In an opinion filed on August 26, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal by the Sheriff of Louisiana’s Orleans Parish, who sought to halt construction of a mental health annex for detainees at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) that was ordered under a 2013 consent decree. 

As PLN reported, dangerous and unconstitutional conditions at OPP along with high levels of violence resulted in a class-action lawsuit, which in turn led to the consent decree calling for the construction of a new jail. [See: PLN, Dec. 2017, p.12.] After years of delay and disagreements over implementing the consent decree, the parties had a Compliance Director submit an action plan recommending a new mental health treatment facility—known as Phase III of the jail project—which was signed off by Orleans Parish’s then-Sheriff Marlin Gusman.

In March 2019, after an attempt by the City of New Orleans to explore alternatives to Phase Ill, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ordered the City to comply with the plan and begin construction of the treatment facility. The City then attempted to stop Phase III unilaterally, filing a motion in the district court to be relieved from the previous orders.

The City’s argument was that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, a court cannot order the construction of a new jail facility. When its motion was denied, the City appealed, but in June 2022 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, saying that it lacked jurisdiction over the substance of the previous 2019 order. See: Anderson v. City of New Orleans, 38 F.4th 472 (5th Cir. 2022).

Just before that decision, Susan Hutson was sworn in as the new Sheriff of Orleans Parish, and she was automatically substituted as a party in the case, replacing former Sheriff Gusman. When the Fifth Circuit’s ruling then came down, a year after Sheriff Hutson took office, she moved to “terminate all prospective relief regarding the construction of the Phase III jail,” again citing the PLRA. The district court denied the motion, and Hutson timely appealed.

Taking up the case again, the Fifth Circuit said it felt like “deja vu all over again,” as Hutson argued that the PLRA barred the district court from ordering the construction of Phase Ill—the same argument that the City had made in its earlier unsuccessful appeal. The Court noted that parties attempting to modify or dissolve an order must show “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences,” which the Sheriff had not shown; nor had she even shown that the district court refused to modify or dissolve any previous order or injunction, as required by In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2015). 

The Court also pointed to the well documented risks of inadequate housing and care for detainees with mental health issues at OPP, along with reports that the jail conditions had only regressed over time. As PLN reported, the Compliance Director under the consent decree with operational control over OPP found continued problems at the jail, such as hundreds of violent detainee-on-detainee assaults and 132 uses of force by staff. [See: PLN, June 2024, p.51.]

Asserting that it was bound by its previous ruling under the law of the case doctrine, the Court said it was prevented from reexamining issues of law or fact previously decided on appeal—while also reiterating that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of the Sheriff’s motion to terminate but lacks jurisdiction to review the underlying orders to construct Phase III. 

The Court also described Sheriff Hutson’s motion as an attempt to “circumvent procedural history and rules under the guise of a PLRA motion.” Pushing back on her suggestion that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because the motion was styled as a motion to terminate, the Court said that would “exalt nomenclature over substance,” quoting Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (1978).

As to the PLRA, the Court found that the law set parameters in prison-conditions civil actions for the “termination of relief,” allowing a party to terminate remedial orders following two years, unless the district court finds the relief remains necessary. But here, the Court continued, the Sheriff “has not attempted to obtain belief on this basis,” quoting Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).

The Court also found that the Sheriff’s “motion to terminate” failed procedurally because it provided neither a basis for the district court to grant it under the PLRA nor a basis to review the previous orders at issue. Thus, the Court determined that the district court did not err in denying the motion to terminate, noting that with Phase Ill in progress but only 12.82% complete, the motion “is at best premature and we lack jurisdiction to review.”

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the consent decree in effect with oversight by the district court. A request for rehearing before the full Fifth Circuit en banc was also denied on January 28, 2025. PLN will continue to monitor and update case developments as they are available. Plaintiff class members were represented before the Court by attorneys Emily M. Washington and Elizabeth Cumming from the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center in New Orleans. See: Anderson v. Hutson, 114 F.4th 408 (5th Cir. 2024); and 132 F.4th 751 (5th Cir. 2025).  

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