$340,000 for Former Massachusetts Prisoner Whose Baby Was Stillborn
On February 3, 2025, a former Massachusetts prisoner dismissed claims arising from a stillbirth she suffered while incarcerated at Massachusetts Regional Women’s Correctional Center (MRWCC). In return, Lidia Lech agreed to dismiss all claims over the tragedy that she had lodged against Hampden County Sheriff Nick Cocchi, whose office operated the lockup, as well as Dr. Dorothy Von Goeler and other staffers with Baystate Health, which was contractually obligated to provide healthcare to MRWCC prisoners.
Lech was pregnant when she was imprisoned in October 2013. Because a uterine rupture during a previous pregnancy had resulted in a miscarriage, her pregnancy was considered high risk, and she was scheduled to deliver her baby by caesarian section in mid-January 2014. But in mid-December 2013, she began to complain that her baby was “withering away inside of her,” according to the complaint she later filed. In response, staff called her “overbearing,” she said.
On January 2, 2014, Lech complained of vaginal bleeding to guard Natalie Cruz. When she then saw a nurse, Lech confided that she believed she was going into labor. Lech was then transported to a Baystate hospital, where staffers examined her and found that her baby was dead—from a suspected placental abruption which deprived the fetus of oxygen.
Lech then filed suit in 2017 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court for the District of Massachusetts, accusing Defendants of violating her Eighth Amendment and state-law rights with deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. She claimed that from December 22, 2013, until her baby’s death, she sought medical attention almost every day, informing Defendants of decreased fetal movements, vaginal discharge, a “dropping feeling” in her abdomen, and a “bulging sensation” on her right side. She alleged that Defendants ignored and, at times, belittled her medical complaints, refusing all but her last request to go to the hospital.
The Defendants disputed the allegations. They said the medical notes for each of Lech’s visits reported no pregnancy-related symptoms and that nothing indicated she requested to go to the hospital. Her case proceeded to trial in 2022, where the judge made two evidentiary rulings that later became the subject of appeal.
First, the Defendants sought to admit recorded phone calls that Lech made to her family and boyfriend while at MRWCC. They argued that the recordings demonstrated that she did not make any mention of her claimed pregnancy-related symptoms in conversations with her loved ones. Defendants also argued that the calls revealed how Lech lied about topics unrelated to her medical care—showing her general character for untruthfulness.
Second, Lech sought to admit the testimony of her close friend Alfred Zygmont, who visited her at MRWCC twice during the relevant time period. He would testify that Lech had informed him of her concern over the recent symptoms and also of the Defendants’ failure to respond to them.
Over Lech’s objection, the district court admitted the recorded phone calls and they were played to the jury. But Zygmont was not allowed to testify on the grounds that his testimony served only to “bolster” Lech’s testimony and was not crucial to her case. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the Defendants, and Lech appealed.
First Circuit Reversal
Sets Up Settlement
On February 2, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ordered a new trial. The Court began by observing that Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) “bars the credibility-related use of some extrinsic evidence,” as held in United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1999). “[E]xtrinsic evidence includes any evidence other than trial testimony,” the Court continued, per United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2000). Under the rule, “extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness,” the Court quoted. While it permits a party to question a witness about recorded false statements, the playing of the recordings “to introduce specific instances of her past conduct for the purposes of showing her alleged penchant for untruthfulness” was prohibited, the Court declared, pointing to United States v. Mateos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1988).
Regarding Zygmont’s testimony, the Court said that it had explained before that under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(i), “a witness’s prior statement is excluded from the rule against hearsay—and thus may be admissible—‘when three conditions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant’s trial testimony; and (3) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,’” quoting United States v. Chiu, 36 F.4th 294 (1st Cir. 2022).
The district court, in making its finding, determined that Lech failed to satisfy prong (3)—deciding that Zygmont’s testimony wasn’t offered to rebut any claim by the Defendants that Lech was fabricating her claim, so the testimony only served to bolster Lech’s testimony about her symptoms. But the First Circuit opined that the record rather showed that the crux of the Defendants’ theory of the case was that Lech had not informed them of her symptoms. Indeed, the cross-examination of Lech and the playing of the inadmissible tapes were designed to attack her credibility for truthfulness and to convince the jury to believe the Defendants’ version of the events. “For this inquiry,” the Court said, it must consider “whether there is ‘some degree of fit between the alleged fabrication and the prior statement,’” quoting Chiu.
The First Circuit concluded that the district court had abused its discretion with regard to the evidentiary rulings in issue. And given that “the case centered on a credibility battle between Lech and the [Defendants],” it was not harmless error to allow Defendants to present evidence impugning Lech’s credibility for truthfulness while simultaneously excluding evidence corroborating the truthfulness of her claims. That is, it was not “highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case,” as held in Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the case for new trial. See: Lech v. Goeler, 92 F.4th 56 (1st Cir. 2024).
The parties then proceeded to reach their settlement agreement and its payout, which included fees and costs for Lech’s attorneys: John R. Godleski and David J.M. Rountree, both of Greenfield; and Felicia H. Ellsworth, Daniel S. Volchok, Lisa Bevilacqua and Simon J. Williams of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP in Boston. See: Lech v. Von Goeler, USDC (D. Mass.), Case No. 3:17-cv-30024.
Additional source: Springfield Republican
Related legal case
Lech v. Goeler
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 92 F.4th 56 (1st Cir. 2024) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Conclusion | Settlement |