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1971 New York Censorship Dispute Enjoins Prison Personnel from Interfering With Mail-Ordered Literature

1971 New York Censorship Dispute Enjoins Prison Personnel from Interfering With Mail-Ordered Literature

A New York prisoner brought a federal civil rights action seeking an order enjoining prison personnel from interfering with the receipt of literature he ordered through the mail. The district court found that the procedure for screening literature, a list of seven specific criteria of non-acceptability, within a specific timeframe, was deficient in that, (1) it did not give prisoners notice of the reason for delays in their receipt of literature, and (2) it failed to provide notice to prisoners that they could present arguments to the committee.

On March 24, 1971, the New York Department of Corrections adopted a new procedure for the screening of literature ordered by and sent to prisoners. The new procedure established a committee consisting of the head of the service unit, a member of the mental health staff, the chaplain, the chief educational officer, and the superintendent. Under the rules, several of the committee members could be represented by delegates, and if a committee member determined that a screened piece of literature is unacceptable, they were instructed to submit their argument to the committee.

Less than thirty days after the March 24, 1971 directive, on April 29, 1971 an administrative bulletin was published, superseding the March procedure. This bulletin provided detailed guidelines stating seven factors which could lead to non-acceptability of literature and identified individuals that would sit on the committee – “the head of The Service Unit, a member of the Mental Hygiene Staff, The Chaplains, An Education Officer or Teacher, or Librarians, and a Representative of the Custodial Service.” The new process remained unchanged, with the exception of a paragraph imposing certain time limitations on the process, to insure that a final decision would be reached within approximately two weeks.

Therefore, the essential question before the court was whether any procedural due process should be afforded, as a Constitutional right, to a prisoner as a means of protecting his First Amendment Rights.

The court found that the defendants, by their recent adoption of a procedure having some aspects of due process, were making efforts to ensure due process and stayed its order for 40 days. The recently-developed procedure would (1) require notice be given to the prisoner involved, and (2) to give the prisoner involved an opportunity to object and be heard. See: Sostre v Otis, 330 F.Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

Related legal case

Sostre v Otis