Sixth Circuit Rules in Excessive Force Case

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a case brought by a jail detainee against Franklin County, Ohio, its Sheriff, and fourteen deputies. Michael Reed claimed deputies used excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

As a result of a motorcycle accident in the 1990s, Reed suffers from seizures. In August 2008, Reed had a seizure in Columbus, Ohio. When emergency personnel attempted to take him to the hospital, Reed violently resisted, was arrested, and charged with assault of a police officer.

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas found Reed not guilty by reason of insanity in December 2008, and ordered him committed to a behavioral healthcare forensic unit.

Reed's excessive force claims arose after two incidents in January 2009. The first incident occurred in his cell at the Franklin County Corrections Center II (FCCCII) and the second event occurred in the hospital emergency room where he was taken in for treatment.

On January 9, 2009, Reed suffered a seizure in his cell at FCCCII. A taser was used twice when deputies attempted to cuff Reed. The event was video recorded and neither party contested the evidence; the issue before the court was whether the video depicted use of excessive force.

Later, on January 29, 2009, two deputies transported Reed to the Mount Carmel Hospital Emergency Room where he was cuffed to a bed-rail. The examination took place without incident. While waiting for paperwork, one deputy stepped out to use the rest room. According to the remaining deputy, Reed immediately began muttering while squatting on the bed. The deputy ordered him to lay down, which was ignored by Reed. Reed then allegedly asked the deputy, “Do you want a piece of me?” In response, the deputy used a taser on Reed. The deputy's account of what happened in the hospital emergency room was uncontested in the record and no other evidence spoke to the incident.

The court ruled the cell incident provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to infer that the deputies exercised deliberate indifference towards Reed's federally protected rights. The evidence of the events, though, could not establish an excessive force claim even if he was suffering from a seizure and unable to comprehend the deputies' statements.

Nothing in the record indicates the deputies' actions were for any reason other than getting Reed medical attention. The court ruled the decision to use a taser “may have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional.”

The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling no rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendant deputies acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism toward Reed.

Reed offered no evidence of his own. There was no dispute that the hospital incident was a “rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament” precluding a pre-response deliberation. Reed could not show that the deputies' actions “involved force employed maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” rather than a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. Mich. 2001).

Because there was no violation of Reed's constitutional rights, his claims against Franklin County, its Sheriff, and the deputies failed and the district court ruling granting the defendants summary judgment was affirmed. See: Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. Ohio 2014).

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