No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Defendant’s Plea Withdrawal and Sentencing

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a lower court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing a prisoner based on his criminal record or in denying the prisoner’s motion to withdraw his plea without the prisoner showing a “fair and just reason.”

Ronald Merritt, arrested on crack cocaine charges, pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Days before sentencing, news arose of a scandal with a chemist responsible for testing Merritt’s crack. Sentencing went on as planned, with Merritt retaining the right to seek withdrawal of his plea. The district court sentenced him to a below-the-guidelines prison term. With news of the chemist’s illegitimate testing practices, Merritt moved to withdraw his plea and the district court denied his motion. Merritt first appealed his sentence as unreasonable and then appealed the denial of his motion. On June 16, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s holdings.

On April 23, 2011, Merritt took cash from an undercover police officer for drugs in a Boston neighborhood. Taking the money to his supplier, Larry Wilkins, across the street, Merritt returned to give the officer a bag of crack cocaine. When Merritt and Wilkins were subsequently arrested, Merritt was found with another bag of crack and Wilkins with many bags. One of Wilkin’s bags field tested positive for crack and thirteen others tested by a police chemist additionally returned positive results. Samples carried by Merritt also tested positive for crack, which were handled by Annie Dookhan, a chemist with the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute.

After being indicted for possession of crack with the intent to distribute, Merritt first claimed that he was innocent but later admitted that he had had crack and pled guilty with the apparent understanding that the government would recommend a lesser sentence. The district court set the sentencing hearing for September 7, 2012. However, due to scandalous news about Dookhan’s substance testing practices before the sentencing date, Merritt reserved the right to seek withdrawal of his plea in the future.

At his sentencing, he was given a prison term of 84 months, a sentence which Merritt appealed, arguing that the district court unreasonably relied on his criminal history. Sometime later, as an investigation revealed Dookhan’s certification of untested substances and contamination of other substances, Merritt filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The district court denied his motion, finding no connection between Dookhan’s actions and Merritt’s case. Consequently, Merritt filed a second appeal under the claim that his plea had been involuntary and uninformed based on Dookhan’s conduct.

The appellate court, consolidating both appeals, first addressed Merritt’s plea. Because Merritt reserved the right to seek to withdraw his plea, federal law stated that he had to demonstrate “fair and just reason for requesting” this relief. The appellate court found no such reason provided by Merritt. The district court had currently determined that Merritt’s plea had been voluntary and informed in light of Merritt’s “overwhelming” guilt through the fourteen bags testing positive for crack — none tested by Dookhan.

Merritt further contended that (1) an affidavit of his lawyer asserted that had Dookhan’s misconduct been known, the lawyer would not have advised Merritt to plead guilty, (2) Merritt’s crack, tested by Dookhan, could have been counterfeit and (3) the “fundamental fairness” of the plea bargaining was at stake.

The appellate court disagreed with each contention, concluding in an objective context that “the subjective, post hoc assertions of defense counsel [did] not possess decretory significance.” Moreover, the court reasoned that Merritt had “never maintained that this counterfeit drug scenario… [had] any grounding in reality” and had “admitted his factual guilt.” The appellate court did note that Merritt had “raised the issue of Dookhan’s misconduct properly” but added “timing alone [was] not enough to tip the scales.” Finally, the court concluded that Merritt had not proved that his plea “was tainted by unfairness.”

In considering Merritt’s claim of an unreasonable sentence, the appellate court pointed out the Merritt qualified for “a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of 151 to 188 months” based on his classification “as a career offender,” stemming from his prior criminal history, but received a lesser sentence of 84 months. Merritt’s argument that the district court had not fairly considered that the majority of his 26 convictions had not been for drugs was held to be meritless, having no detrimental influence on the “substantive reasonableness” of his sentence, especially with the sentence falling below Merritt’s GSR.

The appellate court thus held that the district court had not abused its discretion in sentencing Merritt to 84 months or in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. See: United States v. Merritt, 755 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. Mass. 2014).

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