmates, the Supreme Court has held, prior to Smith, that the regulation must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O'Lone, the Supreme Court provided the following factors for lower courts to weigh when evaluating constitutional challenges to prison regulations: (1) a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it; (2) the inmates should have alternative means of exercising their religious rights; and, (3) accommodating the inmates' rights should not severely impact other inmates, prison officials, and allocation of prison resources generally. Id. at 350-52. Relying heavily upon O'Lone, the district court found that the regulations restricting Young's possession of these items were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and granted summary judgment to Saunders.
[19] The penological interests enumerated by Saunders to limit access to candles, incense, and a lodestone survive both the Smith and O'Lone tests. Significantly, the regulations that limit Young's access to these items are general in their applicability and do not target the religious practice of Voodoo. Furthermore, Saunders' concerns over the safety and security of the facility and its inhabitants provide adequate support for the conclusion that accommodating Young's request for these items would have undesirable results in ACC. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to Young's claims for candles, incense, and a lodestone.
[20] On appeal, however, Young provides several counter-arguments to the penological interests enumerated by the Appellees in denying access to prayer oil and religious powder that warrant further review. Although Appellees claim a compelling interest in protecting the safety and security of the facility, they have failed to articulate the manner in which these legitimate goals are advanced by restricting the purchase of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder. Second, although the district court accepted for purposes of decision that Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo is a valid religious practice and that Young needed prayer oils and religious powder to practice that religion, the record fails to provide any information about the demands of this religion. Without this factual finding, the second prong of the O'Lone test, whether Young is able to participate in other religious observances of his faith, cannot be considered. Finally, the record provides no insight as to how the allowance of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder, subject to inspection, would affect other inmates, prison personnel, or prison resources.
[21] Because crucial factual issues remain, summary judgment was premature and Young's claims regarding his requests for prayer oil and religious powder should be allowed to proceed. For this reason, we vacate the district court's order as it relates to prayer oil and religious powder, and, without indicating any view as to any other procedural or substantive issue presented by Young, remand the matter for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
[22] AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART