Alabama Supreme Court Denies DOC’s Improper Venue Objection
by Douglas Ankney
On December 6, 2024, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) failed to raise the issue of venue in the circuit court, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ (CCA) reversal based on venue was error.
In 2018, Joshua Lashawn Booth was convicted of three counts of possession of obscene material in violation of Ala. Code section 13A-12-192 and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. While confined at the Bibb Correctional Facility in June 2022, Booth filed what he styled as an “application for a writ of habeas corpus” in the Bibb Circuit Court. His pleading named, inter alia, DOC as a Respondent. However, Booth plainly stated “[t]his is a correctional incentive time case” and alleged that the DOC “refused and [is] refusing to afford Booth correctional incentive time.” Booth argued that, while Ala. Code section 14-9-41(e) barred persons who “ha[ve] been convicted of a sex offense involving a child as defined in [Ala. Code section] 15-20A-4(26)” from receiving correctional incentive time, that statute did not apply to persons convicted of possession of obscene material because the possession-of-obscene-material statute “refers to persons under the age of 17, not under 12.”
DOC filed a combined motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. In its order denying DOC’s motion, the Bibb Circuit Court stated: “[t]he question to be resolved in this case is whether Joshua Lashawn Booth should be getting correctional incentive time. He should.” Booth subsequently moved for summary judgment in his favor, which the Bibb Circuit Court granted, ordering that DOC calculate the correctional incentive time due to Booth. DOC appealed.
In the CCA, DOC argued for the first time that Booth mislabeled his petition and that he had filed his petition in the wrong court. DOC also argued that instead of filing a habeas petition, Booth was required to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge DOC’s decision denying him correctional incentive time. And pursuant to Ala. Code section 6-3-9, such petitions must be filed in the Montgomery Circuit Court. CCA agreed with DOC and reversed the Bibb Circuit Court’s judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court then granted Booth’s petition for certiorari review on the question of whether CCA’s decision was in conflict with Ex parte Culbreth, 966 So.2d 910 (Ala. 2006) and Ex parte Tanksley, 418 So.2d 94 (Ala. 1982).
The Court observed that Ala. Code section 6-3-9 requires that an action “‘where the prison system of the state on account of the prison system is interested must be commenced in Montgomery County’—such as the action commenced by Booth in the present case—‘has been generally interpreted as controlling the venue of actions involving the prison system.’” Therefore, the Court concluded that the issue in the instant case was one of venue, not jurisdiction.
In Culbreth, a prisoner in Mississippi filed a habeas petition in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking credit for time he spent in jail. The circuit court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. CCA determined that the Montgomery Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over the habeas petition because it was not the circuit court closest to the prisoner as required by Ala. Code section 15-21-6. CCA held that the circuit court’s judgment was void and dismissed the appeal.
The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari to Culbreth and explained that the requirement of section 15-21-6 that a habeas petition be filed in “the nearest circuit court” “implicate[d] not jurisdiction, but venue.” And “[v]enue can be waived, and any objection to improper venue is waived if not timely raised. See Rule 12(h)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.” The Culbreth court ruled that the Montgomery Circuit Court had power to rule on the habeas petition and that any objection based on improper venue had been waived. The Court then remanded the case to CCA for further proceedings.
In Tanksley, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The defendants moved for a change of venue to the Montgomery Circuit Court and the plaintiffs did not object. The motion was granted. After litigating the suit for six months in the Montgomery Circuit Court, the plaintiffs moved to transfer the case back to the Jefferson Circuit Court. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the motion. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Supreme Court ordering that the suit be transferred back to the Jefferson Circuit Court. But the Tanksley Court denied the petition, holding that the plaintiffs’ failure to timely object to the transfer of venue constituted a waiver of the plaintiffs’ original right to select venue.
The Court concluded that CCA’s decision reversing the Bibb Circuit Court’s judgment was in conflict with Culbreth and Tanksley. The requirement that an action commenced under section 6-3-9 be brought in the Montgomery Circuit Court implicated venue and DOC waived its objection to improper venue by waiting to raise it for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the CCA and remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with the instant opinion. See: Ala. Dep’t of Corr. v. Booth, 2024 Ala. LEXIS 196 (Ala. 2024).
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Related legal case
Ala. Dep’t of Corr. v. Booth
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 2024 Ala. LEXIS 196 (Ala. 2024) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |