BOC Report on CA Guard Killing, 2005
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Independent Operations and Incident Review Panel on the California Institutions for Men MARCH 2005 CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS State of California Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor Youth and Adult Correctional Agency Board of Corrections Independent Operations and Incident Review Panel California Institute for Men Members Glenn S. Goord, Chairman Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services William B. Kolender Sheriff San Diego County Gary H. Filion Assistant Commissioner New York State Department of Correctional Services Joe McGrath Deputy Secretary (A) Office of Internal Affairs Youth and Adult Correctional Agency John L. Scott Chief Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Brian Parry Assistant Director National Major Gang Task Force 1 INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND INCIDENT REVIEW PANEL TABLE OF CONTENTS A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 3 B. APPROACH UTILIZED BY PANEL 5 C. PANEL REVIEW FORMAT PRE-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS 7 Initial Placement Decisions Disciplinary Decisions - Inmate Blaylock Length of Time in Reception Center Sycamore Hall Housing Unit Incidents Handling of Threats Against Staff INCIDENT RELATED OBSERVATIONS Snapshot of Sycamore Hall Distribution of Vests POST INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS Correctional Policy and Procedure Observations Tour of Reception Center Central (RCC) and Sycamore Hall 10 11 D. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 16 F. APPENDIX PANEL BIOGRAPHIES 17 2 BOARD OF CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND INCIDENT REVIEW PANEL March 2005 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE On January 10, 2005, at approximately 10:57 a. m., Correctional Officer Manuel Gonzalez, a 16-year veteran of the California Department of Corrections, was fatally stabbed by an inmate at the California Institution for Men, Sycamore Hall Housing Unit. In response to this tragic event, Roderick Q. Hickman, Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) and Chairman of the California Board of Corrections (BOC), requested that the BOC consider at its next scheduled meeting on January 27, 2005 the creation of an Independent Panel composed of national, state, and local experts and that the Panel be authorized to meet, analyze, review, and comment on the: • • • • Details of the death to determine if the prison or reception center had unsafe working conditions; Explore related or tangent operational issues, including crisis response protocols; Review the process for issuance of vests; and Issue recommendations for improvement in operations to the BOC, YACA, Governor, and Legislature. The Board approved creation of the Independent Panel, per Penal Code Sections 6027 and 6028, authorizing special commissions to study and make recommendations regarding state and local penology. The appointed Panel members include: v Glenn S. Goord, BOC Independent Review Panel Chair and Commissioner of the New York Department of Correctional Services v Gary H. Filion, Assistant Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services v Sheriff William B. Kolender, San Diego County, California Board of Corrections Member 3 v Chief John L. Scott, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, California Board of Corrections member v Joe McGrath, Deputy Secretary (A), Office of Internal Affairs, California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency v Brian Parry, National Major Gang Task Force The Panel was provided subject matter expertise by Warden Derral G. Adams, California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, Corcoran; Warden David Runnels, High Desert State Prison Susanville; Captain Debra Hanlon, San Diego County Sheriff’s Department; Lieutenant Mike Bornman, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Karen L. Stoll, Executive Officer (A) and Don Representative, Board of Corrections, staffed the Panel. 4 Allen, Field APPROACH UTILIZED BY PANEL There were several issues impacting the appropriate timing and approach of the Panel’s review. The Panel delayed implementation of their review until the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department had completed their investigation and the District Attorney filed a formal charge. On February 18, 2005, Inmate Jon Christopher Blaylock was formally charged with murder with special circumstances. At the end of this section a profile of Inmate Blaylock is provided. During the interim period between the Board of Corrections appointment of the Panel and their first meeting, legal opinions were requested regarding confidentiality of investigation documents obtained by the Panel during the normal course of their review and confidentiality of materials, documents, and discussions relevant to the prosecution and interview of witnesses involved in the incident. To avoid any contamination of the prosecution’s case, it was determined that briefings and questioning of agency representatives would elicit relevant information pertaining to this review. The Panel met the week of March 7 – 11, 2005, in Ontario, California and interviewed the following individuals: • • • • Matt Cate, Inspector General San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Homicide Investigators: Sgt. Tom Bradford; Detectives Mitch Dattilo, Timothy Jordan, Rod Medley; Lieutenant Thomas Neely California Institution for Men, Chino: Warden Lori DiCarlo, Chief Deputy Warden Greg Mellott; Correctional Captain Manuel Nieto; and Correctional Officers and staff in the Reception Center and Sycamore Hall California Department of Corrections Law Enforcement Investigative Unit staff Linda Mackey and Steve Slaten After the first day of interviews, the Panel toured the institution and observed the Chino Institution for Men (CIM) Reception Center Central (RCC) typical inmate intake process and assignment to housing. The Panel had an opportunity to speak with Correctional Officers, supervisory and management staff in the RCC, including those assigned to the Intake Area and Sycamore Hall housing Unit. Sycamore Hall where Inmate Blaylock was housed and where the attack occurred, was visited and several observations were made regarding facility conditions and operations. 5 Several sources of documentation were reviewed and provided the basis for questioning of those interviewed, as well as information for the Panel to consider when making recommendations later in this report. The materials reviewed for RCC/Sycamore Hall included all available post incident reports prepared by staff, program status reports, training materials, past staffing requests, current staffing recommendations, staff training records, training protocols and lesson plans, Inmate Blaylock’s Central file, administrative budget materials from fiscal year 1992/93 to 2003/04, critical plant needs, classification and disciplinary records, vest related information, Housing Unit Daily Audit forms, operations manual and memos related to classification, emergency procedures, alarm response, etc. Other pieces of written information were provided that are not included in this listing. Inmate/Suspect Blaylock’s Profile - Jon Christopher Blaylock, 35, is a parole violator from Los Angeles County, sentenced to 45 years to life on his most recent charge of attempted murder of a police officer. Blaylock’s criminal background began as a minor with commitments to the California Youth Authority. He has served two prior prison terms and has a well-documented history of predatory and violent behavior. He was paroled in 2002, and returned to custody at CIM as a parole violator with a new term on June 23, 2004. Inmate Blaylock’s case factors included medical issues, numerous inmate enemies, enhanced mental health issues, extensive prior disciplinary history, and a proclivity for violence. 6 PANEL REVIEW FORMAT The discussion in this section of the report is divided into three parts and the point of reference is related to the stabbing of Correctional Officer Gonzalez and the reception and housing decisions made for Inmate Blaylock. The format includes: I. Pre-Incident Observations II. Incident Related Observations III. Post-Incident Observations I. PRE-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS Observations included in this section rely primarily on the written documentation reviewed of events leading up to the homicide and include a review of Inmate Blaylock’s records and housing decisions made related to the handling and housing of this inmate. Initial Placement Decisions Initial intake of Inmate Blaylock at CIM and decisions on his placement in Sycamore Hall General Population, were based on limited information available to staff in the RCC Intake Unit which included: • Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department statement that Blaylock would not voluntarily leave his jail cell for transfer to CIM; • Commitment offense of attempted murder of a police officer; and, • Inmate Blaylock’s statements at CIM. Based on the information above, CIM placed Blaylock in general population. Upon receipt of the OBIS information and/or the inmate’s Central file in the following days, it is the opinion of the Panel that Blaylock should have been placed in Administrative Segregation. Disciplinary Decisions Related To Inmate Blaylock On July 31, 2004, while inmate Blaylock was housed in General Population in the RCC, he, by his own admission, stabbed another inmate in the chest in the Sycamore Hall dining area. Inmate Blaylock was then moved to the Reception Center’s Administrative Segregation Unit and a CDC disciplinary rule violation for Battery on an Inmate With a Deadly Weapon was issued. On August 4, 2004, the charges 7 were reviewed by the Institutional Classification Committee and Inmate Blaylock was placed on single cell housing status due to his past history of in-cell violence. A disciplinary hearing was conducted on September 9, 2004, and the Senior Hearing Officer reduced the disciplinary finding to mutual combat. On September 17, 2004, the recommended finding was reviewed by the Facility Captain and on the same date by the Associate Warden (Chief Disciplinary Officer) who concurred with the finding. On September 22, 2004, the Institutional Classification Committee again reviewed Inmate Blaylock’s case based on the 30-day Administrative Segregation review. The Committee noted the reduction in the disciplinary charge and released the inmate back to Sycamore Hall general population confinement, singl e cell, for continuing reception center processing. Although the Institutional Classification Committee did not change the Hearing Lieutenant’s decision to reduce the disciplinary finding, it is the Panel’s opinion that Blaylock should have been retained in Administrative Segregation based on his well-documented history of violence. Length of Time in Reception Center A Director’s Review Board (DRB) referral was dated November 19, 2004, and logged in on December 10, 2004 at the California Department of Corrections, Headquarters office. It is the opinion of the Panel that the DRB should been completed and submitted well before December 10, 2004. Furthermore, based on the case factors contained in the DRB, it is the opinion of the Panel that Blaylock shoul d have been retained in Administrative Segregation during this process. Sycamore Hall Housing Unit Incidents • • • • Between August 1, 2004 and December 28, 2004, there were several incidents necessitating the use of force in Sycamore Hall. On December 5, 2004, as a result of staff finding weapon stock missing from a light fixture, written direction was given by the Warden to conduct increased searches of inmates, living and common areas, and to exercise caution during inmate movement. On December 19, 2004, a riot occurred in the Sycamore Hall Dining Room between Black and Hispanic inmates. On December 20, 2004, the Warden issued another written order to increase searches and exercise caution during inmate 8 • • movement, and to keep White and Hispanic inmates separate from Black inmates. On December 28, 2004, staff allowed a Black inmate to have contact with a White inmate worker in Sycamore Hall and the White inmate stabbed the Black inmate. On January 3, 2005, the Warden issued another written order that no inmate workers from Sycamore Hall were to be used. The Unit was to only use White or Hispanic workers from the Gymnasium (Permanent Work Crew). It is the Panel’s opinion that the Warden’s written directions were not fully followed. Further, there is no indication that supervisory staff enforced or addressed violations of the Warden’s written direction. The Panel arrived at this opinion based on the following: • • • • • Incidents occurred that involved weapons. The number of weapons found after the homicide. The review of the written documents for Sycamore Hall do not show that increased searches were conducted between December 5, 2004 and January 3, 2005. There were several instances where the written direction on inmate movement was violated, including the above-mentioned incident that occurred on December 28, 2004. The Panel received information that staff used perceived influential inmates to act as a liaison with other inmates to reduce racial tension in Sycamore Hall, thus allowing them to have unrestricted movement on the tiers. This practice allowed access between inmates of different races, at the open bar cell fronts, and is in violation of the written directive. Handling of Threats Against Staff The Panel received information from the Inspector General and San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Homicide Detail that, prior to the homicide, information was received of threats against staff. The first threat surfaced two weeks prior to the homicide, when Inmate Blaylock stated there was a staff threat (unspecified to the Panel), but that he wasn’t the one making the threat. The second threat occurred the night before the homicide when Inmate Blaylock attempted to have personal correspondence mailed as legal mail. When he was advised that his correspondence was not legal mail it was reported that Inmate Blaylock stated something to the effect that this was why staff get “stuck.” When the Panel asked CIM administrative staff for documentation of these threats, the Panel was told there was none. It 9 is therefore the Panel’s opinion that there is insufficient documentation available to indicate to what extent these threats were evaluated or communicated with Sycamore Hall staff. II. INCIDENT RELATED OBSERVATIONS Observations in this section of the report include information from briefings and questioning by the Panel of various investigative staff, California Department of Corrections staff interviews/investigations, as well as a comparison of statements documented in written incident reports. CDC policy and procedures were also reviewed. Snapshot of Sycamore Hall, Second Watch, January 10, 2004 There were four staff assigned to Sycamore Hall at the time of the murder of Officer Gonzalez. The Panel confirmed through written reports and briefings that: • Officer Manuel Gonzalez had let Blaylock out of his cell over the objections of another Correctional Officer. After some period of time, Blaylock was returned to his cell to facilitate inmate movement. After the completion of the inmate movement, Officer Gonzalez directed another officer to again release Blaylock from his cell. Blaylock was released. • Three other inmates were unrestrained in Sycamore Hall West on the tier with Officer Gonzalez. They were on the tier for the following reasons: o One Hispanic inmate worker was allowed onto the tier to repair plumbing in cell 432. o The two Black inmates, who occupied cell 432, were released onto the tier so that the Hispanic inmate worker could enter the cell to complete the plumbing repair. • A second Hispanic inmate worker was in the plumbing chase to the rear of the cells (not accessible to the tier). • There were six to eight Black inmates from Sycamore Hall that were staged unrestrained in the officer’s area. 10 • Officer Espinosa had positioned himself in the doorway to the main corridor to control a White inmate who was returning to Sycamore Hall from medical. • Officers Marin and Loera were in the officer’s area. Officer Marin was the officer positioned at the gate to observe Officer Gonzalez on the West side tier. Officer Loera was positioned at the East side gate. It is the opinion of the Panel that the combination of activity was in violation of the post orders and the modified program for Sycamore Hall. Distribution of Vests Protective vests were received on September 9, 2004, at CIM for 362 officers, including Officer Gonzalez. An additional 100 vests were received on January 5, 2005. The institution began issuing protective vests on January 12, 2005. It appears that prior to the incident, CIM’s administrative direction for distribution of vests had been to wait until all vests were received for the CIM reception center staff. It is the Panel’s opinion that issuing protective vests as they were received would have been the better course of action. III. POST-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS Observations in this section reflect conditions observed during the tour of the CIM Reception Center and Sycamore Hall. This section also includes the Panel’s opinions regarding correctional policy and procedure. Correctional Policy and Procedure Observations Based on the above, the Panel makes the following observations: • • • Staff responded quickly to the incident and moved Officer Gonzalez to the medical clinic; There did not appear to be a coordinated tactical approach to manage the incident, specifically the crime scene and the extraction of Inmate Blaylock, and the other inmates loose on the tier; Command and control by supervisory staff was inadequate; 11 • • • • • The crime scene was not preserved; The efforts to collect and preserve evidence, search inmates, and search Sycamore Hall and other areas were not coordinated; All staff involved in the removal and transfer of Inmate Blaylock from CIM handled the situation professionally while in a highly charged emotional environment. It appears that no post-incident review was conducted by the institution (e.g. tactical, crime scene preservation, training); Administrative staff provided appropriate peer support and grief counseling to all employees; Tour of Reception Center Central (RCC) and Sycamore Hall Observations Reception Center Central During the tour of the inmate reception area, the Panel observed what appeared to be a number of operational practices that violate security. For example, group holding cell doors were standing open with 35-40 unclassified inmates in each of the two holding cells. Permanent Work Crew Inmates appeared to have unrestricted access to the area. A number of barriers had been placed in a manner that limited officers’ view of the inmates. Additionally, there were a number of maintenance issues that have not been addressed for some time. In spite of the cramped and dilapidated conditions, the staff continues to process over 600 inmates per week. Following the incident, the receiving area of the RCC obtained the OBIS system, which provides staff with additional information to appropriately house arriving inmates. Sycamore Hall While conditions during lock down are expected to be less than ideal, the Panel observed deplorable conditions in Sycamore Hall. The Panel observed heavy cobwebs, broken windows, fecal matter on the walls, accumulated filth and food on the floor, gang graffiti on cell walls, an enormous number of “fish lines,” and inmates blocking officers’ view of their cells with “curtains.” The Panel also observed Correctional Officers using their tier access keys in violation of their post orders. 12 Since January 10, 2005, the administration of CIM has taken the following actions: • • • • • • • • Distributed available protective vests (1/05); Installed the Offender Based Information System in the Reception Center (OBIS) (2/05); Modified post orders regarding cell, bed and common area searches (3/05); Made improvements to the cell/area search log books (3/05); Modified housing Sergeant’s post orders for enhanced accountability (3/05); Initiated daily watch meetings (per Warden); Modified inmate movement policy to require that, at a minimum, handcuffs be used (3/05); and, There are a number of pending recommendations suggested by CIM administration. 13 RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation #1: The California Department of Corrections needs to immediately conduct a security audit, management and training audit, maintenance and physical plant audit, and assess whether the stated missions of CIM can be safely accomplished within the existing physical plant. Discussion: This recommendation is based on the totality of the Panel’s discussion and overall review. Recommendation #2: Referrals to the Director’s Review Board (DRB) should be completed in a timely manner. Discussion: The DRB referral was dated November 19, 2004 and logged in at CDC headquarters on December 10, 2004. It is the Panel’s opinion that the DRB referral should have been completed well before December 10, 2004. Recommendation #3: Communication among staff needs to be improved at CIM. Discussion: The Panel found deficiencies related to communications, including: • • Communications to Warden and senior staff regarding high risk inmates and urgency to transfer; CIM Reception Center staff needs a process for passing on threat information to other staff and shifts. Recommendation #4: CIM should complete a post-incident review of all critical incidents and take appropriate steps to identify and address deficiencies. Discussion: It was indicated that a post incident review was not completed and the reason given was that they were waiting for completion of the homicide investigation, Inspector General’s report, and the Panel’s report. It is imperative that the Warden and senior staff immediately determine the causal effects of the incident and take pro-active steps to correct problems. Follow-up review needs to occur at the highest level possible within YACA and CDC. 14 Recommendation #5: Immediate improvements are needed in handling crime scenes. Discussion: There appears to be a long-standing problem with crime scene preservation that has been noted as an issue in past CIM incidents. For example, the Warden was debriefed in 2004 by the LEIU staff about an incident which noted the poor handling of crime scene evidence and recommended adding investigative staff. The recent staffing study evaluation reviewed by CDC Headquarters also recommends adding staff to support this function. The Panel noted that in addition to additional staff, there is a need for continuous training of all staff in order to adequately support the priority of preserving a crime scene. Recommendation #6: Tools utilized within the facility need proper control and accountability. Discussion: During one of the presentations, and later confirmed by the Warden, the Panel was advised that CIM failed to follow departmental policy regarding tool control and the use of shadow boards for tools. Recommendation #7: The institution needs to review its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with outside agencies relative to mutual aid and investigation. Discussion: The Panel received information that there was some confusion about which agency was responsible for the criminal investigation, which appears to have delayed the process. 15 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS It is the Panel’s opinion, after reviewing all of the pertinent information, that Inmate Blaylock should have been placed in Administrative Segregation when he was first received by CIM - and numerous times afterward. It is the Panel’s conclusion that the inmate’s predatory violent behavior, prior confinement in security housing units in prior incarcerations, and prior referrals to the Director’s Review Board, should have raised concerns related to appropriate housing level and assignment. While the Warden issued directions for increased searches, program modifications, and limited inmate movement, it is the Panel’s opinion that the unit was not properly supervised, directions were not followed, and there appeared to be a pattern of not following established post orders. In addition to the steps that have been taken since January 10, 2005 by the CIM administration, it is the Panel’s opinion that review, involvement and support of CDC Headquarters is imperative. For example, CIM has submitted a staffing augmentation request, which includes staffing for an investigative squad, which the Panel believes is vital for enabling the appropriate handing of crime scenes and criminal investigations. The remainder of staffing needs identified in the March 2005 Staffing Study evaluated by Headquarters needs to be expedited through the budgetary process. Once these positions have been filled the staffing requirements need to be routinely re-examined in concert with the facility mission to assure the safe operation of the facility. The Panel was asked to comment on the process for issuance of vests. Our finding, after reviewing the department's policy on vests, fittings and fitting dates for CIM officers, vests ordered and dates of receipt, is that the vests received on September 9, 2004, by CIM should have been immediately distributed to staff. In conclusion, the last point the Panel wished to communicate is that CDC needs to evaluate the number of inmates being processed to determine how many inmates can be safely processed and housed at CIM. 16 Glenn S. Goord Commissioner New York Department of Correctional Services Commissioner Goord is a native of Clifton, NJ graduated in 1973 from Fairleigh Dickinson University in Rutherford, New Jersey, with a Bachelor of Arts in psychology. He is a 31-year employee of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, and rose through its ranks to become Commissioner in 1996 of what is now the nation’s fourth-largest state prison system. Commissioner Goord has had an extensive and broad correctional experience in the New York Prison system, which began in 1973 as a drug abuse rehabilitation counselor. He has served as a drug abuse counselor, supervisor of inmate grievance programs and volunteer services supervisor at five New York prisons. In 1980 he was temporarily reassigned to Albany to participate in writing a five-year master plan for the Department's future. Dramatic and unexpected inmate population increases, occasioned by “crack cocaine,” caused implementation of the master plan to be delayed. But the experience provided Mr. Goord with a broader knowledge and deeper understanding of this diverse agency. In 1982 he transferred to the maximum-security Eastern Correctional Facility, becoming Deputy Superintendent for Administration where he was responsible for fiscal planning, personnel and facility maintenance as well as the operation of the 150-bed medium-security annex. He returned to Albany in 1985 as Assistant Commissioner for Correctional Facilities where he oversaw daily operation of the state’s prisons. In 1988 he became Deputy Commissioner for Correctional Facilities responsible for the management, direction, oversight and operations of all prisons. He administers an operating budget of $2.2 billion in state and federal funds, plus $205 million in capital expenditures. He manages an agency employing 30,400 workers and housing approximately 63,700 inmates in 70 prisons, plus an 850-bed drug treatment center. Mr. Goord’s commitment to security contributes to the fact that inmate-on-staff and inmate-on-inmate assaults in recent years were the fewest in nearly a quarter-century. He is implementing the Governor’s plan to “right-size” the prison system. He has overseen the construction of 4,950 maximum-security beds for violent and predatory offenders, the largest such expansion in state history. At the same time, he has implemented the Governor’s punishment alternatives for nonviolent offenders that have allowed 63,000 inmates 17 to earn early release since 1995, allowing the takedown of more than 6,000 lower-security beds. Commissioner Goord’s outstanding contributions to furthering excellence in corrections has earned him recognition and honors from several state and national associations such as the Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association, the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA); the National Association of State Correctional Administrators; the American Correctional Association (ACA). Mr. Goord’s service has included creation, implementation or oversight of some of the Department’s best innovations and improvements: n Directed the task force in the mid-1980’s that drafted the Shock Incarceration Program. Now the largest program of its type in the nation, it is also recognized as the best. n Created a close relationship between the Crisis Intervention Units and the Correction Emergency Response Teams in a program that ensures negotiators and the “Orange Crush” work together to find the least forceful means to resolve any prison incident. n Oversaw the ACA’s accreditation of every prison in New York, ensuring each meets nationally-accepted standards for operation and management. The ACA presented him with its Eagle Award in 2001, recognizing New York as the largest jurisdiction in the nation in which all its facilities were accredited. Gary H. Filion Assistant Commissioner New York Department of Correctional Services Assistant Commissioner Filion began his career with the New York State Department of Correctional Services in 1968 as a Correction Officer at Green Haven Correctional Facility. Prior to his present position as Assistant Commissioner for Human Resources/Training, he has served the Department as a Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Director of the Department's Correctional Emergency Response Team Operations, Superintendent at two Shock Incarceration Facilities, two medium security facilities and one maximum security facility. Mr. Filion received Departmental and FBI certification as a Physical Training and Defensive Tactics Instructor and Departmental certification as a Situation Controller for the Department's Crisis Intervention Unit. He was also designated by the Commissioner to 18 serve as a security expert witness for the Department of Correctional Services, working with the Assistant Attorney General with regard to litigation against the State. During the past five years, Mr. Filion has provided leadership training to all new sergeants, lieutenants, captains, deputies, and superintendents for the New York State Department of Correctional Services. Mr. Filion is an ACA Auditor for the American Correctional Association and has served as a consultant to the State of New Jersey's Department of Personnel, Selection and Placement. William B. (Bill) Kolender Sheriff San Diego County Sheriff Kolender, a native of Chicago, earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Urban Affairs and Public Administration from San Diego State University in 1964. He is the 28th elected Sheriff of San Diego County, a position he has held since 1995. He currently provides leadership to 4,000 employees, including sworn and support personnel, and he oversees a budget of approximately $4755 million. Prior to becoming Sheriff he was appointed by Governor Pete Wilson in 1991 as the Director of the California Youth Authority (CYA) where he administered the largest youth correctional agency in the nation, with a budget of about $350 million annually, more than 5,000 employees, and approximately 9,500 youthful offenders in 11 institutions and 4 conservation camps. Kolender has been a career law enforcement professional, serving for 13 years as the Chief of the San Diego Police Department. He was appointed at the age of 40--one of the youngest big-city police chiefs in the nation--and retired in 1988. From that time until his appointment as Director of the Youth Authority, Kolender served as Assistant to the Publisher of the UnionTribune Publishing Co., which publishes the San Diego Union-Tribune in California's second-largest city. Kolender started with the San Diego Police Department in 1956 and worked at every rank on his way to becoming chief in 1975. He was 19 described by the Governor as "fair but firm." During his tenure as chief, he served as a board member of the International Association of Chiefs (IACP), the San Diego Criminal Justice Council, past president of the Major City Police Chiefs’ Association, member of the California Attorney General's Commission on Narcotics, member of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), chairman of the task force that integrated the San Diego City schools, past president of the San Diego Police Officers' Association, member of the Mayor's Crime Control Commission and chair of the Criminal Justice Resource Panel, among others. He also served for eight years on the California Community Colleges Board of Governors. Sheriff Kolender is currently representing California on the Western States Information Network (WSIN) Board of Directors along with the State Attorney General. He is also serving the Governor as a member of the California Board of Corrections and Judicial Selection Advisory Committee. He is also incoming President of the California State Sheriffs' Association and will be sworn in next week. Kolender has received many honors over the years, including the 2004 Courageous Leadership Award by the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, the prestigious John M. Penrith Award for “Excellence in Law Enforcement Administration,” given by the Alumni and Foundation of the National Executive Institute in June 1999, "Outstanding Alumnus" from San Diego State University in 1985, the Urban League's "Equal Opportunity Award" in 1981, and the "Diogenes Award for Truth and Honesty in Government" from the San Diego Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America. He is an active member of or on the boards of directors of several community-based law enforcement and charitable organizations. Sheriff Kolender has also served two terms for the Governor as Commissioner on the State of California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). He has also been a member of the Governor's Policy Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse, the Board of the Presley Institute of Correctional Research and Training, and the California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ). John L. Scott Chief Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department John L. Scott, a 36-year veteran of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, started his career in January 1969. As a deputy he patrolled the Lakewood Station area. In 1974, he was promoted to 20 Sergeant and held assignments at Firestone Station, the Special Enforcement Bureau, and the Emergency Operations Bureau. Following his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant in 1984, he was assigned to Men’s Central Jail, Carson Station, Field Operations Region II Headquarters, the Office of Emergency Management, Employee Relations, and the Office of the Assistant Sheriff. In 1995, he was given command of Carson Station, following his promotion to Captain. In 2001, he was promoted to the rank of Commander and assigned to Custody Operations Division. On April 1, 2003, he was promoted to the rank of Chief and assumed command of the Custody Operations Division. Chief Scott holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Management and a Master’s Degree in Public Communications. In August 2003, Chief Scott was appointed as a member of Board of Corrections. He also serves as a member of the American Correctional Association and the American Jail Association. Joe McGrath Deputy Secretary (A) Office of Internal Affairs Youth and Adult Correctional Agency Joe McGrath has worked in California corrections for 26 years and is currently the Deputy Secretary, Office of Internal Affairs, California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. His most recent accomplishment includes the successful revision and implementation of the employee discipline and investigation processes for the Agency. Immediately prior to his current post, Mr. McGrath was the Warden at Pelican Bay State Prison. Mr. McGrath is an industry expert in prison operations including emergency response and use of force. Mr. McGrath is a certified Phi Theta Kappa instructor in leadership and ethics for public safety officers and earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Corrections and Social Justice from California State University, Sacramento. Brian Parry National Major Gang Task Force In 2002, Brian Parry retired from the California Department of Corrections after 31 years of service. At the time of his retirement Brian was the Assistant Director in charge of the Law Enforcement and Investigations Unit. The Unit was responsible for gang suppression, intelligence and management, apprehension of paroled fugitives and escapees, Officer Involved Shootings, Threat assessments as well as other investigatory duties. 21 Brian has a Bachelors degree from the University of Dayton and has been a firearms instructor and a polygraph examiner. He has received 32 commendations from law enforcement agencies and received the Distinguished Service Medal on behalf of the unit's exemplary work during the 1993 Los Angeles riot. During his career Brian has taught all over the country on gangs and officer safety issues. Since his retirement Brian has been working as an expert witness and consultant on gang related issues. Brian has been on the National Major Gang Task Force's Leadership Council since 1997. 22