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Cripa Cleveland Oh Police Investigation 7-23-02

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-1U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Special Litigation Section
P.O. Box 66400
Washington, DC 20035-6400

July 23, 2002
Subodh Chandra, Esquire
Director, Law Department
Cleveland City Hall
601 Lakeside Avenue
Room 106
Cleveland, OH 44114

Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police

Dear Mr. Chandra:
We would like to take this opportunity to express our
appreciation for the considerable cooperation we have received
from the City, Police Chief Edward Lohn, and the men and women of
the Cleveland Division of Police (CDP) in our investigation and
mutual effort to improve policing in Cleveland. The CDP’s
willingness to review and improve its policies and procedures is
admirable. We likewise want to thank the Cleveland Police
Patrolmen’s Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, the Black
Shield Association, and community leaders who share the
Division’s desire to improve police practices.
Members of our team, including our police practices experts,
have met with Chief Edward Lohn, former chiefs Mary Bounds and
Martin Flask, and the CDP command staff to share informally
recommendations about the policies and practices of the CDP.
During our meeting on March 11, 2002 then Acting Law Director
Rick Horvath, Public Safety Director James Draper and Chief Lohn
expressed interest in receiving specific written recommendations
to assist the CDP in the implementation of new policies,
including the Manual of General Police Orders adopted on March 1,
2002. In this letter, we convey in greater detail our
recommendations regarding use of force, misconduct complaint
investigations, risk management, traffic stop procedures, and

-2To date we have reviewed relevant CDP policies and
directives; attended police academy and in-service training
sessions; ridden along with district patrol officers; and
conducted interviews with CDP officials, a broad cross-section of
the CDP command staff, and those charged with oversight of the
CDP. We have spoken with representatives of the Cleveland Police
Patrolman’s Association, the Fraternal Order of Police and the
Black Shield Association, as well as local attorneys, community
leaders and citizens. Additionally, we are in the process of
reviewing the investigative reports provided to us by the City
relating to civilian complaints, use of force investigations and
Internal Affairs (IA) investigations.
This letter is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather
focuses on significant recommendations that we can provide at
this stage of the investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and 42
U.S.C. § 3789d. Although we have nearly completed our review of
the use of deadly force investigations and the discharge of
firearms investigations provided by the CDP, important aspects of
our investigation have yet to be completed, most notably
completing our review of the CDP complaint investigation reports,
and the more current reports of uses of non-deadly force, still
to be produced. In addition, we are proceeding with our review
of the computer data relating to traffic citations that we have
received recently. Therefore, this letter is not intended to
provide our findings regarding the ultimate question for our
investigation: whether the CDP is engaged in a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional conduct.
We hope that this letter will assist in our mutual goal of
ensuring that the CDP provides effective and respectful police
service to the people of Cleveland, and we look forward to
continued cooperation toward this goal. We also would be happy
to provide examples of policies used by other police departments
that might address issues we raise below.

Uses of Force


The CDP should clarify its use of force policy

We recognize that the CDP has recently adopted a new Use of
Force policy (GPO 2.1.01), which provides guidance on both the
use of deadly force and the use of non-deadly force. The new
policy appropriately adds head strikes with ASP batons to the
definition of deadly force. However, it does not include head


strikes with other hard objects. (e.g., flashlights, portable
radios). Model policies of well-recognized authorities,
including the National Law Enforcement Policy Center of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, consider strikes
to the head with impact weapons such as flashlights to constitute
uses of deadly force. Accordingly, we recommend that the CDP
clarify its use of deadly force policy to designate any strike to
the head with an impact weapon as a use of deadly force and
impose the same use threshold, reporting and investigation
requirements as other uses of deadly force.1
B. 	 The CDP should clarify its process for reviewing uses of
deadly force to ensure consistency
We understand that the CDP investigates uses of deadly force
differently depending on whether or not the use of force results
in death or injury to a person. Although not specified in the
policy, we understand that when a CDP officer uses deadly force
and a person is either injured or killed, the Use of Deadly Force
Investigative Team (UDFIT) responds to the scene and conducts an
investigation. However, if deadly force is used, but no person
is injured or killed, the UDFIT apparently does not respond to
the incident. We understand that, instead, on-duty homicide
detectives and staff from the Inspections Unit investigate noninjury shootings and other non-injury incidents in which deadly
force is used. Finally we understand that prior to October 2001,
these non-injury incidents were investigated by the involved
officer’s district supervisor.
We recommend that the CDP clarify its policy on the
investigation of use of deadly force incidents to make clear that
in-depth examination of uses of deadly force does not depend on
whether there is injury or death to a person, but on whether the
force used by an officer could result in death or serious bodily
injury. The use of deadly force definition contained within GPO
2.1.01 appropriately includes any “action that is likely to cause
death or serious physical harm” and is not limited to incidents
that actually cause such harm. Therefore, we recommend that the
We observe that the CDP policy now defines intermediate
weapons as “authorized less than lethal devices approved and
issued by the Division” including the ASP baton and beanbag
shotgun. We recommend that the CDP clarify that ASP batons and
beanbag shotguns, given their potential to cause lethal injury,
are “less lethal” rather than “less than lethal” weapons.


CDP adopt a uniform policy requiring the investigation of all
uses of deadly force by the UDFIT, regardless of whether injury
actually results.
In addition, we recommend that the CDP form and utilize a
shooting review team to review uses of deadly force after any
criminal and administrative reviews have been completed. The
purpose of the shooting review team should be to review every
incident of use of deadly force to evaluate the tactics used, the
effectiveness of the equipment used, and whether training
standards need to be altered.
We also recommend that, if not already offered, the CDP
explore making confidential psychological counseling and stress
de-briefing available to officers in the aftermath of a traumatic
event as part of the process of ensuring that the officer remains
fit for duty. We recommend that the CDP review and consider
revising its stated policy that officers involved in a use of
deadly force incident automatically “undergo a psychiatric
evaluation if they cause death or injury and shall not return to
street duty until so ordered by the Chief.” (GPO 2.1.01 (V)).
This policy raises two potential concerns. First, the use of the
term “psychiatric evaluation” may unfairly suggest that an
officer is unfit for duty before any such determination is made.
Second, if the CDP is performing only a traditional “psychiatric
evaluation,” that process alone may not offer the assistance and
support appropriate to an officer involved in a traumatic use of

CDP should thoroughly investigate and document uses of force

Our review of CDP use of deadly force and use of non-deadly
force investigations from 1998-2000, and our interviews with CDP
investigators, revealed a lack of documentation that raises
concerns about the competency, thoroughness, and impartiality of
use of force investigations. For example, we have found
instances in which investigators failed to document interviews of
victims, suspects, or CDP or civilian witnesses. In other
instances, CDP investigators failed to document the location of
all physical evidence, perform standard gunshot residue tests,
locate other forensic evidence, or take relevant photographs. We
recommend that the CDP provide specific guidance that
investigators photograph all claimed or actual areas of injury
and interview all officers who could be witnesses in addition to
all civilian witnesses.

-5These apparent deficiencies may derive from inadequate
training for use of force investigators. The command staff and
investigators we interviewed informed us that investigators
receive no specialized training in conducting these sorts of
investigations. We recommend, at a minimum, that the CDP provide
all of its use of force investigators with training in the
following: observation and surveillance skills; basic forensics;
interviewing and interrogation skills; report writing; basic
criminal law; basic court procedures; basic rules of evidence;
and CDP's disciplinary and administrative procedures.
We also reviewed several investigations where the
investigator was involved in or supervised the use of force
incident. This raises the strong potential for a conflict of
interest. In addition, for injuries which result in hospital
admission and, as described above, incidents involving the use of
deadly force, we recommend that investigators not be based in the
district in which the incident occurs. We recommend that CDP
policy make specific that supervisors who are involved as
witnesses, participants or supervisors in a use of force incident
shall not investigate that use of force.
We also recommend that every supervisory review of any use
of force include an assessment of the following issues: (1) was
the force used in compliance with policy, training and legal
standards; (2) if not, should the incident be further
investigated to determine whether misconduct occurred; (3) using
different tactics could the officer(s) have avoided using force
or using the level of force employed; (4) does the incident
indicate a need for additional training, counseling or other
remedial measures; and (5) does the incident suggest that CDP
should revise its policies, training, tactics, or equipment. The
investigations we have reviewed to date are inconsistent in terms
of addressing these critical questions.
We were recently provided with a database of use of nondeadly force reports by the CDP. We noted that this database
does not track whether the use of force is determined to be
within policy. We recommend that this information be added to
the database.

Complaints of Police Misconduct

A. 	 The CDP should clarify its structure and policy regarding
complaints of police misconduct

-6We recommend that the CDP include a definition of
“complaint” in its policy on accepting citizen complaints (GPO
1.3.15) and that the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) and
Internal Affairs (IA) procedural manuals contain consistent
We recognize that the CDP has recently reallocated
responsibility for investigations of police misconduct.
Currently, allegations of criminal misconduct are investigated by
IA, which consists entirely of sworn personnel and reports
directly to the Chief. All other complaints of police misconduct
are investigated by OPS, which is staffed by sworn personnel who
report to a civilian supervisor. OPS forwards its investigations
for review by the Police Review Board, which then makes a
recommendation to the Chief regarding the disposition of the
complaint and whether discipline should be imposed. In light of
this restructuring of the complaint investigation process, we
recommend that the CDP promulgate a policy statement that clearly
delineates the responsibility for the investigation of complaints
or allegations of misconduct between Internal Affairs, OPS and
first line supervisors.
To assure that complaints are directed to the appropriate
unit for investigation and the results of the investigation are
appropriately tracked, we recommend that the CDP develop a
centralized system for accepting, logging, tracking and assigning
complaints for investigation by the appropriate CDP authority.
We recommend that these data be entered into the Risk Management
System discussed below. We recommend that the CDP adopt a policy
addressing who will be responsible for investigating complaints
against OPS and IA personnel. Moreover, we recommend that the
CDP implement both a public education campaign and additional inservice training on the policies and procedures for accepting and
handling complaints. Ensuring that the public is informed of the
means by which complaints can be lodged and that all complaints
will be professionally and appropriately handled benefits
community/police relations.
B. 	 The CDP should review its policies for staffing IA and OPS
and review the training and equipment needs for these
specialized units
We understand that staff assignments to OPS are determined
almost entirely by seniority and that OPS investigators receive


no formal training in conducting complaint investigations. We
recommend that the CDP work with the appropriate union officials
to establish eligibility criteria for sworn investigator
applicants, including consideration of an officer’s complaint and
disciplinary history. We also recommend the CDP remove
investigators whose actions while serving as investigators would
have disqualified them from selection as investigators.
IA and OPS investigators should receive specialized and
ongoing training. Officers newly assigned to OPS and IA should
be paired with a more experienced investigator in these
specialized units for an appropriate period. We also recommend
that the CDP provide additional training to both IA and OPS
investigators from sources outside the Division. We would be
happy to assist the CDP in identifying appropriate resources.
Additionally, OPS and Internal Affairs investigators should
provide in-service training to first line supervisors regarding
their roles at the front end of the complaint process and in
assisting in internal investigations. Finally, we recommend that
the CDP takes steps to encourage officers to consider OPS duty as
an important step in their career development paths. Lending
greater prestige to this office should aid in having effective
OPS staff.
We also recommend that the CDP carefully evaluate the
staffing and workload of OPS, as the responsibility for a larger
volume of complaints has raised concerns about the adequacy of
OPS staffing. We understand that the recent restructuring
increased OPS’ workload from approximately 350 cases per year to
over 700 while the staff only increased from five investigators
to eight. We understand from staff that complaint investigations
are being resolved more quickly than in the past, but
investigations still take as long as four months to be completed.
We also heard staff concerns regarding the equipment assigned to
OPS. Specifically, we understand that OPS has only two cars for
its eight investigators and that at the time of our interviews
with OPS staff both of these cars were in disrepair. The
unavailability of cars can limit the ability of investigators to
be in the field. Further, we understand that investigators must
devote time to transcribing tape recorded interviews. It is our
understanding that both IA and the former Complaint Investigation
Unit investigators were assigned or had access to a CDP vehicle
and that transcription of tape recorded interviews by these
investigators was performed by clerical staff. We recommend that
the CDP review the allocation of resources to ensure that OPS is

-8adequately staffed and equipped to perform its function
C. 	 The CDP should review its policy on the administrative
withdrawal of misconduct complaints
We understand that many complaints are administratively
withdrawn because investigators are unable to contact
complainants or complainants do not respond to phone calls or
letters seeking additional information necessary to the
investigation. We also understand that under current CDP policy
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, complaints are
investigated by OPS only if signed by the complainant and written
in the complainant’s own handwriting. Complaints that do not
comply with these requirements are administratively withdrawn and
are not investigated. We understand that the limited
availability of staff and equipment discussed above may hamper
the ability to contact complainants, many of whom contact OPS
initially by phone, to obtain the required signatures and written
statements, thus precluding investigation of those complaints.
Our review of complaint files to date reveals that a significant
number of the total complaints received by OPS are
administratively withdrawn without a final determination on the
merits. Based on a review of the OPS investigation files
provided to us, during the period 1998 to 2000, approximately 28
percent of complaints were administratively withdrawn.
Investigations by CIU during the same time period resulted in a
nearly identical administrative withdrawal rate (27 percent).
We recommend the CDP work with the appropriate union
officials to permit the CDP to investigate all citizen
complaints, whether signed and written in the complainant’s
handwriting or not. Absent this change in policy, we recommend
that the CDP allocate the necessary resources to assure
meaningful efforts to have complaints received conform to these
requirements. Although we recognize that some complaints from
anonymous sources may not provide sufficient information upon
which to base an investigation, we recommend that CDP investigate
all citizen complaints to the extent reasonably possible to
determine whether or not the allegations can be resolved and that
the CDP not close any misconduct investigation without rendering
one of the following dispositions: sustained; unfounded;
exonerated; insufficient evidence; or administrative withdrawal.
We recommend that the CDP adopt a clear standard for when a


case may be administratively withdrawn. We note that Section 9.0
of the Proposed OPS Procedural Manual contains useful guidance on
this issue,2 however further clarification may be beneficial. We
recommend that the standard for administrative withdrawal be
phrased so that a matter is not administratively withdrawn unless
an investigation cannot be completed because the complainant is
unavailable or unwilling to cooperate after diligent effort has
been made and there is no other information on which to base an
investigation. We recommend that the standard be incorporated in
a general police order and be made applicable to all officers
charged with investigating complaints, including IA.
D. 	 The CDP should revise and update the standard procedures for
accepting and investigating misconduct complaints
Based on our review of investigations to date, we are
concerned that investigators inject opinions and speculation that
may call into question the objectivity of the investigation. We
recommend that the CDP clarify Section 3.4 of the OPS manual to
make clear that investigators should not insert personal views or
unsupported conjecture in their investigative reports. The goal
of administrative investigation is to (1) ensure that the
investigation is conducted fairly and impartially, (2) establish
what happened, and (3) uncover and preserve all pertinent
evidence. Accordingly, we recommend that all complaint
investigators be trained to consider all relevant evidence
including circumstantial, direct and physical evidence, as
appropriate, and make credibility determinations, if feasible.
Investigators should not give automatic preference to any
person's statement over any other person's statement. In making
such credibility determinations, the investigators should
consider, at a minimum, the following factors: (i) the officer’s
investigation history (if relevant to their credibility in the
investigation); (ii) the complainant’s or witness’ criminal
history (if relevant to their credibility in the investigation);
and, (iii) other credible facts suggesting a propensity for
untruthfulness of the persons involved or credibility of the
Section 9.0 provides in relevant part: “Administratively
Withdrawn - the investigation cannot be completed due to the
unavailability of the complainant after diligent efforts have
been made to contact him and there is no other information on
which to base an investigation and/or the complainant’s
unwillingness, if there is no other information on which to base
an investigation.”


complaint in general. In making such credibility determinations
CDP investigators should not disregard a witness’s statement
merely because the witness has some connection to the
complainant. Further, the CDP should train all of their
investigators on the factors to consider when evaluating
complainant or witness credibility. Investigators should make
efforts to resolve material inconsistencies between witness
statements. We recommend that the CDP prohibit investigators,
during complaint investigations, from asking officers or other
witnesses leading questions that improperly suggest legal
justifications for the officer's conduct when such questions are
contrary to appropriate law enforcement techniques.
Our review of OPS investigations also revealed concerns
about the thoroughness of misconduct complaint investigations and
the potential for possible criminal prosecutions to be affected
by a lack of appreciation for the principles of Garrity v. New
Jersey 385 U.S. 493 (1967)(holding that if a law enforcement
officer is not provided with immunity, any statement given under
threat of adverse personnel action is unconstitutionally
coerced). We recommend that OPS institute the following
investigative policies and practices: for all complaints
alleging misconduct, require investigators to conduct in-person,
recorded interviews with all identified complainants, witnesses,
and officers who are the subject of such complaints; require that
all complaints alleging misconduct, including, anonymous
complaints, withdrawn complaints, and complaints filed by
complainants who are unwilling to cooperate with the OPS or whom
OPS is unable to locate, are investigated to the extent
reasonably possible to determine whether or not the allegations
can be resolved; create written guidelines regarding when to
compel statements pursuant to Garrity v. New Jersey that ensure
the integrity of potential criminal investigations; and train
investigators in these procedures.
Finally, the IA procedural manual CDP provided to us by the
CDP was published in 1982. This 20 year old manual does not
appear to accurately describe the current role of IA and, by
virtue of its age, contains techniques that are out-dated and no
longer applicable. Accordingly, we recommend that the CDP
develop a new IA manual that, at a minimum, describes the
required investigative steps including (a) procedures for
contacting victims and witnesses, (b) evidence gathering
techniques, (c) the format and content of investigative reports
and (d) procedures for exchanging information between different


units of the CDP. We would be happy to suggest training
resources and model policies that may assist in the development
of this new manual.

Risk Management

A. 	 The CDP should develop its risk management system to track a
wide variety of employee conduct in order to identify and
assist employees whose actions suggest job-related issues
We understand that the CDP has recently purchased a risk
management software system to help identify and remedy
potentially troublesome officer conduct. We understand that this
system is designed to allow the CDP to aggregate data from a
variety of sources, such as personnel files, citizen complaints
and use of force reports in order to review systemic issues that
may require changes in training or policy. Our specific
recommendations on the data elements that should be collected to
make the risk management system a more useful tool from the
present day forward are included below. We also recommend that
the database be populated with historical data from the last
several years.
We believe that the CDP will benefit from utilization of its
automated risk management tool. We are pleased to learn that the
CDP’s system was installed in December 2001, and that CDP staff
are presently working on the logistical issues involved in
populating this system with data from different sources. We
recommend that the CDP capture data elements relating to both
officer action and organizational conduct. Data that may be
helpful include: uses of deadly and non-deadly force, complaints
investigated by both IA and OPS, criminal allegations against
officers, civil or administrative claims against officers,
assignment and rank history of officers. Because of the CDP
policy regarding the administrative withdrawal of complaints
discussed above, we recommend that the risk management system
also include data regarding complaints that are closed by
Because risk management tools are designed to help
supervisors and managers identify and correct behaviors before
the imposition of discipline might become necessary, we recommend
that the CDP review its policy regarding the Early Intervention
Program (EIP) and clarify how the risk management system will be
used in connection with the EIP, including what thresholds will


be used to identify officers for review and how such officers’
conduct will be reviewed. Moreover, officers should be made
aware of what non-disciplinary actions may be taken by
supervisors and managers when specific officers are identified by
the risk management system. We also recommend that the CDP
emphasize that first line supervisors remain responsible for the
behavior of officers under their supervision.
We understand that the current EIP policy contemplates that
the office of the Chief of Police will monitor statistical
records, presumably the risk management system. In addition,
when an officer exhibits a number of indicators equal to or
exceeding the threshold determined by the Chief, an EIP package
will be delivered to the officer’s commander for review. We
understand that the commander, with input from supervisory staff,
may determine that intervention is not warranted. We recommend
that the CDP require district commanders who determine that
intervention is not merited under the EIP, be required to provide
a written explanation to justify this determination. Finally, we
recommend that the EIP not be voluntary on the part of the
officer, as the program is designed to reaffirm agency policy and
provide additional training or other appropriate non-disciplinary
assistance. We understand that other police departments around
the country require that officers participate in these types of
assistance programs in order to address at risk behavior and
prevent officers from becoming involved in serious misconduct.

Traffic and Pedestrian Stops

A. 	 The CDP should implement its data collection initiative and
expand the frequency and scope of its data analysis
We understand that the CDP has decided to collect data on
all pedestrian and motor vehicle stops by CDP officers. We
understand that as part of this initiative the CDP is including
diverse members of the community, representatives of the CPPA,
the FOP, and other line officers and command staff in the
development of the policy statement and data collection protocol.
We applaud these efforts. As we have discussed with Chief Lohn,
former Chiefs Bounds and Flask, and members of the CDP command
staff, meaningful analysis of stop data requires the collection
of a number of data items. We have been provided with a draft
data collection form that CDP officers will utilize to capture
the following data: the date of the stop, the officer’s name and
badge number, the location of the stop, the gender,


race/ethnicity and date of birth of person stopped, the basis for
the stop, whether a search or frisk of the person or vehicle was
conducted, whether the search was consensual, whether any
contraband was seized, the result of the contact (i.e verbal
warning, citation issued, or arrest), the state in which the
vehicle stopped is registered, and whether a canine was deployed.
We understand that the CDP had planned to begin data collection
in February 2002, but that a test of the data collection system
in January 2002 highlighted certain logistical issues that the
CDP is currently working to resolve.
We also recommend that the CDP develop a methodology for
analyses of stop data on a regular basis. Because much research
is presently being done in the area of data analysis, both within
the policing profession and in academia, the CDP may want to
retain a consultant for guidance in data analysis. In addition
to examining traffic stop data, we recommend that traffic stop
analyses include a review of commendations and compliments, as
well as information on complaints and civil suits (both pending
and resolved) that allege discrimination in the provision of
police services on the basis of race, color, or national or
ethnic origin.
We also understand that for the last year the CDP has been
collecting and reviewing certain data items from uniform traffic
tickets (UTTs) including the identity, gender, and race of all
persons to whom a citation is issued, data that identifies the
vehicle and license plate, the street location of the stop that
resulted in the issuance of the ticket(s), the police district in
which the ticket was issued and the identity of the issuing
officer. We understand that the CDP has been conducting regular
reviews of this UTT data and recommend that this practice
continue in conjunction with the stop data analyses discussed
B. 	 The CDP should utilize its in-car video cameras and audio
recorders more systematically
It is our understanding that CDP utilizes video cameras
mounted in police cruisers and audio recorders to detect and
prosecute persons suspected of driving under the influence
violations and to investigate fatal and other serious traffic
accidents. (GPO 3.4.03). We recommend that these cameras and
recorders be used to record all traffic stops. We urge the CDP
(1) to configure the video camera systems and audio recorders so


they begin taping at the time that an officer activates his/her
emergency equipment, and (2) to modify its policy regarding the
storage of the tapes to prohibit officers from rewinding the
tapes or erasing or re-using the tapes and to maintain the
evidentiary integrity of the tapes. Used tapes should be stored
for a minimum of 90 days. These recordings can then be used to
aid in quickly resolving complaints as well as in conjunction
with the stop data and analysis discussed above.
V. 	 Training
A. 	 The CDP should provide additional in-service firearms
All CDP officers are required by the state training board to
qualify annually in the use of firearms. We understand that this
qualification is achieved during an eight hour in-service
firearms training. This training consists of classroom
presentations and the administration of a short written exam on
the use of deadly force policy, followed by a live-fire
examination on the shooting range that focuses on ensuring that
officers know how to use firearms proficiently. We understand
that the GPO 1.1.10 requires that officers score a minimum of 80
percent on the written examination, but that the written exam
consists of approximately 20 questions. Thus, a passing score
could be obtained even though questions that test an officer’s
basic understanding of the use of deadly force policy are
answered incorrectly. We recommend that the CDP review this
requirement to ensure that a passing score on the written
examination requires that officer correctly answer key questions
related to the use of deadly force policy.
During our observation of firearms qualification and
training, CDP staff showed us the 19 room training facility that
is an obvious source of pride. We understand that training is
offered at this facility in both search techniques and the use of
firearms indoors. We were favorably impressed with the facility
and recommend that the CDP develop a formal training curriculum
and schedule so that all officers can receive the benefit of this
resource. We understand from speaking with command staff,
firearms trainers, and rank and file officers, that additional
firearms training would be welcomed.
We also understand that the CDP is considering adding
quarterly firearms training for all officers to focus on tactical


and decision-making skills. We strongly encourage this plan.
Our review of use of deadly force investigations and “non-use” of
deadly force investigations revealed numerous circumstances in
which CDP officers utilized tactics that appeared to create
additional risks to the officers. Specifically, we observed a
number of investigations of CDP officers firing at moving
vehicles that, through the use of different tactics, may have
been avoidable and presented fewer risks to officers and
subjects. We recommend that this additional training include
exercises in tactical training and “shoot, don’t shoot” decisionmaking scenarios. Further, the use of interactive firearms
training technology, or simulation training tools, would provide
for realistic role playing and provide CDP officers decisionmaking practice and assessment. To the extent possible, we
recommend that the CDP training include scenarios drawn from
actual CDP use of force incidents. We recommend that the
scenarios be balanced between incidents wherein the officer is
able to deploy tactics that result in avoidance of shooting as
well as incidents wherein use of deadly force was necessary and
justified. Finally, we recommend that officers receive training
in night shooting and stress training (i.e., training in using a
firearm after undergoing physical exertion). Our review of the
23 use of deadly force incidents provided by the CDP reflect that
17 of these occurred at night.
B. 	 CDP should develop a structured Field Training Officer (FTO)
Program, implement a well-designed FTO selection procedure
and take measures to assure that FTOs are adequately trained
We understand from district commanders that FTOs are
selected almost exclusively on the basis of seniority with little
input from the command staff. These FTOs serve for indefinite
terms and receive only limited training. We recommend that the
CDP work with union officials to develop a structured program for
recruiting, selecting, training and evaluating FTOs.
The CDP should develop specific criteria for the selection
of FTOs from the ranks of qualified personnel with the clearly
established minimum qualifications. At a minimum, FTOs should
have several years of experience as police officers. FTOs should
have no adverse disciplinary actions that reflect a lack of
integrity, use of excessive force or discriminatory behavior,
have favorable performance appraisals, and exhibit interpersonal
skills consistent with the coach/mentor function of an FTO.
Moreover, the CDP should adopt a structured training and


evaluation program for FTOs. We would be happy to provide the
CDP with examples of FTO programs that other law enforcement
agencies have implemented with success.
We recommend that the CDP take measures to recruit and train
qualified FTOs, including providing additional incentives to
encourage officers to apply to become FTOs. Possible incentives
include greater monetary compensation or priority for receiving
training on new equipment (such as weapons), policies and
procedures. We also recommend that FTOs be appointed to serve
for a fixed term of approximately 2 years, renewable at the
discretion of the CDP based upon overall satisfactory
performance, and that the CDP develop a mechanism for removing
FTOs who fail to perform adequately.
C. 	 CDP management should audit recruit and in-service training
and provide in-service cultural diversity training.
A number of training sessions that we have observed
highlight the need for the Chief or Executive Staff to audit
academy and in-service training in order to be confident that
policies are being effectively taught. While some training
courses we have attended were well done, others clearly were not
effective in conveying the subject matter. For example, one
particular training course consisted solely of a lecture on
Supreme Court decisions and complex legal concepts. Officers
clearly were not paying attention to the lecture (to the point of
reading newspapers, doing crossword puzzles and chatting among
themselves), asked no questions, and did not participate in any
discussion of the issues. CDP command staff apparently were
unaware of the specifics of this training until we brought it to
their attention.
The recommended auditing can be accomplished either through
an auditing function, in which designated CDP personnel, not part
of the academy staff, attend training courses and report their
observations to the Chief, or by requiring executive and command
staff to attend training and to report to the Chief. Regardless
of who is designated to carry out the audit function, there
should be a reporting structure that, at a minimum, provides
information on whether the subject matter taught complied with
department policy and current law, whether class time was
sufficient and properly used, and whether teaching methods were

-17In conclusion, we appreciate the cooperation we have
received from City and CDP officials in our investigation to
date. We look forward to continuing to work with you and to
discussing the issues raised by this letter.
/s/ Steven H. Rosenbaum

Steven H. Rosenbaum
Special Litigation Section
cc: 	 Emily M. Sweeney, Esq.
United States Attorney