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$100,000 Settlement Reached in New York Prisoner’s Solitary Confinement Suit, After Jury for First Time Finds Practice Violates Eighth Amendment

by Douglas Ankney

On September 27, 2024, the state of New York agreed to pay $100,000 to settle a lawsuit that alleged that the state had violated the Eighth Amendment rights of state prisoner Wonder Williams by keeping him isolated in administrative segregation (Ad Seg) for nearly nine years.

The settlement was reached after a jury found two employees from the state Department of Corrections and Community Services (DOCCS) liable for punitive damages. The verdict and settlement are thought to be the first time that solitary confinement in New York was found to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Williams’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint accused DOCCS employees James O’Gorman, John Colvin and Matthew Thoms of confining him in Ad Seg from March 5, 2010, until February 6, 2019, a length of time that violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Williams included his time spent in a step-down program (SDP) from December 1, 2017, where conditions were substantially the same as those in Ad Seg.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. In its response on May 16, 2024, United States District Court for the Northern District of New York observed that an Eighth Amendment claim related to conditions of confinement “must satisfy both objective and subjective tests.” Citing H’Shaka v. O’Gorman, 444 F.Supp.3d 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2020), the Court said that for the objective test, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs such that the conditions pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health”; to satisfy the subjective test, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.”

Applying Subjective and Objective Tests

The Court then observed that “Defendants did not address the objective conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement,” nor whether they “qualify as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” However, Williams had alleged in his Complaint that while in Ad Seg and SDP he was confined by himself in a cell no bigger than a parking space for 23 hours per day; that the cells were filthy, and he was denied cleaning supplies; that he could not talk to other prisoners; and that he slept on a damaged mattress which exacerbated his neck and back injuries. Moreover, a light was kept on for hours every day, he said, and he was fed inadequate food that led to unspecified medical problems and weight loss. For his one-hour recreation period each day—which he was often denied—he was led to a “rec pen” that had visibility only on one side. The Court noted that under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), all uncontroverted facts alleged in a complaint by the nonmoving party that would support a jury’s finding in his favor are accepted as true at the summary judgment phase; therefore, Williams had satisfied the objective test.

As to the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, the Court explained that it is satisfied “if there is no penological justification for the condition imposed.” Williams was initially thrown into Ad Seg after a letter from a County of New York District Attorney (DA) on March 5, 2010, informed DOCCS that while held at New York City’s Rikers Island jail complex, Williams had hired a “hit man”—who was in fact an undercover cop—to kill three witnesses to a shooting in which he had allegedly been involved. Since Williams orchestrated both the murder-for-hire plot and the hitman’s payment via telephone and jail visits, the DA requested that Williams’ ability to communicate outside the prison setting be restricted. That same day, Williams was transferred to Auburn Correctional Facility and placed in Ad Seg.

Lack of Penological Justification

Williams subsequently received 45 Ad Seg reviews until his transfer to SDP in December 2017, over seven and a half years later. The reviews were supposed to determine if continued confinement in Ad Seg was justified. Citing Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2017), the Court noted that reviews must also be “constitutionally meaningful,” requiring that prison officials: (1) “must actually evaluate whether the inmate’s continued Ad Seg confinement is justified”; (2) “must evaluate whether the justification for Ad Seg exists at the time of the review or will exist in the future, and consider new relevant evidence as it becomes available”; and (3) “must maintain institutional safety and security (or another valid administrative justification) as their guiding principles throughout an inmate’s Ad Seg term.”

In the instant case, the Court examined documentary evidence of the reviews and concluded that a jury could read O’Gorman’s comments and find: that he did not consider new evidence; that Williams was held in Ad Seg because of grievances that he filed and not because of institutional safety and security; and that “boilerplate language” indicated O’Gorman acted merely as a “rubber stamp” for decisions of the central office. Thus, the Court concluded that a jury could find that Williams had not received “meaningful reviews,” and his nearly nine years in Ad Seg lacked penological justification. See: Williams v. O’Gorman, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88095 (N.D.N.Y.).

The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found in Williams’ favor. But jurors did not award compensatory damages because Williams had not proven compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. On their finding that Williams’ rights were violated, jurors awarded $1 in nominal damages. But the jury also two of the Defendants liable for punitive damages in an amount still to be determined. However, the jury had not determined an amount to award when the parties reached a settlement.

That was apparently sufficient to get the DOCCS to the settlement table, and the negotiated payout included costs and fees for Williams’ attorneys, Ellen M. Dunn, Andrew A. Kunsak and Laura Sorice of Sidley Austin LLP in New York City, along with fellow attorney Leslie Kuhn-Thayer of the firm’s Chicago office. See: Williams v. O’Gorman, USDC (N.D.N.Y.), Case No. 9:20-cv-01417.  

Additional source: ABA Journal

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