by Douglas Ankney

On December 30, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s judgment that had held that prisoner plaintiff Clint Edwards had: failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; failed to adequately allege a conditions of confinement claim; and failed to adequately allege a procedural due process claim.

In 2017 and 2018, Edwards was incarcerated at a Westchester County Department of Corrections (WCDOC) jail in New York state, awaiting trial on charges that included sexual offenses. On February 11, 2019, Edwards filed, pro se, a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 complaint (“Complaint”) against Westchester County, WCDOC, and several employees at the jail including Assistant Warden Eric Middleton, Captains Natasha Vanlierop and Christopher Roberts, and guard Christopher Arocho (“Defendants”).

According to the Complaint, on May 25, 2018, another detainee, Paul Small, assaulted Edwards due to the nature of Edwards’ charges. Small furthermore assaulted Edwards at the instigation of Arocho. Another detainee (known to Edwards by the nickname “Ice”) informed Edwards that Arocho had disclosed his (Edwards’) charged offenses to Small. Further, Ice informed Edwards that yet another detainee, Kentrell Hill, had telephoned someone outside the facility shortly before the assault to verify that Edwards was charged with sexual offenses.

During the course of the litigation, Edwards obtained two phone recordings of Hill that were made an hour before the assault. In one call, per Hill’s request, a woman confirmed that online records revealed that Edwards was charged with second-­degree rape. In the second call, Hill stated to the woman: “the C.O. came today, he just stepped out of nowhere and said Edwards was a rapist.” Hill can also be heard confirming to other detainees near him that Edwards had been charged with rape.

Edwards also alleged in the Complaint that, on June 26, 2018, he was removed from general population at the jail and confined in 3-­East Witness Room #1 (“3-­East”). Middleton informed Edwards that the move was prompted by “security concerns” based on a “confidential source’s allegations” that Edwards was extorting pretrial detainees, hoarding the television remote control, and commandeering the television as well as the housing unit board games and fan. Edwards disputed the confidential source’s allegations and urged Middleton to review video recordings that would disprove the allegations. But Middleton “brushed [Edwards] off without any regard for [Edwards’] responses” and told Edwards he would suffer in 3-­East for the remainder of his incarceration at the jail. The following day, Edwards was informed that he had been placed on administrative segregation, further restricting his movement.

According to Edwards, his cell in 3-­East “lacked hot water, was extremely hot without a fan or air conditioning, lacked a working ventilation system, was infested with bugs and mice, and was covered in black mold. The toilet leaked when flushed.”

Edwards submitted numerous grievances related to the assault and to his placement in 3-­East. On the day of the assault, Edwards submitted, under oath, an incident report that assailant Small stated that a corrections officer had informed him (Small) of Edwards’ charges. Edwards also stated in a memorandum of law that “[a] few days after the [assault,” he attempted to hand a grievance to a sergeant but was told he could not file a grievance while the assault was under investigation.

Near the end of June, the same sergeant informed Edwards the investigation was completed. On June 28, 2018, Edwards submitted a grievance, complaining about the assault, the physical restrictions placed on him, and his placement in 3-­East. Weeks later, Edwards learned that this grievance was denied as “overly broad.” On July 27, 2028, Edwards submitted three additional grievances to cure the overbreadth deficiency of his June 28 grievance. In one of these grievances Edwards stated: “On 5-­25, I got assaulted by an inmate while on GP because C.O. Arocho told another inmate a lie of why I was here.” But all three of the July 27 grievances were denied as untimely due to the fact they were filed more than two days after the June 28 grievance had been denied.

In his Complaint, Edwards alleged: (1) that Arocho failed to protect him and instead actively incited other detainees to attack him; (2) that he was subjected to severely unsanitary and unhealthy conditions of confinement; and (3) that he was deprived of due process when he was placed in administrative segregation without notice and without any opportunity to be heard. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sua sponte dismissed WCDOC as a Defendant. Edwards then filed an amended Complaint, removing WCDOC but adding two Defendants—Sergeants Kevin Grant and Ivan Lopez.

Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the grounds that Edwards had failed to state a claim and also moved to dismiss on the ground that Edwards had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the conditions of confinement claim and the procedural due process claims, finding that Edwards had failed to plausibly state either claim. The district court then dismissed the failure to protect claim, finding that Edwards had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Edwards appealed.

The Second Circuit observed “[s]ummary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a “prisoner confined in any jail” must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before filing any action “with respect to prison conditions.” And “a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust” administrative remedies. However, a prisoner need not exhaust unavailable administrative remedies, given that “the test for deciding whether the ordinary grievance procedures were available” is “an objective one: that is, would a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness have deemed them available.” 

In the instant case, Edwards had declared, under penalty of perjury, that he filed his July 27, 2018, grievance within two days of learning that his June 28 grievance had been denied as overly broad. And Edwards’s one-­line statement in that grievance regarding Arocho’s alleged incitement to attack him was sufficient to put WCDOC on notice that it should investigate Arocho. 

Therefore, Edwards’ declaration was admissible evidence that created a genuine factual dispute as to whether he missed the “two-­day deadline” that resulted in Defendants dismissing his grievance as untimely. If a jury believed Edwards, then Defendants had improperly dismissed his grievance as untimely, rendering the grievance procedure unavailable to him. Consequently, summary judgment dismissal based on Edwards’ alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies was inappropriate.

Turning to Edwards’ conditions of confinement claim, the Court observed that he “must satisfy two prongs…an objective prong showing that the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the right to due process, and a subjective prong … showing that the officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” 

The Court concluded that Edwards’ description of his conditions of confinement in 3-­East satisfied the objective prong. In Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001), it was held that freezing temperatures, the constant presence of mice and “human feces, urine, and sewage water” directly outside of the cell satisfied the even higher Eighth Amendment objective prong. (Note to Readers: In the instant case, Edwards was a pretrial detainee and had to satisfy an arguably lower Fourteenth Amendment due process prong). And the fact that Edwards had informed Defendants of his conditions of confinement in his grievances satisfied the subjective prong, i.e., the Defendants were made aware of the conditions and did nothing to remedy them, demonstrating deliberate indifference.

Finally, the Court added that Edwards had plausibly alleged a procedural due process claim. Edwards alleged that the day he was placed in 3-­East, Middleton “brushed off” Edwards’ statement that the jail’s video recordings would refute the confidential source’s allegations, supporting an inference that Edwards was given neither prior notice nor a hearing before placement in 3-­East.

Furthermore, as a pretrial detainee the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government from punishing Edwards until there was an adjudication of guilt. The Court determined that Edwards had adequately alleged conditions of confinement that amounted to punishment.

In sum, the Court concluded that “Edwards plausibly alleged that he failed to receive all the process that was due at ‘a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. See: Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336 (2d Cir. 2024). 

[Note to Readers: In the above case, the Court also vacated the district court’s dismissal of WCDOC as a defendant because the district court misunderstood the correct standard of municipal agency liability. In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency unless the capacity to be sued is in its charter. On remand, the district court was to consider under the correct standard whether WCDOC could be sued.] 

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