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Arizona Doc Notice to Mtc Re Asp Kingman Escapes 2010

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1l\epartment of <!Corrections
(602) 542-5497





December 29, 2010

Odie Washington, Senior Vice President
Management & Training Corporation
500 North Marketplace Drive
Centerville, Utah 84014

Contract AD9-0 I 0-A3 , Kingman 3400 Beds

Dear Mr. Washington:
As discussed during our meeting on December 21, 2010, this letter is intended to document the status of our contract in
light of those corrective actions taken and those still required, subsequent to the tragic and avoidable escapes from the
Hualapai unit, Arizona State Prison (ASP)-Kingman on July 30, 2010.
As I have shared with you consistently throughout this ordeal, I am evaluating all of the available information from Arizona
Department of Corrections (ADC) staff, the ADC Annual and automated "Green, Amber, Red" Inspections (conducted on
November 15-19, 2010 by 9 ADC subject matter experts) recently completed at your facilities at Kingman, our letters, your
responses, and my personal observations. I also reiterated that I would consider the report which Management and Training
Corporation (MTC) contracted for with the Nakamoto Group (conducted on December 15-17, 2010 by Mark Saunders,
Mike Randall, Larry Norris and Steve Huffman).
This letter is intended to document and outline the history of our interactions since the escapes, the activities that are

ongoing and the necessary curative actions required from MTC at Kingman in order to determine that your operations are
compliant with ADC policy (the only standard that has been utilized throughout this process) and for me to determine that I
have enough confidence in your responsiveness and operations to continue the contract.
I have been transparent and extremely communicative with you, as you acknowledged during our brief telephonic
conversation on November 22nd. I acknowledge that you have effected some corrective action and some improvements;
however, I also refer to our communications with you regarding chronic operational deficiencies which have been

unaddressed or inadequately addressed over the past 5 months. I acknowledge your stated observation that there is a
tougher monitoring process in place; as is to be expected in the wake of an incident of this magnitude. I affirm for you that

MTC is not being held to a higher standard than any other ADC prison or ADC contracted facility. I am looking for
sustained and systemic improvements in your operation that will support independent compliance with ADC policy and
contract requirements.

History of Significant Events at ASP-Kingman:
Subsequent to the escapes on July 30, 2010, part of the review of the Kingman facility and ADC's contract monitoring of
that facility included a review of all of the reported significant incidents. What we discovered was that from 2005 forward,
there were 13 instances of large groups of inmates refusing directives andlor chasing MTC staff off the yard. Contrary to
your statement during a meeting on December 21, 2010, this is not simply a matter of instances typical in the operation of
prisons; rather, this is a pattern of unacceptable inmate behavior, in which large inmate groupings of hundreds of inmates
react to dissatisfaction with MTC operations, endemic inmate idleness or other triggers.


Specific to the post-escape reviews, you were provided with the following written reports/communications (with MTC
responses listed):




August 12,2010 - An extensive Security Assessment conducted by 6 ADC subject matter experts on August 4-6,
August 17, 2010 - MTC's Memorandum/corrective action plan to the assessment, noted above.
September 1,2010 - An out-briefing provided to MTC staff regarding the findings of the inspection conducted
August 30 through September 1 by Division Director Patton, Contracts Administrator Profiri and Contract Monitor
September 7, 2010 - ADC's requirement from MTC regarding a corrective action plan.
September 9, 2010 - MTC's submission of a corrective action plan to ADC.
November 1, 2010 - ADC's notice to MTC which included 9 outstanding deficiencies that remained uncorrected,
as well as an additional 24 deficiencies identified at both Kingman units (Hualapai and Cerbat). This letter
included concerns regarding the large inmate demonstrations on the Cerbat unit on October 17,2010, followed by
a larger inmate demonstration of the entire yard at Hualapai on October 18,2010. In both cases there were similar
concerns by the inmate population regarding food service issues left unaddressed by your staff. It also was
becoming apparent that ADC contract monitor staff was being deferred to by MTC staff seeking leadership and
November 2010 - ADC received an undated and unattributed "response" to the above letter via e-mail from
Administrator Sternes.
November 15 - 19, 2010 - ADC provided MTC with daily out-briefings of the ASP-Kingman Site Inspection,
Annual Inspections Report and ADC DO 703 GAR Automated Inspections Report, which included the electronic
notifications of all GAR Findings.
December 7, 2010 - MTC's corrective action plan to the GAR findings from Administrator Sternes.
December 27, 2010 - MTC was issued a response to Administrator Sternes authored by Mr. Profiri which
responded to MTC's corrective action plan, requested additional information regarding proposed actions, and cited
corrective actions that have not, in fact, taken place.

Ongoing Compliance Activities:
As I acknowledged following the July 30, 2010 escape, the ADC contract monitor and his administrator were not
performing their duties adequately, which resulted in me taking immediate corrective action. All ADC contract monitors
are now selected from a pool of candidates that are experienced Deputy Wardens. Additionally, the contract team members
have expanded responsibilities to ensure that they are all contributing to contract monitoring on an ongoing basis.
To supplement that, I have dispatched various teams of employees to conduct reviews, assessments or inspections (to all

facilities). You have been notified of each of these initiatives for Kingman. I have personally toured your facilities on a
number of occasions at Kingman, along with other executive staff, and have observed evidence supporting the issues of
non-compliance discovered by various tearns. Additionally, I have repeatedly raised concerns about the extremely high
level of inmate idleness (directly to MTC staff on-site), which is a precursor to inmate management problems leading to
groupings and disturbances.
The sum of ADC's concerns, observations and reports to MTC lead me to believe that you have instituted a number of the
physical plant improvements during the preceding 3-5 months, not the least of which was the perimeter alarm system which
has been dysfunctional or unreliable for the better part of2 Y, years.
However, MTC Kingman has not effected sustained systemic operational improvements. It is apparent that your staff are
deferring to ADC employees for leadership in incident management, as well as waiting for ADC staff to point out problems
and prescribe corrective action before acting upon that direction. The following examples are illustrative of these points:

MTC staff was unable to identify the name of your complex administrator, as recently as the night of October 17,
2010, during a disturbance.
MTC staff could not find the phone numbers for the Mohave County Sheriffs Office and did not have the presence
of mind to dia1911, leaving ADC staff to make the contact on that same night.







When advised about the escape response protocol cards, ADC monitors asked MTC perimeter patrol officers to
see a copy, which could not be produced and of which they were unaware, as recently as December 16,2010. This
is in spite of ADC having provided post orders on December 10, at the request of MTC.
When challenged to describe what nse of force actions they would take in the event of an escape, responses were
incorrect (one MTC employee responded that he would shoot at the inmate "ifhe were coming at me", but would
"shoot in the dirt, ifhe were running away from me"), also on December 16,2010.
We discovered inmate unescorted access to no-man's land, which is still a routine activity, on December 15, 2010.
The ladder that the Nakamoto report indicated was found in the sallyport was indicative of a chronic problem that
ADC had previously directed to be corrected.
There are myriad chronic tool and key control issues that your staff report as corrected, but my staff continually
Inmate movement during count time, as well as failure to control movement and prevent inmate access to
unauthorized housing units, is a chronic problem discovered as recently as December 15,2010.
As recently as mid-December, ADC monitors continue to find footprints in no-manls land unreported and
unaddressed by your staff.
Security device inspections are still not reported or corrected in a timely manner; for example, during the week of
December 6th, the Cerbat North Yard gate was malfunctioning and would not open. Repairs did not occur for 3
days, despite MTC's stated timeline of24 hours for security device repairs.
Post order corrective additions were not made as of December 16th for Main Control and North Yard Officer
responsible for Zone Alarm Testing, despite MTC reports that this has taken place.
Joe Profiri, Administrator of Contract Beds, provided Administrator Stemes with a follow-up response on
December 27, 2010.

Nakamoto Report and Findings:
I reviewed and have considered the Nakamoto report, received from you on December 27, 2010. It clearly reflects a
contracted assessment based on limited parameters or research, as many conclusions are unsupported by factual data.
Rather than critique or respond to the entire document, I will refer to a few of the citations:



Escape Incident Reparation - ADC concurs with these reparations, as the majority of them were identified during
the August 4 - 6, 2010 ADC Security Assessment, to include the physical plant improvements, the addition of the
static/stationary posts, the revisions to the post orders and tool control modifications.
Emergency Plans - The escape response plan is an after-the-fact development, and did not exist prior to the escape.
Entrance/Exit Point Security - The recommendation and commentary by the Nakamoto Team Leader about
"utilizing an actual inmate(s) in determining if any vulnerability exists in the exit identification process" is an
irresponsible tactic in challenging a security practice. To do what was suggested by the Team Leader would
jeopardize the safety of the inmate and the ultimate security of the facility. Switching identification cards with
staff would serve the same purpose.
Inmate Disciplinary System - Arizona Revised Statutes require ADC to maintain control of the inmate disciplinary
system. The report does not indicate that Nakamoto was aware of this fact.
Local Support Agency Agreements - The Nakamoto Group identifies that MTC has no agreements with local
support agencies regarding emergencies, which raises the question; why has MTC not done this in the six (6) years
that MTC Kingman Private Prison has existed?
o Nakamoto's contention is that "the facility could have permeated the surrounding areas with staff
standing vigil to detect the missing inmates; however the local law enforcement inexplicably prohibited
this activity. Strategically placed staff could have changed the entire course of the incident, very likely
ending the incident the night it started, based on the lack of cover in the terrain surrounding the facility."
o The escape occurred between 2000 and 2010 hours. Mohave County Sheriff was initially contacted by
MTC at 2219 hours. ADC was initially contacted at 2337 hours. MTC had not practiced escape response
drills and over two hours elapsed before any outside agency was notified of the escape. Though ADC has
not heard of this request or denial previously, it is implausible that establishing escape posts in the
immediate vicinity more than two hours after the escape would have had any impact on the course of
events. Additionally, the lack of escape response plans/training, and mutual aid agreements with local
law enforcement inhibited the productive communication between MTC and law enforcement responders.
It appears the Nakamoto's Team did not thoroughly read the ADC investigation to ascertain the fucts.




Inmate Classification - Although the Nakamoto Team conveys a finding that the population of inmates housed at
the facility is appropriate for a medium security prison, the Team Leader goes on to question the validity of the
instrument. The generalization that questions the 'gang classification procedure' requiring a 'long-term process
for mitigation' is without foundation. Again, statutorily, inmate classification is an ADC responsibility.
No where in the Nakamoto Report is found a discussion about the level of idleness and inactivity throughout the
populations in both Hualapai and Cerbat. Pro-social engagement in work and programs is a basic requirement of
sound correctional practice.

Required Cure Actions:

Based on what we have been providing MTC verbally and in writing, I can reiterate that I am looking for sustained,
systemic operational improvements, in order to gain confidence in MTC's ability to operate the Kingman facility in
compliance with ADC policy and the contract. Physical plant improvements alone are insufficient. MTC needs to
implement a training program for your staff, as well as to demonstrate that corrective action has been taken and been
institutionalized in a systemic manner to the daily operations.
You will find the following areas of concern, identified in our initial inspection and/or the letters of September 4 and
November 1, 2010, remain incompletely addressed, unaddressed or uncorrected, as of the November 15, 2010 inspection
(further discussed in the attachment, with noted and expected cure time frames):
Inmate identification card compliance
Staff communication with inmates
Command staff communication with line staff
Inmate housing compliance
Staff training
Perimeter sand condition
Perimeter alarm response
Perimeter security challenges
Perimeter post order revisions
Perimeter lighting
No man's land access/storage
Count procedures
Inmate controlled movement
Ingress: personal propertyistaffprotocols
Pat searches
Key control

Service journals
Inmate population training
Facility security: unauthorized metal
Sweat lodge security enhancements
Fence tie accountability
Detention training
Tool control: generaVyard
Awning security enhancements
Security device tracking and corrective action
Kitchen protocols
Fire detection system
Weapons storage
Weapon munitions
Weapon accountability
Inmate Programs

I expect that you will provide me with a proposed corrective action plan for all of the outstanding deficiencies prior to
January 10, 2011. Although you are afforded 30, 60, or 90 days to complete corrective action, it is my expectation that you
will begin corrective action on all identified items immediately. Corrective action on all items must be ongoing tluoughout
the 90 day cure period, and you must regularly (daily, weekly, monthly) demonstrate to our contract monitor(s) and staff
that corrective action is ongoing and being completed throughout the 90 day cure period.
Additionally, I expect that your complex administrator will schedule time with the ADC contract monitor and contract
administrator to demonstrate to them that corrective action has actually taken place. I also expect that when confirmation
has been made that acceptable corrective action has been completed, I receive regular written updates at 30 day intervals of
those corrective actions and systemic change implementation. However, the cure period will not exceed 90 days.
In closing, I reiterate there have been improvements; however, I retain serious conCerns about myriad chronic operational

deficiencies, as well as discrepancies between what you report as having been accomplished compared with what my staff
is observing. I expect MTC employees, supervisors and administrators to take responsibility for the operation of your
institution, as well as to effect proactive corrective actions, demonstrating these to the monitors as they are accomplished
and institutionalized.


This letter shall also serve as a demand for written assurance in accordance with section 8.1, Right to Assurance, Uniform
Terms and Conditions, that it is MTC's intent to perform and comply with all provisions of the contract. Specifically that
MTC will complete all deficiencies as documented and as identified in this letter within a 90 day time frame.
Accordingly, MTC has ten (10) days from the date of this letter to respond to the demand for assurance and ninety (90)
days to complete all noted and documented deficiencies.
Failure to provide written assurance of intent to perform within ten (10) days and failure to cure all deficiencies noted
within ninety (90) days will be the basis for termination of your contract with the Department.
I will continue to communicate openly with you about the issues we observe and I will remain transparent in my
expectations. I must be assured that this letter of assurance is fulfilled before I can have the confidence necessary to
increase the population or continue our contractual relationship.


Charles Flanagan, Deputy Director
Robert Patton, Division Director
Mike Kearns, Division Director
Karyn Klausner, General Counsel
Joe Profiri, Contracts Administrator
Denel Pickering, Procurement Officer

Attachment: Required Cure Actions, Detail


Inmate identification card

Staff communication with

Command staff communication
with line staff




Inmates continuously observed not in compliance with
required wearing of ID Cards
Poor communication routinely reported by inmate
population which have contributed to inmate groupings
Briefings are not occurring for all staff, "phone tree"
briefings occnr intermittently and are not available to all

Inmate housing compliance

Staff training

Perimeter condition

Inmate housing areas continuously observed to contain
unauthorized items and excess hobby craft and inmates
observed laying in bed under sheets and blankets past
Assigned perimeter officers remain unfamiliar with proper
escape response/use of force protocols. No training
program for Case Managers.
Dirt piles in no man's land, excess weed growth in inner
perimeter, inner perimeter hard packed and perimeter soil
erosion observed.

Perimeter alarm response

Relevant Post Orders are not inclusive of perimeter

Perimeter security challenges

response protocols.
Secnrity challenge tracks on outer perimeter routinely
missed by assigned Perimeter Patrol Officers.

Perimeter post order revisions

Perimeter Post Orders contain no information regarding

Perimeter lighting

escape response protocols.
Perimeter Lighting in Zone 9 was observed malfunctioning.

No man's land access/storage

Inmates continue to be observed unescorted in no man's
land. Ice freezers are stored in no man's land.

Page 1 of 4


Consistent and sustained enforcement of DO 704

30 Days

Adhere to provision outlined in DO 916, specifically
Community ForumslMeetings
Conduct briefings wherein all posting personnel are in
attendance, ensnre facility administration regularly visit
posts and shift commanders visit posts daily. Maintain
running operational logs at all posts .
Consistent and sustained enforcement of DO 704. Conduct
search operations consistent with DO 708 and complete
quarterly facility searches. Searches are to be conducted as
often as necessary to control contraband.
Develop a formal training program related to escape
of force,
drills/exercises and train all personnel. Develop formal
training program for Case Managers.
Remove/spread dirt piles in no man's land, remove all
weed growth in inner perimeter, soften soil within inner

30 Days
30 Days


30 Days


60 Days


30 Days

perimeter to aid in track identification and ensure constant
maintenance of soil erosion on inner/outer perimeter.

Rewrite relevant Post Orders to include language specific
to perimeter alarm response protocols.
Institute training protocols regarding perimeter soil


30 Days
30 Days

anomaly identification, conduct and track self assessment

security challenges of posted perimeter personnel and
ensure proper use of assigned equipment (handheld
spotlightS) in evaluating perimeter.
Re-write Post Orders to include specific language
regarding escape response protocols.
Include and document serviceability of perimeter
lighting/zone alarm lights dnrillg zone alarm testing.
Restrict all unescorted inmate movement within no man's
land. Develop written protocols, with respect to accessing
ice freezers stored in no man's land, wherein staff do not
carry keys to access the gates to these freezers, thus
accessing no man's land and restricts no man's land gate
access in any event when inmates are present.


30 Days
30 Days
30 Days

Count procedures

External inmate movement not entered into AIMS. No
procednre in place for "red lining of beds," Proper
signatnres missing on Out Connt Forms, Shift Commander
not consistently clearing count, and signing count sheets,
rather cleared by Acconntability Officer. Shift
Commanders inconsistent.
Inmates observed secnred in rnn(s) not assigned to them
after meal turn outs and requesting release from respective
runes) at count time in order to return to assigned runes).
Uncontrolled inmate movement occurring during inmate
Staff food items and property entering the facility are not
consistently inspected. Increased rate of occurrence during
bigh traffic periods/shift change.

Train and ensure staff is completing count procedures in
accordance with DO 70 I - Inmate Acconntability.

60 Days

Properly control inmate movement through direct
observation and enforcement actions. Institute count
announcement to population 10 minutes prior to count and
enforce no inmate movement during counts.

60 Days

Ensnre proper staffmg/controls are in place with special
attention to high traffic periods and ensure proper screening
procednres of personnel, food and property entering the
facility occur at all times.
Ensnre completion of random pat searches with emphasis
on turn outs and turn ins.
Review key control systems and ensure compliance with
Department Order 702 - Key Control. Develop Emergency
Key diagrams identifying Emergency Key access locations.

30 Days

Ensure shift supervisors are visiting all posts during the
course of their shift to reVIew logs/journals for
completeness and accuracy. Facility Administration should
also complete routine reviews.
Sustained and consistent enforcement of D.O. 704, which
will train inmates to largely self-comply.
All hanging metal file folders need to be removed.

60 Days

Complete construction of Sweat Lodge at Cerbat and
ensure proper security enhancements are m place,
commensurate to its location.
Properly mark fence ties. Additionally, ensure fence ties
associated with the new "slow down fence" are properly
marked as they are placed.
Conduct remedial training of officers assigned to detention
regarding proper detention protocols and ensure Post Order
is inclusive of requirements associated with Detention.

60 Days


Inmate controlled movement

Ingress: personal property/staff

Pat searches

Random pat searching seldom observed.

Key control

Emergency Keys stored at complex were only labeled as
"D," with no additional designation or number.
Exterior/yard gates are not labeled with a specific color
code for Emergency Key use. Hot Box(es) contained key
sets in excess of the number of hooks available in the box.
Officers are not consistently in with logging Security
Device Inspections on their daily post logs/journals.

Service journals

Inmate popUlation training
Facility security: unauthorized
Sweat lodge secnrity
Fence tie accountability

Detention training

Lack of consistent enforcement of DO 704 - Inmate
Hanging metal file folders within units.
Though enhancements are complete for Hualapai Sweat
Lodge, Cerbat remains without a Sweat Lodge.
Fence ties at base of Hualapai Detention enclosure,
officer's station in detention and property storage enclosure
in detention need to be properly marked.
Assigned staff are routinely observed not wearing personal
protection equipment and have been observed opening
doors without a second officer present.



Page 2 of 4


30 Days
60 Days

60 Days
30 Days

30 Days

30 Days

Tool control:

Awning security enhancements

Security device tracking and
corrective action

Tools not properly shadowed. Tool check out forms not Ensure compliance with Department Order 712 in all tool
maintained in unit for 30 days. Inaccurate inventory of storage areas and tool use protocols.
Main Control tool box at Hualapai Unit. A tool box located
in Cerbat's WEE area was listed on Cerbat Tool Inventory,
but is stored at Complex. Institutional Order 712 regarding
tools references restricted products, but does not address
Tools. Master Tool Inventories not in place. Inmates in
Cerbat WBE area were observed using Class A tools
without supervision. Proper tool check in and out protocols
not occurring with Class B tools (Spade shovels and wheel
barrows). Tool Inventories did not match check out log.
Inconsistent accounting oftoolsl:><:ginlending of shift.
Awnings in inmate accessible areas lend themselves to Add razor wire at buildings roof line in all areas where
I potential breach points.
awnings are present in inmate accessible areas.
Journal entries annotating Security Device Inspections are Security Device Inspections accountability, malfunction
inconsistent. Security Device tracking and logging is tracking and repair needs to be complied with in
inconsistent and items remain open for extended periods. accordance with Department Order 703.
As exemplified the week of 12/06/2010 when a

30 Days

60 Days
30 Days

malfunction security gate at Cerbat unit was not repaired

Kitchen protocols
Fire detection system

Weapons storage

Weapon munitions

Weapon accountability

Food service not consistently adhering to food safety,
health, sanitation and security requirements.
Fire detection and suppression system in trouble/silence
Staff not logging seals at beginning and ending of shift.
Information reports/journal entries are not occurring at time
of seal breakage.
Damaged and potentially inoperable anununltlOn was
discovered in service on perimeter patrol posts.
Inventories found to be inaccurate regarding weapons and
munitions present (14 foggers not on inventory and one CS
grenade). No evidence of monthly inventories occurring by

Chief of Security. Proper form utilization for signing out
weapons not in place.

Page 3 of 4

Food Service shall comply with Department Order 912 and
all security,jIealth and safety standards.

30 Days

Fire detection and suppression system needs to be repaired

60 Days

and/or properly maintained via preventive maintenance
I practices.
Facility needs to comply with requirements outlined in

60 Days

Department Order 716.
Weapons and munitions exchanges need to occur In
accordance with D~ent Order 716.
Facility needs to accurately account for all weapons and
munitions in accordance with Department Order 716.

30 Days
30 Days

Inmate Programs

Inmate Idleness - 50% of facility's inmate popnlation is
unemployed; 176 seats are available in Academic and
eareer Technical Education classes at Cerbat Unit with
over 700 inmates' eligible but unassigned; 20 seats are
available in the DUIISubstance Abuse Treatment Program
at Cerbat Unit with over 700 inmates' eligible but
unassigned; 12 seats are available in Academic Programs at
Hualapai Unit with over 600 hundred inmates' eligible but
unassigned; 39 seats are available in the DUIISubstance
Abuse Treatment Program at Hualapai Unit with over 450
inmates' eligible but unassigned; No Career Technical
Education classes are available at Hualapai Unit. Unit.

Page 4 of 4

75% of population shall be engaged
programming activities.


work or

90 Days