by Chuck Sharman

In a decision reached on April 7, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit clarified the boundaries of qualified immunity (QI) for a Michigan jailer accused of retaliatory assault on a compliant prisoner and deliberate indifference to his resulting injuries. The Court said that Gogebic County Jail guard Scott Voitt was not entitled to QI for the assault allegations, but that he was entitled to QI for the deliberate indifference claim because it wasn’t clear that he had the requisite subjective knowledge that prisoner Randy Erikson’s injuries were so severe.

Erikson was serving a sentence for DUI at the jail when Voitt happened by and found an orange peel on the floor. When he demanded to know who had tossed the litter, Erikson replied, “If you were doing your job, you would know.” For that, Voitt announced that Erikson’s impending visit with his family was canceled and walked away.

In a fit of pique, Erikson kicked the cell door and threw the “boat” that held his mattress. But he soon calmed himself and straightened his cell. Voitt, who had been watching on surveillance video, returned and asked Erikson if he needed a “time out.” To which the prisoner replied, “No, I need my fucking visits.”

Erikson was ordered into the hallway, where Voitt handcuffed him behind his back. The guard took him into a holding cell and ordered him to kneel on the mattress to be uncuffed. Erikson complied. But Voitt threw him to the floor and rolled the prisoner onto his stomach before kneeing Erikson in the back.

After filing a medical grievance over his unmet need for care for these injuries, Erikson was taken to a hospital two days later, where he was diagnosed “with back contusions and a fractured upper rib,” as the Sixth Circuit later recalled. After an investigation by the office of Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessell (D), Voitt was charged with assault but acquitted by a jury at trial. Then-­Sheriff Ross Solberg suspended him, reinstating him after the acquittal on condition that Voitt attend retraining for bringing “discredit” to the office. Voitt retired instead.

Erikson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Voitt of violating his civil rights with use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to his resulting serious medical need. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Voitt’s claims of QI to both accusations, and he timely filed an interlocutory appeal.

Denial of QI Affirmed on Excessive Force Claim, Reversed on Deliberate Indifference Claim

“Erickson deserves a trial on his use-­of-­force claim because a reasonable jury could find that Voit gratuitously assaulted him,” the Sixth Circuit declared. “And once we accept this fact about Voit’s state of mind, any reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was illegal.”

The Supreme Court of the U.S., the Sixth Circuit said, “has adopted a ‘more demanding’ subjective element but a ‘more relaxed’ objective one” in examining excessive force claims, as laid out in Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2023) and Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam). Objectively, that same case marked the boundary of unconstitutional use of force at something more than de minimus—like a “malevolent shove”—though no “significant injury” is necessary once a prisoner establishes that a guard used force in the “required malicious way.” Measured against this standard, the Court said that “Voit’s conduct falls on the actionable side of the line.”

Guards “must regularly make quick decisions in dangerous situations to restore order or prevent a disruption,” the Court said, so they are not liable for “honest” miscalculations that result in excessive force, citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). Rather, the use of force must be exercised “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” as held in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). “Perhaps a civil jury will believe [Voitt’s protestations] (as a criminal jury did),” the Court said. “Yet a reasonable jury could also accept Erickson’s claim that Voit did not subjectively believe he needed to use this force. So Voit must save these arguments for trial,” and the district court properly denied QI on the excessive force claim.

However, the Court reversed the denial of QI on the deliberate indifference claim, which “has a more demanding objective element and a less demanding subjective one.” On the former, “inmates must establish that they had ‘serious medical needs,’” as held in Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). But the Court said that it needn’t conduct that analysis because Erikson failed to meet the subjective standard by showing that Voitt “subjectively knew of (and consciously disregarded) the serious medical needs,” as required by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

This was primarily his own fault, the Court explained. Erikson presented no evidence that he made the guard aware of his injuries, and Voitt was off work the following two days until Erikson went to the hospital. The prisoner argued that the use of excessive force by itself should have put Voitt on notice that he was possibly injured. But the Court rejected that argument, noting Erikson’s lack of visible symptoms to let the guard off the hook. Before the Court, Erikson was represented by attorneys Kali M. L. Henderson of Seward Henderson PLLC in Royal Oak and Shawn C. Cabot of Christopher Trainor & Assoc. in White Lake. See: Erickson v. Gogebic Cty., 133 F.4th 703 (6th Cir. 2025).

The case has returned to the district court for Erikson to proceed on his excessive force claim, and PLN will update the case outcome when it is resolved. See: Erickson v. Gogebic Cty., USDC (W.D. Mich.), Case No. 2:22-­cv-­00067. 

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