Sex Offender Loses Adam Walsh Civil Commitment Appeal
Sex Offender Loses Adam Walsh Civil Commitment Appeal
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, on December 10, 2013, the judgement of the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina civilly committing appellant Richard Savage to post-incarceration confinement with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at their Butner, North Carolina facility. Savage was convicted in 2006 of distributing heroin in the District of Columbia and sentenced to three years imprisonment with the BOP. Reflective of Savage’s history of sexual offenses, though unrelated to his charge of incarceration, Savage was certified a “sexually dangerous person” and caused per the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (18 U.S.C. §4248) to remain in the custody of the BOP after completion of his sentence.
Savage appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Adam Walsh Act in that he was not “in the custody of the BOP” as required by §4248(a). He also asserted that in not releasing him to the supervision of the District of Columbia Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency Authority (CSOSA), the district court erred by not following the provisions of §4248(d).
Savage relied on a Fourth Circuit case wherein the prisoner, an ex-army officer, argued that under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the military and BOP had a contractual agreement where the BOP housed military prisoners and that based on this contractual agreement, he was exempt from the strictures of the Adam Walsh Act because he was not under the legal custody (i.e. release, parole authority, etc.) of the BOP, but rather he belonged to the military for the final disposition. Savage maintained that D.C. code, under which he was incarcerated, was like the UCMJ, a separate body of law from Title 18, and that BOP maintained physical, but not legal, custody as required by §4248 to adjudicate a civil commitment. The district court denied Savage’s argument.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Savage’s legal posture was dissimilar to the case which he claimed was “virtually indistinguishable” to his. The court pointed out that District of Columbia offenders are statutorily, as opposed to contractually, as is the case with military offenders, placed under BOP control, and that the BOP does have legal authority over the final disposition (parole, release, etc.) of District of Columbia prisoners, and that the BOP is the Attorney General’s designee in matters of confinement. The court also noted that because Savage never raised the issue of §4248(d), mandating his release to CSOSA, rather than civil incarceration, he effectively waived his right to do so in the high court. See: United States v. Savage, 737 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. N.C. 2013).
Related legal case
United States v. Savage
| Year | 2013 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 737 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. N.C. 2013). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Appeals Court Edition | F.3d |