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Virginia Jail Acted Under Color Of State Law For § 1983 Purposes

Virginia Jail Acted Under Color Of State Law For § 1983 Purposes


The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that a jail had acted under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 but that it did not receive federal financial assistance for purposes
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Plaintiff Malik Jarno, a Guinean citizen, was arrested at Dulles
International Airport in Virginia for attempting to enter the United States
illegally. While awaiting a hearing before an immigration judge, Jarno was
held at the Piedmont Regional Jail which was under federal contract to
house immigration detainees. While at the jail, Jarno claimed he was beaten
by guards and sprayed with pepper spray without provocation. Jarno
subsequently brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) against jail officials
and guards "alleging constitutional and statutory violations resulting both
from his detention and from his treatment at the Jail."

On defendant's motion for dismissal, the district court held: 1) Jail
officials acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes as Jarno's
complained of injuries resulted from jail officials' "alleged failure to
train its guards not to use excessive force against INS detainees, and its
alleged condonation of a policy and practice of using such excessive force
on those detainees." 2) Entities receiving "federal financial assistance"
are prohibited by Title VI from "discriminating on the basis of race,
color, or national origin." The district court held that even though the
Fourth Circuit had not addressed the issue, "other circuit courts have
squarely held that procurement contracts do no constitute federal
assistance where the recipient receives no government subsidy for its
services but rather acts solely as a market participant." Thus, Jarno's
Title VI claim was dismissed. See: Jarno v. Lewis, 256 F.Supp.2d 499 (ED VA
2003).

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Related legal case

Jarno v. Lewis

256 F.Supp.2d 499

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

Malik JARNO, Plaintiff,

v.

Warren LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
No. CIV.A. 02-1622-A.
April 11, 2003.

Immigration detainee who was held in regional jail pursuant to contract with federal government, brought civil rights suit against jail authority, jail superintendent, guards who allegedly attacked him and Immigration and Naturalization Service officials. The District Court, Brinkema, J., held that: (1) jail authority acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit, and (2) receipt of federal funds in consideration of contract to temporarily house federal detainees did not constitute federal financial assistance for purposes of national origin claim under Title VI of Civil Rights Act.
Motion granted in part and denied in part.


*500 Eliza Tamsin Platts-Mills, Esq., Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
William J. Howard, Asst. U.S. Atty., United States Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRINKEMA, District Judge.
Before us is defendant Piedmont Regional Jail Authority's Motion to Dismiss, in which it asks us to dismiss plaintiff Malik Jarno's claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.FN1 We partially addressed this motion in open court on February 21, 2003, directing the parties to file supplemental briefing on two issues left unresolved at the hearing: whether a state-established prison authority acts under color of state law with regard to immigrant detainees held at its facilities pursuant to a contract with the federal government, and whether that authority's receipt of federal monies in consideration of that contract constitutes federal financial assistance under Title VI. This Memorandum Opinion resolves both of these issues.

FN1. By an Order dated February 21, 2003, we granted in part and denied in part defendants Lewis Barlow and T. Cynthia Williams' Motion to Dismiss, with the denial subject to reconsideration pending further briefing by the parties. Having considered that briefing, we find no reason to alter our ruling, beyond the clarification that the dismissal of defendant Barlow was without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

According to his Complaint, Plaintiff Malik Jarno is a Guinean citizen with limited English skills who is moderately mentally retarded. Jarno alleges that, during the time period in question, he was a 17-year-old juvenile. On January 28, 2001, Jarno attempted to enter the United States through Dulles International Airport in Sterling, Virginia, using a French passport. Although Jarno allegedly asserted a claim for political asylum at that time, he was detained by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (the INS) for a period of roughly eight months before being given a hearing before an Immigration Judge, in late September 2001. During this time period, the INS placed Jarno in a number of detention facilities, one of which was the Piedmont Regional Jail (the Jail).
Defendant Piedmont Regional Jail Authority (the Authority) is a regional jail authority established pursuant to Section 53.1 of the Virginia Code. The Authority maintains the Jail on behalf of six participating*501 Virginia counties. Jarno alleges that, while delegating final policymaking authority to the Jail's Superintendent, the Authority is responsible for establishing minimum standards for the Jail's administration and operation. The Jail houses INS detainees such as Jarno pursuant to a contract with the federal government.
Jarno was detained at the Jail from approximately August or September 2001 to March 2002. According to the Complaint, he was housed within the general population at the Jail during most of his confinement there, except for a ten-day period beginning approximately January 23, 2002, when he was placed in solitary confinement pursuant to the direction of the INS. Jarno alleges that the Jail was not properly equipped, and its guards not properly trained, to handle immigration detainees. Specifically, he claims that Jail guards engaged in a pattern of mistreating immigration detainees, resulting in two separate incidents in which Jarno himself was physically abused, first by a guard spraying him in the face with pepper spray at close range without provocation, and second in a group assault in which four or five guards attacked and battered him without provocation. Both of these incidents allegedly occurred on November 1, 2001.
Jarno sued the Authority, the Jail guards who allegedly attacked him, the superintendent of the Jail, and various INS officials, alleging constitutional and statutory violations resulting both from his detention and from his treatment at the Jail. In Count VI of his Complaint, Jarno alleges a cause of action against the Authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the Authority condoned a custom or policy under which guards were permitted to use excessive force on INS detainees in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Authority's failure to adequately train Jail guards directly resulted in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force against him. In Count VII, Jarno claims that the Authority unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (Title VI), by, inter alia, failing to provide him with language translation services during his confinement at the Jail.
The Authority moved to dismiss the claims against it. In its motion, the Authority argues that it is not subject to suit under § 1983 because it did not act under color of state law with regard to Jarno, and that it is not subject to suit under Title VI because it does not receive federal financial assistance as defined in 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c). For the reasons discussed below, we find no merit to the Authority's first argument, but will grant the Motion to Dismiss with regard to Jarno's Title VI claim.FN2

FN2. The Authority's motion raises a third argument, that Jarno fails to state a claim under § 1983 because he cannot, as a matter of law, establish that the alleged abuse that occurred on November 1, 2001 constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because we resolved that issue in open court on February 21, 2003, we do not address it here.


DISCUSSION


I. Standard of Review

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true """ it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999) (citing *502 Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992)). In considering the Authority's Motion to Dismiss, we draw all reasonable factual inferences in Jarno's favor. Id. We are not, however, required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Id. (citing District 28, United Mine Workers of America, Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir.1979)).

II. Count VI (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Section 1983 provides that [e]very person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State """ subjects """ any citizen of the United States """ to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining whether a party acts under color of state law, and is therefore subject to suit under § 1983:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible"""" Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Id. Section 1983 does not apply, however, to parties acting under color of federal law. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir.1998).
The parties do not dispute that, in its normal course of operations, the Authority is a state actor. Rather, the Authority argues that its contractual relationship with the INS transformed it from a state actor into a federal actor with regard to its treatment of Jarno, because Jarno was detained pursuant to federal law. Jarno argues, however, that because the INS exercised no meaningful control over the manner in which he was held within the Jail, the Authority was not a federal actor with regard to either him or other INS detainees held in the general prison population.
The precise issue before us was addressed in Henderson v. Thrower, 497 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.1974). In Henderson, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a federal prisoner's § 1983 claim against various officials of the Mobile, Alabama city jail, who had allegedly deprived the plaintiff of adequate medical care while he was temporarily confined in that facility. The court below had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the defendants were not acting under color of state law but rather were simply holding the plaintiff pursuant to a contract with the federal government for the temporary care and safekeeping of federal prisoners. In reversing, the Fifth Circuit stated that the proper focus of the inquiry was not on the particular circumstances which brought the plaintiff under state control, but rather on the fact of that control and the manner of its exercise. Id. at 125-26. Because the federal contract at issue did not authorize federal interference with the operation of the Mobile jail, and because the defendant jail officials supervised and treated the plaintiff by virtue of the positions conferred on *503 them [under state law], the court found that the defendants were subject to suit as state actors under § 1983. Id. at 126.