Fourth Circuit Rules in Favor of Prisoner’s Eligibility for Time Credits
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a prisoner must have been convicted of the death-resulting enhancement element of 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) before that enhancement may be applied under 18 U.S.C. section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) to make a prisoner ineligible for time credits under the First Step Act (FSA).
Robert A. Valladares was indicted on three felonies in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c): Distribution of a Controlled Substance Resulting in Death (Count One); and Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances (Counts Two and Three). The indictment alleged that Valladares had “distributed a small quantity of fentanyl and methamphetamine” and “death resulted from the use of said substances.”
Valladares, however, entered into a plea agreement wherein the original indictment was dismissed and he pled guilty to the same offenses but with one major exception: the “death-resulting” language was omitted. Without the death-resulting enhancement being charged, Valladares now faced a maximum term of 20 years’ imprisonment; with the death-resulting enhancement charged, he had faced a mandatory minimum of 20 years and a maximum of life in prison. 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C).
The plea did include a stipulation of facts providing that, inter alia, Valladares “admits that on February 7, 2020, he distributed controlled substances to the victim, and that the death of the victim resulted.” Valladares’ Sentencing Guidelines range was 292 to 365 months but the district court, citing several mitigating factors, sentenced Valladares to a downward variance of 144 months’ imprisonment.
While Valladares was serving his sentence, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) informed him that he was ineligible for time credits that may be earned under the FSA for successful completion of specified programs. That is, 18 U.S.C. section 3632(d)(4)(D) makes prisoners “ineligible to receive time credits” if they are “serving a sentence for a conviction” under any one of an enumerated 68 “provisions of law,” including: “21 U.S.C. section 841, relating to manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, in the case of a conviction for an offense described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (b)(1) of that section for which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance.”
Valladares filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting the BOP’s actions violated the FSA because his conviction did not make him ineligible for time credits. The district court found that Valladares’ judgment “merely indicates [he] was convicted under 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1), … it is silent as to the applicable sentencing procedure under section 841(b)(1), which is needed to determine eligibility to earn [time credits] under the FSA. However, other documents from petitioner’s criminal proceeding clarify that he was sentenced under section 841(b)(1)(C) under all counts.”
Because those documents “unmistakably cite[d] section 841(b)(1)(C) and further note[d] that a death resulted as a consequence of petitioner’s conduct,” the district court denied and dismissed Valladares’ habeas petition. Valladares appealed.
The Court observed that “[a]s an initial matter, Valladares was not convicted of the death-resulting enhancement. The penalty provision with which he was charged…covers both when death results and when it does not.” The Court determined that resolution of the appeal turned on whether 18 U.S.C. section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) made prisoners ineligible based only on a conviction of the death-resulting enhancement or whether the statute encompassed “those who were not convicted of the death-resulting enhancement but whose conduct resulted in death.”
When Congress uses the word “conviction,” it refers only to what “the defendant had been convicted of” and is “not about what the defendant had actually done” or “the facts of the crimes.” See: Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016). Both section 3632(d)(4)(D) and section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) used the word “conviction.”
The Court further explained that under the meaningful variation canon of statutory interpretation, “where a document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea.” In two of the 68 categories of ineligibility, Congress explicitly stated ineligibility is triggered “only if the conduct that led to the conviction involved a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”
But two other categories referenced conviction specifically: the one at issue in the instant appeal and section 3632(d)(4)(D)(xvii) that applied “only if the conviction involved a weapon of mass destruction.” Congress clearly chose to specify that in some categories the “conduct that led to conviction” would result in ineligibility but in other categories only the actual “conviction” would result in ineligibility.
The Court concluded that ineligibility under 18 U.S.C. section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) is limited only to those convicted of the death-resulting enhancement element and the BOP cannot look to other uncharged facts. Therefore, Valladares was eligible to earn time credits.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of Valladares’ habeas petition and remanded. See: Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025).
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Related legal case
Valladares v. Ray
| Year | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |