CDCR May No Longer Use Sentence Credits to Advance Parole Eligibility of Some California Prisoners Serving Indeterminate Sentences
by Chuck Sharman
In a tough ruling for some California prisoners, the state Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, said on July 28, 2025, that a 2016 voter initiative explicitly authorized the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to award “good time” credits to state prisoners in excess of limits established in prior statutes, but it did not authorize application of those credits to advance the parole dates of all indeterminately sentenced prisoners.
The case was brought by the nonprofit Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, which challenged the CDCR’s application of constitutional changes approved by Proposition 57. That gave the CDCR authority “to award credits for good behavior and for approved rehabilitative or educational achievements,” the Court read from its text, “notwithstanding … any other provision of law.” The measure also “directed the [CDCR] to adopt regulations in furtherance of such authority.”
The genesis of the referendum came in 2011, when the Supreme Court of the U.S. affirmed a lower court ruling that found state prisons unconstitutionally overcrowded and ordered the prison population reduced by 46,000 to a level no more than 137.5% of design capacity; as PLN reported, that was followed two years later by another order to release an additional 9,600 prisoners because the state had not produced a “durable remedy” to the constitutional violation previously found. [See: PLN, July 2011, p.1; and Aug. 2013, p.20.]
Proposition 57 was the state’s “durable remedy.” It amended the state constitution, directing the CDCR to avoid having prisoners released by court order. It also gave the CDCR tools to achieve that mandate, increasing sentence credits for prisoners who maintained good behavior and achieved other rehabilitative goals. The credits were directly applicable to reduce the length of any determinate sentence; for an indeterminate sentence, they were applied to advance the earliest date for parole eligibility. However, voters were promised that the credits would not be used to offer early release to any prisoner convicted of a violent felony.
Plaintiffs argued that the CDCR “award[ed] credits to some inmates at a rate higher than the statutory limits imposed by the Penal Code,” the appellate Court recalled. The trial court agreed with the CDCR that it was authorized to do so by the “notwithstanding” clause in Proposition 57, later enshrined in § 32 of the state constitution.
Plaintiffs also argued that the CDCR awarded credits to some prisoners not authorized to received them at all under the Penal Code, as well as awarding “extra good conduct credit to inmates assigned to a minimum-security facility without constitutional or statutory authorization.” Again the Court agreed that the CDCR was acting withing the authority granted by Proposition 57 and its “notwithstanding” clause.
However, the Court said, Plaintiffs final argument had merit—that “use of credits to advance indeterminately sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates in conflict with the Penal Code” was not permitted by Proposition 57. For those prisoners, the Penal Code prevents release before serving the greater of “(1) A term of at least seven calendar years,” or “(2) A term as established pursuant to any other law that establishes a minimum term or minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole.” See: Pen. Code, § 3046(a).
Some of those “other” laws the Court found instructive: Penal Code § 190(e), which “bars a murderer from earning any post-sentence conduct credit to reduce” his or her minimum eligible parole date; and §§ 191.5 (d), 217.1(b), 667.7(a)(1), and 667.75, which taken together “allow credits to apply in some indeterminate life terms with parole minimums.” So while “existing law permits the [CDCR] to use credits to advance some indeterminately sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates,” the Court said, “the regulations allow the department to do so for all inmates.”
Given that § 32 is “silent” on the matter, the Court turned to other evidence looking for the intent of the voters who adopted Proposition 57. They were advised that passage of the measure “would reduce an inmate’s time in prison by allowing the [CDCR] to award them more credits.” But nothing was said about “advancing an indeterminately sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date with credits.” Debate over the measure focused on the type of crime committed—violent or nonviolent—rather than the type of sentence received. “Moreover,” the Court said, “a grant of parole—the center of the proponents and opponents’ debate—is not the same as the minimum eligible parole date.”
Accordingly. the Court rejected the CDCR’s contention that Proposition 57 allowed it to use credits to advance the parole eligibility date of an indeterminately sentenced prisoner. “To be sure,” the Courts said, “the language gives the [CDCR] broad power to award credits. But awarding credits and applying the credits awarded are two different things, and section 32 is silent on the latter. See: Criminal Justice Legal Found. v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 113 Cal. App. 5th 26 (2025).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Criminal Justice Legal Found. v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.
| Year | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 113 Cal. App. 5th 26 (2025) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |