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Tear Gassing of VA Prisoner Requires Trial
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that material facts were in dispute in a Virginia prisoner's suit alleging guards willfully and maliciously fired a tear gas device in his face at point blank range that their action was punitive and not for security purposes, and that he was denied adequate medical treatment.
The prisoner became violent and demanded medical attention. After he was placed in an isolation cell, he began destroying the contents of his cell and set fire to the mattress and bed clothes after he was again refused permission to see a doctor. After guards put the fire out, the prisoner broke the windows and damaged his sink and plumbing. Guards then fired a 12-gauge tear gas shell into the cell. The next day, the prisoner was given a bowl of water and a piece of cloth to clean himself and was moved to another cell. He was not taken to a doctor for four days. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit held there was several factual disputes between the parties. It was disputed whether the tear gas was fired into the cell or at the prisoners' face, at close range. The prisoner contended use of the gas was punishment for destroying property, while guards contended it was to cease a security risk. The court found there was no explanation why lesser force was not used, and why the prisoner was not placed in a bare cell when guards knew he was acting violently. Moreover, there is no explanation why he did not see a doctor for four days and was not removed from the cell after the gas was used on him.
The district court's order was reversed and remanded for trial. See: Greear v. Loving, 538 F.2d 578 {4th Cir. 1978).
The prisoner became violent and demanded medical attention. After he was placed in an isolation cell, he began destroying the contents of his cell and set fire to the mattress and bed clothes after he was again refused permission to see a doctor. After guards put the fire out, the prisoner broke the windows and damaged his sink and plumbing. Guards then fired a 12-gauge tear gas shell into the cell. The next day, the prisoner was given a bowl of water and a piece of cloth to clean himself and was moved to another cell. He was not taken to a doctor for four days. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit held there was several factual disputes between the parties. It was disputed whether the tear gas was fired into the cell or at the prisoners' face, at close range. The prisoner contended use of the gas was punishment for destroying property, while guards contended it was to cease a security risk. The court found there was no explanation why lesser force was not used, and why the prisoner was not placed in a bare cell when guards knew he was acting violently. Moreover, there is no explanation why he did not see a doctor for four days and was not removed from the cell after the gas was used on him.
The district court's order was reversed and remanded for trial. See: Greear v. Loving, 538 F.2d 578 {4th Cir. 1978).
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Related legal case
Grear v. Loving
| Year | 1978 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 538 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1978) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
Greear v. Loving, 538 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 04/22/1976)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 75-1430
[3] 1976, 538 F.2d 578
[4] April 22, 1976
[5] JAMES L. GREEAR, APPELLANT
v.
W. R. LOVING, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUPERINTENDENT OF CORRECTIONAL UNIT NUMBER 10, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Ted Dalton, District Judge.
[7] Ralph S. Spritzer [court-appointed counsel] for appellant; Patrick A. O'Hare, Assistant Attorney General, and (Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, on brief) for appellee.
[8] Author: Butzner
[9] Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
[10] BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
[11] James L. Greear appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in his suit against W. R. Loving, individually and as superintendent of a Virginia prison. In his pro se complaint, Greear alleged that the prison officials willfully and maliciously fired a tear gas device in his face at point-blank range, that their action was punitive and not for security purposes, and that he was denied adequate medical treatment. The district court properly recognized that Greear's complaint stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. Cf. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). Ruling that the use of tear gas under the circumstances did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and that the prisoner had received adequate medical care, it then granted the superintendent's motion for summary judgment. Greear v. Loving, 391 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Va. 1975). Because the record presents genuine issues of material facts, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
[12] The pleadings and affidavits show that Greear, an inmate of correctional unit No. 25, became violent and demanded medical attention. After five correctional officers subdued him, he was transferred to Unit No. 10, where he was placed in an isolation cell. When his request to see a doctor was again denied, he began to destroy the contents of his cell, eventually setting fire to the mattress and bedclothes. After the guards used a water hose to extinguish the fire, Greear broke the windows and damaged his sink and plumbing. The officers then fired a 12-gauge tear gas shell into his cell. The next morning Greear was given a bowl of water and a cloth with which to wash himself, and he was moved to a new cell. He was taken to a doctor four days later.
[13] The record discloses several material factual disputes between the parties. Greear alleges the tear gas was fired into his face at close range. The appellee denies this charge. Greear claims the tear gas was discharged to punish him for destroying property. The appellee insists that the tear gas was used because Greear presented a security risk. The parties also disagreed about Greear's need for medical care. Greear alleges that the officers told him he could wash the tear gas off if the gas burns made him uncomfortable, but the superintendent contends that Greear was not burned.
[14] The affidavits do not disclose why the prison officials failed to use lesser measures, such as locking Greear in a bare cell and removing his matches when it became apparent that he was violent and emotionally disturbed. Similarly, it is unclear why Greear could not have been subdued by the use of means other than tear gas and why he could not have been removed from the gas filled cell shortly after the shell was fired. The record also fails to explain adequately the superintendent's assertion that no doctor was available from October 23, when Greear became mentally disturbed, until October 28.
[15] Before summary judgment is granted, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and all pleadings and supporting papers must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This principle is applicable even though the pro se complaint and supporting papers are inartfully drawn, cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972).
[16] We decide nothing concerning the merits of Greear's claims. He has, however, demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material facts. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded for trial.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 75-1430
[3] 1976, 538 F.2d 578
[4] April 22, 1976
[5] JAMES L. GREEAR, APPELLANT
v.
W. R. LOVING, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUPERINTENDENT OF CORRECTIONAL UNIT NUMBER 10, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Ted Dalton, District Judge.
[7] Ralph S. Spritzer [court-appointed counsel] for appellant; Patrick A. O'Hare, Assistant Attorney General, and (Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, on brief) for appellee.
[8] Author: Butzner
[9] Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
[10] BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
[11] James L. Greear appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in his suit against W. R. Loving, individually and as superintendent of a Virginia prison. In his pro se complaint, Greear alleged that the prison officials willfully and maliciously fired a tear gas device in his face at point-blank range, that their action was punitive and not for security purposes, and that he was denied adequate medical treatment. The district court properly recognized that Greear's complaint stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. Cf. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). Ruling that the use of tear gas under the circumstances did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and that the prisoner had received adequate medical care, it then granted the superintendent's motion for summary judgment. Greear v. Loving, 391 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Va. 1975). Because the record presents genuine issues of material facts, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
[12] The pleadings and affidavits show that Greear, an inmate of correctional unit No. 25, became violent and demanded medical attention. After five correctional officers subdued him, he was transferred to Unit No. 10, where he was placed in an isolation cell. When his request to see a doctor was again denied, he began to destroy the contents of his cell, eventually setting fire to the mattress and bedclothes. After the guards used a water hose to extinguish the fire, Greear broke the windows and damaged his sink and plumbing. The officers then fired a 12-gauge tear gas shell into his cell. The next morning Greear was given a bowl of water and a cloth with which to wash himself, and he was moved to a new cell. He was taken to a doctor four days later.
[13] The record discloses several material factual disputes between the parties. Greear alleges the tear gas was fired into his face at close range. The appellee denies this charge. Greear claims the tear gas was discharged to punish him for destroying property. The appellee insists that the tear gas was used because Greear presented a security risk. The parties also disagreed about Greear's need for medical care. Greear alleges that the officers told him he could wash the tear gas off if the gas burns made him uncomfortable, but the superintendent contends that Greear was not burned.
[14] The affidavits do not disclose why the prison officials failed to use lesser measures, such as locking Greear in a bare cell and removing his matches when it became apparent that he was violent and emotionally disturbed. Similarly, it is unclear why Greear could not have been subdued by the use of means other than tear gas and why he could not have been removed from the gas filled cell shortly after the shell was fired. The record also fails to explain adequately the superintendent's assertion that no doctor was available from October 23, when Greear became mentally disturbed, until October 28.
[15] Before summary judgment is granted, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and all pleadings and supporting papers must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This principle is applicable even though the pro se complaint and supporting papers are inartfully drawn, cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972).
[16] We decide nothing concerning the merits of Greear's claims. He has, however, demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material facts. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded for trial.