Human Drug Testing by the Cia 1977 Hearings Before Us Senate

• Topics: Medical, Medical Experiments/Exploitation

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HUMAN DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977

HEARINGS
B~ILE

THE

SUBCOMMITIEE ON
HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC R~EARCH
01' T1Ul

COMMITrEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES·
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
0111

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1893

TO AMEND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SDVICE ACT TO ESTABLISH
THE PRESIDENT'S CO!lWISSION FOB THlD PROTECTION OJ'
HU!4A..N SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REBEABCR, AND rOR OTHER PURPOSES

Printed for ttel1le of the Committee on Buma.n BeIOUreeU.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFJ'ICE
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W.AeBINGTON : 1811

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Turner, Adm. Stansfield, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, accom. panied by Harry E. Gordon, Office of Research and Development; Ray
Reardon, Office of Security; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical ServOffice of Inspector
General; and Lyle L. Miller,_
vices; legi8lati've
Alan Brody,
acting
counseL
.,.

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

';'.

Articles, publications. et cetera:
uHyperaensitivity Phenomenon Produced by Stress: The 'Negative
Phase' Reaction," by Charles F. Geschickter, M.D., W. Edward
O'Malley, M.D., Ph. D., and Eugene P. Rubacky, Ph. D., from the
Americ..... Journal of Clinical Pathology vol. 34, vol. 1, July 1969__
"Role of Mucinolysis in Collagen Disease," by Charles F. Geschickter,
M.D.;.r, PanayiotaA. Athanasiadou,M~DAandW. Edward O'Malley,
Ph• .u., from the American Journal of \.ilinical Pathology, vol. 30,
No.2, AugUst 1958
~_.,.-------------;..---------"Use of Amino Acid Antagonists for the Inhibition. of'l'umor
Growth," by Charles F. GeschickU!r', M.D., Murray'M~.Copeland,
M.D., and Jean Scholler; B.S., from the Bulletjn,()eorgeto~University MedJealCentel', No.2, Auguat-Septembtr 1951
_
Communications to:
.
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts, from:
Miller, .Lyle L, acting legislative counsel, Central Intelligence
Agenctt, September 27, 1977 (with enclosure)
_
Siemer, lJeanne C., General Counsel, Department of Defense,
September 2<!. 1977 (with enclosure)
~
_
President of the united Sta~, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Under Secretary of State; John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health
Education, and Welfare; and Richard Helms, Director of Centrai
Intelligence Agency, March 24, 1977
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HUMAN DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977 .
'rtJESDAY, SEP'l'ElIItBEB 20, 1977
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTInC RESEARCH
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES,

Washington, D.O.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kennedy and Schweiker.
.
OPENING STATEKENT .OF SENATOR KENNEDY

.Senator KENNEDY. We will come to order.
Today the Health and Scientific Research Subcommittee :resumes
its inquiry into the biologic and behavioral research activities of the
Centril Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. The
events we will hear about over the next 2 days occurred between 1952
and 1972. They had their origin in a different time which had different valUf!S and realities. But it is important for us to fully understand these events today-because they raise fundamental questions
.
about the kind of society we are and want to become.
We are a free people, living in an open society. But some of our most
cherished freedoms have been threatened. by these CIA activities.
The question is not whether a free society can accommodate the
need for covert intelligence activities. The question is how those
activities can be made accountable; how they can be carried out without jeopardizing the very freedoms they are supposed to protect.
In tlie Unite(l. States, the ends never have, and never will, justify
the means. Freedom can be eroded by internal excesses as well as by
external threats. The story we will hear in these next 2 days is of well
motivated, 'patriotic Americans who, by their work, eroded the
freedom of mdividuaIs and of institutions in the name of National
. .
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security.
As a result, .individual Americans from all social levels,. high and
low, were made the unwitting subjects of dro~ tests; scores of universities were used to further CIA research objectives without their
knowledge, thus threatening in a fundamental way their traditional
independence and integrity; other GoverllJDent agencies, such as the
Bureau of Narcotics, the National Institutes of Health, and the
Internal Revenue Service, were used to further the programs· and
mission of t~e Central Intelligence ~ency.
These ~:cts were not the creation of low-level agency bureaucrats wor' . against the wishes or Without the knowledge oi the
Agency's leaaership. The collection of activities now known as
(1)

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MK-ULTRA were approved, after personal review, including briefinp by the Director of the Agenc)7, Mr. Dulles.
"
. It is well known that anotlier CIA Director, Mr. Helms, approved
the destruction of the" MK-ULTRA records in 1972. This has made
the task of reconstructing those· events. verydifficult-Qoth for the
CIA and for interested senate committees. What is clear now, from
the witnesses we have hear~ and will hear, and from the fe':K records
that have been found, is the following: .
1. When MK-ULTRA was phased out, it was replaced by MK~·
SEARCH. MK-SEARCH represented a continuation of a limited
number of the ULTRA projects. It is now clear that the records of
this project have also been destroyed. In fact, the records of aU drug
J:'esearch projects available to· the Director of the Technical Services
.
Division of the CIA were destroyed at the same time.
2. Some operational activities ut.jJjzjng the fruits of this research
...
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were carried out.
3. The bulk of the research effort led nowhere.
4. The Bureau of Narcotics was heavily involved in all the drug
projects invol~ unwitting subjects.
5. The CIA had available certain documents pertaining to these
acfvities in 1975, when this subcommittee's inquiry began, which
they did not make available until 2 weeks ago; and that the A~ency
only discovered that some MK-SEARCH materials were avallable
alter the August 3 hearing.
" .
It is my hope that these next 2 d9's of hearings will close the book
on this chapter of the CIA's life. We have the opportunity to learn
from what lias happened. We have the oPf0rtunity to build in controls
so these excesses will not occur again I we do not take the opportunity, if we return to business as usual, then the next erosions of our
freedom and traditions may not be reversible.
Part of the obvious interest of the continuation of these 2 days of
hearings is that we will see that many of the programs that were
started in the early 1950's, many of them continued into the early
part of the 1970's, and during this period of time we see the perver- .
sion of many different govemment8J ~encies, and where we found
at least some prOgrams were started, looked like they had a limited
life. ~~then !Verereally phased out, that the continuation of those
actiVItIes contmued on and on and on.
.
I think we are concerned about the perVersion of those various
agencies of Government. We are concerned most of all about what the
impact of these activitiesliave been on unwitting American subjects
during this whole period of time. Even though we will. hear about the
series of di1feren~ tests that took place, and we wiJl track how those
tests began, how they continued and, in some instances,. how they
were phased out, we will see a continuation, I think, of activities that
will fiiI to really protect particularly the unwitting subjects that were .
involved in many of these programs, and that is a matter of obvio~
serious concern about the activities, particularly when they went oil .
for such a profound and extensive period of time.
Of course, always we have to ask ourselves what was really gained
from these kinds of programs, particularly in the health field, at a
time when we see scarce resources and we see the expenditures of
hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars r..Uy, in terms
of health function, and we see virtually little if any kind of accounta-

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bility in many of these areft,S. No one doubts that there are serious
kinds of national security isSues 'Which are raised in the whole question.
of behavioral control. During the course of the hearing tomorrow,
in inquiring. of Mr. Turner, we are going to inquire also about what is
essential in terms of providing some degree of protection for the
security of the American people in this area of behavioral research.
[A copy of the bill dealing with the subject follows:]

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t!Im OO~GRESS
1ST SI88JOli

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
19 (legislath-e day, MAY 1~), 1977
. Mr. X2NSmy (for himself.lIr. J.\'·ITlI, lb. PEu., And.Mr. ScmnntER) introducedthe following bill j which W8S I't'od twice lLM referred to the Committee on Human Resources
JULY

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A:BILL
To amend th~ Public Health Service Act to establish the Presi. dent's Commission for the Proteotion o' Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral. Research, and for other purposes.

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2

Be it Cftactedby the Senate and House of Represt'ntatives of the United Stales of A'ffleMca in Olmgress

a88em~led,

3 That this Act may be cited· os the "President's Commi~sion

" .for the Protection of HUlDan Subjects of .Biomedical and
5 Behavioral Research Act of 1977".
6

AlIENDKENT 'fO THE PUBLIC HEAL'l'H SERVICE ACT

SEC. 2. The Public Health Service Act is amended by

8 adding. after title XVII the foll()wing new title:
II

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"TITIJE XVIll-PRESIDENT'S COlfM!SSION arOR

THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF

BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH

"ESTABLISHMENT OF OOMHlBSION

"SEC. 1801. (a) (1) There is established a Commission

6 to be known as the President's Gommission for the Protec7 tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-

8 search (hereinafter in this part referred to as t·he 'Commis9

sion').
"(b) The Commission shall be composed of eleven

11 members appointed by the P.resident by and with the advice
12 and consent of the Senate. The' President shall appoint13

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" ( 1) five (and not more than five) members of

the Commission from individuaIa-

"(A) who are or have been engaged in bio-

medical or behavioral research involving human

subjects, and

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" (B) who are especially qualified to serve on

the Commission by virtue of their training, experi-

ence, or background; and

" (2) six members of the Commission from indi-

viduals-

"(A) who are not and have never been en-

gaged in biomedical or behavioral research involv-

ing human subjects, and

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.' " (B) who are dis~e~ .in the fields :of

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m&dic~e,'law, ethi~, theology~

ica1, behavioral

social

the'biological, phy's-

sci~nces,

philosophy,

W1-

manities, health administration, government, and

public affairs.

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" (c) No individual who is a full-time e~plo~ee of ~e

7 United States may be appointed as a member of the CO!D-

8 mission.
9

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"(d) Prior to the appointment of an individual ~~ a

10 member of the Commission under subsection (b), each s~Qh .
11 individual shall receive

alI agency and department secwity

12 clearances necessary to assure Buch individual's access, as ..
13 member of" the Commission, to information (as deftned;in

14 section 1811) •
15

(e) Until such time as the President acts ~. appoillt

16 members of the Commimon under subsection (b), :th~
17' members of the National
. . Commission for the Protection . of
"

18' Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Researcl1,
i9 who are serving upon. the date of enactment of the

X: Act,

20 . are' deemed .members· of the' Oommission: Provided, ~t

21 no classified information be made available to such me~
22 bers through a request of th~ 'Commission
""23

24
25

Until appropriate

security clearanceS" be ob~d by such. members.
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(f} The term of office of each member of the ·Co~-

mission shall be four Ye&l'S;except that-

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" (1) the ·terms ofoffiee' of-members first taking

'Office shall begin' on the date of appointment and sl1i.ll

expire, as designated by the 'President at the time ·of

.their appointment, four; at· the. end

at the end of three years, and three at the end of four

years;

of ·two years,

four

"(2) the term of office of each member ·a.ppointed

to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the exPiration of

the tenn for which his· predecessor· was appointed shall

·10

be appointed for the remainder of such term; and
<I.

"(8) a member whose term has expired may serve

su~eessor

has been appointed.

until his

"(g) (1 ) The members of the Commission shall elect

14 a Chairman and one Vice Chairman from among themselves.
15 . Either the Chairman

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Vice Chairman may be a scientist;

16 however both shall not be scientists.
17

"(2) Seven members of the Commission shalf consti-

18 tute a quonnn for business, but n lesser number may condnct
·19 hearings.
20

"(3) The Commission shall meet ·at the call of the

21 Chairman or at the call of

majority of its members.

"(4) No individual may be -a.ppointed to serve as a

member of the Commission, if such individual has served

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D4: for two terms of four years each.

5
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" (5) A vaa..dCY on .the ~Commission ·sholl not affect the

2 authority or activities of the Commission.
3

(h) Members of the Commission shall'receive compen-

4 sation at a rate to be fixed' by' the Commisson, but not ex5 ceedingfoi" any -day (including traveltime) the daily equiv-

•

6' alent of the· eff~ctive rate for 08-18 of the General SChed7·

we while

vested in the Commission, and shall be reimbuned for travel,

subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred in -the pef\o

engaged in the actual performance of the· duties

•

10· formance of such duties.
11

(i) The Seoretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,

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12 the Secretary of Defense, the· Directot 'of Central ~telli..
13 genoe, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology

14: Policy (established under the Presidential-·Science and Tech-

15 nology Advisory Organization' Act of: 1976); the Adminis·

16 trator of Veterans' Affairs, and the Director of the National
;

17 Science Foundation shall each designate' an indi;idual to

18 serve

a non.oting, ex-officio adviser to the Commission.

" (j) The Commission may secure directly from any

~O' department or agency information necel!8&ry to enable it to

21 carry out its duties. Upon the written request of the Chair-

22 man of the Commission, or eight members thereof, each

23 departmBnt or

ageooy lJh~ furnish~inf9~~OP'

requested

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1 - by the Commission which is necessa.ry to enable the Com']

mission to carry out its duties.
"Duties and Functions of the Commission

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"GENERAL

"SEC. 1802. (a) (1) (A) The Commission shall con-

6 duct a comprehensive iD\·estigation and study to identify

7 the basic ethical principles which should underlie the conS duct of biomedical and
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behavioral' research involvinJt

human subjects.

"(B) In carrying out tbe provisions of subparagmph

(A) J the Commission shall consider at least the following:

"(i) The boundaries between biomedical or be-

havioraI research involving human subjects and the

accepted and routine practice of medicine;

15-

"(ii) The role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria

in the determination' of the appropriateness of research

involving human subjects j

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"(iii) Appropriate' guidelines for the selection of'
hunian subjects for partiCipation in biomedical and
. .behavioral research;

21'

"(iv) Appropriate mechanisms to assure. the full

exercise of the rights and full" protection of the interests

23 .

.' of . human 'subjectS

research;

of biomedical and

behaVioral

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sent in various settings;
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(v) The nature and definition of informed con~
t·

(vi) The .principles identified and developed by;

the National Commission for the Protection of H1imaJi

Subjects of Biomedicai and Behavioral Research; and,·

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sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi;.·

cal arid Behavioral Research.

(vii) All relevant work of the National

. "( 2) The Commission shall develop comprehensive and.

10 uniform policies, procedures and guidelines which should;
11 be followed in biomedical and behavioral research involving'

12 human subjects to assure that it is conducted in aCQOrdance'
~1

13 with principles identified by the Commission imder subsea14

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iron (8.) (1) (A) and concerning any other matter pertain;

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15 . ing" to the full exercise of the rights and "fuli pr.otection of

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16 the interests of human subjects'of such research.

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"(3) The Commission shall advise, consult with, and

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18 make recommendations to 'any department or agency con-

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19 cerning such administrative or other action as may be appro20

pria.te or necessary to apply the policies, procedures and,

21 'guidelines developed under paragraph (2)- to biomedicaL
22 and behavioral research conducted, funded or regulated under:
23

programs administered by such departments or agencies,:

24 and concerning any other matter 'pertaining to the full exer-

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1 ing, and monitoring human investigation reVi6"71 boards in
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those entities which receive funds from or which are regu-

lated by each such department or agency.

"(B) In carrying out the provisions of subparagraph

(A), the Commission shall include· among other matters,

6 comprehenSIve and uniform policies, procedures, and guide-

7 lines conceming8

"(i) the establishment, operation, and functions of

the Protocol Review Subcommittee and the Subject Ad-

visory Subcommittee required under subsection (c) of

section 1805;

" (ii) the nature and extent of public participation

in the decisionmaking process of the human investiga-

tion review boards and subcommiuees;

15
16
17

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"(iii) the inclusion of the public in meetings of
such boards and subcummittees;
"(iv) The requirement for public hearings by such
boards and subcommittees; and
" (\')

The requirement of public disclosure of

decisions of such boards lind subcommittees and the
. nntnrc nnd scupe of such disclosure.

" (2) Once Ii. department or agency has required the

establishment of Immnn investigation review boards in those

24 entities which receive funds from 9r which are regulated

25 by such department or Agency, the Commission shall, from

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1 time to time, monitor such department's or agency's policies,

2
3

procedures, guidelines, and other administrative actions.
" (e)

The Commission shall continually re,·icw the
1].

4 ethical, social. and legal· implications of· all biomedical and
5 behavioral research involving human subjects conducted,

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funded, or regulated by any department or agency, and shall

7 make appropriate recommendations to. any such department

8 or agency, for the protection of human subjects of such
9 research.

"(f) (1) The Commission shall compile a complete

11 list and record of decisions of human investigation review

]

12 boards and shall annually publish reports of important deci13 sions and distribute such reports to the public.

"(2)

The Commission shall insure communication

15 among human investigation review boards as it detennines

16 necessary to permit such ~oards to beinfonned about the
17 activities, standards, and decisions ofsuchboards.
18

"sPECIAL STUDY

"SEC. 1803. (a) The Commission shall undertake n com-

2(;

prehensive study of the ethical, social, and logel implications

21 of advances in biomedical and behavioral re~earch tech22 nology. Such study shall include-23

" (1)

an analysis and evaluation of scientific

24 .

and technological advances in past, present, and pro-

jected biomedical and behavioml research and services;

•

15
12
" (2) an analysis and evaluation of the implications

2
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of such advances, both for individuals and for society;

"(3) an analysis and evaluation of laws and moral

and ethical principles governing the use of technology

in medical practice;

"(4) an analysis and evaluation of public under-

standing of and attitudes toward such implications nnd

laws and principles; and

" (5) an analysis and evaluation of implications for

- public policy of such findings as are made by the

Commission with respect to advances in biomedical and

behavior!!! research and technology and public attitudes

toward such advances.

(b) o( 1) The Commission shall simultaneously submit

15 copies of a report on such study to the appropriate depart16 ments or agencies and to the appropriate committees of

17 Congress.

"(2) The Commission may, if it deems it appropriate,

19 include in such report recommendations to such departments

•

20 or agencies and to Congress.
21

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"DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES

-22

"SEC. 1804. (a) (1) The Commission shall identify the

basic ethical principles which should underlie the delivery of

24 health services to persons.

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1
2

(2) In carrying out. the provisions of.paragraph (1),

the Commission shall-

(A) study those basic ethical principles identified

in subsection (n) (1) (A) of section 1802 for the pur-

pose of determining their application to the delivery of

health services to persons;

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(B) conduct a comprehcnsh'e investigation and

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study to identify those ba.qic ethienl principles which-

(i) should underline the delivery of health

services to persons; and

(ii) were either not identified' under s:lbsec-

tion (n) (1) (A) of section 1802 or if identified

under such subsection were detennined by the Com-

mission to be inapplicable to the delivery of health

services to persons.

(b) The Commission shall develop comprehenshoe and

17 uniform policies, procedures, and guidelines which should be
18 followed in the delil-ery of health ~ervices to persons to as:-

19 sure that such services are perfonned in accordance with
20 principles identified by the Commission under sobsection

(a) and concerning any other matter pertaining to the full

22 exercise of the rights and foll protection of the interests of
23

persons receiving health services.
"(c) The Commission shall advise, consult with, and

17
14

1· make recommendations to. any department or agency the
\

2 Commission deems appropriate concerning such admHiistra-

thee or other action as may be appropriate or necessary to

4 apply the policies, procedures, and guidelines developed
. ii
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5 under subsection (b) to the delh"ery of health services to

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6 persons and concerning any other matter pertaining to the

7 full exercise of the rights and full protection of the interests
8 of such persons.
" (d) The Commission shall, from time to time, monitor

the

implementati~n

of those policies, procedures and guide-

11 lines recommended by the Commission under subsection (c)
12 and adopted by departments or agencies.
13

"Human Ill\'estigation Review Boards

"ESTABLISlIMEKT A~D OPERATION

"SEC. 1805. (a) Each department or agency shall, in

16 consultation with the Commission-

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" (1 ) develop· policies, procedures and guidelines

for the establishment and operation of human inyestiga-

tion reyiew boards in entities which recehoe funds from

or which are regulated by such department or agency.

" (2) require the establishment and operation of a

human investigation review board by each such entity;

" (3) take such administrath'e or other action as

may be necessary or appropriate to require the estab-

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lishment and effective operation of a human investiga-

tion review board by each such en ti ty.

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(b) (1) The members of each human investigation

4 review board shall be appointed by the chief executive officer
5

of the entity in accordance with policies, procedures, guide-

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6 lines, and regulations established by a department or agency.

~.;.).

(2) No member of a human investigation review

.~:

invol~"ed

board shall be

review of an activity in which he has a conflict of interest as

in either the initial or continuing

]

10 defined by the Commission, except to provide such infonna11

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as may be requested by such human investigation review

12 c\)ards.
13

"(c) Each human in\"estigation review board shill

14 establish two subcommittees as follows:

(1) a Protocol Review Subcommittee, which shall

be responsible for approving, diasapproving, or offering

suggestions and modifications of protocols for experi-

mental procedures;

(2) a Subject Advisory Subcommittee, which shall

be primarily concerned :with the protection of the rights

and interests of ~l1bjects of biomedical and behavioral

research, and shall assure that human subjects are as

well informed about the nature of the research as is

reasonably possible.

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16
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"(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no

entity shall be required to establish more than one human

investibrntion review board.

" (e) In a case where the policies, procedures, or guide-

5 lines of more than one department or agency conflict and a
6 human investigation review board or an entity cannot resolve

....

7 the application of such conflicting policies, procedures or
8 guidelines, the Commission shl\l1 decide the resolution of snch

9 conflict.
10

"CERTIFICATION

. uSEC • 1806. (a) Each department or

,A~ency which

12 funds or regulates an' entity with respect t-o biomedical and
13· behavioral research involving human subjects shall certify

that the Human Investigation Review Board of such entity

15 is in conformity with the requirements of subsection B.

. 16

" (b) _No human investigation review board shall be

17 certified by a department or agency unless such department
18 or agency is satisfied that19
t.

(1) the entity has established a human investiga-

tion review board in such manner as is required by this

title and by such department or agency;

(2) the human investigation review board will

operate in a manner so as to assure the full exercise of

the rights and full protection of the interests of subjects

'~I

,,:",

J
'1 ';

20
17
.1

of biomedical and behavioral research consi$tent with

the ethical and moral principles identified by the Como.

mission, pursuant to section 180 l.

unUTIEs OF THE HUMAN INVESTIGA.TION REVIEW BOARDS

"SEC. 1807. It shall be the duty of each human investi-

gation review board, established under section '1805, to-

" (a) establish policies for the reyiew of research

sponsored In whole or part by Federal funds or required

by Federal regulation, consistent with the policies, pro-

cedures, and guidelines of appropriate departments or

agencies;

] ~.

:1
•

J
J
]

(b) assume full responsibility to insure that bio-

medical Ilnd behavioral research involving human sub-

jects is carried out under the safest possible conditions

and with the fully informed consent of the subject (or

his family) in a manner fully. consistent with thepoli-

cies, procedures, and guidelines of appropriate depart-

ments or agencies;

" (c ) seek the consultative services of the Com-

mission on any decision, or for the provision of informa-

"I
~

a
.J

... •·
u
:;,'

tion needed to arriye at a decision; and

'.••.

]

':',;

" (d) initiate, if appropriate, the referral of par-

ticular decisions to the Commission in accordance with

regulations promulgated b,v the Commission.

•...

'.,'

;j
:j.. .
>1

.:::J

21
18
1

"MONITORING AND INSPECTION

"SEC. 1808. (a) A department or agency which has

certified the Human Inyestigation Review Board of an en-

4 tity shall, from time to time, monitor the operation and

•

...

5 activities of-

" (1)

such Board, and

(2) such entity,

s to determine whether the operation and activities of such
9 Board and entity are in compliance with this title, and the

10 policies, procedures, guidelines, and regu.lations of such deII

putment or agency.

" (b) (1) A department or agency which has certified

the human investigation review board of an entity shall,

14 from time to time, inspect such entity to determine "'hether
15

it is in compliance with this title, alll!. the policies, pro-

16 cedw'es, guidelines, and regu~atiollS of such delJartmeut or
':·1

.:.j

17 agency.

,.1
".'

•

(2) In the case of an entity inspected pursuant to this

19 section, the inspection shall extend to all tangible things
to

.20 therein; including records., files, papers, documents, processes,
21 controls, and facilities, which such department or agency
22

finds relevant or material to whether such entity is in com-

pliance with this title, and the policies, procedures, guide-

lines, and regulations of such dep,artment or agency.

"(c) The m<mitoring and inspection authority of any

]

19
1

department or' agency, pursuant to this section, shnll be

limited to those operations, actiyities,and tangible thUlgg

<]
']

3 which relate to research funded, in whole or in part, by or

.....

••••

4 required pursuant to a regulation of such department or

agency.

"CONFIDENTIALITY AND RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS

]

SEC.

1809. If an entity has established a human investi-

gation review board and' such board has been certified by a

deplU'tment or agency, such entit.y shall"--

"(a) establisb and maintain such records, make

such reports, and provide such infonnation as any snch

department or agency .shall by regulation or order re-

quire to determine whether such entity is in compliance

with this title, and the policies, procedures, guideliucs,

and regulations of such department or agency;

" (b) makc such records, files, papers, documents,

processes, and controls which such depnrhncnt or agency

finds material or relevant to whether such entity is in

.19

compliance with this title, and the policies, procedures,

.guidelines, and regulations of such department or agency

available to such department or agency, or any of its

d~y

ing, or mechanical reproduction on or off the premises

of such elltityupon the reasonable requegt therefor;

authorized representntives for examination, copy-

" (c) (1) a depart.ment or agency shall not disclose

•

]
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~l

.
...

:l
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20 .

•

•
•

any information reported to or otherwise obtained by it

pursuant to this· title which concems any information

which contains or relates to a trade secret or other mat-

ter referred to in section 1905 of title 18 of the United

States Code;

"(2) the Commission, each department 'or agency

and each entity which is required to estahlish aud main-

tain records, make reports, and provide infol1liation

pursu.ant to this title shall in securing and maintaining

any record of individually identifiable personal data

(hereinafter in this subsection referred

data') for purposes of this title-

as 'personal

"(A) inform any individual who is asked to

supply personal data whether he is legally required,

or may refuse, to supply such data and inform him

of any specific

.sion~ department ~r agency, or entity, as the case

may be, of providing or· not pr{)viding such dam;

. " (B) upon request, inform any individual if

he is the subject of person.al data secured or main-

tained by the Commission, department or agency,

or entity, as the case may be, and make the data.

a,-ailahle to him in a form comprehensive to him;

"(0) assure that no use is made of personal

data which is not within the purposes of this title

co~sequences,

known to the Commis-

21
1

unless an informed consent has been obtained from

t.!J.e individual who is the subject of such data;

" (D) upon request, inform any indh-idual of

the use being made of personal data respecting such

individu.aJ and of the identity of the individuals and

entities which will use the data and their relation-

ship to the Commission, department or agency, or

entity;

(3) any entity which maintains a record. of per-

sonal data and which receives .a request from the Com-

mission or a department or agency for such data for

purposes of this title shall not transfer any such data

to the Commission or a department or agency unless

the individual whose personal data is to be so trans-

ferred gives an infOlmed consent for such transfer.

•

]
q

(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

personal data collected or maintained by the Com-

mission or a. depa.rtment or agency, pursuant to this

. title, may not be mt;de available or disclosed by the Com-

mission or a department or agency to any person or

tntity other than tIle individual who is the subject of

such data. Such personal data may not be required to be

disclosed by any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal,

administrative, legislative or other proceeding.

" (d) Any person who unlawfully discloses the contents

25
22

, I
r
!

1 of any record, file, paper, document, process, or control shan
2 upon conviction be fined not more than $500 in the case of a
3 first offense, and not more than $5,000 in the case of each
4 subsequent offense.
5

" (e) The recordkeeping requirements established by

6 any departmentor agency shall be limited to those operations

7 and activities which relate to researilh funded by or required
8 pursuant to a regulation of such department or" agency.
9

"INTERIM PROVISIONS

"SEC. 1810. (a) Until such time a~ a human investiga-

11 tion rcyiew board has been certified by a de-pnrtmcnt or

12 agency, each department or agency shall determine with re13 spect to biomedical and behayioral research conducted, sup-

14 ported, or required by regulation under programs a.dminis15 tered by each such deptlrtment or agency that16

17 -

18
19

" (1) the rights of human subjects of such research

are fully exercised;
"(2) the interests of human subjects of such research are fully protected;

"(3) the risks to a human subject of such research

are outweighed by the potential be~efits to him or by

the importance of the knowledge to be gained from such

research;

" (4) informed consent is given by each human

subject in accordance with the provisions of this section.

]

1
2

]

"(b) For purposes of this section only,. the term 'informed consent' shall mean. the consent

3 legal. reprcsentath-e, so situated
4

.88

of a

]

person, or his

to be able to exercise

]

free power of choice without the intervention of any clement

5 of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or

]

6 coercion. Such consent shall be evidenced by an individual7 izedwritten document signed ~y such person, or his legal

•

8 representative. The information to be given to the subject
9

]

and recorded in such written document shall include the

10 following basic el~ments:
11

" ( 1) .a fair explanation of the procedures to be

followed, including an

experimental ;

14
15
16

18
19

idcntific~\tion

of any which nre

risks reasonably to be expected;

" (3) a fair explanation of the likely results should

the experimental procedure fail;

~~j

"( 4) a description of any benefits reasonably to be

expected;

" (5) a disclosure of any appropriate aJternative

procedures that might be advantageous for the suhject;

"(6) an offer to answcr an'y inquiries concerning

]

"(2) a description of any atttondant discomforts nnd

the procedures; and

" (7) any other matter which a department or

agency deems appropriate for the full exercise of the

•
,.

'I'

J
'I
:'1
.-

'-.'~'

':'';.'.

27
24
!

: '. ~ !

.<1#

•

rights and full protection of the interests of human sub-

jects of biomedical and beha.vioral research.

In addition, the written document executed by such

person, or his legal representative, shall include no exculpa-

tory language through which the subject is made to waive,

or to appf'ar to waive, any of his legal rights, or to release

1. the institution or its a.gents from liability for negligence. Any
8 organization which initiates,
9

direct~,. or

engages in programs

of research, development, or demonstration which require

10 informed consent -shall keep a permanent record of such con11

sent and the information provided the subject and develop

appropriate documentation Rnd reporting procedures as an

13 essential administrative function.
14
15

uAD)UNISTRATIVE . PROVISIONS

"SBC. 1811. (a) The C-ommission mllY for the purpose

" 16 of rarrying out its dut.ies hold such hf'srings, sit nnd nct at
17 such times and plac.es, take such testimony, antI receive such

.
~

!
.i

•

18 evidence as the Commission deems advisable.
19

"(b) (1) The Commission may appoint and compen-

20 sate, at a rate not to exceed the annual rate of basic pay in
21 effect for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule, an execu22

tive director, wit.hout ,regard to the provisions of title 5,

United States C1)de, governing appointments in the oompeti-

tive service, and the provisions of chapter 51 and subcha.pter

25
1

III of chapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and

2 General Schedule pay rates, who shall administer full-time

3 the daily activities of the Commission.
4

"(2) The

Com~ission

may appoint and fix the compen-

5 sation of such personnel as it deems advisable, without regard

6 to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing

7 appointments in the competitive service, and the provisions

8 of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title,
9 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.
10

(3) The Commission may procure, in accordance with

11 the provisions of section 3109 of ti tIe 5, United States Code,
12 the temporary or intenni ttent services of experts or con-

13 sultants. Persons so employed shall receive compensation
14 at n rate to be fixed by the Commission, but not exceeding
15 for any day (including

tra~eltime)

the daily equivalent 'of

LI'

16 the effective rate for grade G8-18 of the General Schedule.

17 While away from his ,home or regular place of business in the
18 iJerIormance of services for the Commission, any such per19 son may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
~

20 lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 (b) of title

21 5, United States Code, for persons in the GoveI'IlIJlent sen·ice
22 employed intermittently.
23

24 Commission moy puhlish nnd disseminate to the public such

•
•

29
26

1 reports, iuformatifln, rC('omrllcndations, nnd other material
2 relating to its functions, activities, :l.nd studies as it deems

3 appropriate.
4

(2) The Commission shall not disclose any informa-

5 tion reported to or otherwise obtained by it in carrying out

6 its functions which (1) identifies any individual who has
•

7 been the subject of an activity studied or investigated by

8 the Commission, (2) concerns any information which con9

tains or relates to a trade secret or other matter referred to

10 in section 1905 of title 18, United States Code, or (3) is

11 properly classified for any purpose by a. Federal agency.

(d) 'Vithin sixty dnys of the receipt of any recommen-

13 d.ation made by the Commission under this part, the appro14 priate department or agency shall publish it in the Federal

15 Register and provide opportunity for intl'rested persons to
16 submit written data, views, and arguments with respect to

..
•

11 such

recommendation. The appropriate department or

18 ag~ncy shall (1) determine whether the administrative or
19 other 8('tion proposed by such recommendation is appro20 priate to assure the protection of bumnn subjects of bio21 medical and helul.\"ioral research couducted, supportecl, or
22 required by regulation under programs administered by it,
23

and (2) if it detennines that such action is not so appro-

24 priate, publish in the Federal Regist('r such determination
25 together with an adequate statement of the reasons for its

]
30

~
.tJ

:J7

]

1 . determination. If the appropriate. department or agency de-

]

termines that administrative action recommended by. the

3 Commission should

be undertaken by it, it shall undertake

]
.]

4 such ac~ion as expeditiously as is feasible.

(e) The Commission may make grants and enter into

.....

6 contracts for the purpose of undertaking ~y required in-

~] :~

7 vestigation or study, fOf the development of required policies,

2;:'

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9 with this title and policies, procedures, guidelines and regu10 lations of a department or agency.
II

(f) The Commission shall determine the priority and

12 order of those duties and functions required to be performed

13 under this iitle.

"(g) (1) Upon a deiennination by the Commission that

15 sufficient information already exists concerning an area of
16 investigation and study required to be conducted under this

17 title, the Commission may decide that such investigation
18 and study need not be conducted. In such a case, the Com19 mission $hall utilize already existing information as the
2(j

basis for identifying those principles and developing those

policies, procedures and guidelines required under this

•

22 title.

.. (2)

r nless

the Commission has determined that an

24 investigation and study required under this title need not

25 be conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), each investigation

~
.'

8 procedures and guidelines and for monitoring compliance .

31
28

1 and study shall be completed within three years from the
2

date of. enactment of the President's Commission for the

3 Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral

4 Research Act of 1977.
5

"(h) (1) Pursuant to any activity relnting to its dutic:J

6 and functions undcr this title, the Commission may subpena

•

7 witnesses, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses,
8 and require the production of any rccords and information,
9 including records, files, papers, documents, processes and
10 controls and other tangible thing~, which the Commi~sioll

11 finds relevant or mlltcrial to its dutics nnd functions. The
12 attendance of witnesses and the !lrodnction of records may
13 be rcquired from nny plncc in any State or in any territory or

14 other pJacesllbject to the jurisdiction of the United States
15 at any designated place of hearing; except that a witness
16 shall not be required

to appear at :lDY hearing any Blore than

17 500 miles distant from the place where he was scrved with a
18 subpcna. \Vitnesses summoned under this section shall be
."

19 paid the same fees and milenge that arc paid witnesses in

•

20 the courts of the United States.
21

"(2) A subpena issued under this section may be served

22 by any person designated in the subpena to senoe it. Serv23 ice upon n natural person may be Jnllde hy personal uelivery

24 of the subpena to him. Service may be made upon n domestic
25 or foreign corporation or upon a pnrtnership or other unin-

32
29·

1 corporated association which is subject to suit under a com,.
2 mon·name, by delivering .tho subpena to an officer, to
(.

3 managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized
4 by appointment or by law to receh-e service'of process. The

5 affidavit of the person serving: the subpena entered on
6

true' copy thereof by the person sen-ing it shall be proof
•

7 of service.
8
9

(3) In the case of contumacy by or refusal·to obey

a subpena issued to any person, the Oommission may invoke

10 the aid of any court of the United8te.tes within the juris.
11 diction of which the activity. is carried on. or of which the

'..?'1

12 subpenaed person is an inhabitant, or in which he carries on

13 business or may be found, to compel compliance with the:
14 subpena. The

COlD"t

]

may issue an order requiring the sub-

15 penaed person to appear bemre the Commission to produce

16 reoords,if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the mat-

f,1

17 ter under consideration. Any failure to obey·the' order of the
18 court may be punished by the court as

contempt thereof.

19 AD process· in .any Buch case may be served in any judicial
~
"."

distriot in which such pe1'9Oll may be found.
II

(i) On NovembeJ'll'of each year, each departmentor

22 agency shall each submit a report simultaneotmly to the

23 President and to the appropriate co~ittees of C<»ngress.
24 Eath .such report shall· include· with respect· to -the previous
~

"J.

•

-.'

::1
~.

':1
s.]

..
r"I

fiscal year-

,'{

33
30'·

., ( 1) a complete list and description of all recom-

mendations made to such department or agency by the

Commission;

4
5

•

(2) ~ description of what action such department

. or agency took with respect to each such recommenda-

tion; .

(3) in those situations where such department or .

agency accepted a recommendation, a description of the

policies~

10
11

procedures, guidelines, regulations, and other

adminiStrative actions were laken by such department
. or agency to implement such recommendation; .

" (4) In' those situations where such department

or agency failed to accept, in whole or in pArt, a' recom-

mendation, a description of the reasons for such fail-

ure;

.regulations,. aud' other administrative actions 'were fol-

lowed in lieu of such r('~ommendation; and what were

the results.

a description

of policies, procedures, guidelines,

. "(j) Section 14 of the Federal Advisory Committee

20 Act shall not apply with respect to the Commission.

21
22

"PENAL~IES

"SEO. 1812. (a) No entity may receive any Federal

2.1 funds from a department or agency, for the conduct of bio-

2t medical or behavioral' research' unless such. entity has es-

(

. (.

1
;~-

'>.----1

;:-

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]

1 tablished a human investigation review board which has

,-,

2 been certified by such department or agency.
" (b) N o entity may recehre a Federal a.pproval by a

4 department or agency of a program, pa.tent, product or

'i.;,.•
.;->

5 study which requires the conduct of biomedical or beha,vioral
oi].

6 research unless such entity has established a human investi-

i~'

7 gati~n, review board which has been certified by such de8' partment or agency.

'J
I,

.....

UDEFINITION8

9
10

. .~"

_ ... '

-:.

"SEC. 1813. (a) As used in this title the term~

(1) 'Commission' means the President's Com-

<,~

mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio-

medical and Behavioral Research.

14
15

" (2) 'President' means the President of the United

.n1-. '

".-'

States.

II·-·.

"(3) 'Department o~ Agency' means faCh author-

. ity of the -Government of the United States, whether or

not it is ~tbin or subj~t to review by anOther ageDcy~

but dOes not include-:

p
~

2(.

" (A) the Congress;

" (B) the' courts of the United States;

23
24
25

(e) the govemments of the territories or pos-

sessions of the United Staies; and .

"",",

•

H
fJ·.
,;_.
:.:.!-"

"(D) the government of the District of
Columbia.

:"."
:·'1--

'~;,;-

:1•.

35
R2

"(4)' 'entityJ includes an individuaJ,partnership,

corporation, association, or public or private organization

but does not include a department or agency which con-

ducts biomedical or behavioral research solely through

grants or contracts.

"(5) 'bUormation' includes any information which

is classified or deemed to be classified·for any purpose

(including national security) by an agency or depart-

ment.

"(6) 'health services' means those health services

10
11

which are supported or financed by Federal funds.

"(7) 'regulated' and 'required pursuant to a regu-

lation' means any biomedical or behavioral research in-

volving human subjects whi:ch is required to be conducted

pursuant to a regulation of a department or agency as

a conditi~n precedent to an approval by such department

or agency of a program, patent, substance, product, or

study.

" (b) As used in subsection (b) of section 1802 the

20 term21

" (1) 'children' means individuals· who have not

~..

attained the legal age of consent to participate in research

as determined under the applicable law of the jurisdic-

tion in which the research is to be conducted.

"(2) 'prisoners' means individuals involuntarily

36 .

·33

confined in correctional institutions or facilities as defined

in section 601 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Aot of 1968 (43 U.S.C. 3781).

(3) 'institutionalized mentally infirm t includes in-

·5

dividuals who are mentally ill, mentally retarded, emo-

tionally disturbed, psychotic, or. senile, or who have

other impairments of a similar nature and who reside

•

patients in an institution.
u

(4) the term 'military personnel' menns individ-

uals who are active and inactive members of the United

States Armed Forces and employees n.nd agents of the

Central Intelligence Agency.".

. SEC. 3. (a) Part A of title II of the National Research

MISCELLANEOUS

15 Act (42 U.S.C. 2891) is repealed.
16
(b) Sections 211 and 213 of the National Research Act
17 . are repealed.
18

,
:.:.

19 Service Act (42U.S.C.218 (f)) is repealed.
20

EFFJroTIVE DATE

SEC. 4. This Act and the amendments made by this

Act shall take effect on October 1, 1977, except that the

23 provisions of section 1812 shall not take effect until April 1,
24

1978.

•

..
•

•

Senator KENNEDY. But it seems to me, and I think the other members of ~he committee, that· we have to protect our national interests, but we also have to protect the interest of our American citizens
in a very im'portant way, and develop the kinds of {>rocess where
those protectIons can be made in ways that are not gomg to see the
basic and funda.mental integrity of our universities, other agencies
and individuals compromised.. .
.
What we have seen over the issue of behavioral health research,
which is the ~a of interest of this committee, during this period of
time is that the agency worked effectively without accountability
and, in so many instances, really basically without basic regard for
the.,protection of the human subjects.
.
Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIICEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
.
Ha~ served on the original Senate Intelligence Committee,
I find it rather disturbing to be here at all today. During the Intelli~ence Committee's 18 months of investigation, we were continually
~ven information by the intelligence agencies with the very specific
Implication that the information was either complete or it was the
best we knew. We were told that we had. the whole story then, just
as this subcommittee.· was told we had. the whole story during our
1975 hearings. Time after time after time, that has proven not to be
the case.
The series of hearings we are now conducting· began ..because we
found yet another black box that we opened up to find information
that throws just a little bit more light on the whole picture. It is rather
tragic to me that Senate committees have to operate this way. We
are limited by our knowledge and in our ability to make new laws
and to oversee present laws when we are given information piecemeal-and seemingly with great reluctance by the agencies. It's
like opening a series of small boxes, and then findin~. that after we
open the last box, which we are assured has everything in it, there
appears yet another box that has to be opened and the whole matter
examined again.
..
.
That's certainly the description· I would give of the way that the
intelligence a~encies have disclosed material on their past actions to
Senate COmIDlttees which are charged with legislative and oversight
responsibilities..
.
.
I do commend Admiral Turner for his candor, for his straightforwardness in revealing the discovery of this latest group of documents
containing more information relating to CIA human experimentation.
I do ,have to say I wonder who was responsible for supplying the
information to us in the past and where thiS material was at the .time
our committee initially looked into the use of human subjects by the
CIA. We were told 2 years ago that we had all of the information that
was available, and that it was the most the officials knew. Of course
the people who knew differently were either silent or not available.
So I am very troubled that this process goes on and o.n.
Also, while this point is not particularly relevant to this morning's
hearing, in reading the newspapers this week we see the same sort of
situ,ation in the matter of the intel~gence communi~y's use of journalists. We see almost an exact parallel of the pattemof information
disclosure on that i!sue as the subcommittee faces on the human
subjects issue-being told something, but not ·being told the whole

'38
stoty, and then finding out later that, in fact, we were told just a
small part of the storr, and DOW a new story has come out with a lot
more· detail and much broader implications than what we were orig. . .
.
inally told.·
·80 it is not surprising tome that we are here today, but it is rather
disappointing.
.
I am here to learn, and I have learned enough by now about how
~hes~ thin~ o~rate to know that there may well be more chapters
.
m this contmu~g s t o r y . ·
Thank you; Mr. Chairman.
.
Senator KENNEDY. The final point I want to make., I suppose the
matter which is of greatestconcem for Americans, is that we have
seen over the period of these 14 years when these programs were
being undertaken a perversion again of the freedom of both individuals
, ., as well as agencies, and I suppose it is only fair to ask what was really
achieved and what was accomplished from that?
I think that that certainly has been my conclusion reviewing both
the details of the material and the documents. I think we would be
hard pressed to find it.
.
Senator 8CHWEIKER. Mr. Chairman, I do have a request. Senator
Goldwater, who is ranking Republican member of the Senate Intel!igence Committee, cannot be liere because of the scheduling conflict.
He has asked me to include a statement of his in the record at the
start of these proceediI!gs.
'
Senator KENNEDY. We will include that in the record as though
read.

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STATDlElIT OF lIOlf. BARRY •. GOLDWATER, A U.S. &BATOR
THE STATE OF ARIZONA

no.

.Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman: Information Qn drug testing
of human. beings b, the .CIA and other intelligenc~ ~ncies became
known to the public dUl1Il1!the Rockefeller COmDllSS10n and Church
committee investigations. these events happened over 12. and as far
back as 25 years ago and are now completely stopped. Yet, we continue. to hear and read about these events in a manner that causes
enough confusion and which lead some people to believe that these
events are being revealed for the first time when in fact that is not
the case. The current emphasis is a rehash of previous revelations and
really adds nothing wortliwhile except to cause a new rash of publicity
and more confusion. None of the things that you are bringing up
before this committee and .transmitting on television across this
country and spreading across the pages of the press of this country
is new or, in fact, even: news. We went through this, I guess, 2 years
ago before the first Senate Selec't Committee on Intelligence and
everything that you are hearing has been heard before.
Now as to why the orders were issued, you may recall that during
the Korean conflict, for the first time, American prisoners were
subjected to the use of drugs by the enemy in an effort to either D!~e
them talk or to punish them or to use them as propaganda agents.
This business got started at a time when it was consideled to be essential. I can recall how bewildered a lot of us were just following the
Korean war when many of our soldiers who had been prisoners of war
did not want to return home and it led us to believe that they had

•

39
been brainwashed. The Church committee's report explains it this
way:
The late 1940's and early 1950's were marked bl concern over the threat pOl'ed
by the a~tivitie... of the ~oviet pnion,the People s Republic of China a~d other
CommuDl8t bloc countnes. UDlted States concern over the use of chemical and
biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had
used chemical nnd biological agents in interrogation;r, brainwashing, and in
attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable
pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological agents
!o that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which
these substances worked arid how their effects could be defeated.

••

The Church committee report further explains that the rationale
for testing programs was a follows:
.

Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Ameri.ca"~ ·,r America's allies led to the development of a
defensive program desigped to diScover techniques for American intelligence
agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biological agents.

..
••
I

I think it was a very natural reaction of our leaders, in this particular instance, to run tests to find out what the effect of drugs, or at
least certain drugs, would be on individuals so tha~ we might provide
protection for our own forces in the future. Certainly there were some
unfortunate results, particularly in regard to the unwitting participants and even to those who volunteered for the program. But,
war itself is an unfortunate thing.
That's behind us now. After H' years of investigation by the Church
committee and now followed by more than a year of oversight by the
new Senate Intelligence Committee we are now assured that the
intel~gence agencies are ~der congr~ional control .with effective
oversIght and accountability. To amve at that pomt the select
comnuttee has set u{)six subcommittees whose combined responsibUties involve them m all aspects of the intelligence gathering activities of the Federal Government. Each executive branch or~anization
engaged in intelligence operations, all the way from the Whlte House
on down, must ask for funds, justify the programs for which those
funds are requested, advise the committee of special undertakings,
and, above all, account' for what they do.
The .ntelligence business has been through some tough times and
the public's view has been soured. That is behind us now. I believe
it is time to look ahead. I am convinced that our agencies are staffed
by competent and concerned public servants who will continue to provide the Nation with an effective intelligence program dedicated to
the national interest. I believe they have earned and now deserve our
support.
in my humble opinion, I think: the time has come for someone to
rise to the defense of the Central Intelligence Agency in this whole
matter of the administration of certain types of drugs to individuals
in this country, either on a voluntary or an involuntary basis. Now
these individuals that you are bringing before this committee were
members of the Intelligence Agency, and they were acting under
orders. These are good, patriotic, dedicated .>\..merican citizens ,\rho
were told to do something and, in turn, those people who issued -the
instructions were given ordels from on high, and if you want to trace
the source right on up, you'll probably find that the source was probably at the White House level. People working in agencies like the
CiA are pretty much like the people in uniform. They do not disobey

40
orders unless they feel so strongly about the subject that they would
be willing to resign their posts or their commissions.
I would hope that the hearings before this committee would cease
andthat all the good wOrk being done in rehabilitating and rebuilding
the Central Intelligence Agency will not behiIlderedby spreacling
these matters, whichwiU leave an erroneous impression, across the
news of this country. I believe. that it would be more useful at this
time to focus our attention on finding and helping those individuals
or institutions that may have been harmed by any improper or illegal
activities.
. - .
..' .
I offer this with all respect to you, Mr. Chairinan,and to your committee and with the full knowledge that you havt\ every right in the
world to hold these hearings.
' .
.
Senat.or.KE.NNEDY. yve had join~ hearingspreyiously and we have
worked very closely Wlth the Intelbgence Comnuttee..
Our interest in these hearings is obviously limited to health aspects
and this spins over, obviously, into other provisions.
Our first witness this morning is Dr. Charles Geschickter, Geschickter Fund for Medical Research.
.
Dr. Geschickter, we welcome you here. If you will be kinderiough
to come up, we will ask you to stand and be sworn in.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give is the- truth, the
whole truth, so help you, God?
.
Dr. GESCBICKTER. I do.
Senator KENNEDY. Just before we get started, one of the obvious
aspects of oUr inquiry has been how the Agency in the development of
thlS program of testing involved other agencies. We are going to hear
from Mr. Bensinger tomorrow about the Bureau of Narcotics. I have
here just a sworn statement by John Bartels, and I will just read it
into the record.
It is a brief statement, but it is related to our first witness, and I
think we ought to have this in the record, and I \\ill insert it into the
record a.t this time.
[The material referred to follows:]

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STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER )

ss. :

JOHN R. BARTELS, JR., being a member of the Bar of the

State of New York, affirms under penalty of perjury the
following:
1.

On July 1, 1973, I was appointed Acting Administrator

of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration by Attorney

•

General Elliot Richardson.

During the first few weeks

of that term, I learned from Patrick Fuller, Chief

Inspector, that there were between 13 and 17 agents of
D.E.A. assigned to various field offices as

~nonymous

inspectors. These men had prior C.I.A. training, and I
believe some may have had prior C.I.A. experience.

Hr.

Fuller explained that he had promised to keep their
names anonymous, and accordingly could not tell even me
who they were.

Their function was to report to him

alone anonymously, questionable instances or allegations
concerning the character or integrity of other agencs.
Thus an agent could be transferred or removed from his
position on Fuller's say-so alone without ever being
confronted with a charge.

·a

After consulting with· Jonathan Moore, Mr. Richardson's
executive assistant,I decided to encourage Mr. Fuller
to retire or resign.

•

He continued to refuse to disclose

the names, but agreed that the program be
and it was.

disband~d,

During this time period I received a letter

Cl"

1
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]

from William Colby, head of the C.I.A., withdrawing all
support for this program.
3.

]

Many months later I learned from my executive assistant,
Daniel Casey, that the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics
had maintained joint "safe houses" with the C.I.A.

told me that the Bureau had used these apartments in
California for debriefing informants while he supposed

•

]

the Agency had used them for meeting sources and perhaps
compromising situations as they contained two-way mirrors.

•

It is my belief that whatever Hr. Casey learned was from
other agents or reports.
4.

At about the same time I asked Hr. Colby for a representation from the C.I.A. that there were no employees on the
D.E.A. payroll who were also performing services in any
manner for the Agency.
received an oral

It is my recollection that I

representati~n

cd:

to that effect from Hr.

!
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Colby, and I believe a written letter, either from 1.1m
or one of his

dep~ties.

J
J
J

In addition, the Office of Personnel

informed me that there were approximately 53 employees at

]

D.E.A. with past C.I.A. experience who had been absorbed

into the Agency in the merger between B.N.D.D. and the

Bureau of Customs.

We obtained affidavi.ts from each one

~i'.;

of those employees to the effect that he was not performing

any services for, or acting at the'request of, any employee
of the Agency.

I believe we got affidavits from every

employee with any past history of working with the Agency.

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43
5.

To my knowledge. there was no formal program of
cooperation between D.E.A. and the C.I.A. after July
of 1973 apart from the formal exchange uf information
between our office of intelligence and liaison for the
Agency. initially Seymour
Kennedy.

~.))
Sworn to before me this
19th day of September 1977.

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JOHN R. BARTELS. JR. /

•

and subsequently John

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Senator KENNEDY. We will refer back to that during the course of
our hearing. .
..
Dr. Geschic~ter, would you tell us a little bit about the Gescbickter
Fund for Medical Research?
.
Did you arrange \\ith the CIA to have the CIA money funneled
through the funds for medical research in order to carry out various
research projects?
ftATElIDT OF CHAl'tLES F. GESCHICXTER, SR., •.D., GESCJIICltTD
:rUltD FOR JlEDICAL B.ESEAllCH, PROFESSOR EKElUTUS OF :aESEAltCB: PATHOLOGY, GEOltGETOWB l1lUVDSITY JlEDICAL CD·

TEll, COJDIAlmD, U.S. BAVY Alm CHIEF PATHOI.OGIST, U.S.
BAVY, ACCOltPAlUED BY PLATO CACBEllIS, ESQ., HOADLEY &
CACHEltIS, P.G., WASHmGTOB, D.C.; ABD CHA'RT.'FJI F. GESClIICltTEll, a, ESQ., BRAULT, LEWIS, GESClIIC1tTEll& PAUIE'B.,
FAmPAX, VA.

Dr. GESCBtCKTEIL The Gescbickter Fund had already been in
being since 1939 and was doing rese~rch in cancer and in chronic
diseases. The original contract with the fund, given us by the CIA,
was for a group of anticancer compounds that had already been
published in 1951. I have reprints of these compounds and their use
on cancer patients.
Subsequent to this, the CIA enlarged their grants to my laboratory
at Georgetown which was being supported b)9 the Gescmckter Fun<l
and by the NClgrants and ultimately from grants from the Army's
Institute of Walter Reed Research, and they agreed to supply funds
to continue the research as we had done previously because of our
capabilities in synthetic chemistry and in their reading of their usefulness in physiology by a unique procedure, that was giving of .
material to rats and subsequently ana1;yzing their effects through
microscopic preparations of virus organs. ~bis is not usual in p~arma
cology. Our la1)oratory represented practically the only one mthe
world that was assaying new chemicals by this· lustolopc method. We
did not furnish monies kno\\ingly to other universities for separate
projects until 1955. The Agency came in with moneys for other
universities who 'submitted ~roposals for ongoing research, and none
of this research, neither in Geschickter Fund Laboratory nor in the
universities supported through the Geschickter Fund by the CIA,
ever had any research instituted by the CIA.
These were ongoil1g projects in reputable universities and hospital
centers, and never did they depart from their usual practices because
of the CIA_grant.
Senator KENKEDY. Why was the CIA in it? Were they interested
in cancer research1
Dr. GESCBICKTER. If you read their reports, you will find one of the
byproducts of this will be cancer research advancement and they were
intcltl."tWJ in picking up whatever ideas-Senator KENNEDY. Do you believe that this is what they were
interested in, or is that just a statement that they were interested?
Why would the CIA be interested?

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Dr. GEsCBICJtTIlB. I can only give you the r~port that came to me
from Allen Dulles, and I will quote it: uThank God there is something
decent coming out of our bag of dirty tricks. We are delighted."
Senator KENNEDY. We will get into some of those other ones. ('an
you tell us why you ~t involved With the CIA funding?
Dr. GESCHICltTER. I would like for Senator Schweilter and y< u:self to have copies of these repc0rts.
..
Senator KENNEDY. They will be made a part of the record.
[The infolmation referred to follows:]
.

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46
AIl

Jovuu OP Cu__ 1. p"ftI_
Vol. M. rolo. I. Jul)-. 'MO. pp. 1-11
p,.;..w ill U.S.A.

A HYPERSEXSITIVITY PHE~OMENON PRODUCED, BY STRESS:
THE "NEGATIVE PHASE" REACTION

CHARLES F. GESCHICKTER, M.D., W. EDWARD O'MALLEY, M.D., PR.D.,
EUGENE P. RUBACKY, PH. D.
Ge",geUMrl UraiNrnt" 8c1loo1 01 MediciM. WcaaAiftVtort. D. C.

The role of stress in disease has been a
source of controversy and interest since
Selye' " first published his unprecedented
observations on the general. adaptation
syndrome. Since that time, an extensive
literature has accumulated on the effects of
prolonged stress on the pituitary-adrenal
axis; however, the effects of a single brief
episode of stress has received little attention.
The streSleS of life are most commonly
short and intennittent. It therefore seemed
of great interest to assess the effects of a
single brief stress episode on adrenalcortical function. These studies were stimulated by a surprising finding during the
course of investigations on Alannine, a
substance' discovered by Cp.schickter and
associates' to produce lesions simulating
those of the collagen diseases.
SelyelO • II demonstrated that chronic daily
administration of ACTH and cortisol
prevented the anaphylactoid reaction to the
intraperitoneal injection of fresh egg albumin
in the rat. It was noted that in Alarminetreated rats the injection of egg white
caused no reaction. This was unexpected
and occurred even after a single injection of
AJannine. Thus, rats that were treated
\\ith 1 dose of Alarmine responded in a
manner identical with that of rats conditioned for a long period of time by repeated therapy \\ith ACTH or cortisol. The
anaphylactoid reaction in the white male
rat follo\\ing the intraperitoneal injection of
2.0 ml. of fresh egg white obtained from the
hen's egg consists of conspicuous ed·,anai"tlS
swelling around the paws, tongue, nose, and
~rotwn. This response appears regularly
IVc~ivrd, NOY~Dlber 21, 1959; aee~pted for
publication February 29, 1960.
Dr. GCllchickter ill ProfetlllOr of PotboJol)'. and
Dr. O'Malley ill Research Auiatant, Department
of PathololY.
Thill wor" "as lIupported by a Irant from tbe
Geeehickter Fund for Medical Research.

AND

within 60 to 90 min. follo\\ing the injection.
and it occurs in the absence of a preceding
sensitizing dose of egg white. All rats are
susceptible, and the edematous response is
relatively unifonn and can be observed
grossly.
Several other stressor substances were
tested for antianaphylactoid activity. They
included fonnalin, nitrogen mustard, and
epinephrine hydrochloride. All of these
substances in a single dose prevented the
anaphylactoid reaction, apparently by ~ro
voking the general adaptation syndrome
(GAS), which involved the pituitaryadrenal axis. Epinephrine was selected for
further study. Its use pennits the administration of a quantitated degree of stress for
a very short time interval. The effects of
this brief stress can be studied for many
hours thereafter.
The studies herein reported were designed
to elucidate the immediate and long-tenn
effects of a single stress episode produced by
the injection of epinephrine. Less extensive.
parallel studies .were conducted using
fonnaliD, AJannine, and nitrogen mustard.
The egg white anaphylactoid reaction was
USP.d as an indicator system in studying
these reactions.
.
.
These experiments demonstrate that
whereas a mild acute bout of stress in
animals protects against immediate sensitivity reaction, it subsequently but transiently weakens the organism's resistance to
further stress. These findings are in marked
contrast to the currently held concept that
in intennittent chronic stress conditions
the organism becomes resistant to future
stresses.
EXPEklYE!Io'TAL PROCEDURES

Ezperi7Mnl No. J. Epinephrine hydrochloride, 0.1 ml. of 1: 1000 solution, was
administered subcutaneously to 170 white
male. Wistar rats that weighed 100 to 120

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47
2

Om. each. Following this, 2 ml. of fresh hen
egg white were administered intraperitoDl~aUy at each of the following time interVals to groups of 10 of the epinephrinetreated rats: 1 hr. and }i hr. before the
administration of epinephrine; simultaneouslywith the administration of epinephrine;
~ hr,\ 1 hr~, and H2 hr. after the administration of· epinephrine; and every
hour thereafter for 6 hr., and then every
3 hr. theretlftcr for 12 hr. A single· group of

•

Vol.

GE8CHICKTER In' AI..

EXPZBUUNT

No.

I-REBPONII.

16 rats not treated with epinephrine served
as a control, and they received only 2 mt.
of egg white intraperitonealty. Responses to
egg white· 1 hr. alter injection were recorded
as 0 to 4 plus, according to the severity of
the reaction (Table I). It witt be seen' that
the stress invoked by epinephrine protected
against the anaphylactoid reaction to egg
white for approximately 2 hr. after a postepinephrine period has elapsed.
Ezperiment No. B. Forty-five hypophy-

TABLE 1
or RATS TO bTRAPEBITOSBAL INJECnOH

Eoo WalTZ:

APTER

TREATMZNT WITH EPI:-rZPHRIN.

\·H,. R_1e to

I. Control group (no epinepbrine)

nephrinet
Ill. Egg white ~ hr. before epinephrine
IV. Egg white at time of epineph.
rine
V. Egg white ~~ hr. after epineph.
rine
VI. fo;~ white 1 hr. after ePinePh.\
nne
VIl. Egg white 1~ hr. afterepineph.
rine
VIII. Egg white 2 hr. after epinephrine
IX. Egg wbite 3 hr. after epinephrine
X. Egg wbite .. br. after epineph.

ri~

•

Xl'. EO white II hr. after epineph•.
rine
XVI. Egg white 14 hr. after epineph. I

o
6

W
10

XVll. Eg white 17 hr. after epineph.
riM
W
XVIU. J,;~ white 20 br. after epinepb. I
nne
,10

II!

10 ..
! 0 I 0)

I
I

0
0

I O~pro.
OJ tected

2
0

ri~

;

XI. Egg white 5 hr. alter epineph.
rine
XII. EO white 6 hr. afterepineph.
rine
XlII. EO wbite 7 hr. after epineph. i
rine
I
XIV, Eu white 8 hr. after ePinePb-1

---1--"---1---1'-6----+1

11. Egg wbite- 1 hr. before epi-

Ea Wbite

NR'a':,ol 1-------------.....,.-----

NlUIIbe, 01 G.....p

5
2

0
0

- Egg wbite-2 mi. per rat inlraperitpneally.
t Epinepbrine HCl--().1 mi. of I: I~ solution lIubeutaneoUilly,

48
.1uI7l1960

STRESS HYPERSES81TIVITY PHESOMESOS

injection of epinephrine. They served as
controls. Anaphylactoid reactions were
observed and graded 0 to 4 plus 1 hr.
following administration of egg '. white
(Table 2). It will be fleen that no adequate
protection resulted from injection of epinephrine .in the absence of the hypophysis.
Ezperiment No. S. F..xperiment No.2 was
duplicated, substituting 45 adrenalectomized
rats injected 2 days postoperatively (Table
3). Again, no adequaie protection was
achieved in the absence of the adrenal
gland.
Ezperimnd No.4. One hundred and

sectomizcd male Wistar. rats, weighing 200
.to 200 Om. each, were divided into 9 groups
of 5. rats each. Ten days postoperatively
they all were injected subcutaneously with
0.1 mt. of a 1:1000 epinephrine hydrochloride solution. Egg white was administered intraperitoneally at each of the
following time intervaJs to groups of 5 rab:
1 hr. before the· administration .of epinephrine; llimultaneously with the administration of epinephrine; and I, 2, 4, 6, 9,
and 18 hr. after the administration of
epinephrine. Another group of 5 hypophysectomized rats received egg white but no

T.~8U:

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•

EXPERIMENT )\;0. 2-RESI'0IH'E OF HYI'()PHYSECTOMIZED RATS TO hiJ~ON 0,. Eoo WHITZ AnER
PRJOR TREATMENT "'ITH ErlSEPHRJNZ

!
N..... ber 01 G..... p

: N\Uftbcr of

Ratl

I·Hr. R_ _ 10 Ear "ibite

- - - - - - - - - - - ------ ---:-----_.. ----I· --~---5

I. Cont·rol Iroup (no epinephrine)
II. Egg "'hite- I hr. before epilleph·
rinet
.
III. Egg white at time of epinephrine
IV. Ell white 1 hr. after epinephrine
V. Ell white 2 hr. after epinephrine
VI. Egg white .. hr. after epinephrine
VII. Egg "'hite 6 hr. after epinephrine
VIII. Elg white 9 br. after epinephrine
IX. Jo:II white 18 hr. after epinephrine,

:
I

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

0
2

i
I

l'
2.

?
I

;

o
o

I
1

2
0

2
2

o
o
o

1
1

I
2

1
1

o
I

- Ell wbite-2 ml. per rat intraperitolleally.
t Epinepbrine HCI-o.l ml. of I: 1000 solution subcutaneously.
. TABLE

RzaPON8E 0 .. ADRENALECTOMIZE!) RATlS TO IIUECTION 0 .. Eoo WHITE AnER PRJOR TRZATJlliNT WITH
EPINEPHRINE

NR.~01
-------------\I. Control I"oup (no epinepbrine) I
II. F-4l1 wbite- 1 br. before epinepb·
rinet
III. Ell "'hite at time of epinephrine
IV. Ell white I hr. after epinephrine
V. Ell "'hite 2 hr. after epinephrine
VI. Ell white 4 hr. after epinephrine
VII. Ell wbite 6 hr. after epinepbrine
VIII. Ell white 9 hr. after ePinePhrine./
IX. Ell wbite 18 br.. after epinephrine

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

I
I

I-Hr. RcopoDoe 10 Ea White
0

- - - _\._+_1_.
I

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

- Ell white-2 ml. per rat intraperitoneally.
t Epinepbrine HCl-o.l mt. of 1: 1000 solution subcutaneously.

0
2

0
0
I
I
0

-I

1
2
2

5
1

1
0

3
0
2
0
3

•

1
1

2
0

"II

49
4

Vol. 84

GESCRICKTER ET AL.

twenty male Wistar rats, weighing between
TABLE 4
100 and 120 Gm. each, were divided into Eltrt:RIME:ST lIio. 4-i-:,.FE:CT 0,. .-\CUTS AOMINISTRATION' OF HrOROCOKT180lil: os Rt:AcnON
12 groups of 10 rats each. Groups I to IV
TO Eoo WHITE
were administered 1.0 mg. per kg. of
_.- -_._- - . - - -----_. --------_..
i
:
hydrocortisone solution intraperitoneally.
•
; Ti_of • Av~ ....
Groups V to VUI were administered 10
l'lWllbe. 01 Grvup. : 0 - 01. Hyd"" i Ad'!'ill;' I I-H•. IlecorlllOne
tratlOft of " SIJOftIe to
mg. per kg. of hydrocortisone .. solu'tion
. ;
IE" Whilet EM White
.--,_._!
..
intraperitoneally. Groups IX' to XII were
."". ~, i,.
administered 100 mg. per kg. of hydrvI
1.0
+3
cortisone solution intraperitoneally. Groups
II
1.11
+4
I, V, and IX were administered 2 mi. of
III
1.0
a
+3
egg white intraperitoneally ~2 hr. following
IV
1.0
14
+3
the administration of hydrocortisone.
\"
10
+3
'i
Groups II, VI, and X receh'ed 2 mt. of egg
VI
10
(12
+4
white intraperitoneally n1 hr. after the
VII
10
a
+2
administration of hydrocortisone. Groups
VIII
14
10
+4
lIl, VII, and Xl received 2 mJ. of egg
IX
100
+4
"
I' ,
100
X
+3
white intraperitoneally 5 hr. after the
100
Xl
a
+.f
administration of hy~rocortisorie. Groups
1-1
Xli
>100
+4
IV, VIlI, and XII received 2 mt. of egg
white iotraperitoneally 14 'hr. after the
• Ten male rllt.. to ea~h group_
administration of hydrocortisone. Reactions
t Hours afterhydm~ortisone,
to injections of egg white were noted and
graded in the manner previously described
TABLE 5
(Table 4). I t will be seen that in contrast to ExrERIMt:N'T Xo. a-E'-FECT OF CIIROSI<: Al>lI1Sepinephrine, varying doses of hydrocorISTRATIOS OF HrDROCORTISOSE os RE!lPOS!lE
tisone administered L'J Ii single dose gave
TO IsJ£(-rt:1> EGG WHIT&
110 protection when the animals were
challen~ r.t varying time intervals.
l'lWII'
be. of
. Treatmen'
Experimt"nt No.6. Sixty male Wistar Grvup
-~,--rats, weighing 100 to 120 Gm. each, were
·
0 :+l1+2i+21+4
divided into 3 equal groups of 20 each.
Group I received hydrocortisone, 20 mg.
• TrPllted wllh hytlrocor.: 0 : 0 , 3 : 12i 5
t ilion.." for I.J da)"S;;'
.
per kg. subcutaneously twiCe daily for 2
;
~~U
..
weeks. Group II received 0.1 ml. of 0.9
II : Treated 'Kit h !laline ",0- : 0 : 0 : 8! 8! 4
per cent solution of sodium chloride twice
· lution for 14 dll)"Il; ~:
I
daily for 2 \\·(.-eks. Group I II received 10
i
ratA.
':
units per kg. of ACTH intramuscularly III i Trl'l\ted with .-\CTHt : 3; : 6 8: 2
twice daily for 2 weeks. Following thl' lust
: for 14 day,,;~ ratl!
!
injection, all 60 rats were administered 2
--.,.--- -- --_._--_ ...._----mt. of egg white illtrnperitoneaUy. Heactions
" Hydrocortil!oll_~ mg. per kg. slIl>cutanewere observed and recorded as stated above oU1lly twi~e daily.
t ACTH-IO units per kg. intraDlu.. ~ularly
(Table 5). It will bP Seen that chroni(' doses
of hydrocortil!One and ACTH failed to t "'i~l' daily.
protect.
Experiment Nu, 6. Twenty hypoph~' sulx~utJlneously; .!-2 hr. later 2 ml. of egg
sectomized and adrenalectomized male Wis- white per rat WIlS administered intraperi·
tar rats, weighing approximately 200 Gm. toneally. Group I I I received 20 mg. per kg.
et'.ch, were di\'ided into .. groups of 5 rats of hydrocortisone solution intraperitoneally;
each, 10 days postoperuth·ely. Group I .1'2 hr. later 2 mt. of egg white per rat was
J'ecf'ived 2 mJ. of egg white per rat intra- administered intraperitoneally. Group IV
peritoneally. Group II reeeh'ed 0.1 mt. of rec~ci\'ed both 0.1 mt. of I: 1000 epinephrine
I: 1000 epinephrine hydro<"hloride !lOlution hydrOl'hloride solution subl'utnneously l1nd
I

~-.-

•
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-~._--_:

-._._~-_._---

II,I,

--;----.- . ··--.-------;--:--·l-!-iI

•
•

:-1

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50
July 1960

TABLE 6
No. 6-E....zcr

swelling of the paws, snout, tongue, scrotum,
and ears. This response usually is manifested in approximately 1 hr. It is predicated
upon a natural or inborn hypersensitivity
of the rat to egg albumin and needs no
previous conditioning. Reference to Ta.ble 1
reveals that this reaction was blocked during
the period of approximately IH to 2'-2 hr.
after administration of epinephrine; that is,
when egg white was administered H to
l~ hr. after administration of epinephrine.
A lesser degree of blockage by epinephrine
was noted before and after this period of
time, but it will be noted that rats were
more sensitiVE to injectioll of egg white
4to7 hr. after injection of epinephrine.
Not only were responses accentuated, but
also the reaction occurred within 30 min.
after injection of egg white instead of 1 hr.
Ioigure 1 illustrates this "negative phase" of
hyperreactivity.
ErperimenU No. t and 3. Hypophysectomized and adrenalectomized rats
treated with epinephrine responded in a
manner identical with that of control
hypophysectomized and adrenalectomized
rats, with the exception of 1 group. This
group received injectiolls of epinephrine
and egg white simultaneously, and was
afforded some slight degree of protection
against the anaphylactoid response (Tables
2 and 3), .apparently because of transient
peripheral vasoconstriction. The adrenal-

EXPBIUIIII:NT
0 .. ACl:TII: ADIIINlllTaATiON or EPINBPHBlNB AND HYDBOCORT1BONB
ON HYPOPR'ItlIICTOIIIIZD-ADRZNAL&CTOIiIIED
RATa

N_ _

I.R~W:!O

H...•

toerof

G"",p

D.....

Rata

-I

II
III

None
Epinephrine-

IH"'...........

+J +J +4

0
0
0

.50

0
0
0
1 0

Epinephrine andt ..•
Hydrocortilone

1
5

- Epinephrin~.1 mi. of I: 1000 IOlution lub·
cutaneously.
t Hydrocortisone 1l0Iution-3> mi. per kl. intraperitoneally.

20 mg. per kg. of hydrocortisone inlraperitoneally; ~ hr. later 2 mI. of egg white
per rat· \\-as administered intraperitoneally.
Reactions were observed and results recorded as above (Table 6). It will be seen
that in hypophysectomized-adrenalectomized rats, a combination of adrenalin and
hydrocortisone offered protection.
RESULTS

Experiment No.1. The responses of the
nonnal male rat to injection of 2.0 mI. of
egg white intraperitoneally include severe
EGG WHITE
RESPONSE

---

HYPO- REACTIVE

o
ttYPER- REACTIVE
I-PHASE I

--' <

...

I
...,

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sue 0

TIME

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~'.

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MEASURED RES PONS E

PRESUMED NATURAL
RESPONSE

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"

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J
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1',

TIllE 0" aoMlIlISTII&TIOIII
0' E~IIlE""'". HCL

.::.:.:.=.a

1+ PHASE)

,•

STRESS HTPER8ENSmVITT PHENOMENON

•

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"

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F

IN HOURS

FIG.t. Curve indieatinl the resPOI1lell to injections of ell white administered 1 hr. prior to observations

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51
6

•
•

GESCHICKTER E1' AL.

ectomized animals responded to injections of
egg white more vigorously and,at times,
with convulsions. This was more conspicuous
than in the hypophysectomized animals.
Ezperimenl No.4. It will be noted that
acute therapy with single doses of hydrocortisone failed to modify the reaction to
egg white (Table. 4).
Experiment No.5. Chronic therapy with
bidaily doses of hydrocortisone and ACTH
likewise failed to. modify the reaction JIJ._
egg white (Tahle5).
~,
Experiment No.6. Epinephrine· and hydrocortisone, when administered simultaneously,prevented the anaphylactoid
reaction in the hypophysectomized-adrenalectomized rats (Table 6). Either compound
alone was ineffective.
DISCUSSION

•
i'

•

BelyeU first demonstrated that the degree
of reaction suffered by the rat upon injection
of egg white was a measure of the prophlogistic status of the animal. Reference to
Table 1 estabJishes that intact rats remain
in an antiphJogistic state, failing to react to
injection of egg white for IJ.i to 2J.i hr.
after the administration of a single dose of
0.1 mt. of 1: 1000 epinephrine subcutaneously. These findings are in accord with
those of Clark and MacKay,' who also
demonstrated· blockade of the anaphylactoid
reaction by epinephrine. Furthermore, it will
be noted t.hat the animals then suffer a
"rebound" effect, becoming hyperreactive
for 4 to 7 hr. follov.ing administration of
epinephrine. A more rapid onset and increased edema resulted in reaction 'to egg
white. This prophlogistic hyperreactive
state is, on occasion,severe enough to cause
convulsions.
We have referred to the hypersensitivity
rebound effect 8S the "negative phase."
During the negative phase rats previously
treated with epinephrine are more sensitive
to the anaphylactoid reaction than normal,
untreated rats. This illustrates a temporary
period of weakening of the organism's
defenses resuJting from prior stress.
It seems that these short, intemiittent
periods of stress cause hypersusceptibility
to a noxious agent, egg white. One is tempted
to compare these findings with the delayed

Vol. 34

hypersensitivity response of rheumatic fever
and glomerulonephritis to streptococcal
infections, or to the increased incidellt-e of
pneumonitis and upper respiratory infection follo\ring sudden changes in seasonal '
temperature. It also may he compared to
the postpuerperal exacerbations of rheumatoid arthritis.
Recently, Kitay and his co-workers'
have demonstrated that a single dose of
'epinephrine tends to deplete the amount ("'.
ACTH available for immediate release from
the pituitary gland in acute distress. The
pituitary gland thereby· becolbes less responsive to successive stresses. OUr studies
are coDsistent with these findings.
Although the "negative phase" is simiJar
to Selye's' exhaustion stage. of the gpneral
adaptation syndrome, it differs by being a
more acute; frequent, and repetitive occurrence, and of a lesser degree of seyerity
than ,that observed "ith exhaustion (Fig. 1).
It bears no relation to delayed shock and is
reversible. The organism's expenditure for
protection by means of the general adaptation syndrome apparently can detract from
its ability to provide protection in the
immediate future, as illustrated. Within
18 hr. the organism has returned to the
normal pretreatment reactive status. These
results are indicative of a pharmacologic
action ofepinephrille persisting up to 18
hr., an agent usually regarded as having a
duration of action of only a few minutes.
In this respect, our results parallel those or
Kaplan and Gant,' who have demonstrated
a delayed 'hyperlipemic action of epinephrine.
References to TableS 2 and 3 support· the
, contention that acute effects ofadministration of ,epinephrine o~ the egg white,
reaction are mediated, at least in part, tja
the pituitary-adrenal aXis. It will be noted
that epinephrine itself produces no protective effect in the hypophysectomized or
adrenalectomized rat. There are no "negative phase" results. It was, therefore, of
additional interest to determine if the
effects of administration· of epinephrine
were mediated through a final common
pathway or increased production of cortisone. Even large, single doses of cortisone
(as recorded in Table 4) failed to elicit &

]

52
Jul1l1960

STRESS BTPERSENSmVITY

PBENO~ENON

7
,

protective antiphlogistic effect.. The usual tempted to conclude that the proximity of
4 to 7 hr. prophlogistic effect8(negative the Bdrenal cortex and adrerml medulla is
phase} were similarly absent.. It was noted more than accidental.
attl)iS time that rats injected with large
The data presented Seem to illustrate
doses of cortisone. by an inexperienced the necessity of the liberation of both
technician were protected against the cortisol and epinephrine,in order to bring
anaphylactoid reaction. It was postulated about protection against the anaphylactoid
that the increased manipulation of these reaction (Table 6, Group IV).
rats resulted. in liberation . of endogenous .
It is of interest to note that Halpern and
epinephrine, thereby explaining the anti- l:Usllociates4 observed that treatment with
phlogistic protective effects.
.cortisone may enable adrenalectomized mice
The· foregoing· observations posed an to tolerate 5 otherwise lethal dose.<i of
inte~ting queStion. A single dose of· cor- histamine. Epinephrine alone enabled adrentisone, carefuUy administered in a gentle alectomized· mice to tolerate 5 to 10 lethal
manner (in order to avoid flighteriing the doses of histamine. Together, epinephrine
rat, witli concomitant liberation of endog- and (:ortisolle enabled the adrenalectomized
enous .epinephrine) fails to. be· antiphlogis- animal to tolerate 50to 100 leLhul doses of
tic. Selye,oreported that chf9nic ad- histamine, thereby restoring histamine tolerministration of ACTH and cortisol is ance to normal levels.
antiphlogistic. It seemed possible that the
It seems that the protection expended in
stress of daily injections,· liberating epine- warding off the noxious anaphylactoid
phrine, rather than cortisol, or administra- reaction imposes the hazard of future
tion of AeTH might be the basis fOf the hypersusceptibility. The latter bas been
antiphiogistic state so produced. For this termed by us a "negative phaSe." Its role
reason, the chronic effects of ACTH and in human disease remains to be elucidated.
These studies, however, suggest that the
cortisol were again studied.
The questionable factor of epinephrine ability of the human body to withstand the
liberated by the daily pain and fright of onslaught of disease following short bouts of
injection, feeding, noise, and caging was stress, whether psychic or physical, shou:d
minimized. The animals were isolated in a . receive more study.
It is known from clinical and subjective
quiet room and _handled by skilled workers.
Reference to Table 5 reveals that. under experience that stress provoked by psychic
these conditions no ditJerence exists in the mediAtion: evolves within l"eConds, rather
egg white reactivity of corti~ne- and saline- than in the 30 or more minutes required for
treated controls. ThesP. results are in epinephrine to mediate theproteetive
agreement "ith those {·f Morrison and his action of the general adaptation syn:lrome.
co-workers7 and of Swingle,'t who, also It therefore seems possible that.· psychic
failed to prevent the anaphylactoid reaction stimulation, operating by neural pathwaYs,
by injection of cortisOne. :Th~ restil~ are can act directly ·ori end-organs, including
in opposition to those of S\vingle,'t
that the adrenal medulla and perhaps the cortex,
epinephrine in our hands prevented the without involving the hypophysis. This is
anaphylactoid reaction. in the intact rat. suggested in our experiments by the fact that
Carinon,· in his original demonstrations of the injection of both adrenalin-and cortisone
the "flight or fight" response; measured the afford some protection in the absence of the
ability of the organism to resist noxious hypophysis and the adrenal gland. The
attack largely in· terms of sympathetic immediate· effects of stre&'J will be the
nervous system effecta and epinephrine. 8ubject of n subsequent paper.
Selye,' in tum, has demonstrated cortisone
8UMM.\RY
to be of vital importalU.,'ein similar· situations. It now seems that neither, alone,
1. The effects of acute episodes of stress
suffices for maximal defense by endogenous . were measured, using the egg white anaphyagents. Both, together, must be present in lactoid reaction.
increased quantities to be of value. One is
2. A "negative phase" period of hy-

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:',

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;',

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;~

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.]
.,

{;,

.~,

".:-,

;- ..:
b

53
8

GESCHICKTER ET ..4L.

persensitivity was elucidated. It occurs
shortly after the initial protection afforded
by stress to the organism. The significance
of t.he "negative phase" response was
discussed.
3. A co-relationship of epinephrine and
cortisone in stress reactions was demonstrated. Neither singularly suffices to evoke
the degree of protection elicited by the
combination of the 2· substances,

SUMlIL\RIO IN INTERLINGUA.

1. I.e efl'ectos dp episodios de stress acute

•

esseva mesurate per medio del reactiOn anaphylactoide a clara de ovo.
2. Un periodo de "phase negative" del
hypersensibilitate esseva constatate. 1110
occurre brevemente po.'lt Ie protection init.ial
que es providite al organismo per Ie stress.
I.e signification del respon.~ de "phase negative" es discutite.
3. Un co-relation de epinephrina e de cortisona in reactiones de stress esseva demonstrate. Ni Ie un ni Ie altere sol suffice a evocar
Ie grado de protection que es evocate per Ie
2 substantias in combination.
REFERENCES
1. CANNON, W. B.: Bodily Changes in Pain,
.
Hunler, Fear and Rage, Ed. 2. New York:
D. Appleton 4: Company, 1934, p. 404.

·'.f

•

Vol. 84

2. CLARK, W. G.• AND MACKAT, E. M.: Effect.
oel·epinephrine and '·ut-erenol on ell white
edema in t.he rat. Proc. Soc. Exper. BioI.
4: Med., 71: 86-87, 1949.
3. GII:BCRICItTZ., C. F., ATHANA81ADOU, P. A.,
AND O'MALLII:T, W. E.: The role of mucinD\vail in collagen disease. Am. J. C1in.
Path., 10: 93-111, 1968.
4. HALPZRN, B. N., BZNACZBBAF, B., AND
BBlOT; M.: Potentiat.ion by adrenaline of
protective elfect of eortilone on histamine
toxicity in adrem,leet.omiled mice. Proc.
Soc. Exper. BioI. 4: Med., 71: 37-39, 1952.
5. KAPLAN. A., ANnGANT, M.: Epinephrine aud
blood lipidl~Paper presented at. American
Phyeiological Society, San FrlUlcisco, Cali.
fornia, 19M.
6. KJTAT, J. I., HOLUB, D. A., ANn JAILED, J. W.:
"Inhibition" of pituitary ACTH release
a.fter adminilt.ration of reeerpine or epinephnne. EndoennololY, II: M8-554,1959.
'i. MODRISON, J. L., RrCHABDSON,A. P., AND
BLOOII, W. L.: Effects of antihistaminic
agents on reaction of rat to dextran. Arch.
internat. pharmacodyn., 88: 9lH05. 1951.
8. SELTZ. H.: The alarm reaction (abstract).
Canad. M. A. J .• at: 706, 1936..
9. SII:LTJ.:. H.: A s:rndrome produced by diverse
nocuous agenta. Nature, 1.: 32, 1936.
10. SELTE, H.: Studiea on adaptation. Endocrinolol)', 21: 169--188, 1937.
lJ. SELTE, H., AND JAIlIIIN, G.: Screeninl of
poBIlble therapeutic agents by IDeans of
experimental relllicas of eonnective·tillllue
diae_. Ann. Sew York Acad. Sc., M:
481-493, 1956-1957.
12. SWINGLE. W. W.: Unpublished observations.
Quoted by COHEN, H .• GRAFF, M., AND
KLZIN.SBO, W-.: Inhibition of dextr4n
edema by proteolytic enzymes. Proc. ~e.
Exper. BioI. 4: Med., II: 517-619, 1955.

54
AII-..J_

VoL •• No. .. "

CI.r_ P & _

i-.....111

,.,... '" U...~.

THE ROLE OF MUCINOLYS13IN COLLAGEN DISEASE
CJLULESF. GE8cBICK~_M.J?:tPANA:YIOTA A. ATHANASIADOU, MD.• AJIP
.
. . .W. £lJWAJtD O'MALLEY, PR.D.
1)qGTlmcnl 01 PalMWw,.Ckor,.e- UniNrn'r 8cAool 01 Medici,.. aM Demil,,.,,, W..Aington, D. C.

The term collagen .di8«J#, according to
Klemperer,' refers to "generalUed alteration
. of the cOnnective tissue, particularly to
abnormalities or its· extracellular component, •.•" and "includes rheumatic rever,
rheumatoid arthritis, polyarteritis, acute
lupUs erythematosus. generalized BClero- .
derma and· dermatomyasitis." Klinge' first·
proposed that this group or rheumatoid
diseases·represents pathologically a 8Ylltemic
. involvement or the entire connective tissue
or the human body; and hepoetulated that
the intercellular components are the primary
siteor~. . . .
The hiStopatbolojpc reatures common to
this group or dieses are:
1. ~iiciJi0Q8 or myxoid degeneration or
the "ground substim~ or connective tissue.
2. Fibrinoid degeneiation involving both
the matrix and collagenous fibers.
3. V&8Culitis of ·mediUm-aized and small
blood vessels, varying rrom thrombonecrosis
to periv&8Cular edema and "cuffing" with
plasma cells and monocyt.es.
4. Focal bistologic changes peculiar to
the individual collagen. dise88e, such as the
Aschoff body· in acute rhe~tic rever,
rhewnatoid nodules in rheumatoid arthritis,
"wire looping" in the glomeruli or dissemin~ted lupus erythematosus, and capillary platelet thrombosis in·thrombocytopenic
purpura.
Among the histochemical reactions observed are:
1. The rormation or L.E. cells, which
contain depolymerized deaoxyribose nucleic
acid.
2. Elevation of hexosamine in the blood
serum (rrom split glycoproteins).
Received, February 3, 1958; revilion reeeived,
March 13; a.ecepted for publication March 17.
Dr. Geaehiekter il Profl!llor of PathololY, and
Dn. Athanasiadou and O'Malley are Reaellrch
Aasi8tants.
. Thi8 work was 8upported by a grant from The
Geschickter Fund for Medical Research.
93

. 3•. Elevation or serum globulin (alpha 2
or garnola).
4. Amelioration or 'clinical manifestations
by adminiatrationof adrenocorticotrophic'
(ACTH) or adrenal cortical hormones.
Whether the collagen diseo.ses represent
examples or the hypersensitivity state or
belong to the Category of· endocrine imbalaJice' resulting rrom the genel'lll adaptation syndrome is still dispu~. Ignorance or
the etiology or these conditions makes it
impossible to state whether all or the
diseases proposed ror this categor:r actually
belong there. The problem of etiology would
be advanced at least 1 steprorward, ir it
could be demonstrated that the pathologic
and histochemical reatwes rererred to above
could be reproduced experimentally by a
single agent or injury. The present report
indicates that a simple chemir.a) compound
can be used to reproduce the main reatures
or all the collagen diseases in experimental
animals.
An tJJili(:ollGgen cJlemiaJl rub3tGna. Several compounds of the phenylenediamine
class have been utilized in biologic work as
dye indicators. Mcleod' used both dimethylor tetramethyl-p-pbenylenediamine hydrochloride to study the oxidation reactions or
gonococcic organisms. More recently, Alterreldtl uaed the dimethylamino derivative of
this compound to study the reaction or the
serum in the major psychoses. We chose an
isomer or this compound, N ,N'~imethyl-p
phenylenediamine, which will be rererred to
as D'P ,P. It has the ronnula shown in
Figure 1.
The preparation or diamine compound
used in these experiments was the crystalline
base prepared in 2 per cent oily solution. This
was applied by repeated daily brushings to
thuhaved skin or rats. The aqueous solution
or the dihydrochloride salt, however, also was
used for intramuscular and intravenous injections in other animals. Except ror some acute
experiments, Wistar rats ,,-eighing approxi-

•
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55
Vol. !lO

•

e~ and bemorrhagic. Histologic studies
were performed only on the 8Idn.
In aeeeood series of~xperimente. 3 groupe
ofW"18taI' male rats, weigbiDg 120 Gm.
eacb, were painted daily (except Sunday),
Fla. 1. Formulaof D'P,P
on the .surface of the shaved Ikin ol the
tbigb over an. area of apProDma~y 2 by 3
. mately 120 Gm.eachwere used. The maincm. The c:Iiamine compoUDd in the form ol
features of the results obtained are shown in . the pure baae w88diato1ved in the diethylthe accompanying iIIustratiolia. The various bexyl-bexahydropbtbalate-bensyl aJeohoi 80focal lesioris of thecoll8gen dieeaaes were lution referrecUo above.
reproducedhistologicaUy,including:ABchoffGroup I, consisting of8 rats and 4: conlike bodies,· the. rheumatoid nodules,capil- trois,
painted with a 2p!!r cent solution.
Iary platelet-. thrOmbi,domeruli "Wire
Group II, C()nsisting of 8 rats and 4:
looping," and focal fibrinoid deaeDeration~ controls, W88 painted· with a 1 per cent
In addition, aniniaJson Cbronic treatment solution.
showed a2,.fold eniarpuu!Iltof the adreJ:l&1·Group III, consistingof8 rats and 4:
cortex, and (apparently 88 a result of such controls, was painted with a 0.5 per cent
adreoa1 changes) there waS focaldestruction solution.
The solution used for painting is a nonof lymphoid tiasueandsplenomepJY•. 1»
cause the chemical used appeared to produce volatile oily solution prepared from the base.
its effects through its mucinolytic action 00 Jnbalatioo is not a complication but the
the conoective tissue matrix, particular animals. bite and lick· the irritated surface
attention W88 given to changes in the muC08& and in_ion and aspiration of the material
of tlae gastrointestinal tract, which included probably explains the tendency for the
multiple peptic· ulcers with a characteristic pulmonary veseela to show the most striking
pUDched~t ap~ce.
changes. It also .probably accounts for the
The reSults obtained do not enable us to appearance of peptic ulcers in some or the
state what role, if any, this particular animals, alt.hoqh it does not occur in all of
cbemical compound plays in the histo- them. The animals were not kept in indigenesis and etiology of the colTflSPOnding vidual cages.
natural diaease states in man.
Groupl,high doMJ,e. The rats failed to
EzperimenlDJproe«lvrt&. In the initial gain in weight and died between 10 and 15
experiment, 24: W"18t8r male rats, weighing days, living on the average 12 days. The
100 Om.. each, were painted twice daily skin showed ulceration and vesicles, but the
with a 5 per cent solution of N ,N'-dimethyl- manifestations were not 88 extensive 88 with
p-phenylenediamine. The pure base was the 5 per cent solution. At necropsy, the
diadved in 80 per cent diethylbexyl- adrenals did not appear to be enlarged. The
bexahydropbtbalate and 20 per cent beuyl spleen and lympboid tissues showed slight
alcohol, and applied to a shaved area of skin atrophy. There was increased eecretion in
on the thigh approximately 2 by 3 cm.· in the· bronchi, pulmonary edema, and COnsiR. The rodents died within 36 to 72 hr. gest.ion, and the right beart was dilated.
Vesicles or ulcerations of the skin appeared MicroecopicaUy, exudation of plasma (soin all rat8 living more than 4:8 hr. In some of caUed lymphon-bagia) aboot the smaller
tbeee rats at autopsy the adrenals were pulmonary vessels was conspicuous (Fig. 2).

was

•

FlO. 2 (upper). Cbaa~ ill the ~Ie of the JUDI. There is a perivucular collar of edema aad the
eDdotheliai celiej»roject lato Uae lumen of the ~II. The rat wu bruahed 7 timee with a 2 per «Dt
lOIutioD of D'P,P aDd died OD the &hday. HematosyliD aDd eoeia. X 50.
..
Flo. 3 (Jower). A8choft'-like cellular agteptee aDd ·capillary dilaiatioD in the myocardium. The
cellular agreptee} which are adjaceat to .m&llveuel., are at the left aDd rilht portion of the baad
of muecle tibe,. which runs di-.oaaJly &C1'08I the photorraPh. The loal.••lit·lilte.paees are dilated capil.
Ian•. Thia rat wu bruahed e tlmeewiUa a 2 per ceat IOlutioa of D'P ,P aad died oa the 7th day. Hematoxylin and eoeia. X 100.
"

,
···1

,I
.:.:1

57
96

GDICHICKTER n' AI..

Vol. SO

]

•
•
'1

'.:,."]

Flo. 4. Hilher mapi6cation of the eellular agreptel in FipN 3. In the upper
left comer (aboUt 11 o'clock) is a typical Anitllc.bkow eell, and in the lower right
comer (about 5 o'clock) is an A8choff eell. Note the spillinl of the erythrocytell from
ruptured capillari. illustrated in the upper portion of the photomicroll'apb. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 220.

•

The basement membrane of these small
"essels showed smudging and dissolution,
and the endothelial lining cells, some of
which were detached, projected int.o the
lumen. In the heart there were foci of en,lathelial cells (apparently liberated by Jill·
solution of adjacent capillaries) lying

between the myocardial fibers. Some of the
sections showed Aschoff-like cellular aggregates (Figs. 3 and 4). There. were
hU111l:NWI JiL'\~ vascular spaces lined by a
single Iay~r of endotihillmn surrounded by
extravasated erythrocytes, ""bieh were
interpreted 88 capillary aneurysms. In lIV~e

FIG. 5 (upper). Seetion through the corLex of the adrenal revealin. h)-perpluia and cvtoplumic
vacuoles. The adrenals were gr_h- enlarged to 4 timee their si.e. This rat w.. brushed with a 1 per
eentlOlution of D'P ,P. The animal died dter 2 monthe. Hematoxylin and _in. X 1:10.
FIG. 8 (lower). Low.power photomicrograph of the stomach illuetratin, 1 of _ftralpeptic ulcerll
whici. WP'n! present in this animal. There is a sharp crater overlaid by deequamated remnants of the
glandular mucOllll. Peptic uleers can be produced more crtnl'iatently by oral administration of O'P, P
than by application to the shaved skin..4.lthou,h this animal . u brushed with a 1 pelt eent solution,
it is l'OMible the material wallIlYo'alloYo'ed by HfOl...,. the wounda. Hematoxylin and _in. X 30.

:
i.

]

.• ••.

59
98

•

Vol.

GESCHICKTER ET Al..
.

of the small' art.tries .in· the mY6cardium, ctyptawas red~cedlmdPePtic.ulcers were
changes igthe,baaement membrane and present (Fig:6);Xo.. suCh changes were
intime. stained positively with periodic oeid· fou,nd in the aiiliraalsofthe cOntrol group.
Schiff . stain, indicatingtbeliberation of . Grt1flplll,li1tf;dOMlfe~ Some oftberats in
mucopolysaCcharide material.
this ~p died 6 weeks after the ~ g
In the sYDovial membranes of thekilee of the eXperil'llents, but. some were still
jointtbe Capillaries were congested ,and- liViog3 months later.' The.animals showed
dilated, .·.·some ,i:>f, them', undergoinglysia. p~vegain in weight. At autopsy, the
There Was snludging of the ground8U,~oilt8taiKlingfilldinlwas endothelial prostanCeiminedia~ly beneath the mesothelial· ··Iifemtion of '. the lining of small pulmonary
lining layer of the synovial 8Urf~.e. In tbevel!lle18. In someoftbeve86e18 the lumen was
bone Jnarl'Qw the capillaries were dilated,&nd pract~y 6ccluded.Tbese vessels looked as
there were areas of co8gu1atedextravasated . if they were beingrecanaliZed in p~ and
fluid. The bone marrow elements appeared some vesselalooked almo8"tlikegIomeruli.
normal. The spleen ehowed completedisap- . The endothelialproliferationinpIaces expearance of ita, lymphoid pulp,. and. the tended into the adje.cent sept(Jrns of tbe lung.
surviving germinal' centers showed fcical This was found in only 2 rata,who may have
necrosis. The thymus and Iymphllodes were aspiratedtbe compound while licking their
similarly affected. Theothei' organs were . wounds (Fig. 7). Ingestion of ~he compound
negative. No significant changes were found in this manner may also have' something to
in the animals of t.he control group.
do with the formation of pepti~ ulcers, since
Group II, middledola,e.Theseratalived a animalswbo are fed D'P, Pdie of perforated
maximum period of2montbS and died peptic ulcers. These oral exp!riments were
usualJy between the thirtietb and sixtieth performed by Dr. A. I. Miller, Emory
day. They failed to gain weight. At autopsy, University, Atlanta, Georgia.
the lungs were congested and edematous.
The spleen was pl"aCticalJy devoid of
There was so:ne thickening or the walls of lymphoid tissue and U5U8Jly twice its normal
small arteries in the lungs but not or the weight. The pulp contained many macroveins. Histologically, there was some "onion phages With numerous foam cells, and there
peeling" of the small arteries and arterioles,· were some granulocytes but practically no
but similar changes were found in some or lymph6cytes.A few germinal centers were
the animals in the control group. The heart intact (Fig. 8). The heart showed areas of
was dilated and the adrenals were markedly fibrinoid degeneration' and aggregates of
enlarged. Microscopically, the adrenals Anitschkow's cells, similar to tbOlle shown in
showed cortical hypertrophy and vacuoliza- Figure 9. In the coronary circulation, the
tion of cells in the zona fasciculata(Fig. 5). walla of the capillaries were disintegrating,
The spleen and lymphoid tissues were and the liberated endothe1ia1cells aecUlDUsimilar to Group I. Microecopica11y, the .lated about 'the adjacent arterioles. The
spleen showed reduction of lymph~id tissue adjacent myofibrils were neCrotic. and
and necrosis of germinal centers, with byalinized. These cbahgea were not as
increaaed number or macrophagea, many of widespread asm the rats on.higher dosage.
which were binucleated. The heart showed The knee joints showed the microscopic
focal fibrosis and aggregates of histiocytes features of rheumatoid arthritis· with the
but no typical Aschoff bodies. The joint formation of rheumatoid nodules in the
cbahges in animals that died early were synovial membrane (Fig. lO~ The bone
similar to Group I. In the gastric mucoea, marrow was not remarkable. The brains and
the mucus in the superficial glandular kidneys were nonnal in appearance. In the
Fro. 7 (upper). Endothelial proliferation pluainla small veuel in tbelunl. This animal wu painted
with aD 0.5 per eent solution of D'P, P daily and lived 6 weelts. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 228.
.
Flo. 8 (lower). Low-power pbo~micr~rapb 01 spleen. Tbe pulp is enti~ly ~placed by red bl~
eel.. and a lew scattered mr.A:ropb~. Tbe local areas of Iympbocytes a~ remnant. of tbe prmlnal
centers. Thill animal W&II painted dally exeept Sunday lor a I)-week period ,,;tb a 0.5 per eent solution.
Hematoxylin and eosin. X 30.

:1
61
100

GESCH1CItT&R B1' Al..

Vol. SO

-J
.'

f(-

]
"

Flo.e. HiB.l!·power ,botomicrojp'aphof aa AHhoIf ~ ilIllltratiDlt)'picai ADitechkow'.
cella. Two eapillari.....seen, I iD IODlittidiDal aDd the other iD C~·MCtIOD. The AIIi_hkow
eel:' MelD to be deveJopilll iD the wan of the capil!U'f.. Note &be mitotic fipre ill the upper
portion of the photopaph. Thiaaaimal wu. bNlhed With a 2 per oeDt lIOIutiOD of D'P,P daily
aad'lived 7
Hematoxylin aDd eaaiD. X 400.

de,...

region of the kidneys aDd pancreas, small to
medium-tUed "easels showed thrombonecrosia or marked endothelial prolileration
lIimiIar to that fouod in the lungs (Fig. H).
The akin abowed· epidermal hyperplasia

rather than necn8a in the punted areas. In
the subcutaneous t_e of tbeee resions
there waS marked edema and 6brosis with
Ie. of collagen 6brils, siinulating scleroderma (Fig. 12). At times tbia involved the
derma and wu accompanied· by atrophy of

the hair follicles.' In the voluntary muscles
beneath the painted are88, there were
coUections of plasma cells and lymphocytes
about damaged blood vellJe1s, simulating
the lesions of dermatomyositis. In other
places the depMration of muscle fiben
resembled muscular dystrophy. In the liver
there were inereued numben of ceUa with
aeidophilic cytoplasm and binueleated fonna
but no focal necrosis. Some of the liver cells
were vacuolated j othenl abowed hyaline

FlO. 10 (",per). Rheumatoid Dodule denlopiDI iD the lyDOViai membraDtl of a knee
joiDt. The J. .oa ~teDda~lD08t to t~ IDf!'OtheliailiDb:a. The ~iDe pUllin. throup the ce!!terof
the J!hot.ol:rapb .. aD. artifact. This aDlIl'" w.. bruslted WIth _ 0.5 per «:eDt IOlutloa of
D'P.PdaiIY aDd w.. II&Cri6ced alter.3 months. HematoltfliD _d _iD. X 12S.
Fio. 11 (lower). Artery DlaDif.UDI thrombooeel'OlllI aDd perivueular infiltrate. The
v_I iI in the perireDai fat. From tlie same animal illustrated in FilUre 10. Hematoxylin
_d eosin. X so.

J
'1

;;;1

'(:

63
102

OESCHICKTER

droplet degenerntion, and the nuclei were
,,-nrying sile and density. Some the small
hepaticve8eeJs showed endothelial proliteration aa in the lungs. The adrenals were
enlarged 88 & result cortical hypertrophy.
AU iones of the adrenal showed increased
V8llCularity. The control rats showed no
significant changes.
Aet* ezperimenlB. In the animals surviving 10 or more days, no membranous
glomerulitis was found and the "wire
looping" of· disaeminated lupus erythematosus was not reproduced. Theoretically. the
lapse of time before sacrifice was sufficient
to allow the chemical compound to act as a
hapten· and combine with serum albumin
and produce an antigenic effect. In order to
resolve this question of a possible hyperseDlritivity reaction and to produce more
acute lesions that might involve the kidney,
smaller rats were chosen in preference to
raisiog the dosage
the compound. The
experimental procedure was repeated with
24 rats, thi. time using males weighing 60 to
80 Gm. each. The animals were pair.ted daily
with a 2 per ce~t solution or the diamine
compound prepored by 2 separate chemical
laboratories in order to insure that the
experiments would be reproducible (this
compound undergoes darkening through
oxidation). These animals were sacrificed at
intervals or 2 to 4 dnys. The characteristiC
changes in the myocardium were produced,
as well as membmn~ glomerulitis in the
kidneys,· with typical "wire looping," characteristic
disseminated lupus erythemat08U8 (Fig. 13). Some
these rats also
showed perivnscular lesions of the brain in

•

• Another liDe of evidence indicatiq that the
diamine compound does not act .. hapten ...
obtained by injeetin, a IfOIlp of 12 guinea pip
with the mat~rial in 0.5 per cent solution intramWleularly daily for e weeo. Th_ anim'" failed
to develop anaphylaxis and an IllIrvived the
treatment.

Vol. SO

~rA£.

the form of small focal accumulations of
mononuclear cells resembling typhus nodules
(Fig. 14aod Table 1).
DiP ,P on AypopA1IlI«:Imniud rata. Since
DiP, P produces enlargement the adrenals
and atrophy of lymphoid tissUes, its mechanism of action is possibly that a stressor
or alarming substance (as noted above, its
role lIS a hapten could not be demonstrated).
In order to test this interpretation, 2 groups
of 10 each of male hypophysectomized rats,
weiglling 120 Gm. each, were painted with a
2 per cent solution of DiP ,P as described in
the previous experiments. H this substance
is adreoalin-like in action, hl1JOphysectomy
should block its untoward effect upon the
collagen matrix
connective tissue. The
results obtained partially support this
interpretation. In the animals surviving 2 to
4 weeks, characteristic changes were observed about the smaller pulmonary vessels.
Both arteries and veins were surrounded by a
collar of edema and monocytes, and their
endothelial lining was destroyed in patches
or reduplicated. Some of the vessels contained small mural thrombi. A number or the
animals showed. peptic ulcers. However, no
chamcteristic rheumatoid nodules were
found in the synovial membrane of the knee
joint, although in places the synovial lining
cells were reduplicated to 4 to 6 layers and
stained deeply with hematoxylin and eosin.
In IIOme animals the synovial membmne
showed highly vnscular papillary protrusions
in which the connective tissue cells had
proliferated about tAiiated capillaries. The
myocardium showed capillary dilatation but
no Aschoff bodies or proliteration of endothelial ceUs were found. Adrenal cortical
hypertrophy was absent, and the lymphoid
tissue of the spleen, thymus and lymph
nodes was unaltered. In general, t.tte changes
were not striking outside of the lungs and
gastrointestinal tract. The skin changes
were not. suggestive of scleroderma. It

FlO. 12 (lIpper). HeMe, fibrotic sea~nl involving the ~ubcutaneou~ region in th~ area painted wit.h
D'P, P in a 2 per cent IIOlution daily for 6 da}"lI and II&cnliced on tbe lIeventb day. Remnants ·of ha.,
follicles show 1ft the IIpper portiun of the photogl1lph. Sote. t~e llmall thromboBed vesa4!l. The u~der·
Iyin, mlL'leI~latllre !lIsho..n in the lo_r !eft.hand com~r. Similar chan.- ..ere found 1ft the skID !>f
aninials palDted "·lIh 0.5 per rent ..olUl/on, who survived for longer than 2 months. Hematox)-'hn
and ·i!oein. X 28.
.
FlO. 13 (lo.·er). H)'31in thromhi in eftrly memhranollllliomenlliti,! in an SO·Gm. rat that wa~ bru...hed
"'ith a 2 per cent >lOll/lion of H'P .1' for 3 dayll. Hematoxylin and 808m. X 32J.

..',

"
TABLE 1
'HISTOLOGIC

V_II oI ....

IIIut......... I·

CllA.NOl:8

0tIMr. V-.II

PaoDUCI:D B., N ,N'.DIMIITR'fL-,-PRI:NYLJ:NI:DIAIUNJ: IN TBI: RAT

f S~

T1auc

XIdMy

.w.-II

I .JoIDia

aDd Skill

I ....

1,...

IDlIIliul Tract

Group I: Averale duration of treatment, 12 daYI; painted with 2 per cent solution·

No oOlllpieuoUi

Capillary dilatation, pluma
leakapabout lmall, v_e~1
with diuoJutlon of bUtment
membtlDe¥d detachment of
endothelial celli; AMhol
bodi.. in myocardium. "

chaD'lI

Nochanp Atrophy of pulp;
focal necrosil
in Ilrminal
centen

No cbanle No chanle

Joints: 80me edema of No chanp
around lubetance.
capillary dilatation
IDd oonllltion.
Skin: Ulceration and
velicl..

G.oup II: Aver..e duration of treatment, I to 2 months; painted with I per cent solution

Thickeninl of walla of lmall ar- No chanau
teri.. in lunl; f~of hittiOOytll
in myocardium withc.plUary
aneurYlm.

Bame as Group I

80me IoUcoid de·
pneration

No chanlea Cortical hyper. Similar to Group 1
tntphy; vacuo
. olilation of
cella and hem·
orrhale in lona
fi.aciculata

Peptio ulce,. in
Itoinach
and duodenum

GrOup III: A\'8hP duration of trealment, 2 to 3 montha; painted with 0.1 p..tr cent lolution
PlugiUI of Imall pulmonary vea· ThromboDeCroail
.ell by endothelial cella. Occaof meeJum·
liled VI.la of
lional. Aachoftbodi81 i.n myokidDey and
cardium with adjacllllt fibrinoid
pancre..
deleneration; necroei. and.hy• Iini.ation of myocardial fiben.

Edema andl Replacement of
6broeil
pulp and ler·
of con-minal cente,.
nective
macroI hy
tiiau(
phal", with
splenomelaly.

---

•

,...

'-~
.. '~.-

F" ;-"::',"

Occasional
Joints: Rheumatoid
. n.odul81 in synovial
peptic
ulcer
membrane.
Skin: Epiderma. hy·
perpl~iai fibrolil of
denna Ilmulatini
Icleroderma .

Group IV: Acute experiments in younl rats; duration 2 to 4 day.; painted 'fith 2 per cent lolution

No chanle No chanle
Perin. cular edema of pulmonary Perivucular
mononuolear
VeeIO II; capillary aneury8lD1 in
infiltrate About
myoo ardium, and endothelial
lmall·cerebral
aurel latel.
ve......

No chanle Marked hyper.
trophy and h)"
perpl..ia of
cortex with in·
creued YaICUlarity

it{_:!:,·~'-···:;

Wire loop- No chanp
'inl of
renal
Ilonloruli

;&:.,.. ,.",,1

11" ,:<;

...........

i, -'' ,,' .".' ""~

("'"
~
,

,:.': .. '&

Ulceration of lkin;
. jointl: DO chanle

No change

V':" ,j

..1

r.:.........J

L::"''!C;)

;f?~~. ~"'
::."'

. ? .~

67
106

::.'.

.. }
.\:

...,

Vol. SO

GESCHJCKTER ET AL.

appeared, therefore, that D'P, P has .'\ in the tissue. The earliest stage is "softendirect mucinolytic effect in the tissues which iog," which allows the capillary _wall to
it reaChes in ,high concentration, but wide- stretch and fonn aneurysmal dilatations
!Spread cOllagen diseaSe is not produced (Fig. 1&). Iii the. ba$ement meml>rane
unless' ~h~ general adaptation syndrome is behind'. the end()theliur.linpreeapillBry
provoked· i~,.,-an intact" anill\al. The im~ arteries and in· arterioles this hydration can
. por'tance 'or t.be tissue concentration ,of ·beseen histologically as a cbainof small
. D'P,P in prOducini colfagen .diaiease. lIy b\lbbles, ,vhich we have tenned "beading"
direct action is further in4icatedby vascular. (Figs. 16 and 17). In the next stage, the
and "g1omeruTar damage,.,. which we ·have capillary" wall disint~tesand 'the viable
produced in the dog's. kidney by retrograde endothelial ceUs ana intact etythrocytes spill
intravenoasinjectioll in the renal wili, into the tissue spaces at the point of rupture.
which will be reported in a'subsequent Behind the rupture the free ends of the
capillary at times retract into the adjacent
communication.
..
The hypophysectomies were apparently precap~ry artery" fonn a thrombus
adequate since. all of the animals showed encircled by a double row of endothelial
nbsence· of· spennatogenesis and var}'ing cells. In the heart, the liberated endothelial
degrees of testicuJar atrophy. In' these cells from injured capillaries proliferate and
hypophysectomized' animals. painted with migrate toward damaged arterioles and fonn
D'P ,P, regressive changes were found in Aschoff-like cellular aggregates (Fig. 18).
the adrenal medulla. The medullary cells In subsequent stages, there is more wideshowed shrinkage and vaCuolization of their spread damage, which results in fusion of
cytoplasm with persistence of sparse num- etythrocytes, condensation of ground subbers of-J:U'ge eo&Wophilic cells, which re- stance to fonn fibrinoid degeneration and
sembled ganglion cells.
liquefaction of other portions of the matrix,
Ad!.eDnlectomy similar to hypopby- probably aided by plasma leaking from
sectomy abqIishes' moSt of. the. changes ruptured capillaries. This' is followed by
observed- with D'P ,P. The animals do oot Idlreddiog of the collagen -fibers 'Vith subsetolerate the skin applications and die early. quent necrosis
these structures and
The effect. of the. ad~~ectomy and ad- adjacent muscle cells. Fibroblasts are m~
ministration of cortiaoile will be discussedbiliaed as bistiocytes and show frequent
in a 8ubsequent communication.'
mitotic figuretJ. Myocardial cells are liberated
also. Depolymerization and hydrolysis seems
DJ8CUSSIOX
to affect the nonviable cement and ground
The effect 0/ D'P,P on tire cmnent and substances and later the collagen fibers. The
ground aubatancu. Apparently the prilllary Prln:lary effect is mucinolysis that results in
effect ofD'P,P il!J.toproduce hydration of anglolyais and stromatolysis. This deduction,
the mucopolys.tcchande structure. of ba8e- we beUeve, is justified by the corresponding
ment membranesaod ground substance in. changes observed in the- mucous gl&nds and
meseochymal: tissues. The mucin in the "lining celis of the gastrointestinal tracts
glands' of thepit~intestinal tract is also (Figs. 6 and 19). However, the foregoing
affected. Ap~n.tly the most sensitive interpretations will require additional .e.-,;tissue coniPo~t is tile cement substance in perimental verification.
the endothelial wall of capillaries, perhaps
According to the latest chemical studies
because this is the site of the initial con~t of collagen, fil:ftinoid. degeneration does not

....

""1'

:....

:-"':r...

FlO. 16 (upper). Capillary thromboeill and hydropic 'chanp in tbe basement memhl'1lne
or pres:apillary artery In ~ 43"'ear-ol~ patient with rheumatic re.ver, d~i~1 roll.owing !alvu.
lectomr.. Thevl!Sl!Iel was In t.h~ !:'.enlnies. The thrombo!led capillary 18 IDv&lJnated JD the
precapillary artery. Hematoxylin and eoein. X 421).
- '. '.
Fto. 17 (lower). So-called platelet thrombi or the lIma1l y_"~ inlbe perirenal rat or an
8O-Gm. rat bfWIhed "'ith a 2 per cenlllolution oC J)IP. P daily Cor 3 days. Note the douhle endothelial waU iodical.ing invalination in the precapillary artery'. Note the hydropic chanK~ in
the endothelial cytol)Ia.'1m oC the onler wall. Compare with FIgure 16. Hematollylin and eoo<in.
X 323.

69
108

•

OESCHICKTER

initially involve the collagen bundles of
Well-fonned connective tissue fibers. In
order to emphasize the sequence of events,
it is import.D.nt to review the composition of
connective tiSsue. Robb-Smith l has defined
connective tissue as a continuou,s· matrix
varying in consistency from the limpidness of
Wharton's jelly of the umbilical cord to the
bardn"SS of bOne. in which lies an interlacing
fabric of fibers of different lION and which
is·b8thing isolated or closely set cella. This
continUous matrix pervodes the spaces
between the organs and major vessels and
supplies· the capsule,. as well as their supporting stroma, for these major structures.
Within this matrix the fibroblasts show
various stages of development from reticulum cells to adult fibroeytes and also a
parallel line of development (usually under
pathologic conditions) from reticulum cells
to histiocytes (Fig. 20). There is an additional specialized component of connective
tissue. the basement membrane. The matrix
of connective tissue contains a variety of
mucopolysaccharides, such DB hyaluronic
acid and· chondroitin sulfate in combination
with proteins. In this matrix are embedded
fibers of collagen, reticulin and elastica,
which are defined as .precipitated scleroproteins. The· elastica· does not concem us
here, but the retieulin and eolli1gen fibers do.
The collapn fibers are polymerized polypeptides,which are oriented in linear fashion
and eontain a small amount of mueopolysaccharide. The reticulin fibrils are
similar. but their polypeptide linkages are
non-oriented.They may be tenned proeoUa,.en fibrils because of their less
dilferer.tiated structure. Both fibers are
precipitated .or fonned· from the matrix,
influenced by the fibroblast in a manner yet
to be determined. The third noncellular
strueture.the basement membrane, is
formed from retieulin fibers and condensed
matrix, which stains more intensively for
mucopolysaccharides than- the ground substance. This condeDlled matrix at the basement membrane is usually tenned eementin

......]:

Vol. SO

AL.

and also· forms the binding substance
between the endothelial cells in the capillary
wnJl.
.
HiMogeMtli. of the AdoJl
The
damage to the cementin of capillaries is the
earliest demonstrable change in the experimental production ofcollagendiaease deacribed here. Because this is beSt eeen in the
myocardium, the probable histogenesiaof
the Allchoft body can be traced 'from this
initial change. Following the fonnation of
capillary aneurymns, which .is the first
ehange obeerved, there is leakage of pluma
and hydration of the gro~d substance with
subsequent damage to collagen fibrils.
Capillary aneurysms and hydration of the
ground substance are found within 36 to 48
hr. after the initial painting with D'P ,P.
Within 48 to 96 hr., there is dissolution
of capillaries, liberation of the viable endothelial cella aDd proliferation of fibroblasts
in the edematous matrix. Within this period
these mobilized endothelial cells and fibroblasts clump together around damaged
arterioleS to form the earliest eellular
aggregates, which may· be looked- upon as
asceptie granuloDlas formed in part by the
sacrificiaJ dissolution of adjacent eapillaries.
Within 5 to 7 days, the granulomas eontinue
to enlarp and are accompanied by changes
of early dissolution of collagen fibers and
the deposition of fibrinoid material. From 8
days to 2 weeks. there is a proiressive accumulation of Anit8ehkow's cells from the
damaged myocardial fibers and further
fibrinoid degeneration and continued fibrobl8fttic proliferation. Thus, both endothelial
cell proliferation and migrating and proliferating fibroblasts contribute to·. the·
fo~tion of Aseholf-Iike bodies, whichf~nn
after these fixed cells are free from the
capillary cementin and the eonnective tissue
matrix, respectively (Table 2).

bod".

]

'rc

~(..;

CONCLUSIONS

A simple irritant amine. which is a strong
redueing agent and whieh apparently lyses
the matrix of eonnective tissue. is capable of

FlO. 18 (upper). Aachoft·like cellular ~rqatel in proeea of formation in a rat reeeivini 7 brush·
inp or a 2 per cent IOlution. or D'P,P. The animal dietl on the eighth day. The cellular aurqates
.are endothelial eel" milf'atinl from ruptured eapmaries, seen to the left. Hematoxylin and eosin. X 220.
FIG. 19 (lower). Mueinolysis in the mueOU8 Ilands or the larynx manifestinl_ eomplete dissolution
ofaeinar eontent. This is taken from the rat with the peptie ulcer iUu.trated in Filure 6. Hematoxylin
and eosin. X 220.

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110

Vol. 80

G£8CHICKTKR 87" AI..

....~"OOTHIEUUII

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'CAPILLARY

SUISTANCE

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- TABLE 2
EVOLUTION 0 .. EXPK:lJIIBN7AL A8CHO.... BoDlltS IN RATS TaZATBD .-ITH

N ,N'-DlllnH TL-p-PHBNTU:oIKDIAIlI:oIB

Capillariel

'l<

.~I

H)'dration of adjacent ground sumtllnce

2 to of day,

Diuolutioll of ~apillary wall, liberation of
viable endotbelial cell'

Freeinlof fibrobluta in h)-drated mairix,
aeparahon of reticulin and collagen
fibrils; early proliferation of fibrQblasts

& to 7 day,

Mill'lltion of altered capillary endotbelial
cella (endotbe1ioid c:ella) to adjacent
damapd arteriol. to take part. in uc:eptic IJ'&nuloma

Mill'lltion of altered fibrobla.~t' (biltio_cytes) todamapd arterioles to t... ke
part. in ~ptic panuloma

Endotbelioid cella aod'tromal bi'tiocY'ea form Aseholf-Iike
by a1&ered myocyka (Anitechkow', cell.)

8 to 14 day.

•

Softenin, with becinninl mucinoly,ia of
capillary c:elQentin with formation of
_ capillary -ueul')'1lllll

•
",

36 to 48 hr_

Focal disappearance of capillaria

aarept~ a~~mpanied

-, Precipita~ion of matrix .. fibrinoid depneratlon

reproducing the histopathology of all the shipe between the adrenal cortex and the
more common coUagen di8eaaes, u weD as collagen ~diseases. Adrenal corticnJ hyperinducing peptic ween in rata. Ita relation to trophy and atrophy of lymphoid tisroes
naturally occurring IUbetances in the human accompany theae changes. Aschoff-like
disease states is unknown, but it representa a bodies in the myocardium, rheumatoid nodvaluable tool for studying -the histogenesis ules
the joints, and "wire loop" -changes
of the lesions, as well as the interrelatioD- -in renal glomeruli are found:

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MUCINOLY818 IN COLL.\OU DIBEA81:

The oction of this irritant aminP is apparently partially direct and·· partially
indirect. since hypophyaectomy inhibits
many of the chAracteristic lesiona of collagen
diBeMe8 which were foulld in the intact
Imimals.
Cardiac lesions simulating Aachofl' bodies
were not seen conaiRtently exCept in animals
pointed with a 2 per cent eolution of N, N'dimethyl-p-phenylenediamine (DiP,P).
Some of them weiPed 13) Om. and llOIIle 80
Gm.; in other words, theY were only in
Group I 8l'ld Group IV (Table 1)-the high
dosage and the eeute experiments, respectively. Scleroderma-like lesions in the skin
were Been only with high doses or on the very
prolonged trestment (with·2 per cent ·and
0.5 per cent eolutiona)-Groupe I and III.
The adrenal changes were seen in Groupe II
and III only if the animals lived for 5 or
more weeks. The same applies to the marked
changes in the spleen and lymph nodes.
Endothefaal pluging of capillaries in the
lung and peptic ulcers probably occurred
only in animals that aspirated or swallowed
the material by licking their wounds. and
the mucinolyt.ic lesions in themucoua glands
of the larynx were probably dependent upon
the same factor. Renal and cerebral lesions
occurred only in the acute experimenta, in
8O-Gm. rats painted with a· 2 per cent
solut.ion of DiP, P.
8UIIKABIO IN IlIo"T£RLlSOUA

Un simple amina irritante, que es un forte
lIgente reductori e que apparentemente 81feetua Ie lyse del matrice de histo conjunctive, es capece a reproducer Ie histopathologia de orone Ie plus commun· morboe de
collageno e a inducer ulceres peptic in rattos.
Su relation con substantia de occunentia
natural in Btatos pathologic in humanos non
cs COIDoscite. sed ilIo repreeenta un importante adjuta in Ie etudiodel bistogenese
del lesiones e etiam del intenelation del
cortice adrenal con ·Ie morboe de CQllageno.
Hypertrophia odreno-cortical e atrophia de
histos Iymphoide accompania iste· alterationes. Corpores "aschoffoide." nocluloe
rheumatoide. e alterationes a "ansa de filo
metallic" in Ie glomerulOR renal es ineontrate.
II pare que Ie action de me amina irri-

111

t.aDte es in parte directe e in parte indirecte,
proque hypophyeectomia inhlbi· muUes del
characteristic lesiones de morbos de collageno Ie quale.eva incontrate in animales
intacte.
LesiODes cardiac que simula eorpore3 de
Asehoir non esaeva trovate uniformemente.
excepte inanimalespinlite COD un solution
de 2 pro. cento de N. N'-dimethyl-p-pbenylenediamina (DiP .P). Alicunes de illoe pesava 13) Gm. ealicunes 80 Gm. In altere
parolas. iUoe easeva aolmentein Gruppo I e
Gruppo IV (Tabula O. i.e.• Ie gruppos a alte
dosage e a experimentation acute. Lesiones
cutanee nmile a scleroderma eaeva vidite
aolmente post alte doses 0 post un tractamentomulto prolongate (con soluUODe8 a 2
e a 0.5 pro cento). i.e.• in Gruppo Ie Gruppo
III. Le aJterationes adreoal eaevavidite in
Gruppo II e in Gruppo III aolmente si Ie
animales superviveva 5 Ileptimanas 0 plus.
Le mesmo vale pro Ie marcate alterationes
in Ie splen e in Ie nodos lYmphatic. Obstruction endothelial del capillares in Ie pulmones
e ulceres peptic occurreva probabilemente
aolmente iD animates que aspirava 0 ingereva
Ie material per lamber lor vulDens. Le
lesiones mucinolytic in Ie glandulae muC0ge
del laryuge resultava probabilemeDte del
mesme factor. UEODes renal e cerebral
occurreva solmente in Ie ellperimentos acute.
iD rattos de 80 Gm. pingite con un solution
de 2 pro cento de DiP .P.
1.

REFERENCES
AIt&....LDT. 8.: OxidaUoa 01 N.N -diDletbll.po
pbeayl8llediamiae by .rum lrom patlea&.
with meatal dileue.· ScieDce.1JI: 117.1957.
Ku.. r
P.: The concept 01 collapn diee
Am. J. Path., II: ~19, 19l5O.
KLiNOIl, F.: Der "RheumaUlmlll." patbound elqJerimentell.
losiech·anatolDilebe
patbolociecbe Ta~ben·und ihre alll.enuni
lar das InLlicbe RbeulD&problem. Erpbn.
d; alii. Path. u. path. ADat.• IT: 1-351. 1933.
McLuD, J. W., CoATD. J. C.• HA.'-poIJ). F. C.•
Pa...TL,.. D. P. AND WallA""'''. B.: CuttiYation 01 IOnococcIII .. method 01 diacDOIia
of IOnorrhea witb lpecial relerence to olydue
reaction aadto value 01 air reinlorced in ita
carbon dioxide conlen'. J. Pa'b. et Bact••

II: 221-231. IBM.
A. H. T.: The FunctioDinl Silo
ni&cance 01 ConnectiYe Tilsue.· Lecturel ou
the Scientific Buia 01 Medicine. II. Univer.
lity 01 Londou, ]962-1953. The Atbloae
Prell, ISM.

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73
THE USE OF AMINO ACID.ANTAGONISTS
FOR THE INHIBITION OF TUMOR GROWTH

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CHARLES F. GESCHICKTER. M.D.
MURRAY M. COPELAND, M~D.
JEAN SCHpLLER,B.s.

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Reprinted from

THE BULLETIN. 6EOR6ETOWN UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER·
. : .. ~.... !'~I. V. No.2. Augult-Septeinber
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. .Dr. G_CBICXTEIt. I was ,using .aJitir&ncer drugs at Georgetowp,

and we. had publish~ on this in 1951, t!le CIA had come to thiS repriIit
throughotlier means that Ilmow not of. . .
One of the compounds, which is benzoether, WaLS listed in the anti..;.
malaria1:programC\ undertaken during the war. One of these was very
. similar to our product, and in the antimalarial re~rt three volumes.
't~s particular group of compounds.had some, shoUld I say, disturbing
elects ~n the· nervous'system of the patients, that ·was submit·ted to
this antimalariQ! drug under the antimalarial program, and this is
so reported in those three volumes. This is hOllf they came to be interested in this grollp of compounds.
Senator KENNEDY. How many years were you involved with the
CIA?'·
.
Dr. GESCHICXTlCR. They say 13 years. The number of years that
we were giving money to ·otlier universities was about 9 or 10 j 13
years is the major part. It tailed off so that a number of. the years
were added to that subsequent to handling this money that went to
other universities.
Senator KENNEDY. Your personal involvement was over what
period of t i m e ? < - >
. Dr. GESCHICJtTER. It was from late 1953 until 1972.
Senator KENNEDY. And were all the resources that were coming
through your medical foundation at that time for cancer research?
Dr. GESCHICJtTER. No. As I ~f)inted out, the Geschickter Fund is
not for cancer research. The Geschickter Fund reads Geschickter
Fund for Medical Research, and it is, applied to chronic diseases.
Senator KENNEDY. So the fundin2 of some of these programs was
not solely for cancer, is that correct"f
Dr. GESCBICJtTER. Correct.
Senator KENNEDY. Co!11d any of the work tilat you supported,
have been·done by Nm if t~y wanted to?
Dr. GESCBICJtTER. The Nffi has a billion dollar budgetSenator KENNEDY. More than that now.
Dr. GE8CBlCKTEB. And what they do with it is unpredictable.
When y,')u get a grant from there, they want a report within.a, months
before you can get the. next one. So It is not fL feasible way of doing
this sort of research.
Senator KENNEDY. But the point is the research that you were
doing could have been done:.or supported by the National Institutes
of Health, is that.correct? .
.
Dr. GE8cmcKTEB. Certainly they have the facilities and the money
to have "done1t.
.
Senator KENNEDY. So none of the work you were doing or' supportinLon that kind of thi'!g was secret or covert in that sense?
.
llJ'. GESCBICKTER. All has been published.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, if we could get into a specific project, the
MK-ULTRA Subproject 23. . "
As I understand· the p~ose of this project, it was to synthesize
new drogs and modify old ones to determine their effectiveness in
mo(Jjfying behayjQr+a.ild function of the ceJl·tral"nervous .system. This
included:animal ·tests and tests-· on tenninally ill cancer patients.
!nan August 25., 1955, memorandum for the record, an authoriza-"
tionwasgiven for the. contractor, ostensibly you, to pay the hospital
expenses of certain pers~ns s~ering from incurable cancer for the

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privilepofstudyng the effects of these chemicals dur~:ng their
terminal illness.' ' ,
Is that coreet?
'Dr~ GEBCBICltTD. No, sir. Absolutely incorrect.
Senator KENNBDY. Well,are you familiar with this document
[indicatjng]?
' .
Dr. GJ:8CBICltTBB. I, have it in my, hand.
.I want to show you BC)mething peculiar about it if you'willlook at
it. You will see that they pull out 5658.05 out of expenditures that
were made in 1954. That 5658.05 went into the Georgetown Hospital
phU'gla~ for dmgs used ,by my,assistants:n the animal house. ,Now,
watch the peculiarity. They come along on the 25th day of Augtlst
1955, and ISSue a specific C:lirective for 5658.05. Now, we are using
hundreds of thousands of dollars which they imply are going to patient
, research, and the only thing they can come up with is a se~arate and
new voucher for 5658.05 a year later, after the project has been completed and ~d for.
Senator KEN~EDY. Why are they doing this? Are there other
records that are simply mistaken"
Dr. GBBCRICXTEB. Absolutely.
Senator KENNEDY. Tell us a little bit about that.
Dr. GEBCRICXTER. I have a record, which was a very foolish record,
the way th~ put it down.
Senator KENNEDY. Who is they?
Dr. GESCRICXTEB. They?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Dr. OESCRJCXTEB. You are talking about MK-ULTRA project.
I do not know who "they" are.
Senator KENNEDY. All right.
Do you know who thA people are?
Dr. GESCRICKTEB. I dO'not know all of them.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, Mr. Bortner, doy.ou know him?
Dr. GEBCHICKTEB. I knew Mr. Bortner. That was the man I saw
most, frequently. ,
.
,
'. . Senator KENNEDY. As I understand it, he was the one who signed
these 'documents.
Dr. GESCRICKTEB. He ~~d this one.
Senator KENNEDY. Certainly you are familiar with Mr. Bortner
who signed these. Let us go back to the·other question about whether
you have other reoords which are inadequate·as well.
Dr. GEBCHICKTER. I have a record of $1,000 charged to patient
care at G~town under the MK-ULTRA project. This is at the
date of March 1957, there is a copy of a checK on our private funds
for $1,000.
Do yoq have that record there?
Senator KENNE))Y. Yes.
:
Dr. GEscmcKTEB. In September there is $250 charged to surgeon's
fee.
Senator KENNEDY. I believe we have those records here. We have
all the records because the ·staff went over those with you
'tI(

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I think: we want to make a particular comment on that. 1 think
we have that one and we also have mother one dated OC~~)ber 8,
19M that said:
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Due to a considerable increaae, in the ICOpe of the work under Dr. Gcschickter
at the direction of the SSCD, which is CIA, under Subproject 23, Project MKULTRA, the $42,700 lum originally oblipted for this worJt is iuu8lcient. It is
therefore,propoeecl $15,000 to that already obUpted. under this Illbproject.

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You are famjljar with that?
Dr. GEScmCltTBB. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Is that accurate?
Dr. OZSCmCltTBB. That is accurate. We do not account ,for that
'11,250 on that.
"
Senator KENNEDY. Did you do the work?
Did you do that work described iii that project. '
Dr. ,GI:8CmCKTER. Yes. But, Senator, we were talking about
patients in the hospital. I want to make that clear. Now, we are
Jumping to this generallaboratory work on animals.
",
senator KENNBDY. I think the point that we are interested in, or
at least one of the point..~ we are interested in is not sO much the bookkeeping aspects, although we do want to examine those to the extent
that tliey are important, but the
. "
Dr. GZSCBICltTEB. They are crucial, Senator:
Senator KENNEDY. OK.
But, as I understand, they are inaccurate.
Dr. GZSCBICJITBB. Not accurate, sir.
Senator KJ:NNBDY. You tel. us about it.
Dr. GEScmCKTJ:B. The inaccuracy applies to' patients.
Senator KJ:NNEDY. Tell us about it.
Dr GZSCBICKTBB. Well; I will. We'are concerned here with laboratory studies done exclusively on animals. We are then goin~over to
11,250 ascribed to hospitaliz8.tion, of an advanced cancerpattent, and
so icited in your report, and this patient that wecontributedSl,OO()well, it was a case or abdominal aneurysm, he.was not seen by me as a
pat ent, I referred him to' the surgeon-I never administered to
him-he -was operated on, and if they want to sneak that patient in
as advanced cancer ~, they should never pu~ the .1259 ,on top 'of it
because I couJdrecogmze the surgeon from it. HIS low fee was a
courtesy to me.
.
Senator KBNNEDY. It is basically inaccurate? Is it inaccurate or
accurate?
Dr. GJ:8CmcJtTEB. It is inaccurate.
Senator KBNNEDY.Now,do you have any ideawhvthey did that?
Dr. GJ:8CIUCJtTEB. I do not know what they weretbinking of.
Senator KENNEDY. Why lVlJuld they put that kind of information
fu?
. '
Dr. OBSCBICJtTEB. They .were trying to make sure fu their own
records that they had some breakthrough on clinical grounds so they
put in anything clinical they could lay their hands on. They put the
money on the wrong patient that time.
Senator KENNEDY. Even with rega.l'cl" to the particular case you
have described, it is not accurate?

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Dr~ O.CBlCKDL It is not &eCurate at aU.
Senator KuNm;)Y. Now,. turn to subproject 36. This involves the
intention of the Apncy:.to construct a new research wing at the
GeolptoWIl University Hospital using. the Geschickter Foundation
as a cutout lor ch~e~g CIA money for. t~e project..
.
Georgetown Umvemty was to be unWlttmg 01 CIA mterest, and
CIA's intel'e$t was to provide the ~cy with the equivalent of a
hospitalufehouse for doing resea.reh. The plans for thiS project were
approved by the Director ofthe CentralIDteIligence AJtency.
In this approval document of November 16, 19M, tlie memo says
that ~cy~~red research projects in sensitive fields would be
canied outr---Isu~poseitis imP'!rtantto note that it says "would be
carried.out"-in·· tJie.~ew!Jingofthe hospital.
..
The Agency's eontnbution to the hospital would be a nonrecurnng
grant of 1126,000•.And the Agenc;y was to encourage the Atomic
Energy Commission to make a similar contribution.
The document describes the background of the relationship of the
" Geschickter Fund for medical research and the CIA, and it describes
the back2round of Dr. Geschickter and the contributions to be made
by the Cll and by the Geschiekter Fund.
Their plans included integrating at least three Chemical Division
employees into the n~w hospital wing to work on the Agency's research projects. It talks abOut three Chemical Division employees
and how they are going to put those employees into the new wing
of the hospital. It was anticipated that one-sixth of the total space in
the new research wing would be available to Dr. Geschickter and, in
turn, would be available to the CL\. Indeed, the CIA referred to this
as the equivalent of a hospital safehouse.
"
Then, on April 6, 1950, it became clear that the Atomic Energy
Commission would not p~cipate".in Jivin~ money, and so the
Agency proposed to double Its contnbutlon. In the latter document
of April 6, 1955, the CIA states that they<will no longer have to wait
until the new wing is built in order to take advantage of the research
facility. This was because you, Dr. Geschickter, were to be allowed to
use exist~ space in the present hospital in order to build up an
o~ation that would. later"" occupy the new wing, and tne CIA
claims. and I quote, "This. means< that we wiIlbe able to begin to
take advantage of thiS cover sitqation within a matter of months
instead of waiting for a year and" a half." "
So, did you give CIA money to Georgetown University Hospital
"
for construction of a new research wing?"
Dr. GZSCBICKTBB. In 1957, I Itave some money to the building
fund of Georgetown Universit)r Medical Center. I never kave them
".
a ~nny for any particular building.
Senator KENNEDY. So you did not have the money for that?
Dr. GB8CBICJtTllIL No, sir, I did not.
The Geschickter Fund was ~ving it anyhow. I never had the money.
Senator KENNEDT.Well, IOU have tills document in frontaf you
about the memorandum of January 10, 1956, that talks about Subproiect 35 W$S finally completed on December 9. 1957. Total funds
made available '515,000. SO they spent a half a million dollars they
to build the wing.
said they would
Now, did the
'ckter Fund pass the money?

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Dr.OIl8CBICJtTD.. No; we nevel' passed that sum of money,
Senator.
'.
, Senator KIlNNIlDT. Well,did you pass any money?
Dr. GIlSCBlCETJ:B. $375~OOO,not 1515,000.
.
SenatorJUNNDY. So what was the >Agency's contribution? ' "
Dr. OJrBCBICETU. It couldbeanythiDg bec&useI do not know what
their ~rds showed.
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, Senator KPNBDY. But through the Gesehickter Fund, was it the
1375,000-- " ' .
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Dr. OUCBlCJtTBL1375,OOOgivenin 1957.'
,'"
Senator KIlIiN_DY. And can you tell us whether that.as the CIA,
funds or how much of that was CIA. fundS? "
"'
Dr. OJ:SCBICJtTI:B..Tha;twaS CIA money, as it turned out later~
At the time in 1965 we did notlmowwhetJier the AECwas involved'
or not, or whether some other foundatioDwas there.
'
. Senator!U:NNDT. But that was CIA money?
Dr. GBSCBICJtTllB. It turned out to be 1375,000 CIA money.
Senator IU:NNJ:DT. Why would" they invest this mODey? Do 'you
have ~y idea why they wanted to invest it?
'
Dr. GIlSCBICJtTD. I have not the sli2h~t idea J>«:cau~ I never
saw any of that memo or that so-called Project 35 tintil about Saturday. It was the first time I had ever laid eves on it. That is about 80
hours,ago..
Senator KJ:NNZDT. Did you .ever get in return onHdxth of the
h~ita1 wing?
.
Dr. GI'.8CBICJtTD. Not at all.
SedatorKENNEDT. Did you conduct researchDr. OBBcmcrrU. Not a bit in this building. I was still in.· the
anilnal house in the Department of Pathology where I had been
since 1946.
SenatoJtJKBNNBDT. So you never got any-at least. you- never di~
any research, and none of the research that was done under your
gui~, .and you have no idea as to what the followup was?
'. Dr. GJ:8CmcJtTZB. I have no idea what their plan was fot giving
the m o n e y . .
..
,
Senator KZNNBDT..And even though the documents all relate. to
. you. and indieate.what yo~ are~oing_to do in terms of the researchDr. GmsCBlCJtTD.As In "The Man From La Mancha," as far as.
:r am concerned, I know not of what they were thinking.
.' .
Senator KJ:NNJ:DT. They are not accurate then either in their portrayalof whtt·-they said you were going to do?
Dr. OBSCBICltTBB. Senator, if y!»u go to that buildin~, the ~P floor
that they say they would occupy 19 50 percent mechanical eqUIpment
for air~ODditioners.
Senator KENNJIlDT. You did not know what the agency got out from
.
all that money that they put in? You have no idea?
Dr. GBSCBICKTZB. No Idea.
. .
Senator·KENNKDT. Did you perform any otherreseareh for testing
drugs, gadgets, or any research at all on human subjects? ' .
..
Dr. GESCBlCltTU. .Are you referring to research m that particular .
building?
Senator KBNNBDT. No. Any other.

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Dr. OBSCBICKTBB. I did my usual research every year,diseoveriq
the cause of cancer, a new treatment for cancer, a new treatm~nt for
asthma, ·a new ·treatment .for hypertension, and new insights into
arthritis.
. .
'.
.
Senator KZNNZDy.Did the CIA s~nsor that research?
Dr. OBsCBICKTb. They sponsored it along with the other contributors. ....,
.
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.
Senator KZNNZDY. Why were they interested in all of these?
Dr. OBBC!ilCltTBB.They had money but they did not have ideas.
Senator KzNNJ:DY. What did they speak to
about in terms of
cancer? What were the other diseases, 8.rtbritis
.'
Dr. OBBCBlCItTD.,High blood pressure, arthritis, asthma,and
cancer.
Senator KZNNEDY. Could you see any connection between that and
the' national security-eovert mtelligence?
Dr. OB8CBICKTZK. All I can say is any understanding of, the way
the'body works and how chemicals work or pharmaceuticals or drugs
work is impo~t for aD{ age~cy in the Govt!rDment to know.
I have a repnnt here t at will be made available.
.
.
.
Senator KZNNBDT. What do you have?
Dr. OB8CBICKTZB. I have a reprint here on the hypersensitivity
~henomenon lroduced by stress by Charles Geschickter and Edward
'Malley,ltu lished and submitted for publication in 1959.
Senator ZNNEDY. Is this Subproject 46? '.
. .
Dr. OBSCBICltTJ:B. This is 45.
Senator KZNNZDY. If I could make a brief comment about that:
Accord~ to the CIA; d~ the period of 1955 to 1963, you were
~ to i entUy and evaluate subStances which might have a~cations in the field of the. psychochemical and knockout
's
was also supposed to involve, first, the testing of drugs on vanced
cancer. J?atients,and then on ap~rosriate patients.
This IS the project that invo ve into a stud~ of stress. The CIA
was supposed to have contributed approximate y $600,000 over that
period of time in support of this project. Apparently, in order to
cover the CIA's purpose of being involved in tliiS project, on January
30 1956, a CIA memo says.
Dr. OJ:8CBlCKTZB. The project of stress that· they referred to was
done entirell on rats a.nd so re~orted.
Senator ENNBDY. Now, in the memo it says:

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In order to continue th" established cover activities in the Fund and to make
available a f.'OC)l of subjects for testing purposes, the cardiovascular and anticarcinosemc effects of compounds resulting from the above program ·will be
evaluated.

Now, it would seem to me in the health area that what you are
basically talking about in this situation is where you are completely
mixing what would be legitimate kinds of research-that is, testing
cardiovascular and anticarcinogenic effecis oC compounds-in' order
to cover the real purposes.
.
..
Dr. GEaCBICltTZB. I waa.not.covering anyt~•.
Senator KENNEDY. No, no. This ·is what I' am quoting in the
memorandum-.I am nots$ying that you were. I am quoting the
CIA memo that indicates that that .is what their· understandiDg of
.
.
the nature was.
What do you say about that? Is that an accurate description?

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GESCBICKTJ:R. No. They were look:ing on' any~s work in
my '!Lbo.ntol'Y or any oth~r of 86 UDiversitiesfor anytlring.they c.ould
fuidm that field. But I did not know what they wel'atlooking for.
Senator KBNNEDY. What field is this now?
In what '.eld is·this?You aretalkiDg. aabobout'stressDOW?
Dr. GESCBICKTU. Stress. We aretalJdngabout stress.
Senator KIlNNBDY. That is subproject 45, is that correct?
Dr. GESCBICKTBR. Y e s . ·
.
Senator KENNBDY. There were a series of annual·renewals . of this
p~ect?
.
Dr. GESCBfCIt1'BR. Correct.
.
Senator KIINNBDY. In each one of them there were summaries of
what was accomplished and what was ho~ to be accomplished.
On the Janu!uy 17, 1957, draft, they talk about s~tlies~ and
the clinical evaluation of compounds mown to have application mthe
psychochemical and K-fields. In addition, natural toxic psY.:choses
were to be studied. These included compounds lowering blooo glucose.
'.
compounds to be admin.istered by all routes.
Do ,"OU remember this research? .
'.
.
Dr. GIlSCBlCltTIlB. I have a list of the com~undsandthat research
applies to thiogycolic acid submitted to the NCI, and I will give you
. their number for it. I remember the research very well, Senator.
Cancer code number is 59-2-79, it is an anticancer compound and not
a psychotic knockout drug.
Senator KBNNEDY. Now, in January 1959, in the next renewal of
this project, the following goals are enumerated by the CIA. And it
talkS about development of materials and techniques for the production
of maximum levels of physical and emotional stress in human beings.
And then it continues, development of material and techniques which
produce a maximum attenuation of stress inhuman beings once. it
has been produced. It continues along. It indica_ you are going to
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Dr. GESCBICItTBR. This refers to continuation of rat studies of
~tress and these other chemica.I.s that produce· stress and phenomena
JJl rats, and they have been published..
.' .
Senator KIlNNBDY. Were any of these tests done on human subjectSl.. "
Dr. GBBCBlcKTBR. N 0, sir.
Senator KENNmDY. Well, it indicates that that is what they made
the grant in order-.
_
Dr. GIlSCBICItTIlR. Can I correct you on that, Senator?
The cancer compounds were glvento patients under that NCI
number, and they liave~en reported to the Tumor Board at Georgetown. They are looking for its e1fects on blood sugar and on stress,
but the compounds that we used were modified to cure cancer, and
they were so modified that they would show up as anticancer drug at
the NCI, and thatis what theyaid.
But we were not gi~ our patieBts stress drugs.
SenatOr KENNEDY. All right.
Now; in the continuation of this project, the funding· for this particular project, on' the 29th of December,. 1959, .the memo will obviously be J)art of the record, but let me read you the relevant J)art:
liAs in indicated in the attached proposal, wmch is the propos8J. for
the next year, work of the past year haS progressed to the point where
more definitive expe~e~ts on stress reaction can:: be carried out.

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Primarily this is brought about by the characterization of several
new materials ~~chproducereac:tions ~hum~ and:thea,Pplication
of some new cliDica1 methods of measnPlno the extent of 'disturbance
produced"...
. '...
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Now, as I understand, this is theintemal document that would
justify the expenditures for the next year. But you say that that is not
accurate, that that as~ct is not accurate?
...
Dr. GIl8CBICKTBJL Those materials, Senatort have tQ bec:ortisone
and adrenaliD, and we bad. disco:ver8d that . they work uniquely in
combination. Now, those materials, Senator, are standUd-cortisone
is standard treatment for l--rmphoeareoma and for Hodgkin's disease,
and our studies in that field would define the side eftects in cancer
patients ,who were getting cortisone as approved treatment, and
&drenalin at times. .
. .'
.
Sell&tor, KENnDY. Well, that is not terribly dramatic then, is it?
.It is im~rtaDtbut not dramatic.
..
.'.
Why do you think the . .ney is ..ttemp~ to -dramatize this?
Dr... GBBCaICKT.B. I .coul<l not answer that, excej)t they.were
, trem.'endousl-y doJt2ed in maintaining connections with Georgetown
and, remember, alf through this ~Od we were distributing, hund~
of thousands of dollars to other universities, and they did not want to
lose that either.
Senator KBNNBPT. Why is this all sort of kept in the black box, so
to 8~ak7 If this is legitimate, valuable, useful, and worthwhile, why
is it all couched i n Dr. GBBCBICKTIlB. Senators, the amazing tmn.t to me is what is in
tha.t blwbox. Some of what was in that black 60x was available on
o~ market, and they were ~ tosYDthesize it secretly.
Senator KBNNBDY. They.paid $600,000 for this type of research.
Why, if it is available in tile open market-why are they channeling it
thrOugh the agency?
Dr. GBBCBICKTBB. I have not the slightest idea. I can just quote
you a $32,000 ~t to another institution to synthesize a drug that
was in French.pbarmaeoPea, and I bought it for $220 a pound. '
Senator KsNNBDY. How much went to the Gescbickter Fund over
' ,
these yearstotaIlj, ap~ximately?
'Dr. 'G:r.sCHtCKTBB.
ject 4~I can tell you exactly, $535,000.
Senator KBNNBDY. ' For all projects?
. ','
.'
Dr. GEScBICnBB. For all projects that went to us· for research,
the expense, the total amount ,!8S $655.500. Total building program
8XpeDSe was 1375,000, and· that IS total amount.
.
Senator KBNNBDY. For the 13 years, what would be the total of it
approximately?
.
Dt.GESCBICITBB. That is approximately the total for those years.
Senator KBNNEDY. All the years, all projects.
Dr. GESCBICKTZB. .All projects?
Senator KBNNEDY. If you totaled all the projects that were funded
through the Gescbickter Foundation for the universities in those 13
years, what is the total?
.
Dr. GESCBICKTEB. This figure iii the 51 _million thllt went. to
Georgetown. a little over· that.
Senator KUNDY., Total amount. & little over $1 million is all?
Dr;:·OEcBICITBB. Yes. 11,030,000--- ':Senator KENNBDY. Is that. not just Georgetown?

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Dr.. GESCBICltTER. Th,at was spent at~rgetown... '.
. . . , .'
Senator KENNBDY. I 'wafit the total amount for the 13 years, all
CIA money for any p~that went through the foundation.
.'
.Dr. GEBCBICltTBR. That went through the fOlmdation?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes, approximately.
Dr. GESCBICltTER. I will give it to you eXaCtly.
Senator KENNEDY. Give it to us exactly. ,
Dr. GEBCBICKTER. '$2,088,600~ 'to other'institutions.
Senator SCBWE1JtIl~ Does that figure represent operating orcapit~l
or construction funds?
. ".
. '.
. Dr. GIlBCBICltTER. These are all operational funds distributed to
the universities and all other projects 1 have listed bY' the Geschickter
Fund inde~ndently of the Georgetown University :MedicalCe.nter.
Senator KENNEDY. What would you say they gotf:9mthat? .
Dr. GESCBICICTER~ What did they get from it?" .
. Senator KENNEDY~ Yes.
Dr. GEBCBICKTER. I would like to read you what they got fro'mit.
I would like to cle~ this up." .
.
'
In the first place, they did soil ~arch,' and they spent $300,000
for soil research at three universities~ That soil research has been used
and is still being tried out to convert shale to oil by bacterial action.
They found 57 substances would increase the growth of thosebacterias
to attack shale. Tha.t is one thing that might.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Does it seem peculiar to you that the Central
Intelligence Agency is funding that kind' of researc~ .whether these'
things are valuable or useful or not~
.
Dr. GE8CBICKTER. Senator, this is what came out of the black box.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, just in a general kind of comment, would
you say that there may have been some useful and important research?
Dr. GE8CHICKTER. More good then evil.
Senator KENNEDY. As I understand it, there, was nothing or at
least from what you indicated here, there waS nothing that was done
or chNllleled through your foundation that could. not have been supported by other instruments of government, am I correct? . .
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Money wherever you put it, and that, is what
they were doing, spen~ their money, is well spent on research.
Senator SCHWEIKER. We struck oil in the black box, is that what you
are ~ to teU us?
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Dr GESCHICKTER. We struck oil. That is one thing that came out

Senator KENNEDY. Yet, even in the explanations, and eveninth~
intemal docume:l;lts that describe the work, in some instances, as it
related to yersonal recol'ds, those were inaccurate, ~ I correct in
that?
.
Dr. GE8CHICKTER. They were inaccurate.
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any understanding of why they
would be so inaccurate?
' .
Dr. GESCHICKTER. No, except that I know the amounts were
inaccurate.
~
.
Senator KENNi:DY. Did it occur to you they might be using funds
that ha.d been described in those expenditures for perhaps other
purposes?
'.
Dr. GEScmcKTER. I do not know.

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Senator KENNEDY. You do not know.
Second, in terms of the characterization of the· work, you are
aware of really the dramatization of a number of the research projects that you. were involved in. You have no insight or understandmg of why they might have been either over-dram atized or overstated?
. Dr. GESCBICKTER. Ido not know why they were overdramatized.
Mr. CACBERI8. I will speak for the record.
.Dr. Geschlckter first . learned of these documents throu~h the
courtesy of your staff Friday afternoon and Saturdaymornmg. It
was .the first time he. had seen them, the characterizations of them.
Senator KENNEDY. He has been 'Very cooperative. All of you have
in helping the committee. It is not easy to follow all the lines, .where
th~y have been leading. But you have been very helpful to us.
. Now, the records of MK-ACTION indicate that although the use
of the Geschickte~ Foundation fo~ Medical Research wo~d no longer
be used as condwt, you were still to be used as condUlt to handle
grants to other- researchers through separate commercial· accounts.
It also says that in the past you have been used as a grantee for specific
research activity and as a channel for funding other medical researchers, and as the provider of cover for one staff member of t.he
CIA.
Is all of that accurate?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. That is accurate.
Senator KENNEDY. Who was the staff member? You do not have
to pve us the name, but where did he work? Can you tell us?
, Dr. GEscmcKTER. I do not know where. these people work at the
present time. This was long ago. Where they worked then?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Dr. GESCBlCKTER. I would like to hear the question. I do not
knowwhat-.J?eople you are referrtz!g_to.
aenator KENNEDY. waS the NIH involved in any of the research
p~ec~?
.
Dr. GEScmcKTER.There was NllI involvement.
Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us the nature of that involvement?
.
.Dr. GESCBlCJtTER. I can tell you the nature of it accura!tly.One
wason studies on concussion m which they rocked the lieads of
aniinals back and forth to try to cause them amnesia by concussion
of the brain. And that was for $110,000.
. "The other, which waf funded through this later business was the
use of radar to put monkeys to sleep, to see if they could be, should
I say, instead of Mickey Finn, they could put them under with radar
directed toward the· monkey brain.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Could they?
Dr. GESCBlCJtTER. Did they go ~ sleep?
Senator.ScUWEIJtER. Yes.
Dr. GESCBlCJtTER. Yes, sir. But, Senator, it showed if you got into
too deep a. sleep, you injured the heat center of the brain the-way you
cook meat, and there was a borderline there that made it dangerous.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, "there isa discussion also in the memoranda
as to how to hide contributions so that no additional taxes would be
paid by you. There is no indication of any wrongdoing obviously on
your part. I think all of us understand that in terms of the p!Otection

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91
of !arious kinds .of agents that then: may have to be some procedures
whIch are established to protect thell' cover.
"
, But, in this memorandum, it mentioned examinations of Dr.
Geschickter's-saying if this were the case, the nature of this' transaction would arouse suspicion under cursory IRS examination. Then
it continues" talking about the Foundation:

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Such an investigation could undoubtedly be handled by intercession with the
IRS. The need for such intercession should, however, be avoided.

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It would' certainly indicate that it appears that the ability to intercede with regard to the IRS was certainly a working, tool of the
. agency itself. , '
,Cali ~outell ,us about what MK.,...ACTION, whatwasMKACTION?
,
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Dr. GESCHICKTER. I first heard about it on Saturday. But the
. answer is they were looking for a new way to hide things" and that
is all I can tell you about it.
'
Senator KENNEDY. Were you involved in any research under that
pr~ect?,
'
Dr. GEScmcKTER. I was involved in 'research, no matter how it
came, it went to the Geschickter Fund and to the same laboratories.
Senator KENNEDY. Was that research covert?
Dr. GEScHlCKTmR. No, sir, it might be, it might not. It depends
on how you look at it.
At the same time, it was covert.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, do you want to, just briefly, tell us about
that?
"
Dr. GESC·BICKTER.Among other things I tested all the rocket fuels
, that were in use" for toxicity, and tbey were all of a certain type of
halo~en derivatives r~lated to chlorine we drink in water and the
fJuondes that we use m toothpaste to strengthen teeth. I found out
that these fluorides and these chlorines and these rocket fuels were
all excreted through the lurigsand were damaging to the lungs, so it
is possible' that one of the agents of. cancer of the lung is not just
t06acco, it may be the chlprination ,of our water.
.
senator SCHWEIKER. Does that come from the formation of chloroform after chlorine is put into the water and ingested?
Dr.GESCHIcKTER. It is metabolized and all of the,5e halogens &J'e
excreted through the .lungs, this is what I proved, whether, .Senator ScHWEIKER. Are you sa;ying :rou do no~ agree with EPA's'
finding that the amounts of chlorine in water today are safe? You are
sa)jng they are ~ot safe?
'
Dr. GESCHICKTE,R. We do not know over a lo~ p~riod of time.
This is a terrible thing about cancer, Sena,tor. It 18 like a national
p,oIicy. You think it is good toda,x. and, 20 years later, you might be
wrong. ,
.'
.•
Senator KENNEDY. Just finally, the Agency funneled money to
many universities through the Geschickter Fund, did it not?
Dr. GESCBICKTER. Yes', sir.
,
Senator KENNEDY. Do you have the list of all of those universities?
'
Dr. GESCHICKTER. All of them.
Senator KENNEDY. In general, did the universities know that the
money was coming from the CIA?
'

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Dr. GESCHlCKTER. Some of them had previously gotten CIA .
money, and they just switched this method of giving it to them. In
. general, they did not know.
Senator KENNEDY. Did or did not know?
Dr. GESCHICXTER. In gen.cral, did not know. Some of the universities undoubtedly knew it, in my opinion.
Senator KENNEDY~ As· a researcher, what is your own reaction to
the covert funding of university research in term.q of the universities?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I do not believe in it.
Senator KENNEDY. Pardon?
Dr.. GESCHICKTER. 1 do not believe in covert. funding. I think that
the country has got enough brains and money to use it inteHigently,
I hope when they give it to research..But it has been a ragged record.
Senator, I had a comment. Hpubhc use of money for research was
so wonderful in their administration,. the Geschickter Fund would
not be in existence today.
Senator KENNEDY. But the point about it is that while there is,
obviously, a lot of research that is being done, and obviously it is a
very important part of our whole health effort, we already have a way
and means of trying to do that,· which is the National Institutes of
Health for the most part, as well as private groups.
What we have seen here, just in your own example, is that for about
20 years.the CIA channeled more than $2 million through the·Foundation on work which, by your own admission, could have been done
through open research. We found that within that kind of context,
there are records which are inaccurate, which misrepresent the situation, which distort the situation. We have all of that particular package
laid out before us.
Within that you have the cOQ1promising of the universities. We
have failure for the protection of individuals who are being tested'
and we have failure of So follow-up in terms of adequate kinds of health
protections for those people who have been subject to a good deal
of the testing,. You have as well the perversion of many of the diiferent
agencies of Government and in a very tlliD.ecessary way. You can
say there may have heen some benefits which spin off from all of~at
money that has been channeled ot funneled through, b~t we certainly
have no evidence of any of that in terms of the Agency. Maybe it
has been written about by you or by others, but we certainly do not
have accountability.
I think this is part of the troublesome aspects of this.
Dick, do you have anything? . .
Senator SCBWEIXER. Dr. Geschickter, you have described projects
suoch ~ the oil shale and bacte:ia proj~ct, the use of ~adar waves
on ammals, .md the study of ammal bramsand concUSSlons. Is that
all or are there some other projects, too, that you are familiar with?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I am going to give you a very important one
that I would like to publish, and I could not at the time. We had
trouble with the Vietnamese switching from our side to the other
side at night, and the Army had to have a way of labeling switchcoats .or turncoats, so we helped them to develop a. suspension C!f
matena:l related to pheno-rhthalms, when we would gIve them theU"
health shots or anticholera vaccine, they could inject this fluorescent
ma.terial. It is invisible except under ultraviolet light. I have it in

•

my arm. Some males of his ,staff have it in their' arms, my nurse
and others.
,'"
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Now, this materiai stays visible year after year. ,
,
Now, here is the important spinoff of that. We have a lot of patients
with bad hearts, and we do not know whether to operate on them or
not. H it is a degenerative thing, they will not stand the operation,
which is a long 4-hour operation. But if it is congenital heart valve---a
murmur has been picked up in childhood-,we can operate. H they
have on their back carried their own ,recording or computerized
symbol of what their congenital deformities were, then the doctor'
can puta light on the patient's back and get the history of all important
thin~ just by reading a few tatooed marks. That is what I want to
publish..
,
Senator KENN~DY. You have been describing good projects.
What about some of the bad projects?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I can give you one that I cannot understand.
I think it will amuse everybody.
,"'
They spent $247,000 on mushrooms. Twenty thousand went to an
ao-ent whose-well, I had to, deciphar this, going back and forth to
Philadelphia, and I picked up the l.'hiladelphia ticket stamps-well,
it was not punched out on hiS train record, and he had Atlantic City
on the other side of one of them, and they were spending $107,667
buYing mushrooms from Africa. And these -things were then shipped
down-Senator SCHWEfKER. We grow, mushrooms in Pennsylvania. Why
did we have to bring them in from Africa?
Dr. GESCBICKTER. These are poison mushrooms. Let me tell you
something about it.
The name is in the report but, by God, it is not in any dictionary.
It is an African nanie of an African mushroom.
Now, they also spent $120,000 analyzing these mushrooms at a
university laboratory, reputable State university, so here they are
smuggling in mushrooms back and forth. I have a thousand pages of
memos, mostly bu~tickets, purchasing orders for natural drugs, but
they all turned out to be mushrooms, and the total of that, Senator, is
$247,000, so you will not eat a poison mushroom.
,
,Senator SCHWEIKER.What dId they do with the poison mushrooms
once they had them?
'
Dr. GESCHICKTER. They sent down to-I will not name the university-to analyze them for toxic substances, but they apparently
would poison somebody. I do not know what they did with them. I
have not gotten the followup on tha~ one. ,
Senator SCHWEIKER. Any others lik~ that?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. And the other ones, I told you about, they were
very interested in hashish cannabionol, and that original synthesis
by the way was done by Roger Adams at the University of Illinois in
1932. I worked with him. SO they went back to Illinois to do a lot of
this work. They spent some money at another university, $36,500, to
purify the allergens in ragweed that make you sneeze or give you hay
fever.
Well, this may be very important, because with that as a test, they
discovered a new 9,ntibody in the body called Gamma E, that is on
surface cells only. It does not circulate in the blood as a rule. This led

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to discovery that the mast cell liberates the chemicals that give you
the hay fever and asthma. That was not a complete waste.
.
I mentioned the bacterial work, the concusSion experiments for
amnesia, and they did $177,000 worth of work,trying to cure chronic
alcoholism with various additives. I do not know how successful that
is.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I was going to say I hope yOl,l are going to.
publish a paper on that.
.
Is thera something you C8ilil tell us about a cure for chronic alco..;.
holism?
.
Dr.GEScBICKTER. I will let you know.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Dr. Geschickter, m. subproject 35, one-sixth
of the space of the university hospital wing which the CIA contributed to, supposedly through your fund, was going to b~ available for
the agency's research.·
.
Wlio occupied that. space?
Dr. GESCBICKTER. All of the space that is referred to in that particular memo, which I just saw last Saturday, was used by ordinary
hospital laboratories and outpatient clinic for dentistry, outpatient
clinic for ordinary hospital psychiatry, and they used it for a ba.by
clinic on the first floor.
On the top floor is the only place I was interested in. They had
$375,000 worth of isotope labs, and radio isotopic equipment, while
now that type of equipment that is there amounts to over $2 million.
I bought the first equipment myself for $7,500. This is why AEC was
interested. That is why I started this money-raising effort through
Admiral Strauss, a friend of mine.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. According to the CIA. documents, part of this
agreement says there will be available the equivalent of hospital
safehouse.
.
Dr. GESCBICKTER. Senator, I do not need to tell you if you go to
0. marriage cer~mony, there has·to be at least two parties at the altar.
Here there is only one party behind closed doors making the agreement. I knew nothing of this. Neither did Georgetown.
. Sena.t.or SCHWEIKER. Are you saying that no agreement existed or
that you were not aware of any?
.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. There was no ~'Teement that I know of and
none that you can make with only one Pl1.rty, keeping it in a black box.
Senator SCBWEIKER. There WB~ no saIehouse, or you did not know
.of any safehouse?
.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. We have neycr found it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I.t refers u; here to a written memorandum.
Let me get my notes on it.
.
Were you aware of, or did you sign, a memorandum with anyone
who represented or who might have been from the 'CIA, a memorandum of understanding which might have specified the reasons for
the CIA's donation and what the Agency hoped to get in return for
its money?
.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Never signed anything. I never heard of this
until Saturday. I hM'"e heard of comments in the press. but what has
gone on in that memorandum would scare anybody.
Senator SCHWEIKER. ""Vere there any hospital staff assistants or
people in this bu Iding who were doing work that might have been
construed to be connected with the CIA?

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Dr. GESCHlCKTER. None.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And you, hav e Dr. GESCHICKTER. Not, t.hat I knowot It turned out there was
none at that time.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The building we are talking about insub-\
project 35 was to have sheltered Rome pretty gruesome experimen~s
that the CIA was interested in. They were worried' abollt responsIbility for. this work. In a CIA document describing subproject 35 p
it says:

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The proposed facility offers a unique opportunity for the secure hllndlin~ of
Ruch clinical testing in addition to the many advantages outlined in the proJect
proposal. The security problems mentioned above are eliminated by the fact ~hat
responsibility for testing will rest co~pletely upon the physician and the hospltal.

•

What are they talking about there?
,', '
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I do not know because you cannot do that in s.
university h03pital.
Senator SCH1YEIKER. You signed no memorandum of agreement on
this project?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Absolutely not, or I would not be here today. I
would be running out of the count.ry.
Senator ScmVEIKER. Do you know of anybody on your staff who
did sign such a memorandum?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. No, no one would have the authority to.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I am a little bit confused, Dr. Geschickter,
about what the Government got out of this. In other words, for all
this investment, and in light of all the cover and facilities for all the
sensitive experiments that they expected to gain and refelTed to' here
in these documents, it does not seem like the CIA got its money's
worth.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I do not know what they had in mind.
Senator SCHWEIKER. '\Vell, they certainly would rely upon you.
I have to believe that you were one of the people they relIed uI>0n.
To work through you as the conduit for this much money, t.hey
certainly must have relied on you in some way to produce
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Senator, I was over 55 when most of this was
dreamed up, and it takes 4 or 5 years to build a building, and I could
drop dead ill the meantime. I do not see how you can make a promise
on one side and expect me to live forever.
Senator ScmvEIKER. How was the building financed again? Where
did the $3 million total come from?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. All of that is inaccurate, because what actually
happened is different. Georgetown built three things at once. They built
the Kober-Kobian building, they built a nurses school, and they
built the Gorman building, no one of which comes up to anything
like the mentioned a m o u n t . '
.
Senator SCHWEIKl::R. How was the Gorman building financed? Just
give a brief breakdown.
'
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I have not the slightest idea on that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'That was the Geschickter Fund role in that
building then?
'
,
Dr. GESCHICKTER. None. I was not given a square inch.
Senator SCHWEIKER. '\That was your relationship \"ith the building
for the hospital?

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Dr. GESCH.ICKTER. My relationship was to help with the building
fund., It specified no building whatsoever. I gave them money with no
strings attached. .
.' .
.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. How much was that again?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. $375,000.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Where did the $500,000 come from?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I h~ve not the slightest idea.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you combine the $375,000 with somebody else's money to equal $.500,OOO? '
Dr.GEscHICKTER. Never. I do not know where those figures came
from.
.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And how much did the Gorman Building
cost?
Dr. GESCHICKTER.· I' have not the slightest idea. It depends on
.
who the contractor was and whether he put in extras.
Senator SCHWEIKER. WeJl, your role was,' I thought, connected
-with the building fund? . .
.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. My role was simply to build up Georgetown to
where it could hold its head up in any medical school in the country,
and that is just what. happened.
Senator ~ENNEDY. Finally, Dr. Geschickter, using the example of
the A~ency's description about Georgetown University, it talks
about the objectivesa.nd the details. This is in justifying the commitment of the Agencv.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Is this 35?
Senator KENNEDY. This is on 35.
It talks a.bout objectives and details of the work to further technical
services, it talks about chemical and biological requirements, ana it
goes on to talk about the Geschickter Foundation Fund for :Medical
Research used asa cutout, whereby arrangements would permit
Agency sponsored research projects using Agency personnel to be
carried out in the new wing without Georn-etown University being
aware of CIA interests. Arrangements would also provide the Agency
with the equivalent of a hospital safehousE'; and so forth. All Agency
funds for Geschickter for Georgetown would be met b~- matching
U.S. grants. .
..
Now, the fact is, that is a great deal different from what act.ually
happened in terms of what you have described here today. It would
appear to me that either the Agency did that without you knowing it,
to make it sound so appealing that whenever the Director of the Agency
went to the President or the ultimate authority for approval of it,
they were going to &fprove that,. and yet that is a good deal ~ifferent
from what th~ actua facts were 10 terms of your understandme:.
Either the memo is clearly a misre.presentation, and then we have
t() ask ourselves why did the Agency do it? Or did you not know
what they were doing with the money even though you were a witting
'Subject on that, you did not know what they were doing. Either
wa~' this does not make anv sense.
Dr. GEscmcKTER. It makes no sense, Senator. I agree with vou.
Senator KENNI:DY. If they were overselling what they wereWdoing,
and were not doing it the way you described, you were the principal
agent of that kind of factor, it then leaves the question about who was
getting the resources, who was getting the money, and what were
the real purposes, and maybe we do not know the answer to' that

•

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on.e. Or if it is that. they" were fully interested' in doing the kind of
thing'S you were domg m terms of research, then there were other
agencies of Government. that could have clone it, provided protection
for individuals, and done it very satisfactorily.
Now, it seems to me that that is the dichotomy that we fiJld ourselves in at this time. In either way, it just does not make any senSe
at all.
.
Dr. GESCBICXTER. I agree with you. I agree with you~ 1 cannot
make any sense out of i t . · ·
.'
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think one thing that does makeseilse' from
my past experience on .the Intelligence Committee, is thatone of the
key justifications for subproject 35 of MK-ULTRA as specified in
this tpemorandum, one of the key statements in the 01ltline of the
project that has become available to us is that. UagencysI!onsorship
of sensitive research projects will be completely deniable." It appears
to me that the agency was overwhelmingly successful in achieving
that objective.
Here we are fumbling and stumbling. around trying to ascertain
what went on and who's resp'onsible. Orie of the key aim~ of the subproject was complete deniability.
Dr. Geschickter, you seem to have it, we seem to have it, and the
project seems to have been handled so that it was a cQmplete success
in terms of complete deniability.
I would like to come back once again, to the memorandum of
agreement for this project, which seems to be so very elusive.
I would like to read from article IX in the CIA document that was
made available to us.
Memorandum of Agreement: A memorandum of agreement will be signed with
(blank) outlining to greatest extent possible the arrangements under whic!l t,he
hospit,;,i Sp&C~ under his control will be made available to chemical division persO~lDel and the manner in which cover will be provided and other benefits attained.
No contract will be signed since (blank) would be unable to reflect any ofth~
Agency's contractual terms in his arrangements with the university when (blank) .
makes the d.;nation in question. The memorandum of agreement will be retained
in TSB.
.

•

Now, I am rea.lly confused. This could not be more specific about·
obtaining a written memorandum of agreement. It talks about the
donation to the university, the reasons why a contract can't. be
drawn up, and the need for a memorandum of e.greement specifyirig
certain things about cover, and a.ll of that. Elsewliere, the documents
e~licitly say that you are aware of the terms of the agreement and
will cooperate.
.
YOu are telling me that you absolutely know nothing at all about
any memorandum of agreement? .
.
Dr. GESCBICKTER. Absolutely nothing. Even if there was such agreement, it would not be worth the paper it was written on. You cannot.
do that in a university hospital.
Senator SCHWEIKER~ Why not?
Dr. GESCBICXTER. Because you have got a nursing staff and every
man of caliber on the hospital staff has to have appointment tha.t comes
through the faculty, he has to get-he gets tenure, he has to be approved by a 20-man faculty, and you cannot do it that way.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I have got to believe the CIA got something
for the $375,000, minimum, they put up.

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Dr. GESCHICKTER. I cannot ans'..· erthat.
Senator SCHWEIKER.Did they ever ask.you to sign such an agreement, and· you refused?
.',
.
'
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Never. discussed any of this with me. Imagine
"what I thouEht of it when I read it.
"
'
.'
,Senator KENNEDY. What did you think?
Dr. GESCHlCKTER. I was in Alice in Wonderland's domain.
Senator KENNEDY. Why would they do it? Do you think you were
being set up?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I do not know t.he purpose. I cannot answer
any of your questions. There were plenty of hospital facilities all over
the country, they did not have to build one. '
Senator KENNEDY. Do you think it is possible that you were being
either misled or kept in the dark a.bout al10f this?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I was certainly in the dark. I never heard of this.
It was deliberately kept from me, or intentionally or unintentionally, I
do not know how to answer it.
,
Senator KENNEDY. Even though you were working with the Agency
in terms of conductinO'-·-.'
Dr. GESCHICKTER. ~hey kept all of this from me. I never saw it,
never heard of it, it was never discussed.
Senator KENNEDY. You were still the conduit of the money, though?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. The purpose was just research, not the building.
Senator SCHWEIKFR. What was the reasonthey told you they wanted
to make this charitnble contribution to the cost· of Georgetown's-Dr. GESCHICKTER. They never tolclme anything until/'ears later
they told me they got into~a fight with A'~miral Strauss 0 the AEC,
and when they would not put up the money, they were going to put it
up themselves.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the rationale when the money
mysteriously appeared for you to give to Georgetown?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. It was supposedly for radioisotope laboratories,
which are still there, and that is the only thing tangible that was ever
.obtained.
",
SenatorSCHwEIKER. Well, there was more than that, because the
.en~~n~ing research p!ojects that you described-you uescribeda series
.of SiX or seven proJects.
.Dr. GESCHICKTEB. Which projects are you referring to Senator?
:SenatorScH'WEIKEB. Oil shale, effects of radar waves and brain concus:;ion in animals, poison mushrooms, halogen derivatives excreted
through the lungs.
'"
Dr. GESCBICKTER. They were nearly all farmed out in other places.
'. '
We did not ha\ge to even supply a test tube in most of them.
Senator SCHWEIKEB. Right, but the funding for those projects
went through you?
. '
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Ye:;;; but 'none of that money stuck to our hands.
We got 4 percent. But that went right back in research. So all these
thing~ you are talking about occurred at other universities, had
nothing to do with Washington, D.C. '
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yon clo not draw any connection between the
money they put in the building and the en::;uing research program?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. None at all.
Senator SCHWEIKER. '\Vho approached you with the money for the
building?

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99

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Dr. GESCHICKTER~The o:".lginal idea, and the moneythe.t they would
contribute came from a man who is dead, who said he represented a
Philadelphia foundation, and he was interested in support, because .
there was a mental retardee, and they wanted to keep contributions
anonymous, and he said he thought he could get some matching money.
But he never said he would give us that amQllDt.
Senator SCHWEIKER. That was the conduit?
Dr. GESCBICKTER. That was the conduit. That was the original
conduit.
Senator SCIDVEIKER. Did that man have any dealings with you or
any connection ",ith the subsequent research projects you just described as funded t4rough you?
.
J?r. GESCBICKTER. No;. he d!ed pretty SOOD, thereafter..
Senator SCIDVEIKER. Who did direct, or overse~
Dr. GESCHICKTER. I knew nothing about anything, because the
money, the final accounting of the money, and where it came from,
we never knew exactly. The only person who might know it was our
financial director, and he is also dead.
Senator SCBWEIKER. 'Vhy did they do it through you?
.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. They did not do it throuO'h me personally.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, it was your fund: How were you made
aware of the availability of money? I am not clear on what relationship
existed between you and the CIA, with respect to funds for these
projects.·
'.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Are you referring to the projects of building the
hospital, or these other projects?
Senator SCHWEIKER. These other projects.
Dr. GESCHICKTER. 1'hrough the other universities-Senator SCHWEIKER. I am not clear on how that worked. In other
words, operationally, how did those projects proceed, and how, were
you used-Dr. GESCHICKTER. How was I used? These universities submitted
research proposals to the Geschickter Fund. These research proposals
were on university stationery. They outlined ongoing research, and
gave their publications. They asked-for a certain sum of money. This
money requested for these projects were then shown to me as research
proposals and the money was then made available through our bank
account. We then... passed th.at money on to these particular universities
on the basis of their research proposals, all of which are indexed through
the work of your committee, that made the documents available to me.
Senator SCHWEIKER. It was the Philadelphia Foundation that acted
as the conduit for money on the building projects?
Dr. GESCHICKTER. Yes. We only got, Senator Schweiker, we only
got about $75,000 anonymouslYc' in our books that I can trace to CIA.
All this money that we are talking about, the big volume of money,
came throl!gh the Philadelphia Foundation.
Senator KENXEDY. Thank you very much.
Our next witn~ses are ~1r. David Rhodes, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee; and Phillip Goldman, also a former CIA
employee.
Gentleman, would you stand?
Do you swear the testimony you gi,>e will be the truth, the whole
truth, so help yon God?
1fr. RHODES. Yes.

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Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Rhodes, did you work with the CIA?

STATEMENTS OP DAVID RHODES A1ID PU:IT.LIP GOLDMAlf, FORMER
CIA" EMPLOYEES

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"Mr. RHODES. I did.
"
Senator KENNEDY. Wha.t was your job With the Agency?
Mr. RHODES. I worked asa psychologist on the staff of Technical
Services Division.
""
"
"
"
Senator KENNEDY. From what period?
Mr. RHODES. Approximately 1957 or 1958, until about 1961.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, did you know Mr. Pasternak?·
Mr. RHODES. I did.
"
"
Senator KENNEDY. We had invited Mr. Pasternak, subpenaed ~Ir.
Pasternak. He was scheduled .the last time, and then at the final hour
he decided not to show, and we attempted to get aholdof him. We
have not found him since.
."
"
Did you and Mr. Pasternak travel toCa).ifornia together?
Mr. RHODES. We did.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know there was a CIA safe house in
California?
Mr. RHODES. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And the first trip you made to California with
Mr. Pasternak was to understand the different ways of delivering
LSD to unsuspecting citizens, is that correct?
Mr. RHODES. That is correct.
Senator KENNEDY~ Do you want to tell us the story in your own
words?
.
Mr. RHODES. Well, very simply, ~fr·. Pasternak and I went to
California. We went there with a reasonable supply of money, and
proceeded for about a week, simply to go around to a number of
bars, and drink and meet people.
During" that time we just were trying to establish some sort of
relationship with people so that we could subsequently invite them
to a party on some basis that would be acceptable to them for that
pU!"POse.
"
Senator KENNEDY. Then what happened after the period of a week?
Mr~ RHODES. Well, after that week was completed-" Senator-KENNEDY. The purpose, as I understand it, was to find
ways of delivering LSD to unsuspecting citizens?
Mr. R~OD~S. That is correct: We. were ~sting ~" "parti~ulbr device,
to determme if LSD could be given In smali quantitIes Via an aerosol
delive~.
"
Senator KENNEDY. Aerosol delivery?
Mr. RHODES. Yes; just spray it. in them, that is correct.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you line the people up for a pa.rty?
Mr. RHODES. Yes. We lined up people that we thought we could
invite to slleb a party.
SenatoI KENNEDY. And that resulted from your visit to the bars?
Mr. RHODES. Various bars.
Senator KENNEDY." What wes supposed to happen at the party?
Mr. RHODES. At the party the intent was that we would be able to
spray the aerosol, which as I understood it, had a sufficiently small

•
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101

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quantity, or the amount that could be ingested would be sufficiently
small, so that you would need practiced people to observe any differences in behavior of people, but just to see if it coUld be delivered
in that fashion.
.
.
Senat.or KENNEDY. Was aerosol LSD brought out to the west coast?
.
Mr. RHODES. It was brought out; y e s . ;
Senator KENNEDY. Who brought it out?
. '
Mr. RHODES. John Gittinger, as I recalf.
.
..
Senator KENNEDY. What happened after Mr. Gittingerarrived out
there in California?
. .
'
Mr. RHOl>ES. We had a singular problem. The particular house was
not air-conditioned, and it was hot, and we hoo. the problem ofwhether
or no~wecould arr.ange to keep windows and doors closed long enough
,.
for this type of delivery, and the weather defeated us.
It was as simple as that.
.'
.
Senator KENNEDY. You could not postponethe'party?
Mr. RHODES. We were there for a period of time. Actually-, Mr.
Gittinger, as I recall, tried it out on himself in the bathroom. He felt
the system was not working adequately to continue the exercise.
Senator KENNEDY. What did !vIr. Glttinger do?
~1r. RHODES. The only room in the house that could be completely
closed off easily, and it would not ha~ circulation,was the bathroom,
so he sprayed the aerosol in the bathroom, to see if he could detect
whether he was ingestin~ any of it.
'
Senator KENNEDY. What happened to him?
Mr. RHODES. Apparently he did not get enough, in his terms, that
he felt it would be useful to try to continue it for a group of people.
Senator KENXEDY. Dirl he spray it all in the bathroom?
~lr. RHODES. Yes; to the best of my knowledge. I did not see him
do it. He reported this after he had done it.
"
Senator KENNEDY. So then what happened? He came out of the
bathroom, and what happened?
. ~Ir. RHODES. Fl'apkly, Senator, we decided to scratch it. at this
point. We were grateful we had not invited a bunch of people to a
party.
Senator KENNEDY. So, as I understand it, three grown men flew
from the east coast to the west coast to spend ,a weekin the bars out
there, to gather people for a party, and ~lr. Gittinger-.
,. he was the
only one that went in the bathroom?
~f r. RHODES. And only two of us were in the bars. '
Sen.:!tor KENNEDY. Then what happened? Then you all went back
to the airport?
~{r. RHODES. Simply closed up shop.
Senator KE~NEDY. Closed up shop?
~lr. RHODES. Got on the airplane and came home.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you make any determinat.ion 'of what the
, value of that particular experience was to the Agency at all?
~lr. RHODES. Well, you know, implied in what I said was t.hat you
cannot deliver it bv aerosol under those conditions.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you and I\{r. Pasternak take any other
trips to San Francisco? Was this the only one?
:Mr. RHODES. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator ,KENNEDY. You did?
Mr. RHODES. Yes.
W

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Senator KENNEDY. What ,vas the purpos~ olthe other trip?
Mr~ RHODES. Totally unrelated to anything related to drugs. We
attended the First National Convention of Lesbians in this country.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Can you report on the value of that tripl·
Senator KENNEDY. What is the connection?
,
Mr. RHODES. The major connection was that the primary· work
that we were doing, of a psychological nature, was to test a particular
theory developed by Mr. Gittinger, in terms of nature· of personality-Senator SCHWEIKER. This is after he has been in the bathroom?
Mr. RHODES. That has been developed over years. The theory
wa.o; very useful. in that unlike most· of what was being done at the
time, you could work from testing materials-that is, psychological
testing to behavior, and then with training observe behavior, and
work back to how· people would perform on tests..And to do this
there were a number of different kinlls of ~roups visited by one person
or anot.her, to try to ~et test results, observe behavior, and build
normal backgrounds of personality materials relatell to t his particular
testing operation.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know ~10rgan Hall?
Mr. RHODES. Yes, I met him.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know anything about the details of
the safe house he ran in San Francisco?
~1r. RHODES. This is the safe house that we stayed at, Pastemr.t.k
and I stayed at. That is where the party would have been held. I am
talking about the one in the Marin Countv.
Senator KENNEDY. There were others? ~
~fr. RHODES. Apparently there were others.
Senator KENl"EDY. Before leavin~ this, just in terms of the t(~:stin~
of the LSD aerosol, do you have any sense at all about the fac:t that'
these people would have been unwitting subjects, subject to this kind
of drug, that it ha..<;· had some extremely important negative impacts
on individuals, some absolutely tra~ic results?
I think we have seen those perhaps more in recent times than
that, but I am sure in terms of those that understood the drug, even
during that period of time, were fully aware of it, and I dQ not know
whether you have any reaction..
Obviously it is easier to look back in terms or th~ atmosphere, thE>
moral atmosphere Of the times was different, but I d<.' not know
whether there is anything you would like to S8·Y on that; or whether
you would do it again.
Mr. RHODES. That is really hard for me to say, Senator. I was
aware that this was an un",itting- administration. That was the
intent. It did not come off. That still was the intent.
The purpose of this sort or testing W8·S simply that a person who
takes an LSD trip and can attribute it to the LSD was one kind of
behavioral reaction. And there was some rea..~nableness to believe
that a person who had some of these· internal reactions and did not
know what to attribute them to would behave in a different WilY. WE>
felt we needed to do this in connection with some of the brainwashing'
work, and some of the other thing:s, as to whether there was an
unwitting thing, and t he only way we could discover to do it wag to
do it in this fashion.

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We did take precautions. to try to make it smallest possible dose
that could be delivered that would be detectable. But what you at~
implying is perfectly true. - .
.
. . . . ..
.. .'
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Goldman, bow long did you work for th~
CIA? ..
.
~~r. GOLDMAN. From March of 1958 until January, I think, around
1968, January.
Senator KENKEDY. Were you not involved in laboratory develop.
ment, gadgets and devices of different kinds?
~lr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
'.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Could you describe what you know about the.
operation of the New York safe house?. .
.
:Mr. qOLD~IAN. The New York safe. hopse was set u.~.at the request
of, I beheve, It was Dr. Bortner, that Itwou.Id.be a facility that would
be available for use by the Agency in the event they wanted to use it.In connection with that it was also made available to the Bureau of
Narcotics, for whatever use they wished to make of it. It was also at'
thn.t time suggested to me that we put in a two-way mirror, so that
any interviews and that sort of thing, which would be going on in one
room could be observed from the other room. And a tape recorder was
also installed.
To the best of my knowledge, Senator, this particular place was
used by the Bureau of Narcotics in their drug work, and as far as the
Agency was concerned, I was 110t made aware of any use that it would
.
be pitt to during the time.
It was understood that it would possibly, or could be used by other
parts of the Agency, or other pnrts of the groups that we were working
\\ith.
Senator KEN~EDY. Well, of course, you have ~en the document.
made in 196:l which bears your name on it, and then the request for.
future funds for the continuation of the subproject 42. It says th~t in
the ptl.st year a number of covert and realistic field trials have been
'.
successfully carried out.
- So you must have some knowledge or awareness?
'.'
~Ir; GOLDMAN. Senator, there was, to the best of my knowledge,
nothing carried out in that safe house, to the best of my knowledge. '.
,"Ve did, however, we did do some-through the~Bureau of Nllrcotics-we did get a camera, worked \\ith a photograph, to determine
the presence of marijuana and the presence of opium poppies. 'Vealso
worked througoh them to get a devicc---\ve had a material with ivy,
Virginia. ivy, English ivy, which when put on it would stunt it, and
prevent it from growing any further,' would stop its gr9wth at that
point.
We used the Agency, Bureau of Xarcotics, I1.t that point: to get for
us a spmyer which would sprny this particular material in a very
definitive band, and a certain width.
,"Ve also, through the A~ency-not throug'h the Bureau-thro.ugh
thE" project we also had developed a means for applying the t~iLr gas
CS that ('ould be fitted into n billvcluh. or n. riot stiek.
lVe had at the same time given t.o the people there at the safe house,
and who it was now, I cannot -recall, samples of tear gas dispensers
which could be used for self-protection.
Now, the wording'--I might point out that the wording-nf a lot of
these projects is deliberately misleft.cling.

104

Senator KENNEDY. The what?
Mr. GOLDMAN. The wording.
Senator KENNEDY. The wording on what?
'.'
'
Mr. GOLDMAN. The wording on a project, the reason for a project.
Senator KENNEDY. You mean the justmcallion for the project?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Justification, no, hold on.
Senator KllNNEDY. The ones that were bumped upstairs, so
that-.
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. The original-Senator KENNEDY. Those having responsibility in making the
decisions were getting information that was deliberately misleading?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I was told,whether it wa.q Dr. Bortner.
Senator KENNEDY. Speak up a.little.
Mr. GOLDMAN. I was told, 1 do not know whether it was Dr. Bortner.
-or who it was at the time, that we were to continue the safe house and
justify its use.
Senator KENNEDY. You were just told by your supervisors to
continue the safe house, and work out a justification for it?
Mr. GuLDMAN. Right.
'
Senator KENNEDY. Why would he do that?
Mr. GOLDMAN. To provide the justification, so that he could extend
it more.
'
Senator KENNEDY. You were not supposed to justify from what
you knew about it, even though you nad some responsibility-Mr. GOLD~rAN. From what I knew'les, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. You were tol from your supervisor to go
n.head and justify it?
:Mr. GOLD"'IAN. As far as I know, there was nothing done in that
safe house.
'
Senator KENNEDY. But why would a superior ask you to just work
out a justification-did that happen in any other program that
you were involved in in the agency?
~Ir. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. In other programs?
'
" Mr. GOLDMAN. In another are~, where the wordage of the project
was such that it showed over or surreptitious, or whatever it was.
Senator KENNEDY. Where would the real facts be in terms of what
was going on? If the agent who was going to justify it is told by the
superior how to word the expla.nation, it was not only in this project,
but in another project as well?
'
Mr. GOLDMAN. It must have been used by other people, that is
my only solution.
'
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know what went on in the San Francisco
safe house?
,
Mr. GOLDMAN. The San Francisco safe house, I never knew as a
safe house, until the time that the episode that Dr. Rhodes mentioned
to you. I had no idea at that time that-I am quite sure that this
w~ a temporary establishment. I was aware that it was going to be
gomg-Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me?
Mr. GOLDMAN [continuing]. I was aware of what was going to be
going on there, because I was the person that put together the aerosol
device and the trippinK device to set it off.
Senator KENNEDY. You were aware of that project?

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Mr. GOLDMAN. That it was-Senator KENNEDY. Experimental?
'~1r~ GOLDMAN. On an experimental basis.
Senator KENNEDY. Were you aware of other research going on?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Not at that safe house.
.
Senator KENNEI>Y.At any other safe house?
'.
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. No; as far as I know, there was no other safe house.
Occasionally, when I would go out I would meet with Morgan Hall at
a downtown place, which was simply nothing more than a motel
_
room.
Senator KENNEDY. You carried the money to the people running
the safe houses?
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Generally sent it to them, or carried it to them. Once
in awhile I carried it to them. I generally sent it to them.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You had tlie responsibility of getting the money
to them?
.'
Mr. GOLD~IAN. I got it to Morgan Hall, sent it to him.
Senator KENNEDY. Morgan Hall is George White?
Mr. GOLDMAN. That is my understanding;
Senator KENNEDY. We have in the record that since 1963 you
approved some $2,00o--that is, 22 checks, undercover agents lor
operations, and you approved all-Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And since 1964, some $4,800, and these things
go on year after year. Yet you do not know what this money was for?
Mr. GOLlnrAN. You did not ask me that until this moment.
.
Senator KENNEDY. OK, I will ask you.
Mr. GOLDi\IAN. You did not ask me. You are putting words in my
mouth.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know what the money was for?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Thanks to your excellent staff, and the careful
review olsome documents yesterday, after I had been out of the
United States for over, practically a month. I came back voluntarily
so I could testify, and cut short the business trip,and thanks to your
excellent staff, I was shown some documents, a.Iid asked if that would
refresh my memory, because in the-because the last time when we
sat up across'froIil each other, I coulq not remember, and I frankly
could not.
Thexdid show me these, and this, to the best of my knowledge-I
can tell y'ou what was involved. When I took over that project, and
it was simplypassed onto me as another person to monitor the project,
they already had, apparently from the rec~rds I had seen, done s.ome
work that mvolved a drug of one sort like tetrahydro canna.bmal,
some of these things, and I sat down with White at that time and
as~ed him, in his opinion was there any justification for any continuation, and what was the result of what he had seen.
He thought that he had milked that information dry, as far as any
information would be concerned.
' .
.
. My interest in, has been all the time I was with the Agency, has
been more directed toward the devices and gadget area, and harassment type of things. For that purpose I had developed for us· different kinds of materials, and different thing:; which he evaluated for
me.

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106
I took them out there, turp.ed th~m over to him, and asked him if
he would take a look and Jet us know whether or not it was suitable
for this purpose.
Now, among these things was a launc.hing devjce to launch a ~lass
ampule that would break, .that would even have in it tea:rgas LJSat that time we had CS available to uS,avery fine powder, \vhich air
would blow around, or 8, very odoriferous material which could be
used, referred to by lot as stink bombs, used for breaking up demonstrations.
"
,
Both of these things were for the purpose of disrupting or breaking
updemonstrations.
'
SenatorSCHwEIKER. -What was the Agency's interest in tear gas?
~1r. GOLDMA~. The purpose there was to break up de!D0nstratioDs,
overseas countrIes, where they had reople crowded mto a plaza,
and it could be launched, and launche( in such a way that the person
launching it would not be seen, and would not have the problem that
has happened in one case, where they had a hotel overlooking :the
plaza, and the person drew back with the odoriferous material aud
threw it out the window, and it hit the side of the windO\v, and bounced
back in the room.
So we developed a very silent launching uevice, which you could
throw it about 100 yards.
Senator KENNEDY. Could we ask how these were tested, how
were they evaluated?
:Mr. GOLDMAX. They were evaluated, to be very frank with you,
participated in some of the evaluation of these, because I was interested in doing it, seeing it myself, and we used the beach house
from San Francisco, and threw the stuff at a very isolated ~pot, so
we would not be observed, and measured the drift of the thing to
find out if it is effective, how far it would be effective and noticeable.,
One 'thing this particular powder material had. which we worked
up the 'devices, in which I turned over the devices to him, that 1::;,
to ~forgan Hall, to evaluate for him which I did not pa.rticipate in,
taking the material, and put it in very fine glass, thin glass ampule:.;,
which c~>uld ~e dropped on the floor and stepped on 'covertly, and
a very lIttle bIt of the powder would come out.
ThIS particular material is so potent if you want to use that word,
in irritating the nose, it is perfectly harmless, that it causes sneezing
if it is in a closed room. If it is in a room that is in an exhibition room,
if it is in a small meeting room, or something of that sort, even fl
large meeting room, it will cause very, very violent sneezing and
continued sneezing, and the only way to get rid of it is to get out.
The 'purpose again here was to get the people out of it, for exampie,
in trade fairs, and I was told the thought was it could be tlseJ in
trade fairs overseas, in unfriendly country exhibit areas, where it
would be used, and it would not be attributed, because it woulU not
be detected.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you know if it ever was?
Mr. GOLDMAN. As faF as I know, I really do not know whether that
particular material was. I do know that the other material wns, but
I was telling about the launcher.
'
The other thing that we did, the other thing that we had him
evaluate, we had a material that was very potent on dogs, for quieting guard dogs.
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I remember I gave him some of the material, gave him the right
combination of the material to put in hamburger, ground meat, to try
on sOIp.e dogs, which he knew were guard dogs, and' which would bark,
in whose yard, I do not know, where these dogs were, but he did evaluate this ~for me, and he said it did work.
.
He said the next morning the dogs were·back up, but at the time
they were completely silenced.
..
..
Senator KENNEDY. What about the swizzle stick? .
Mr. GOLD~IAN.The swizzle stick, this. particular material-well,
the idea was that we would develop, or make a swizzle stick for a cocktail, which would have thec:oa:ting on it, which would be soluble in
water, soluble in the cocktail itself, but which when you use it, would
be undetectable. In other words, it wculd not look unnatulal when you
use it, lay it on th-e table alongside of it, nor did it create any adverse
taste at all.
..
.
We used, for that purpose, material which had a very bitter, a very
bitter effect, very, very tiny little bit, which when put on the swizzle
stick first, coated it, and I gave these to Mr.'Vhite to try (jut to see if
the materialcame!off in actual use the way we hoped it would come
off. He reported back to me again on this, that it did work; that it
worked quite well.
. .
Senator KENNEDY. Who did he test that on, do you know?
11r. GOLDMAN. I have no idea. He told me that it worked, that it
passed, in other words, surreptiticusly.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You must haye assumed this was being tested
in the safe house?
.
1-Ir. GOLDMAN. No; I would think not. I think it would have been
tested in the bar, because to the best of my knowledge, this safe house
yol,1 keep talking about, I think was set up for this particular operation
that they are talking a.bout, and I do not believe it existed after that.
Senator KENNEDY. We will hear from Dr. Gottlieb tomorrow about
that.
~1r. GOODMAN. As far as I know,I do know that one other thing
that we worked on, and in this particular case this was something that
was administered, or used to be administered to individuals, it was an
amino type of acid, which was supposed to be perfectly innocuous when
used, but was supposed-I even recall the.name-gamma hydroxybut:yric acid, which wasreput-ed in the literature to cause sleepiness.
Senator KENNEDY. Sleeplessiness?
..
Mr. GQLD~IAN. Sleepiness. To. make one more lethargic. Not put
you to sleep, not knock out drops, but make you sleepy.
I gave him several samples of it, and asked him if he would evaluate
it. I thought there was a slight amino, I would say like glutamic acid,
with due respect to Senator Schweiker, it tastes like a mushroom, and
has that mushroomy Htioyor of this particular one.
.
Senator KENNEDY. What about the syringe, the hypodermic needle
to deliver drugs in wine bottles?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Which one is this now?
Senator KENNEDY. The hypodermic needle to deliver drugs in wine
bottles. Did they test that out there, too?
11r. GOLDMAN. Yes; they tested that out there. The purpose of
testing this, Senator, was to find out if the bartender, in handling the
bottles, or if a person subsequent to that would see tha.t the cork
had been penetrated, and we found out by using a. very fine hypodermic

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syringe of sufficient length, and 'putting it at the proper place, over
the cap" so that the hole would be undetected, and you could smear
over a little bit with something to cover it over, I was told that. it
worked perfectly for the purpose.
'
Senator KENNEDY. This was tested by Morgan Hall, too?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Only to the extent that he tested it to find out if
it could be used. I showed him how to use it, where it should be put
in different kinds of bottles.
'
,
Senator KENNEDY. This was putting drugs in wine bottles?
Mr. GOLDMAN.' He did'not pu' drugs in wirie' bottles. If he did, I
did not know about i t . '
Senator KENNEDY. Was that not the intent, of the test?
Mr. GOLDMAN. The purpose of the test was to find out if it would
be noticed. " , '
, '
Senator KENNEDY. How would you do that? You would do it to a
wine bottle in a bar, I imagine?
Mr. GOLDMAN. That is right.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you presume that he did do it to a wine
bottle in a bar?
Mr. GOLDMAN.·I presume he did it someplace. He may have done
it and asked people to take a look at the bottles, to see if they saw it.
Senator KENNEDY. What do you assume?
l\-lr. GOLDMAN. I would assume the latter.
SenatorKENNEDY. What about passing of pills surreptitiously?
Mr. GOLDMAN.Ob, in this particular case, we had, or thought we
had, indeed in the case of a meeting of some sort, where they would.
want to put a pill in a person's glass, or at a bar, and the purpose
here was to find out if it could be passed on, and could be introduced
into the glass without attracting the attention of the individuals, and
he again reported to me that in this particular case that you better
go', back to 'the drawing board, because when' it hits the water it
fizzles up, and made fuzz on top of the water.
'
Now, we had another particular thing that we did, in which he
evaluated, and did it so it could not be observed and checked out in
any way, was to take thin glass fibers, polyglas fi"~ers, and put an
odoriferous material in them. These were, sealed at the end and
cleaned off, and' these particular fibers could then be ip.troduced
underneath the edge of a rug, and by stepping ,on the rug i, would
break it and release the odoriferous material and create a bad odor
in a meeting_room. ." ' "
,
, Senator ,KENNEDY. Also, there were some kinds of drugs which
'
gave a person diarrhea, as I, understand it?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
'
Senator KENNEDY. All of these were tested, and being evaluated
by Morgan Hall?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. They were all basically on unwitting subjects?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I would assume 'that this was so. I never participated in any of them, but the idea being that they would not be
attribl,ted, and that the person, for example, would feel all right.
Another test which was made--

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Senator KENNEDY. We have got 'a long list, of different things; ,
different examples, ofwhat was bemg tested. We have the background
()f~ll. t~e other facts on unwitting subjects and a whole,wide range of.
actIVItIes.',
" ,
It was quite clear, that, in temis of the west coast, and to some
..,,'
extent, as well, the east coast---Mr. GOLDMAN. To the best of my knowledge, the east coast did
not---Senator KENNEDY. There were east coast---Mr. GOLDMAN. This I did not know.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we will not get into that now.
Jnst finally, in the documents that you are familiar with here, is
this what you are referring to when you say in the past year anum..
ber of covert and realistic field trials have been successfully carried
out?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I would say so; yes. There were a number which I
could go into.
Senator KENNEDY. I do not think so. I think that is all right.
Senator SCH\VEIKER. I woul<!just like to ask Mr. Rhodes a question
related to the point Senator Kennedy brought up earlier about the
ethics of unwittmg testing.
Was your answer directed to the 'time you were operating, in, then,
or now? I was not quite clear about your view of unwitting tests..
Mr. RHODES. Yes, Senator, it was to that time frame.
,
Tho.t was a. peculiar period in our history. I really cannot answer
the question, if another new, strange hallucinogen or something like
that came on the scene, as whether I would participate in such an
activity or not. At the time I thought it was worthwhile to do.
There would be no reason to do any such thing today that I know of.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Let us brmg it up to today. This commit.tee
is confronted 'with the task of writing 8. new law for the protection of '
human subjects. One pertinent question I would like to ask is if
the American Psychological Association, or the body that performs'
accrediting or licensing functions for clinical psychologists, prescribes
any kind of ethical standards on this issue today?
In other words, is there an ethical standard in the profession,
developed by the American Psychological Association or some other
group, relating to unwitting tests on Duman subjects today?'
,
Mr. RHODES. Senator, I am not absolutely sure. But having read,
those ethics, I would strongly suspect there is a very strong state..
menta
'
Senator SCHWEIKER. What do you feel the needs and responsibilities
in terms of new legislation and within the profession are today in this
regard? Forget the past and the time frame of the past. What about
today? What is your judgment on what is needed?
Mr. RHODES. My personal feeli~ is that administering of drugs
to people unwittingly, it is something that we-this is the time to
stop this sort of thing. I would su~gest we not have any unwitting
administration in the future. That IS a personal opinion.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.
Our last panel of witnesses include Mr. Charles Siragnsa, former
Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of N arcotics ;~Ir. George
98-839-71-8

110
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Belk, former District Supervisor for the New York Office of the Federal Bureau ofNarcotics; Mr. Ira Feldman, former agent for the FederalBureau ()f Narcotics; and Dr. Robert Lashbrook, former CIA
employee.
.
Gentlemen, please rise and raise your right hands.
Do you swear the testimony you give will be the truth, the whole
tnlth, .and nothing but the truth?
.
.
[~-Iessrs. Feldman, Belk, Lashbrook, and Siragusa ans,\'ered in the
affirmative.]
. . .
Senator KEN~EDY. W.e will be having Dr. Gottlieb with us tomorrow, who will respond to a number of related areas of inquiry here.
1 think it is important that we understand that he will be testifying.
He is working closely with the committee. These matters have been
.
related obviously to the areas of inquiry here. .
He has been granted immunity, so he has been very responsive.
Now, we might start off with Dr. Lashbrook.
According to the CIA response to our September 25, 1975, letter,
Dr. Lashbrook entered on duty on August 9, 1951, and transferred
to TSS on November 24, 1951. He was a research chemist on Project
En~neer.
. From 1952 to 1956 he was Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Division
of TSS under Dr. Gottlieb. He continued in this area until he resigned
in 1963. Is that correct?

•

STATEMENT OF ROBERT LASHBROOK, M.D., FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE;
ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES SIRAGUSA, FORMER DEPUTY COlI·
MISSIONER, FEDERALBUREAU OF NARCOTICS; AND GEORGE
BELle, FORMER BUREAU OF NARCOTICS SUPERVISOR, A PANEL

-Dr. LASHBROOK. Essentially so, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you like to correct it in any way?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I was not necessarily Deputy Chief that long.
Senator KENNEDY. How long were you?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I do not recall.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you work with· Dr. Gottlieb?
Dr. LASHBROOK.. Yes; I did.
8enat-or KENNEDY. Can you tell us what your relationship with·
.
Gottlieb was in tenus of the hierarchy?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Well, I was his Deputy, whichbnsically meant
that when he was out of town I would act for him laraely in nn administrative capacity, or to answer questions, or anything that would
come up.
Senator KENNEDY. Were you involved with the projects that have
come to be known as ?vlK ULTRA?
Dr. L.-\SHBROOK. Ye~.
Senator KENNEDY. You are listed a.c: project monitor on the ~lK
ID.JTRA subproject No. ~, which involved realistic field testing of
R. & D. items of intere~t to the CIA.
Do YOU remember that project?
Dr. "LASHBROOK. Which one was that?
Senator KENNEDY. That is New York safe house.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Morgan Hall?
Senator KEXXEDY. New York safe house, ~forgan Ha.ll; yes.

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Dr. L.-\SHBROOK. Well, I may have been listed as the monitor, or
·what not for that. project, but.in fact I n~ver did. My personal knowl-.
.edg:e of that particular operatIon was strIctly secondhand.
.
'. .
~eriator·KENNEDY. You were listed, but you say you had no knowl·ed~e, or )on did not have anything to do with it?
. .
Dr. LASHBROO~. The fact that I might havebeE'm li!;ted now I do
not know-"yesterday I~e5s, I was shown a piece of paper on which I
was listed, and this I believe was the authorization for that particular'·
project.
..
Now, my signature was on there, along with many other signatures
in the piece of paper that I ~aw. The fact that my signature on there
does Dot necessaril;y mean thft I was actually the one who signed for'
that project.
."
.
.
leould have signed off oli it administratively for Dr. Gottlieb. At
the time that went through, I could have been listed as the project
.officer for that project, but that could be subsequently changed.
Senator KENNEDY. What can we gather from the fact that it says,
this project will involve reali!;tic field testing of R. & D. items of
interest to the CH/TSS. During the course of research it is sometimes
found that certain field test experiments, or tests are not suited to
ordinarJ laboratory conditions. At the Harne time it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to conduct them with operational field tests. This
project is de::,ignedto provide facilities to fiJi these intennediato
requirements, it will be conducted b.y :Morgan Hall, and we will havo
cE'l'tnin. ~upport activities.
Youhave ~igned it twice. It has your signature on it twice.
\Vhat should we gather? .
Dr:LAsHDROOK. Is that the authorizing document?
~enator KESNEDY. That is right. You saw this, it has those items
typed, and it has Robert Lashbrook, Chemical Divi~ion, approved,
Uobert Lashbrook for Sidney Gottlieb. You have two signatures on
there.
.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Doe::; it have other signatures?
~enator KEXXEDY. Yes; it ha:; ~h. Gibbons.
Dr. L.O\SHBROOK. AU right.
. .As I think I was intimating a little bit before, I cannot make much
~ense out of what you have reild. It ,"vas intimated before, I think, a.
large partoC the documents that you ha,-e of this nature, are what we
cnI led. boilerplate-Senator KEXXEDY. Excuse me?
.. Dr. L.O\SHBROOK. BoiIeI"}>late. 'Vhat was actually signed off on was
not· t he same tis the actual proposal, or actual detailed project.
.. Senator KE.XXEDY. How frequently do you use .boilerplate?Do.you
~lgn off on thIngS that are not releytlnt to what IS really happeIllDg?
Dr. LASHBROOK. You ha"e both. You have what you sign on, and
thE' actuill project, side by side.
.
Senator KEXSEDY. ''\ho has got the real file?
Dr. L.O\SHBROOK. TSS.
Senator KEXXEDy. Pardon?
Dr. L.\SHBROOK. TSS.
Senator KEXXEDY. You mean this i:;. not the real file. It is stamped
top secret.
Dr. LASHBROOK. It is 11 renl file. It is the one which goes through,
recei,·es the signatures, and is then filed.

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Senator KENNEDY. It is what?
Dr. LASHBROOK. It is then filed.
Senator KENNEDY. It is a.real file, but does riot mean anything, is
that about what you are saym~? .
. . ' .' '.
.
Dr. LASHBROOK.. It has admlnlstratlvevalue.
Senator KENNEDY. It is not telling what the story is?
Dr. LASHBROOK. That is right. Not necessarily.
Senator KE!'n"EDy.Not necess8rily?
.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER.What is this, a cover file? Do we have cover
.
files? Is that what we are dea:Iingwith?
Dr. LASHBROOK. In a sense, and in a sense it was done for security.
In other words, the files that went through the system ended up
when the Financia:ISection-"obviously TSS lost control Of those files.
Senator ScmvEIKEB. So the FBI had a "do not file" procedure designed to handle this sort of thing, and the CIA has a cover file system to handle it. In this case, though, some of the cover files contain
pretty damaging information that doesn't seem. to reflect well on the
Agency's use of human subjects-I wonder what the real file contains.
Senator KENNEDY. The Agency has a:Iready admitted that the
testing is going on.
Dr. L_~SHBROOK. Correct.
Senator KE:-JNEDY. So this is accurate, they have indicated tests
are going on, and this does say the tests will be going on, and it is
approved. What is the extent of those boilerplate approva:Is or disapprovals that you make reference to? How routine is that?
Dr. LASHBROOJC. They are summaries. It is a summary. :Maybe
that would be better.
Senator KEX~EDY. But is the informa.tion accurate or inaccurate?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Probably it is reasonably accurate. I could not
say, you know, at this point in time. We are talking about a generation ago, so I could not say.
Senator KE~XEDY. Now, there is a.Bother authorized document I
think you saw yesterday, for October 1953, same project, where you
signed off 011 it. Is that boilerplate, too?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I do notrecaU which one you are talking about..
Senator KEXNEDY. You are talking about boilerplate files that are
not revealing in terms of their substance.
Dr. Gescliickter indicated that a number of the files that repre~
sented his charges and reimbursements were completely inaccurate
and distorted.
.
.
..
Another agent, Mr. Goldman, indicated that this was a procedure
in the Agency itself, and we have heard it again, for the third time
this morning.
. .,
It is our understanding from examination of these various files
that this is the case in terms of boilerpla.te continua.tion of various
projects, and reviewing many of these, :you find almost the E'Xfict
same language 10 years in a row. Maybe one word, or a second word
is altered or changed. '
.
Would you be surprised if that proce~s was followed, and that
procedure was followed?
Dr. LASHBBOOK. \Vould I be surprised?
Senator KEXXEDY. Yes.
Dr. LASHBROOK. No.

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Senator

KENNEDY.

Why do you say. that? You have been in the

A~ncy, and evidently you have seen the way they write the reports.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Well, ~ccurate records were kept, 'accura.te' files

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were maintained, yes. Now, such a thing as summaries were made,
they are summaries, then if you are de8li.ng with a summary, it is '
just that. But the paper that was just shown to me would be
. ..
.
.. '
nothing less than a summary. .
I could look at that, and I could say I do not really know what
that paper is talking about. It does not say enough. It does not say
much.
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. It does not say much. Does not a summary sum
up information? What you are saying is, even though it might be
labeled a summary, it is done in such a way that. you do not know
what it is reallystimmarizing?
. . ...
.
Dr. LASHBROOK. It might be a very brief summary.
Senator KENNEDY. But in terms of what you are saying here is
that you are at least familiar with the process by which information is '
prepared in such a way as to not be either accurate or meaningful-Dr. LASHBROOK. Not to be too revealing.
. .
Senator KENNEDY. "Where does that leave us? Do we assume that
all the information related to these projects were actually destroyed,
and that what we have hero are documents with inaccurate, or
unrevealing information? '
Dr. LASHBROOK. I would not know. I am not sure what you do have.
Senl"},or KENNEDY. Did you know the substance of the field test,
about the testing of drugs, gadgets, on unwitting subjects in any
safe house-Dr. LASHBROOK. With Morgan Hall?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Dr. LASHBROOK. No.
Senater KENNEDY. Or anyone else?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Not with any detail.
Senator KENNEDY. Doyon know in a summary way, in a general
way?
.,
Dr. LASHBROOK. Secondhand, it would have to be very secondhand•.
Senator KENNEDY. Secondhand from whom?
'
Dr. LASHBROOK. Various people who were involved.
Senator KENNEDY. From Mr. Gottlieb?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Possibly. .At this point in time I could not pin
down who. In fact, if is very difficult for me to identify exactly what
I did know, or what I did not know, except that in detail I did not
know.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You were the Deputy Director of the project?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Right..
Senator KENNEDY. Did you know what was going on in the projects?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Only on the broadest or details. I was not only
Deputy Chief of the Division, but my primarv duty was actually as &
sort of project officer, in which I would have anywhere from 12 to, say.
20 projects of my own, which I personally was responsible for, ana
almost all of these were completely outside the area that you are
interested in.
So, my own personal involvement, my
personal detailed knowledge of projects with Morgan -Hall was quite minimal. There might be
.a time when I was--

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Senator KENXEDY. What did yOliknOW.. Why <lo yoU not tell us
what you knew, in general terms, from whatever sources?
_ Dr. LASHBROOK. I knew that :Morgan Hall set up a safe house in
Kew Y()rk~ That the purpose was somehow or other to utilize the safeh~~.

Senator KE~ XEDY. For what?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Interrogating, -or talking to his informants. Hewas interested in using dru~ of some type in this process. And I think
that is all I really could say specifically on what ~Iorgan Ha.ll had in
mind. It was mostly ~lorgan Han· proposing to the Agency that he do
this.
Of course, his having a sa.Iehouse, getting the most information he
could from his informants- _..
Senator KEXNEDY. These safe houses went on for a period of 14
)·ears, did they not?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I would not know how long.
Senator KENNEDY. 'VeIl, they were in your division, you were the
Deputy Director?
Dr. LASHBROOK. But I was not there 14 years.
Senator KENNEDY. But, you were Deputy Chief for a period of 4
years.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Perhaps. I was aware of the safe house in Xe\\,"
York. In fact, I visited the place oil two occasions. I was aware that
it was going to San Francisco, but the details of actually what was
being done, that I was not aware of, that I recall. I do not recall.
Senator KENNEDY. You wrote the memorandum that talked about
a doorway constructed in a wall, a monitor testing surveillance equipment, a window constructed in the bedroom to permit visual surveillance techniques.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Right.
Senator KENNEDY. You wrote that memorandum. You appro\-etl
accounts for microphones, recording equipment, 1i~tening aidtoi, ami a
number of other materials in that. You wrote this other document.
. Dr. LASHBROOK. Right.
Senator KENNEDY. You signed off on these particular reimbur~ement justifications?
Dr. LAsHnRooK. Right.
Senator KENNEDY. But you do not remember anything?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Well, that was a generation ago, and if yon h.llt!
asked me-:-I saw those yeio>terdl1y-if you had asked me without
showing me any of those documents, I would say no, I do not remember,
because I do not recall things in that detail a generationago.
However, the first one you referred to, I was shown this ye~terd8Y,
I read it over, and quite ob"iollS]y to me it waio> a document prepared.
becau~e the auditor had di~ll11owed some of the c1aim~ that ~IOr!!IHl
Hall h9d made at the time he moved from ~ew York. The title of it,
weIl, I had contacted ~forgan Hall io ask him to provide further
justification for the items he disallowed.
One item ~Ior~ftn Hall has been clisllIlowed Wlls 11 tip to t.he hm(llord.
I reported that l\10rg-nn Hall said that thllt tip to the landlord \V1\.:-;
because he had knocked a hole in the wall, and so on.
In other words, that particulur memorandum was strictl~· an admini",,trath"e memorandum to justify, to Jl t-t~rnpt to help ~lorgan Hall
justify his expenditure:;;.
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Senator KENNED1·. You were no ~trlm~er to the whole drug te~ting
program?
Dr. LASHDROOK. ~o. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Were you not aware of the program that actually
.
involved Mr. Olson?
Dr. L.\.sHBRooK YCR.
Senator KENNEDY. You have an awareness of drug te:o\ting in any
event over a period of time'! .
Dr. I...ASHBROOK. Y e~. '
Senator KENNEDY. Particularly in the earlv dftvs?
Dr. L.\.SHBROOK. All lam SR);n~ is thht pllrticular operation of
~10rgan Hall is one t.hat I reaHy-I was not very familiar with at
that time. W'hat I did know at the time. I am sure I ha,-e fo~otten
much of it-there were some other things that I am personally more
... •
familiar with.
Senator KENNED1·. Do you haveknowled~e, or ha~ anyone e"er
told you that prostitutes were in'·oh'ed. in the !;sfe-house operation
run by ~lor~an Hall?
Dr. LASHUROOK. I think I recall having been told that, yes. I nf.',-er
quit-e figured how they entered in this, but yes.
.
Senator KEXXEDY. I think there are other:; who ha\"'e.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Yes; weha"e heard some te:-\timony this morning'.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Dr. Lashbrook, did experiments ~18ting' to
hvpnosis come under your direction '!
Dr. LASHUROOK. I ;88 familiar with some of the work that was done
on hypnosis, ~·es.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. In a nutshell, what was the general thrust of
those experiments? I realize drugs and h~·pnosis were used together
in some of them. \Vhat was the objective or purpose of that series of
eight subprojects?
'
Dr. LASHBROOK. There were, of course, claims, or thou~hts that
maybe great things could be done with hypnosis. There wa.,;; very little
that could be pinned clown as to what could or could not be. done by
this technique. So the only project that I re(~all· on this was 0. very
small project, one sma.ll project, in whic.hwe had a h~"notist do some
experiments ,>rimarily to see what the limitations.~ of h~'pnosismight
be, what cou d or could not be done with hypnosis.. .
'Ve are tr,);ngto get some kind of answer ~ to-well, can you ma.ke
a persoll do something under hypnosis that he would not ordinarily
do against hiswiJI.
.
... .
Senat-or SCHWEIKER. Can you?
Dr. I.JAsHnRooK. I think our conclusion was that this capability
is very limited.
.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What about projectS relalin~ to motivationtu
studies? In his Augl1~t:J testimony, CIA Director Turner listed t!S
category 7, "motivation studies, studies of «iefectors, assessment l1nd
trainin~ techniques". \Yhat would these 23 projects entail?
Dr. LASHBROOK. As~e~~ment would come mostly undf.'r p:"ycholog.\",
I think you probabh" covered that-it is an area that I would not
have an." grent familiarit)· with.
.
In other words, I could not ~ivc, in uctail-Senator SCHWEIKER. \Yhat were we looking for in studies on
defectors?
Dr, L.~SHDROOK. I do not really know. I do not recall.
W

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Senator SCHWEIKER. You do not recall an)· of those projects. Did
not any of them come under vour-.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Not that i recall.
Senator SCHWEIKER. How about training techniques?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Training for what?
Senator SCIrn'EIKER. I do not know. Admiral Turner just simply
listed motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques-23 subprojects in a.ll-as part of MK-ULTRA.
..
Dr. L.O\SHBROOK. That sounds like· something that would come more
under the category of ~ychology.·
..
Senat-or SCHWEIKER. Training for what?
.
Dr. LASHBROOK. That is what I wonder. I do not know. I do not
know of any good answer to that question.·
. . .
Senator SCm'"EIKER. Was Executive action in this category at all?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Executive action?
That term, I think, would perhaps have· been covered pretty well
in the previous testimony-Senator SCHWEIKER. I know it was covered rather thoroughly when
our former Intelligence Committee looked into it, but my question
here is. did any training for-.
Dr. LASHBROOK. Training?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Training for Executive action, was that
included in any of these motivational studies?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Not that I am aware of. Not that I can recall, no.
Senator ScmvEIKER. So that the Executive action concept, political
assassination, was not in any way involved in motivational training
studies under any of these categories in ~IK-ULTRA, is that what
you are saying.? T.hat i~ a--'pretty categorical statement.
Dr. LASHBROOK. OK. Repeat the question.
Senator SCHWErKER. We know what our Intelligence Committee
found that Executive action was, assassination of foreign political
leaders.
Dr. L.\SHBROOK. :\Iaybe I should have asked you to define the
meaning of that term.
. . .
Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, some studies under :MK-ULTRA were
motivational studies, including assessment and training techniques.
~Iy question to you is, did any of the 23 subprojects listed in that
categor.y by the Director involve anything related. to motivation
for }l';xecutive action? . . .
.
Dr. LASHBROOK. By Executive action, you mean assassination-SenatorScHWEIKER. AssaSsination, plots against political lea.ders.
. Dr. LASHBROOK. OK. No, nOlle that I am aware of.
Senator SCHWEIKER. None that you are aware of?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I am not aware of any.
.
Senator 3CHWEIKER. Are you aware of all the 23 subprojects categorizedin Admiral Turner'sstatement?
Dr. LASHBROOK. I doubt it. I have not run through all 23 of them.
Senator ··SCHWEIKER. So you are not excluding the possibility?
You are just saYing that, as far as you are aware, none of the sub~
projects related to this?
Dr. LASHBROOK. Right.
Senator SCHWEIKER. All right. That is all.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Siragusa, what agency of the Federal
Government do you work for and what position did you hold?

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Mr. SIRAGUSA. I was with Immigration and Naturalization -service
for 4 years as a clerk-st-enographer, with the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics
from 1935 to 1963.
Senator KENNEDY. Then you retired in 1963?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. 1963, I retired.
Sena.torKENNEDY. You were Assistant Deputy Commissioner of
the Bureau of Narcotics?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. Later I was Deputy Commissioner.
Senator KENNEDY. De~uty Commissioner. . Could you tell us who Cal Salerno was?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. That was my cover name.
Senator KENNEDY. Salerno was an alias for you, and you became
an agent for CIA, did you not?
..
.. .
Mr. SIRAGUI:lA. 1- was not an agent for CIA. I was liaison with
CIA. I never w~rked for them.
Senator KENNEDY. You were liaison?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. Liaison, in my capacity with the Bureau of
Narcotics.
Senator KENNEDY. Who gave you Cal Salerno?
..
Mr. SIRAGUSA. I had used the name Cal Salerno years before, from
1950 to 1958 when I worked overseas for the Bureau of Narcotics. I
pioneered their foreign operations. At that time I did undercover work,
and 1 used the name of Cal Salerno. I just carried On with that name
later on.
Senator KENNEDY. OK.
Could you tell us what you had to do with the safe house in New
York?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. Along about 1959, which was a year after I returned
to Washington from Europe, among my many other duties in the
:f:l~reau, ~ was aPl?oi~ted ~nofficially 8,S lia~s~n with CIA. I was also
lIaison With the Hill m varIOUS other capacities.
Mr. AIblinger one day introduced me to Dr.. Ray Treichler of the
CIA, a very ~rief introduction, a v~ry_ brief conversation. I was asked
by Mr. Anshnger to take Dr. Treichler back to my own office. Dr.
Treichlergl!.ve us the idea of setting up the!>pera~ional apartment.
Senator KENNEDY. The CIA gave you the Idea, IS that nght? .
Mr. SIRAGUSA. Yes, sir.
.
Senator KENNEDY. What happened?
.. _
.
..
Mr. SIRAGUSA. We set up this apartment on 13th Street off of
Sixth Avenue, and the understanding was that we were louse this
ap'artment for our own purposes. ,:!,hat i~, my office in· New Yo?-"k
City· would use the apartment to mtervlew Informants, todebnef
informants, to work undercover o~erations.
Then whenever the CIA wishea to use the apartment itself, they
would notify us to stay away from the apartment. Dr. Treichler was
my contact man. He 8.lso furnished me with the money. We had an
urifurnished apartment. He gave us the money with which to buy
the furniture.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever have any idea of what was going
on in the safe houses?
.
.
.
Mr. SIRAGUSA. No; I know it was being used for some intelligence
purposes. One of my first guesses was perhaps it was .being used to
uncover defectors in their own· organization.

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If you are asking me if lever knew or suspected it was being used
for drug testing purposes, my answer would De no, I never kuew that.
In fact, had I known that; had I even suspected that, I would have
disassociated myself with that operation.
,
Senator KENNEDY. Why would you have?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. I was surprised to learn from news account about
2 years ago that the CIA was testing drugs on unsuspectiIlg ",itnesses;
that is contrary to myyersonal beliefs.
Senator KENNEDY. Did they ask you to set up 8t safe house in
-Chicago?
.
Mr. SIRAGUSA. No, sir, I do not recall that. I was asked that by one
of your investigators. I do not recall they ever asked me.
In 1963, when I retired from the Bureau of Narcotics, I did so for
the purpose of assuming a position of Executive Direttor of the
Illinois Crime Investigatin~ Commission in Chicago, which later
became known as the IllinOIS Legislative Investigating Commission.
I do not recall that Dr. Treichler or anyone else ever suggested that
we set up an apartment in Chicago. Had the suggestion been made to
me, I would have automatically turned it down because I had all I
.
could do to handle my new duties ill, Chicago.
Senator KENNEDY. They never contacted you in Chicago?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. - Dr. Treichler visited Chicago. In fact, after he left
the CIA, he took a position with a chemical manufacturing company
in Chicago, and several times he contacted me in Chicago. They
were soci81 visits.
Senator KENNEDY. Nothing to do with the agency?
Mr. SIRAGUSA. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Why would a high ranking official of the Bureau
of Narcotics be willing to play the role of administrative agent, paying
rent and keeping the facility, and having no substantive contact whatever with the idea of the project and knowledge of how that project
was carried out?
1-fr. SIRAGUSA. My contact with the CIA was rather remote. The
operation of the apartment was under the control of the District
Supervisor in New York City. He handled all of that. I remained in
Washington. _I had very little to do with the day;,;to-day function of
that apartment.
_
_Senator KENNEDY. In the record of _the ~rK.;.;ULTRA Subproject
.
132, this is March 1964, it sta.tes t.he following:
This project is conducted by Mr. Cal Salerno. Mr. Salerno, a public relations
consultant, has recently moved his offices from New _York City to Chicago, Ill.
Mr. Salerno holds a top secret agency clearance and is completely witting of the
nims nnd goals of the project. He possesses unique facilities and personal abilities
which have made him invaluable to this kind of operntion.

!vIr. SIRAGUSA. There has been some poetic license taken with the
I left the Bureau of Narcotics in November 1963. I only just
learned that the name of Cal Salerno was adopted by others that
succeeded me. I had nothing to do with CIA during the period of time
that I was in Chicago.
Senator KENNEDY. 'VeIl, the description of you then is completely
inaccurnte as being... ~Ir.. SIRAGUSA. Yes. I was not a consultant for the CIA. I ncn~r
hnd ftny official capacity with CIA in any way whatsoever.
t~uth.

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Senator KENNEDY. You were not, would you say, completely
witting from the aims and goals of the project?
~1r. SIRAGUSA. I knew nothing about the project.
Senator ~ENNEDY. Then this report is inaccurate? .
!vIr. SIRAGUSA. ltis.
.
Senator KENNEDY. We have heard from others-as a. matter of
fact, from each witness here, how the memoranda have been inaccurate. I amjust trying to find out what the situation is.
Do youh&ve any i,dea why they were trying to put the monkey
·on your back?·
:Mr. SIRAGUSA. I dono!. know that they particularly put the monkey
on my back. Hecausein Washington in my era from 1958 to 1963,the
·entire bureaucracyoC the Bureau of Narcotics, consisted of four
men. I was one of them,. and which bureaucracy has now been replaced by some 200, men. This is by way of explaining the fact that I
had man)~ duties that I had to assume without benefit of any official
.appointments. I was liaison With the media, with CIA, With con'gressionnl committees, with individunICongressm.en. I had all to do
just to kep,p my sanity.
Senator KENNEDY. But in the CIA files they have, the memoranda.
that you were completely witting, knowledgeable about these programs, the aims and goals-- .
.
:Mr. SIRAGUSA. That is not so. That is entirely inaccurate. lt is
untrue.
Senator KEN,.NEDY. :Mr. Belk, what age'ncy of the Government were
YOU with? Where were yOU :,;tationed?
.. ~-1r. BELK. I was ~ith the Federal Bureau of Narcotics started
with that agency in 1948. I assumed the positio.,n of Supervisor in
Xew York City office in April 196:3. Prior to going to New York,
in the early part of April 1963, I had a meeting with Commissioner
Giradonoat that time, and he informed me I was going to New
York as Supervisor in Charge. And during that conversation he alluded
to the fact that the ugency, that is the Bureau, had an apartment
they were responsible for in New York. It was national security
·endeavor in collaboration with the CIA; and that he would wish me
to continue that project. And that there was an agent in the. New
York office at.that time, a man by the name of John Tagley, who was
familiar with it arid could give me mtlch of the detail.
", ,
"
, \Vhen I arrived in New York City, I took over the office from ~Ir.
·,John Enright, who I believe was aware of the fact that the apartment
'existed.
.'
.
'
I certainly got a briefing from :Mr. Tagley on where the place was
ond what it did look like. J was told we can use the apartment for
.operations, and that when the CIA was going to use the place, that we
would be notified in advance that thev were, and that we would stay
,off the premises.
,~
,
Senotor KEN~EDY. What knowledge did you .ha,-e about what WfiS
going on inside the snfehouse?
'
:Mr. BELK. In terms of the CIA using the safehouse?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
~lr. BELK. I had no knowledge at all of what they were doing there.
I know we used it on a couple of small operations. In fact, as I recall,
in 1964 I recommended to the CommiSSIOner that we close the ill ace

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and get out because I did not think the cost of it was justified, what
we, that is· the Bureau, was getting out of it. .
Senator KENNEDY. Did you have any qualms about paying all the
bills for a project you knew nothing about?
Mr. BELK. No. It was an assignment. It was a national security
thing. We were helping another agency and paying bills.
But in terms of the Bureau's use of that place, I did not think it
was justified. I did not know what they were doing there and how
frequently they used it, and I wanted to get out from under it.
Senator KENNEDY. Your original work for the agency, Mr. Belk,
was part of MK-ULTRA, is that right? .
Mr. BELK. I did not even. know what that was. Never heard of it
before until the last couple of days.
"
.....
Senator KENNEDY. We have documents, memoranda from the
agency itself that have references to your involvement, not dissimilar
to the kind of characterization of ~1r. Siragusa's involvement. But I
understand from what you said here that you would deny that categorically, is that correct?
.
Mr. BELK. I would do stronger than that. It is a lie.
Senator KENNEDY. OK.
'
Mr. Feldman, we are going to recess the hearing until tomorrow
and hear your testimony; Weare going to have to start at· 8 o'clock
tomorrow morning to accommodate Admiral Turner.
.
I want to thank all of you-Mr. Belk and l\1r. Sira.gusa particularly.
I think we are very mindful of the very extraordinary work that you
have been involved in for the Bureall. I just want you to have a very
clear understanding that my interest in this is how the Agency has
used different agencies and, in many instances without the knowledge
of those people being used. We have seen it in the National Institutes
of Health, and we saw reference to it in terms of IRS, and it has
absolutely no reflection, of what I understand from my reading of
your records in the Bureau of Narcotics, on your, very commendable
careers.
I want you to understand that, and what the purpose of this particular area of inquiry is, because' this involves your career people, and
I know that your career means a lot and that your service means a lot,
and there should not be anything that reflects on that contribution.
So, thank you very much.
. "
We will resume at 8 o'clock withAdmiraJ Turner in rooiD. 2228.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 8 a.m., Wednesday, September 21, 1977.]

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HU~fAN

DRUG TESTING BY THE CIA, 1977

WEDNESDAY,SEPTEItIlIEB 21, 1977

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U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMI'I'TEE ON HEALTH AND SCIE~TIFIC RESEARCH
OF THE' CO~nUTTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES,

.
lVashington, D.O.
The subcommittee met, purSlmnt to notice, at 8 :05 a.rn., in room
2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward :M. Kennedv
(chainnanofthe s:ubcommittee) ,presiding.
.,'
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Present: Senators Kenn,edy, Schweiker,ancLChafee.
,
Senator KENNEDY. We will come to order. We welcome as our first
witness this morning Admiral Turner, who is the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, Rnd his associates. We appreciate his
presence here today to respond to +'hc committee's areas of concern,
and I might just, at the outset, mention the particular areas that we
are concerned with.
We have received additional materials from the Agency since our
last hearing, and we want to know what ,theproces.c; was for finding
those. It seems that it: is a never-ending process of finding new material .
. We heard a great deal yesterday from a number of the former agents
of the A~ency that questioned the accuracy of documents and
memoranda within the, Agency. They talked about two sets of files.
They talked about· boilerplate lunguage; summaries that were not
revealing, except with those' that had some very special insight. 'Ve
want to hear from the Director about that observation that was
made by a number of the former agents.
'Ve want to heal' nbout the appropriateness ·of the relationship
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the ot.her. agencies of
Government, as well as private institutions; what does the Director
heli,~v.e is th,eappropr!ate relationsm,~b,etw~en .th.e A,.,gency,, and universltIes, and ,what IS the apprQpnatereIatlonsmp between the
Agency and other agencies-the Bureau of Narcotics, .the NIH, the
IRS, and others-and how will that be developed, how it is viewed at
the present time, and what comment the Director, might say about
that, in terms of the past.
I am absoIut.ely convinced that if we had those materials, that were
in existence in 1975, which were referred to within the AgencY in
this whole area of experimentation, this committee, as far as our
interest, would have wound up it.s area of inquiry a long time ago.
And I suppose the most important area that we are interested in
hearing from the Director, is the disparity of responsibility between
the Agency and the Department of Defense; the areas of }.1KSEARCH
and ~IKULTRA, and ~IKCHICKWIT. 'Ve know that Mpect~ of
the behavioral re~earch started in the enrly 1950's and continued,
to one extent or another, through 197~3.
W

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The various projects were turned on and turned off in a never-,
ending web,at least for that 20-yearperiod of time, .especially the
most recent ones from the late 1960's to the early 1970's, the follow,ups, in MKSEARCH, in MKULTRA, and in MKCHICKWIT.
In the course of our henring, we asked the Director, specificnlly. and I am reading from the record-in a guestion by myself: "In the
followups, in the ~Iksearch, and the ~dkultra, and Mkchickwit., could
you give us, also, a report on those particular programs?" Ad~iraL'
Turner said, "Yes, sir."
. .
"Did they involve experim.entation?" The Admiral indicated, "No,
sir." Senator Kennedy: "None of them?" And then, AdmiralTurner
said. "Let me say this: That these programs are code names for the
CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense·
pro[,Tam."
.
So,
inquired from the Department of Defense about th.eir
knowledge and understanting of these programs, and for a complete
report. Last evening, we received the corre~ondencefrom the General
Counsel's Office from the Department of Defense, and we will make
the letter apart of the record.
'
.
[The information refered to may bp. found on p. 157.]
Senator KENNEDY. In the letter-and I will read just the relevant
parts:

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I have enclosed a copy of memoranda and copies of the documents retrieved by
the DOD. It appears from the available documents that t.he projects Mksearch,
Mkorphan, and Mkchickwit were directed, controlled, funded by the. Central
Intelligence Agency, and much of the participation of the military departments
was solely as a conduit of funds from the Central Intelligence Agency to outside
contractors.

And then, in the operative memoranda for the Secretary of Defense,
.
prepared within DOD, on page 2, it continues:
It appeaI'R from the document that these three code word projects of the Central
Intelligence Agency, identified by the Director in his testimony as basically
Department of Defense projects, were, in fact, planned, directed,' and controlled
by the Centralintelligence Agency,

and then it continues:
Each of the projects arc described below.

, SO,what we ,have is, in the followup programs that took place over
the period of years that brought us into the more. recent period, from
1973, we have the real questions of accountahility, and who is directing, who has control, who has review responsibility, and what kind of
oversight is being exercised on this particular program. Then, we
,'have both the apparent and direct conflict from the two agencies that
were involved in this program as to the responsible agency. We are
looking forward to clearing that particular issue up this morning.
And to do that, having the testimony of the Director on these areas
will obviously be extremely important and will be extremely helpful.
We hope that we can resolve those particular questions ,..· ith a degree
of finality today, so that we may go back to our other legislative
re~onsibilities.

Finally, I would just like to say, after we hear from Admiral Turner,
our.next witness, Dr. Gottlieb, who, at the request of Dr. Gottlieb and
his attorney, for medical reasons, has requested that he be permitted
to testify in a less crowded room. His testimony will obviously bernade
public and will be piped live into this room. He has a medical condition

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which wehaye verified, indenendently, and we will IollO\'~- that
procedure. It is an unusual requ'est, but obviously ,ve are interested in
getting his testimony, and we are also interested in his well-being and
his health. So, we will have the meeting in the next room with him,.
'and it will be piped live in here after Admiral Turner.
. .
.
. SenatorCHAFEE. I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I,
personally, want to extend our thanks, and I believe I speak for the
committee, to Admiral Turner for' all he has done in digging out this
material. I am on another committee where Admiral Turner often
.appears before us, and I think it is marvelous the way Admiral Turner
is able to appear at different committees. I hope some time is left over
for him to run the Agency, because the demands of the Congress upon
his time are certainly strenuous.
And, of course, as you alL know, the matters we are investigating
happened long before his watch. \Ve are digging up material abou t
activities that tock place many years ago and, Mr. Chairman, I think
you agree with me tliatwe have to get on with it and get these hearings
completed so Admiral rrurner can devote his time to matters of
pressing importance to this country at this point.
Senator KE~l'IEDY. Fine. WeU, as the Senator from Rhode Island
understands, the last human testing that took place was in 1973. So,
it was over a 21-year period, and I do not know how many times we
have been told that the variouf. programs were turned off, just to
spring up again. We are told that in the most recent tests by the
Agency, itself.. that they were conducted by DOD; and DOD, in their
testimony here today, sr..y that the tests were conducted by the
Agency.
I am very hopeful that we can resolve these questions. I think that
the extraordinary fa~t is that these matters have come to light. In no
other country would they have come to light..And I do riot question
that there are many other things that have been done in other nations
that never would be known, but we do know, and we are interested
in the protection of human subjects. \Ve have every intention, to the
extent that we can from a le~.slatiYe point of view, to support what
is the statement of Admiral 'furner, and that is that he is committed
to the protection of tbese human subjects. He has ~ommellted on and
testified to that in the past.
..
.
Admiral Turner, we would be glad to bear from you.
STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR, CENTB:AL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY HARRY E. GORDON,
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; RAY REARDON, OF·'
FlCE OF SECURITY; FRANK LAUBmGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
SERVICES; ALAN BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; .AND
LYLE L. MU,TXR, ACTING LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Cbafee, for your remarks I appreciate the fact that both the chairman
and Senator Chafee have reminded us that the activities about which
we are talking today are part of the history, not the current activities,
of tbe CIA.

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And· if I might make one point, while there may have been drug
testing as Jateas 1973, we have no evidence of unwitting testing of
drugs on- humlUl beings past the period of about 1964. So, this i~ a
historical ma.tter, and a.o; I have said to you before, Mr. Chairman, we
are not doing this kind of thing, in terms of unwitting testing on
human beings with drugs, at this time, and I will get into that in more
detail in a moment.
.
Iwo111dlike to prefacemyremark~.also,by saying that I feel it i~
verY l.mfortunate that some of the media and other sources have dra.wn
the~inference from the testimony in the recent days that there may
have been deliberate withholding of material by the CIA, either in
1975 or as recently as July and August of this year, and I categorically
deny that for this year, because I was here and I know that it did not
.happen. I have no reason to believe that-it happened in 1975, and I
would point out that we volunteered the information in July of 1977.
If it had been deliberately withheld, I suppose it would have continued
to have been withheld.
We did di~cover more material in Aug:ust, after our initial voluntary
revelation,; in July and, clearly, we did that voluntarily, also. not
becau~e we were withholding it in July and suddenly decided to rele&<;e
it in August. I pledge to you that I have made every effort, and my
staff has, too, to be as forthcoming with you and your staff 8.:3 possible
.
here in providing information.
Rather than read a prepared statement, ~Ir. Chairman. let me ju..t
address your four points of concemand move on with them as quickly
as I can. How have we come to this process of finding the additional
materials? Well, we came because on the 3d of August, you a~ked me,
and I promised, to find and furnish any materials we had on
~fKSEARCH and on OFTEN/CHICKWIT. as well as providing vou
some additional details on sa.fehouses in San Francisco and New York
that were engaged in MKULTRA, which was the subject. of our previous testimony on the 3d of August.
We provided the information on the 1st of September about
T\1KULTRA. Immediately upon returning from the previous testimony. we started reviewing what limited material we had on ~fK
SEARCH,and trying to see where there might be more. If you will
recall, the ULTRA documents were found in our archives, located
outside of Washington, D.C. However, we had checked previously
and fonndthatthere were no MKSEARCH materials in tho:-;e archive..
under the financial filings, which is there we found the MKULTRA
mat.erial.
.
.
The gentleman on myleft, who had found the ?vlKULTRA materials, then did a very diligent job of Sherlock Holmesing and said to
himself:
If they were found under financial filings in the nrchi,·e~. pt>rhaps I !':ho1l1d
check all thefinancinl holdings of that area of the Agency in our Lnnglt>y headquarter:'!.
.

He did so. and on August 15, came up with adclitional mtlterial~
on ~JKSE.\ RCH, as well as 12 extra. files on research grants, whi(·h
are not technically part ofMKSEARCH, but. related to it-.
Mr. Chairman, the process of finding materinls that are ferretted
away in these file~ at the headquartel·s. in these files at the archive~.
is not eas,,", and there is no way I can look YOU in the eve today and
say there~ will not be some more t'lrn lip this aftemoon. I can only
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assure you\\"e have nothing more. on these subj~cts known to us at
this t~e, and l am pleased at the diligence of our people in looking.
and I am pleased that eiJ,ch time something does tum up, it immedi..
.
.
ately comes fonvard and we make it known to you.
. Next, you asked about the accuracy in some of the allegations-Senator KENNEDY. Maybe I could just refer to this in greater
detail. Our committee bef?;an its inqlliry in 1975. It is apparent from
some of the documents. released to us last week, that documents were
available that could have been helpful to us in 1975. One of the
documents was made available to the Church committee at that
time, but not to our committee until recently, and lam referring to
the memoranda for the· 10 on Subproject 3 ofMKULTRA, dated
February 10, 1954, which describes the project involving the testing
ofdrugs on unwitting persons, the useof electronic and photographic
equipment, the liaison with a narcotics a~entby the name of Morgan
Hall; the Dames olthe drugs he admimstered. The last list of four
drugs would have been useful in 1975.
In the material provided several weeks ago, we noticed a . buck
slip that was found in 1975, and it was handwritten in 1975, and it says,
The attached package should be of interest to vou in connection with the

r~lations with· BNDDregarding arrangements on E8£t and West Coasts; see, .

particularly, the January 30, 1967, Gottlieb memo.

•

So, this was obviously obtained in preparation f()r our hearing in
1975. There was a Gottlieb memorandum which still was not included
in the package given to us. We certainly did not have it back in 1975,
and there were other memos from August 25, 1975, indicating that
there had been inquiries concerning possible employment of Ira
Feldman, and these documents were not provided prior to the
August 3 hearing, when\ve were trying to put themaximtimJight
on these subjects.
So, I want to be very specific. We have mentioned these to your
staff in preparation for these hearings, so that you would be a\\'are
of the program. But, those were the references. I am convinced that
\\ith regards to the memorandum from Gottlieb, that with that
information, we could have had all of this really behind us and we
would not have to be back here, in terms of our particular interest.,
'Vith what weare interested in, I am satisfied, but those were the.
documents that.we referrec) to in my openinf?;.
.
...
.I think the areas in which we would be most interested, Admiraland we will include your stateDlent,obviousJy, entirely into the record-I think is this basic kind of conflict. I wonder if you could
address it. You indicated from· your testimony here, that the followon programs-I mean, we are talking about the early history, which
was on unwitting; the later history, was on witting subject. We are
obviously concerned about that, as well, in terms of the kind of information that is available to agents in order to make an informed judgment and decision about various kinds of testing.
That is, obviously, of great concern. We have seen in the past
where even witting subjects were not given the full kind of information needed in order to make an informed judgment.
Now, that particular docnment-·I am sure you are familiar with
it now-where you indicated that those studies, or those tests, or
those projects were being done by DOD, and DOD's response, was
that they were being done by the Intelligence Agency-and this was

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as of last evening. I mean, this is your Agency and DOD reviewing
the same kinds of material, and each saying that the othethad responsibility on it, and what we are trying to do is to put it to rest, so we
lmowwho had the reSponsibility, who had the authority, and I am
wondering if you can help us on that. . . '
Admiral TURNER. My agency. has full responsibility for MKSEARCH, OFTEN, and CHICKW1T, and I do not believe there is
aeonflict betw~en us iUld the Department of Defense, and I do .not
even believe there is between, my statement on the 3rd of August, but
on. the 3rd of August, I was here to testify on MKULTRA. I knew
very little about MKSEARCH, and the Department of Defense,
Ithink, at that time knew less, because these a.ocUQlents are incomplete and none of us had been reviewing them at that point.
.
I find ~self in no conflict with them at this time. MKSEARCH
and .OFTEN/CHICKWIT were CIA projects. Th~ were part of a
larger envelope which included a Department of Defense program,
but not Department of Defense responsibility for those particular
subcomponents. A part of the activities of some of th<?se components
was funded .through Department. of Defense .agencles, and, most
specifically, the Edgewood Arsenal.
I take full responsibility for anything done in SEARCH, OFTEN!
CHICKWIT.
Senator KENNEDY. Was experimentation on human subjects part
of that program?
'_
.
In your testimony, just earlier, there was, obviously, the CIA
particIpation in what was basically a' DOD program, and the DOD
mdicated t~at it ~as your program an~ y<?u a~e takin~ responsibility
for that this mornmg. The other questIon IS, dId they mvolve expenmentation in human experimentation, and your response to that was,
UNo, sir," and they did. They did involve human experimentation.
.Admiral TURNER. I have two e~erts on my left; one on OFTEN/.
CHICKWIT, one on SEARCH. Ed Gordon, would you talk about
human-'Senator KENNEDY. Would you just identify yourself, please?
Mr. GORDON. I am Ed Gordon. I Will address the OFTEN/CHICK.
WIT. CHICKWITwas, as stated in some of the material you have,
a program to get foreign drugs, informatioll on foreign pbarmaceutiC8.1s, developments in Europe and the Far East. There was no testing
scheduled, and our records indicate that there never was any testing
of any kind under project CHICKWIT.
. '.
I would like to point out that CHICKWIT does not have the ul\IK."
There has been a misunderstanding. So, it is just plain CHICKWIT.
Senator KENNEDY. It does not surprise me, because when we
tried to. find out about MKULTRA, it was very clear what our
interests were; it was and is on human experimentation, and, obviously,
on unwitting e~rimentation. These are our interests. We made all
the requests on MKULTRA and got a response that this was the end
of project MKULTRA. Then we found that t!!~rojectbhave changed,
in names, to either MKSEARCH or :MKOFfEN, or that the code
name has beendropped on it. We had difficulty in getting infonnation,
because we did not make the exact kinds of requests for the information on these projects since thea code names were changed. So
you see our difficulty.

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The Director res~nded that there was no human e~erimentation
in those progJ'ams. Now, I understand that there wasliumanexperi~
mentation in MKOFTEN. .
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Mr. GORDON. In project OFTEN, Senator, there was human testin~ involved. To the best.of o'!-r know}edge,that was pu:to(an on;:'
~mg DOl? program. W~ Identified.a smglecompound which. we w~re
!Jlten;sted m as a defenslv~ m~chamsm, because we knew that forelgD
mte!Ji:genC8 people were usmg It.·
..... .
., .
We believe, from the evidence we have, that though the testing
was fully intended on that compound, that the project .was stopped
in January of 1973, before any human testing for Agency was con. .
ducted.
Se!1atorKENNEDY. I see. So, your· point ~. that theyil1tendedto
test It onhumans t but actually they ceased It before It was tested?
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
.
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... ..... .
Senator KENNEDY. Well, the log of the tests here have June 1973,
a period of four tests; two tests,·· two people· each.. Are you familiar
with those?
.
Mr. GORDON. Senator, I am familiar, in that the Defense Department, ill telling us the things that they had found out, said that there
were two tests in June of 1973 on two military volunteers, and in the
draft that I received on that, it said that it was wholly sponsored
and funded by Army research and development. We have na results.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes, but you just said there waS not human
testing, before, as I understood the
.
Mr. GORDON. Sir, I said under Agency ~ponsorship.
Senator KENNEDY. Oh, under Agency. The thing I am confused
about is that we have the records of testing of those four; two tests
of two individuals each. You say that there was not any testing, as
far as the Agency is concerned.. The Admiral assumed complete
responsibility for the totality of these programs, just 4 minutes ago.
And, now, we have the DOD statement-their coinments-saying
that these matters wer~ directed, controlled, and funded by the
Intelligence Agency, and that they were the conduit of funds. Now,
I am just trying to piece -it together h e r e . .
. .
Mr. GORDON.. Sir; I can .understand the confusion. l can only
again say that I was aware ofaDly one of those tests in June of 1973
that I was given to understand were two, arid ihatthey were done
by· the Department of Defense under· Army's research and develop~ent. As such, they wolild not havebeeilpart of the Agency's pro..
.
Ject OFTEN.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, in one of the CIA documents on drug
research you indicate Agency support .for the clinical testing and
coJlection of information on, and slUDples of, foreign drug developments,which terminated in January. Because of prolonged aftereffects, additional charges to the contract were made after this date·
for the. necessary post-test follow-up observation and examinations
of the volunteer.
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. There is a volunteer.
Mr. GORDON. I acknowledge there is conflict, but I cannot explain
that. We have nothin2 in our records that indicates that there was
the kind of testing tJiat we were interested in, or ClA-sponsored

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We d9lmow that there had been testing on this particular
compound_l!rior to Agency's saying, "Can, you test it for us in this
fashion?" We asked for If. specific kind of application.
SenatQr KENNEDY. Well, this is your document, not DOD's document.
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. It talks about a follow-up on. the volunteer,
and your testimOl!Y is that there was no human testing? "
Mr. GORDON. We have nothing beyond that information.
,'. ' Senator KENNEDY. And, yet, the documents th$t were provided
for us, against some back~und yesterday, where we heard from other
agents who talked about the ve.lue of the files that are kept by the
Agency, seems to indinate otherwise. I mean, if you are confused,
you can imagine how we are on t h i s . '
,
Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir, I certainly can..
"
Admiral TURNER. May I interrupt, sir?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Admirel TURNER. I want to make it perfectly clear, Senator Kennedy, we are not professing to tell you the complete story of these
activities. We are professing to tell you the complete story that we
know. These records that we have uncovered are financial records.
They do not tell the story; they tell pieces of it.
Senator KENNEDY. The thing, though, Admiral Turner, having
tracked this the best that we could from the origins of the program,
we are now up to 1973. There are people around who were involved
in that program. In dealing with tlie early part of the 1950's, it is a
little more difficult because the people who were involved in those
programs are deceased, and we can understand that.
But, now, we are talking about the people who were involved in it
in 1973 and we have direct conflicting testimony on the nature of this
program,' both .from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Now, is that not the case in terms olthe material
that we showed you in preparation for this hearing? The Department
of Defense is in basic conflict with what you are telling us, in terms
of the. nature of the program? And we have just seen an example of
that, in terms of my questions here.
Now, do you understand that; that there is a dilemma that we arc
confronted with at the present time?
'
Admiral TURNER. I do not sense a great sense of conflict between
us and the Department of Defense.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, will you explain for me, then; why, in
your testimony, you tell us that you have full responsibility for that,
and Mr. Gordon says that there was nQ human testing, and then in
the file here, it shows that there were four testings, and we will give
you the dates on those programs?
Admiral TURNER. It is my understanding that is done under the
Army program, not under the CIA program.
Senator KENNEDY. And the Army say~, specifically, "The projects
the Director defines in his testimony as basically Department of
Defense projects, were, in fact, planned, directed, and controlled by
the Central Intelligence Agency." Now; that is from the DOD; we
got it last night;direct.ed control, and that the military departments
were soJely a conduit of funds from the CIA to out.c:;,ide contractors.

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Now, that is 1973. That is just a iew years ago, and that is why we
have difficulty on it, and I imagine y.ou have difficulty, too. ' ... "
Admiral TURNER. I have great ddIiculty. I am happy to ask· the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, who is in the room, '
to come up and help us clarify this thing. I am not trying to hide
anything. If there is confusion here-I do not understand it that way.
I do not understand this statement; I have never seen it or heard it
before.you read it.
' .
'
So, if she would like to come up, we will try to straighten it out
between the two of us. .
"
Senator KEXSEDY. Well, I do not want to take away from your
time. Does the Counsel just want to make a reference to that at this
time, or if you want to be more elaborate on this, we wiII give you a
chance.
.
.
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Ms. SIEMER. Well, we will appear before you later on this morning,
Senator. We do not know any more about it than the admiral does.
We have the same records, and we come to a different conclusion.
Our conclusion is that thp, testing that was done was 'r'art of a project
that was tested by the Agency. We ha.ve no additiona documents and
no additional records, other than those that are available.
Senator KES~EDY. Then, we will wait. As I understand, you have
the same documents as the Agency has and you both reached different
conclusions, in terms of responsibility.
, Ms. SIElIER. We have provided our documents to Admiral Turner.·
I apologize over the fact that they were not provided to him until 2
days ago, and he has not had an opportunity to look at those and
try to analyze them. That is my fatilt, because it took us a long time
to get them out of our files.
.
Senator KE~XEDY. WelJ, we will hear from you later on. But, the
problem, as we see it, is in this foJ1ow-on testing, and over the course
o! our investigati~ns.' we see th! ,~arious kind~of drug testing,...assumi!1E
<hfferent names; It IS the ~JKULTRA, ~lKSE.:\RCH, M]~CHICK
WIT, M:KOFTEN. Whether they have"~IK" before them or not,
there is a continuing program for a period of some 21 years, up to
1973, with unwitting and, then, witting subjects.
The matter that we are obviously concerned with is the issue of
accountability; people wonder how these programs go on and coiltinue. You are not going to be able to halt a program, or review it,
or protect the people who a..e involved'in it unless we know \vho is in
charge. We have direct, contl~cting testimony from the two agencies
of Government that have responsibility in this area., that is the Agency
and the DeI!artment of- Defense, and that is where we are at. ..
Adm~ral T,(;R~ER. WelJ, we are happy to try to sort it ou t. I have
just been handed what I am told is the DOD document that you are
referring to, and in tab G, last page, there isa statement whichand this is a DOD document, not mine-'it says:
."
In June, 1973, two military voluntee~ were tested at Earl&-thatis an army
depot-with EA-3167, but these tests were funded b;r army RDCE funds, and
they are Dot Connected in any way with the CIA project. .

I do believe I am responsible for OFTENjCHICKWIT.I do believe
that we funded some things through the Army under OFTEN!
CHICKWIT, and that the Army did other projects which were not
part of OFTENjCHICKWIT, but were in the same area and related

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to it, .and that this testing of human volunteers was in that latter
category of an Army project closely related to OFTEN/CHICKWIT.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we will move onfrom this. I will yield to
SenatorSchweikeron it, but we will try and get the staffs of your
department and DOD with the same material, since we all agree that
we have got the same documents; so that ·we ~an at least get a resolution about it. I think that is goin~ to be important.
We have the remaining areas, which weare going to review with
Admiral Turner, but Senator Schweiker has an area now.
Senator SCBWEIKER. Well, I have another example the same exact
sort of conflict between your CIA testimony at the last hearing and
the information we now have, Admiral. I want to ~reface my remarks
by saying I commend you fo:.: releasing the initial Qocuments. I know
it was not an easy thing to do; and I know from having served on the
former Intelligence Committee, that that committee could not even
get the infonnation at all. So, I think you have to be given credit for
providing us with the documents.
But, I want to bring up another instance of the same type of conflict
that Senator Kennedy just brought up with regard to other projects.
When I questioned you last time you were here, I asked you apout
subproject 54 on l::"'ain concussion. One of your aides gave a brief reply,
and you promised to find out what you could about it and supply it
to us.
.
~ e have not had ~o much success.~ getting any additional information, except, I. think, at the last nunute, we were told the CIA
really did not have control of this project: It was handled by the
Office of Naval Research; it was basically their project. The CIA
phased it out.
WeU, here we have, again, in the Defense Depa.rtment's, testimony·,
dated Se~tember 20th, what appears to be a contradiction. Here is
what DOD says about it: "
.
This ~roject began in October, 1954 and was terminated, at· least with respect
to the Navy, in December, 1955. It was performed by a contractor located in
California. The involvement of the Navy was primarily as a conduit of funds
from"the ~ntral Intelligence Agency to the contractor. A small amount of Navy
fuudamayalso have been used ·for this contract. In December, 1955, this project
was terminated as far asthe.Navy involvement wasconcemed, and it thereafter,
apparently became subproject 54 in the MKUI..TRA project.

We are raced with areal dilemma in pin~ointingrespon~ibility and
authority as to what happened. Here is another classic example where,
initially, you folks said, no; it was funded and run by the Office of
Naval Research; it was their project. That was the only information
you could supply to us about the project. Now, the Defense Department is saying just the opposite.
How do we pinpoint account~bility and responsibility? How can
we tell who was in charge?
.
"
Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, I would like to make a few comments to
that, since I answered your question before on 54. We furnished the
committee with all the pIoject folders on MKULTRA, including 54,
complete.
senator ScHWEIKER. I want to compliment you for that. I think
it was critical to our at~:kts to sort out what went on in the
MKULTRA projects, I t '
we should compliment you for doing

that.

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Senator KENNEDY. Would you identify yourself, plea<;e?'.
. .
Mr. LAUBINGER. I ibeg your pardon, Senator. lam Frank Laubinger
with the Office of Technical Service, which was formally TSD, Tech- ,
"mcal Services Division. I testified before with the Admiral on
MKULTRA.
On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in
tenns of the work that they prop03e to do, and you asked about the
p!'Oposal and Lsaid, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA.
Now, I overloo~ed-at least, my memory did not serve me correctly
when I went through that tile folder to see one memorandum dated
January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact~ that
that proposal was based on prior work that w~ funded by the Agency.
SeIia.tor SCBWElltER. By whom? .
,
.Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file
folder. It did not happen to be in my head when I testified.
•Senator SCBWElltER. I think I might have read part of that memo
to you at the last hearing. That is why I argued with you at the time,
because I think I had documents in .front of me, as I recall, which
clearly indicated CIA involvement. I did read that to you. You did
supply the documents to us. There is no ~rgument about that information, but you seemed to be denying what al'peared clea.r from
the documents and :2ersisted in denying it until this morning.
.
Mr. LAUBINGER.' Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in
my own view, I am reading under the ULTRA project, that ifit had
bee"n funded under ULTRA, it would have had a project number and'
identified as such. The thing that threw me was that it was
funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it
was under the nonnal contracting process, so tha~ it was not included
in MKULTRA as any work done under that funding umbrella.
The tile folder that you have 'and I have, right here, makes it quite
clear, however, that 1 year's work was done through Navy funding"a Navy funding mechanism-on which the proposal was based that
ultimately came into the MKULTRAprogram. That second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I
think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.
Senator·ScHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's
statement here that even though the initial funding went through
Navy, the Navy was really acting just as a conduit for the CIA?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.
Admiral TURNER. Would you like me. to address your other basic
points, Senator?
"
SenatOr KENNEDY. Yes; if we could go to the quality of the nature
of the files of the Agency, and the'kind of information that is get"aJ1g
up through. the system. ~1aybe you would want to make a general
comment about those allegations and charges which we heard from
the four witnesses to the effect that many of the descriptions of
ULTRA projects contained in the files, for which they were responsible, were not accurate. The witnesses referred to these descriptions as
boilerplate descriptions. One went so far as to say that some of the
records were intended to be misleading. Mr. Lashbrook even implied that there would be two sets of files; one with a complete,
accurate description; one without that.

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Would you comment on the recordkeeping activities of the AgencYt
and do you have requirements that project approval be based on
accurate memoranda which actually reflect what has been done alld
what is intended to be done? Do' you have' double' bookkeeping?
And· why do so many" witnesses take issue with the substance of the
documentation?
,
'
'
Admiral TURNER. There is lots of confusion about the files at the
CIA. I have no indication that anyop,e has kept deliberately inaccurate files. I think when people refer to inaccuracies in this particular context,' they really should be using the word Hincomplete". We
mentioned from the beginning that what we are telling you is incomplete, through no fault of our own at the moment.
'
There are systems at the agency, quite proper, where we have what
we call working files and official files, and there are lots of good reasons
for having working files.And,sometimes, people who do not understand the system try to portray that as a duplicate-perhaps, false,
"
incomplete, or otherwis~distortingfile.
The working file generally is an, incomplete file, and one of the main
reasons for that is that we are dealing in a world of necessary slacurity
and secrecy. And if the man on my right is working on a part of a
project, whether it is one of these or anything else, newill develop a
working file from which he operates, and we do not want it to have the
things that belong to my man on the left, if he is working on a different
part of that project and the two of them do not need to know each
other's part.
'
In order to keep the secrecy as tight as we can, the working files will
be different and each Will. be incomplete, for ~ood reason. In addition,
we keep working files as a matter of convemence and as a matter of
insuring that the official file does not get tom apart, separated, lost, or
destroyed in any way.
"
So, the fellow that has got to have it in his hands and maybe take
it with him to meetings, he takes a copy, which is called a working
file. I thi;1k that is what .the witnesses yesterday, if they were not ~eing
self-se~, "!ere refemng to when they su~gested we had duplicate
files. But,agam, I have no way of guaranteemg, Senator, what people
put in the files in the 1950's and 1960's.
"
J only say that I have looked into the system as it exists today in the
agency, and I do not find any evidence of people keeping files for the
purpose of distorting the facts to people who have the right to get into
them.
"
,
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do I understand-and I realize this was before
your watch-that a file, whether official or working; would not be
p~pared with the purpose of distorting the project or obscuring or
hid~ the facts?
'
Adiniral TURNER. I have no evidence of that, Senator. As I say, I
cannot tell you-Senator SCHWEIKER. We came across the Dr. Geschickter case
yesterday. He pretty well denied the essence of what was in the files.
For example, the files said there was to be a memOraIldllm of agreement
between the Agency and Dr. Geschickter on subproject 35, and that
he was completely writing off the terms of the agreement yesterday,
he denied ever knowing of such an agreement at all, denied ever seeing
a memorandum of agreement, and denied signing a memorandum of
agreement.

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. Admiral TURNER. Well, 1 have not read Dr. Geschickter's testimony. I have been told a little bi~ about it. It is my understanding he
said that we gave $335,000 to Georgetown University, or to his foundationfor the Georgetown UniverSity; that we neither got nor asked for
any services in return for that, and I just find that an utterly incredible
allegation for anybody to make. . .
. .
I cannot imagine any official of this government giving away $335,000 and not asking foJ:" something in return. . ...
.
Senator.KENNEDY. Well, did you get anything in return?
Admiral TURNER. We do not know what we got. ..
.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the point. If you had other kinds
of· documents or information on it, you might have some idea, but
you really do not lmow. It ~incrediJ:)le to us that they gave it away.
. AdmiralTuRNER. I did notsay he was incorrect.'
.
Senator KENNEDY. Right.
.
Admiral TURNER. I said it was incredible that it could happen.
I cannot believe it. I think he was IDistaken.
Senator KENNEDY. I dare say that.it was somewhat more severe,
in terms of the criticisms of the recordkeeping. Mr. Goldman indicated that he was ordered by his superiors to justify the continuation
of a program and to file a statement that would justify it, which was
not based ~pon the merits of that particular program.
They talked about boilerplate language that was used for the
continuation of the program. In one memorandum for the record of
Mkultra, it says:
This project was conducted by Cal Salerno, who holm. top secret agency
clearance and is cornpletely witting of the aims and goals of the project.

Mr. Salerno swore in his sworn testimony that he was shocked to
hear that. He testified he never lmew the aims or the goals of the
project.
More reeently,in the Mkabate,which is another program-a
subdivision of one of the other MK's-.in January of 1972 the notation
of it. says,. 'iauthorizingMkabate dated '1964, I think we should
update, since new Del"-new Director of. Central Intelligence
Agency-then signed by the person.' '..
..
.. .
.. Right underneath i~this. is obviously .~e superior-·"No action
by TSB/BF, per telecon Wlth"-.'another agent. Then, the agent,
evidently~ is not satisfied and, later, on January 18, 1972, -it says;
"Call, reference ne~d for' an update of Mkabate activity. approval."
And then, he contmues, "DCI approval 1964, why update due to
change in DCI's?" And then, under the bottom from the superior,
"No action required."
.
Now, how would you even knO\V that these things were going on?
This is in the one area, in terms of huma.n experimentation, that the
new Director was going to get any kind of information. How do you
know, really, wha~ is going on, if you have got people as recently as
that, and that is in 1972? I imagine Some of these people are still
there.·
.
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have no comment. If Mr. Horowitz
had included that on the list of material he wanted me to prepare for,
I would have. I have never heard of Mkabate until this time.
Senator KENNEDY. We just received that this morning, and it is
just ~e)evant to this particular area.
Could we go to the relationship with the other agencies?

134

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Admiral TURNER~ Yes, sir. We have very cleiU" rules on these. You
asked about universities. We have an internal regulation issued in
February of 1976 that we will have-no contractual relationship with a
university that is unwitting to the university.
We do not have any relationships with other agencies of the U.S.
Government which are unwitting to the appropriate people in those
agencies, and in your area of health care, any remotely. related health
item that we get mvolyed in today-psychology, and th!!J.gs like thiswe have to get a serially numbered approval from the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, and they are, therefore, fully witting.
And we do not get into this kind of area without it being approved by
the proper health authorities in the Government.
senator KENNEDY. You do not believe, nor is it the policy now,
that the agency work covertly with any other agencies of Government?
Admiral TURNER. Well, we work covertly with other agencies of
Government.
Senator KENNEDY. Within the other agencies?
Admiral TURNER. We do not work covertly ~ainst those people.
Somebody in those agencies knows what we are domg.
_
Senator KENNEDY. Well, does the Director of each of the agenc: ~s
alwd:.,:tw what the activities of the CIA are?
A . TURNER. Yes.
Senator SCBWEIKER. You are saying it is done wittingly?
Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
Senator SCBWEIKER. That is the question, whether the other
agencies are witting or unwitting of the CIA's activities.
Admiral TURNER. I do not say, Senator Schweiker, that everybody
in those agencies knows.
Senator SCBWEIKER. But, you are saying the top official knows?
Admiral TURNER. That is correct. I have had personal conversations with-a number of Cabinet officers who have relationships with us,where we work them out in detail. But, I am sure there is a certain
secrecy within their agencies, just as there is within ours.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What about CIA use of foundations? Foundations came u-'p.wit.h relat~on. to Dr. Geschickter's test~mony. I be~eve
the CIA established a policy some years back of not usmg foundatIOns.
Am I correct in that or n<it?
Admiral TURNER. That, I do notSenator SCHWEIKER. A foundation was apparently used to fund the
Geschickter fund as a conduit, I believe the policy on the CIA's use of
foundations is known as the Katzenbach guidelines. I am just wonder-'
ing if the Katzenbach~guidelinesare still in effect.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, they are.
Senator SCHWEIKER. And what, in essence, do they provide?
Admiral TURNER. Well, I am not positive of those with respect to
foundations. I would be happy to get that for you.
Senator SCBWEIKER. Could one of your assistants maybe answer
that?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I am sorry. I did not hear your question. Would
you ask it again?
_
Senator SCBWEIKER. I believe -the Katzenbach guidelines were
promulgated back in 1967, when some information about CIA foundatic~)D .fun<!ing came to light. My question really is, are the guidelines
still m effect. and what are they? :-

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135
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Admiral TURNER. Wewillhave to furnish that.for the record, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'Fine. We'd. appreciate· that~ .
. [The infol'Dlation referred 'to follows:]'
. ..

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136
'rHE DIRECTOR' OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20505

Office of legislative Coullsel

27 September 1977
l

Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research
.
Committee on Human Resources
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.20SI0

•

Dear Mr. Chairman:
In respon.se to Senator Richard Schweiker's question
as to whethe~ the Agency is following the guidelines of
the Katzenbach Report, I have contacted appropriate
offices in the Agency and I can assure you that.we are
complying with the guidelines recommended by the Report
and endorsed by the President.

Enclosed is a copy of the Katzenbach Report for
your information.

,.
"-

Ie L. Miller
Legislative Counsel

•

137
. THE UNDERSECR£TARY

or STATE

• I

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1967

•
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. Dear Hr.. President:
The cOIDIQittee which you appoi~ted on Februa1:Y; 15. '1967 .
·has sought, pursuant to your request:
.
. ,."-. .

. .' .--;0 review relationships between government agencie~.
notably the Central Intelligence Agency,and edUcat1l)na]. .
~d private voluntary organizations which operate abroad;

and

.- .

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--To recoumend meanato help assure that such oqam.- •
zations can play their proper and vital role abroad.
The committee has' held a number of meetings, interviewed
dozens of individuals' in and out of government, and reviewed
t!--"usands of pages of reports. We have surveyed the relevant activities .of a iwmber of federal agencies. And
bav~
reviewed in particul"; and specific "detail the rela*DS}dp
between CIA and each .relevant organization•

.-.

Our report, supplemented with supporting classified
documents, follows.

-In summary, the colllllittee offers two basic recoamendatioos:
1. It should be the policy of the United States Govern-.
ment that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial

The President

•

The White

House~

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138

assistance or S~PPort1 director indirect. to· any of the
nation' sedueational .or .private voluntary or.ganizations.
'the Gov~rnment should promptly develop andestablbh
mechanism to provide public funds openly
~r ovet'seas activities of organizations ~hlch area41~dged
deserving. in the national interest. of p~blic s~pport.
..2.

p~blic~private

•
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A NEWPOLIC!'

saw

The years immediately after World· War .11
a surge.
of .cOllllll1lnist activity in organizations throuahout the world.
S~derits• scientists iveterans .WOID8n and profess:ton&l groups
were organized ·1nto international bodies which spoke :In the
cadences.. advocated the policies. and furthered the interests
of the communist bloc. !Weh of this activity was organized.
directed. and financed covertly by, commun~st governments.

•

'American organizations reaeted°:"frOlll the first. The
yoUitg iDen and women who' foundltld. the United Stat:es Rational
S~dent Association. for 8XaJDPle. did so precisely to give
American youth the capacity to hold their own in the international arena. B~t the importance of s~del\ts as a foree
in international events had yet to become widely' understood"
~41d' NSAfound it difficult to attract private support for
tts international activities. Accordingly. the United States
.C'..cwernment. acting through the Central Intelligence Agency.
provided support for this overseas work.
0"

)

. We have taken liSA as an ~ample. While no usefu1· purpose would be served by detailing any other CIA programs
of ·assistance to private Americaa volutttary organizations.
one fundamentalpoiDt should be clearly stated: such
•
;assi~tancewas given pu;suant to National Security Council
policies beginning ill ·October. 1951 and with t~ subsequent
concurrence of high-level senior 'intfitrdepartmental review
committees in the last four Administrations. I'nDecember.
1960. in a classified report s~ttedafter a year of study.
a public·private Presidential Committee on Information
Activities Abroad specifically endorsed both overt ancl covert
programs. including those assisted by CIA•.

....

_'_-'~-'"-~".,~-,,

139
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',()gr' stUdy., undet:t:aken 'lI.t,alater' . tiaae~cliaC:loses D~ ,
"evelop::aents ~>ltich s\ltgest ·that "'. . should Dow re-ex~ ,
dlese policies. ,The Americ~n public. for eumple. bas be-,
come incre~singl" aware of the' importance of the complex
foms of intern.tio~lcampetitionbetween' free, .societie,s
ad coiaunist states. ,As this awareness has growD. so have
potential sources of support far the overseas work of pri-'
. vate organizations.
'
There is no precise index 'to. these aources. but their
berease issuuest;ed by thegrOb-th in the" number of pt:iv,ate.
foundation, from 2..220 in 1955 to 18a.OOOin 1967. Bence it . .
'I. ~ncrC!as1naly possible for organizations like liSA to seek" .
-'support for overseas activities 'from open sources.
-

.
.Just .as sources of support have increased, so has the
,D'UlDber of Aulerican groups engaged in overseas work. .Accord'IDI to the Agency for International Development, there has •
been a nine-fold increase just amO'ng voluntary organizati.QllS
'Which participate in techriic:al assistance abroad, risins"
hom 24 1n 1951 to' 220 in 1965.. The total of all priv.te
AMricanvoluntary grOups nen'7 working overlie. . .y well exc . .d • "thousand. .
"
.
The number'of s~h organizations which has been assisted
eovertlyis a 5_11 traction of the total. Tbevast pre.~erance hav.had-no relationship with the government or
bIlve accepted only open gove~ntfunds--t."h1.chgreatly exceed
&Ids supplied covertly.
.
. - :
. '
• The work of" private American organizations. in a host
cd fields. has been of· great benef;lt to scores of eountr1es •
.. nat benefit must not be impaired by foreign doubts about:
tbe" independence at these 'organizations.' The com!!litteebe-

¥evesit isessenti.lfortheUnit:ed States' to underscore
and dec1sively~

~.tinc!ependence itai':tediately

•

For these reasons. the cOlmtte. recDrilDends the following:

;)

140
-4·STAmmNT C1E POLICY

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No federal qency shall provide ~y. covert
financial assistance or support, direct or indirect., to any of the nation' s educational or
private'vol~tuy orlanizations.
Tid.. policy
specifically applies to all foreign activities
of such orlanizations and it reaffirms present. .
policy with respect to their domestic act1.vities~

•

where such 'support has beerll:1ven~ it will

be teadnated a. quickly as possible without de-

stroying valuable private oraanizations before
they cap seek new means of support.*
'

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. We believe that, particularly in the liaht of 'r!lcent
publicity, establishment of a clear policy ofth1s kind is
the only way for the aovernment to carry out two important.
respo~sib1lit1es. One i. to 8Yoid any implication that
goVernmental assistance, because it 1s aivencovertly, is
used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups.
'lbe second responsibility is to make it plain. in all fo~eign·.
countries that the activities of private AMerican aroups
abroad Ere. in fact, private.
The cO!l::dttee has sought cuefully to assess the hIp~t
of this Statel:!ent of Policy on CIA. ~"e have revi.e-.-ed each
relevant program of assistance carried oUt by ~ Agency in
case-by-case detail. As a -result of this SCi'Utiny, the
committee is satisfied that application of the State=ent Q£
Policy vill-not unduly handicap the Agency in the exercise
qf ies national security responsibilities. Indeed, it
should be noted that, starting ~ll before the appearance
of recent public-ity, CUbad initiated and pursued efforts
to ~~sengaaefr~ certain of these activities.
.- •
,The cos:mittee also reco::mends that- the i:liplei:!etlt&t1.on
.of this policy be 8uperVise~ by the senior interdepartcental
"

*On the basis of our cue-by-case review. we expect that
the process of term1.nation can be largely--perbapsentirely-c~leted by Dece~ber 31. 1967.
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review committee which already pnsses on proposed CIA activiti.c:s and which ,;·'ould review and assist in t!:te p~ocess of
disengagement.·
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NEll lolETHODSOF ,§UPPoRT

llhile our' first recorm:endat1on seeks to insure the independence of private voluntary organizationS. it does Dot
deal with an underlying probler:l--ho,;o1 to suppOrt the national
need
for. and the intrinsic ..'worth of. their efforts abroad.
.
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Anyone who has .the slightest familiat-ity lIith'intellectual Qr y«?uth groups abroad knows ~hat free institutions
continue to be under bitter. continuous attack. some of it
carefully organized and well-financed. all of" it potentially
dangerous to this nat~n. .
It is of the greatest "importance 1:0 our future ~d to
the future of free institutions everywh~re that other ria.tions~
especially their young people. knO';·7. and, understand- American
vieto7points. There is no be-tter way- to meet this need than
t~ugh the activity 9f private American organizations.

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The tiM ~, surel,. c~ for the govemment to nelp
support such .tICtb'~t,. in a mature. open manner.

Same progress toward that aimalread,. has been made.
a number, of federal agencies have developed
contracts. 'grants.- and other forms of openaasistance to
private organizations for overse.. activities. ,This .seC
assistance. hOwever. does not deal with a, maj or as~~ of
theprob1.elll. A number of or,anizations cannot. without
h8llper1Dg ,their effectiveness, as independent bodies. accept
funds dire~tlj, fr~iove~nt
agencies •
..
.'
In.recentyears~

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'The cOlllllittee: therefor. recoaaends that the GcWermilent

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should promptly develop and establish. public.-private mechan!_
to .provide public funds openly for oVerseas activities, of '
organizations which are .adj udged deserviDg. in the naticmal
interest. of publicsupporr;.
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oSuch' a mechanism ~oulci' take VKious. forms. ODe -prOads~. Eugene- Black. cal}.s for a
publicly funded but privat~Iy adminbtered bod,. patterned
on tpe Bg,tish Council.

ina proposal. advanced by

'!'be" British Council esta~lished" in 1934. OP!l~ates 1D 80
countries. administering approximately $30.000.000JlDDiI.lly
for reference libraries. exhibitioDS. scholarships •. international confereDc~s.ancI cultural.;"Ucha'Qges.Because 21
of lts 30 members are drawn frOID pr$.va~e life. the CoaDcU
has maintained a reputation for independence. even tboa&1l' _
90 per~ellt of its funds are gove~tal..
.
'\

According to' the UNESCO Directory ·of Cultural aelat.1Das
Services. other D&tiOftS have developeCl: somewhat s1m11ar ,
.iJistitut;ioils. Tb8 Indian Council for "Cultural aelat1~.
, for example, is "entlrely govem-nt-financed but operates
autonOlllOUSly. ' The govemlnibody of the SWedish IustihU
for Culturall.elationa cpasists of both government and
.
private members. This iDstitute receives 75 percent of its
funds from the goverament aDd the remainder frCllll private
contributions.
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'1'ba expen_ce of these and other'~~trles
helps to demoDstrate the desirability 6f • similar
body iD the United States, ~olly or ·largelyfuDlled ..
by the federal govermaent. .Ano~r appro&cb. might
be tha establ1s!m:ant of a g'""erDill8ntal foundatiOll.
perhaps with 11uks to the '-Slating Federal InterAsency Council 011 Inte~doual Ecluc~t:iOIl··pd .
Cultural Affairs.
Such a public-private bOdy.would not be ··~to
the UDited States. C:-nare.s established the Siid.'th- .
sonia Institution, for example, '-more thaD a CeDbD:y'
a&o •• a private corporation. uDder the~c11aiash1p
of Couaress, butgowrued by··• •ed public-private
BOard of Regents.
. .
1'ba cOlllldttee began a prel11D1na-ry study of'what ..
.might be the best method of meeting the present uee4.
It is evident, however. ~t, because of the great.
range both of existiDg govenuuent and private ph11Glthrop1c programs. the refinement of alternat:iv81 aucl
selection' amoag them is a task of considerable complexity. AccorcliDg1y, we elo not ·:be11eve that: tb:1s
exclusively governmental cOlilDlttee is an appropriate
forum for the task· and we· recoaaenc1. instead, the
appointment of a larger group. :lDc1ueliDg iDUviduals
in private life with extensive experience, in this .
£ie1el.
.

ne basic principle. in anY event. is clear.
Such a new in.ti~tion would iuvo1ve goverament funds.
It might well 1Dvol:wgoverm:aent officials. But a.
prem1ualmust be placed. on theiDvolvemeut o£ p~VIIte
- .citizens and the exercise of private judgments. for
to be effective. ·it would have to bave--aud be
recopized to have--a¥gh degree of independellce•

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"'lbe prompt c;reatiqn of such an institution. based··
on this prlnciple. would f111 au important--and never .

apparent--~tional need.

~e8PectfUlly.

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Health. E":ucation

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Richard Helms.

Director of
Central Intelligence

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Nicholas deB. Ka~~biac~·
Under SecretaJ;y of. State.'
Chairman

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Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions. It
seems tome that this mat~r, as you know, is going to come up with
the general ~delines that will be set forth by the Intelligence Committee, and It seems to me we have cleared the air to some extent.
And 1 ~hink, as has been said too often here, it is well to bear in
mind that all this took place many years ago, before these gentlemenand, certainly, Admiral Turner-was involved in any· way, .or the
current regjme in the Defense Department.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I have another question.
.
Admiral Turner, last time we were here, I think the chairman and
other members of the committee discussed your plans for notification
of the institutions and investigators involved in MKULTRA. Could
you b~ us up to date on whether that notification has taken place?
Have all the institutions been told of their former involvement?
Admiral·TuRNER. Is General Counsel here?
. Senator KENNEDY. Would you identify yourself, please?
Mr. JULIEN. Emile Julien; I am with the agency's Office of General
Counsel. We are still in the l?rocess of working out notifying individuals, where we can find indiVIduals, with the Department of Justice.
Admiral TURNER. All the institutions have been notified, have they
not?
Mr. JULIEN. All the institutions, yes.
Admiral TURNER. All the institutions have, and in each case, we
have offered, if they want, to provide them all the back-up material
that is unclassified that we can. We just sent them a letter and described the fact that we were involved. Some of them have come back
and ask for those details. Some of them have sent representatives here
. to our offices to review the materials. Others have not responded at all.
But, we are available to give them everything that we have given you
on an unclassified basis tliat they want.
Senator SCHwEIKER. What about efforts to locate subjects of previous research projects for medical check-ups or follow-ups, or informing
unwitting subjects that something might have happened to them during the testing program? What is the policy of the agency, and where
are we in that regard?
Admiral TURNER. We are doing everything we can there. But, of
course, I am being very careful to keep the agency.out of investigating
and searching for American citizens inside the United States. We have
turned that over to the Attorney General who has turned it over to the
FBI. I asked him just yesterday how they were going, and he said they
are working on it, but they have not yet actually located anybody.
But,we are giving them all of the information we have.
There are only a few cases where we think it is likely they would
even be able to find people, and that is like in an institution. A penal
institution might have kept some records. They have some problems
checking with legalities here, and they have not. actually, to my
·knowledge, found any people yet, but they are checking.
Senator SCHWEIKER. This is all going to be handled by the Justice
Department, you say?
.
Ac;lmiral TURNER. Yes, is there a legal check here? I thought it was
a matter of informing people and doing medical followup, or am I
missing the point?
.

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The Attomey General tells me he had some conce:rils about the
the wa.y we ~ about finding these people and prying into
the records of these insti~utions, and so on. I d9 not have the details
or specifics on that, Senator, but he has taken responsibility for the
governmental effort to locate the individuals, and weare providing
su~rt in any way we can.
There is one more supplementary point of information. . . . .
Mr. BRODY. I might add one thing, Senator, and that is that we are
getting o.ccassi0I?-alletters.in f!om peo..R!e who say they have been; or
recall bemg subJects of expenments. We are domg whatever we can
to check out those names of people to see if we have anything in our
own records to indicate that, mdeed, that was the case, and we will be
cooperatiJ!g with those people to try to give them whatever we have.
Admiral TURNER. We have had 77 letters, 49 of which we have answered that we do not have any help for them, and the rest, we are
stiUresearching.
. .
Senator KENNEDY. What records would you chec~ for the unwitting
subjects? As in all the records, you have checked them all, have you'
not?
.
Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes. We have no names of individuals, but
they tell us, "My son was in this place at this time; was that anywhere
connected with your activities," and so on. Lots of people in the
country have written us that are totally unrelated, we are sure.
Senator KENNEDY. In an earlier question in August, we asked about
the other tests involvmg current active tests studying human behavior and what research was taking place. Now, you indicated you
would make that available to us. Could you? We have not received that
yet. 1 would be interested in it, if you could provide it for us in the next
2 or 3 weeks; page 32 of the transcript.
Admiral TURNER. All right. We Will check it out and get it to you,
sir.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Fine. I know you have got a time problem, and I
will just hold you a few more minutes. Can you tell us, from a defense
intelli~ence position, now, what should :be being done now, in terms .
of natIonal security reasons, in this area?
I mean are we faced v.ith adversaries that are continuing to be
involved in this? Obviously, we take that responsibility extremely
seriously, and we want to work closely with the agency along the
guideliries which we have suggested and which you have indicated
.
strong personal support f o r . ·
But, is there anything that you want to mention in this area to us
today?
Admiral TURNER. I have nothing specific, Senator, but we must
keep abreast of what other nations may be doing in these areas that
could be used against us or our people. That, of course,· need not
involve experimentation on humans and, certainly, would not involve
unwitting experimentation on humans. But, through our normal intelligence o~rations, we target against the research activities or the
operation81 use of drugs or mind controlling experimentation in other
countries.
I have no evidence at this point that there is any serious threat or
activity in that area at this moment, but I think we must constantly
monitor that, and if we come to any necessity of a response to it or
preparation for i t l~ality of

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Senator KENNEDY. How prevalent is it now, in terms of the Agency's
agents overseas, and the, rest of them?
.. Admiral TURNER. Not prevalent. It is not a problem.
Sen,atorK:"ENNEDY. But, your information is that there is tha.t capac~
ity for this activity ~. adversaries, is that correct? .
.
Admiral TURNER. Yes; there is.
Senator KENNEDY. Let me just Plske a final comment, Admiral
Turn~.r. I thinkon~ of the things ~hatl.·ssO p~rpleX;ing, as ~e.are t~g
to bnng the curtam down on this phase of mtelbgence, 18 to gam an
understanding in terms of the value and. in terms of the national
security that was obtained through these 21 years of eXperimentation
on unwitting, as well as witting subjects. What was the value in terms
. . . .'
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of our national security?
. I am completely convinced that what was dane and what was tested
could have been done through the other agencies, and done in the
open. I know that there are those that feel, HWell,we wanted to keep
aw~yfrom our adversaries:, the progress that was beingma.de."But,
.' the fact of the matter is, most of the results of the studies that were
being done were actually printed and reported fu documents which
would have been available to our adversaries.
But, besides that, as we try to come to a conclusion on this we se",
really, in what we hope to be our final day, a direct conflict between
two agencies of· Government working under one administration; the
agency and the Department of Defense. It seems there is a conflict in
terms of the responsibility for the testing in the latter years, which
brings us up to 1973 ; which was not that/long ago.
We are going. to make every effort. to try and resolve this, given the
fact that it is simila.r material, but we have the two different agencies
of Government drawing completely .different conclu~ions. I firmly
believe that unless you can get accountability in a program with
dimensions such as t.his, or in any program, for that matter, that we
arejust not meeting our responsibilities for the protection of Americans.
What we are talking abou~ IbeJieve, is an extraordinary burden
which exists for the Intelligence Agency in the United States. W.e put
more of a burden on our Iiltelligence Agency than any other country
puts .on theirs', b~cause. we. eXJ>~ct you to carry t~C?ugh with ~he
mtelligence ga.thenngof informatIon, and yet to do It In ways which
are not going to violate the basic and fundamental principles" which
this country was built upon; and that is a· tough challenge. And I "
think the Agency, at different times in its history, has met it, and at
other times, it haS n o t . . ·
. . ..
But, the fact of the matter is, when we do not have that kind of
accountability, weare not going to have the responsibility in an area
which has affected individuals in the most extraordinary ways. That
is, altering their human· behavior, the various kinds of testings, the
electronics eavesdropping, and recording, all of which is so alien to
the. protection of human Jiberties,and then we see the perversion;
in the past, in terms of universities and other agencies of Government. All of this leaves the question of accountability, here in this area,
susRect.
.
.\Ve are reaching the real bedrock, in tenns of what this society is
to be about. I think it really challenges our whole kind of system to
see how we caq, bring an end· to those kinds of violations of individual
liberties, to~tect our institutions, and still provide for our national
security.

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We continue to be troubled by the nature of the recordkeeping.
We have direct conflicts by sworn testimony by different., agents.
Obviously, rour explanat.ion has been of SOme help, but we had different conflicts about just whether the recordkeepmg was in this file
or that file; agents, under sworn testimony, who toldthatther, were
told by superiors to work up a justification, and others that saId that
they signed matters as a matter of routine that had no relevancy
to the substance which they were interested in.
.'.
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We cannot come away from the conclusion that at least somewhereI do not think it is with you, personally, but I think within the
Agency, that they felt that this was all part of the past and it was not
really necessary to really come forward with the Kind of. information
that close this chapter.
'.
.
We find, .just in our staff people interviewing agents and people
that have information, that they have never been contacted by the
CIA~ even in recent times; recent weeks, recent days. And this is
.
disturbing.
.
. '.
But, we want to look to the future, both toward the charter of
the Agency that will be directed toward the protection of the human
subjects and we want to look to our legislation. We hf\ve extended
~h~ life of the panel onprotec~ionof human subjects, now. W~ passed
It m the Senate last week. It dId not have a partIcular phrase, m terms
of the Agency and DOD on it, but it is alisolutely es.-;ential that we
do, when we come to grips with that, ho~efully at the end oi this year
or the early part of next. The Secretary of HEW has some ideas
relating to that whole panel which we have to clarify:.
.
But, we will want your support in the charter which. I am sure,
from your own personal. testimony, you would see achieved, and we
, would want YOlll' support in terms of the legislation in the future. We
thank you for your presence here today.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you very much:
Senator KENNEDY. We will hear from Deanne Siemer from the
Department of Defense, who also has got a conflict' in terms of time,
her testimony will be, as! understand it, relatively brief and then we
will recess.
Ms. Deanne Siemer, we are glad to have you here. We welcome :rou
here. You have a lot of empty seats on both sides of you~ You look
like a lonely figure out there, but I can tell from our past communications with yon on other matters, that you handle these responsibilities
extremely well and capably for the Department.
Yle welcome your testimony here, we would like you, if you would,
to:l3irect yourself to those inconsistencies that I mentioned earlier
with Mr. Turner, giving you an opportunity to address those. I will
askyou to do whatever you want to do, in terms of your presentation,
but I hope you will come to grips with that particular problem;
.
whatever way you want to proceed.
STATElIEBT OF DEAImE C. SIEMER, GEBERAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTItEBT OF DEFENSE

, Ms. SIEMER. Senator, let me address first the question of the testing
at Edgewood with respect to this compound, which has been designated
3167.
Senator KENNEDY. What was that one? Can you tell us?

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Ms. SIEMER. That appears on page 5 ofmy report to the Secretary,
and it is a project that began in 1971, was terminated in 1973, and
was part of Often, or Mkoften.Apparently, what happened here is'
that the Edgewood Arsenal research laboratories were testing a
number of compounds prior to the time that the Central·Intelligence
Agency had any interest in these compounds.
'
They tested the compounds both on ariiInals and in human testing,
and the human testing has been reported 'to you previous!y.In1971,
the Central Intelligence Agency apparently reviewed Edgewood's
work in connection with their Project Often· to identify any -part of
Edgewood's work that might be useful for that project, or useful for
the purposes that they had in mind, which were o.pparentlydifferent
than the purposes for which Edgewood had initially done the testing.
In 1971,the Agency tre.nsferred' some$37~OOO to EdgewooQ. to
pursue testing of this compound, which' was-designated EA...3i67;
which had previously 'been. tested by Edgewood. The Agency was:
interested in some different kindq of testing.
Specifically, they wanted to know from Edgewood whether this
compound could be plit on an adhesive substance and transferred to
humans through skin contact. Edgewood's previous experimentswith
~his ~omJ>0un~ had apparent~y.bee!! done in clliferent forms of a~mi~
Iste~g It by mtermu.scular mJectIon, and other means of testmg It,
for different purposes.
.
The Agency wanted to know, could this compound be placed on an
adhesive substance and transferred to skin for absorption through the
skin. Again, the documentation is very sketchy and it is difficUlt to
tell exac.tly what was done. Edg~wood took ~he Agency's money,di~
the testmg, and was successful m formulatIng a way to apply this
'
compound to an adhesive.
They tested it primarily on animals and, indeed, the indicatio~are
that all of the results that were reported to the Agency were testing
on SJ#mals; prim~y, I .think, on mice~ Thefundin~for this was
planned to be tenmnated m Januatyof 1973. The fundmg apparently
was not terminated until June of 1973.
The testing about which you asked Admiral Tumer occurred some~
time in June of 1973. It is our conclusion from the documents available
to us, and from the people available to us, tha.t the testing oil that
particular compound, in June of 1973, was' a part of the Agency's
project.
"
,
Now, as I, say, I have no other doc~ents~support .that conclusion
than the Agency has to support.thelrconciuslon that It was not. T~e
reason I reach that conclusIon IS that Edgewood had completed Its
testing of this compound and had no furth~r interes'~ ~ it at the time
that the Agency asked Edgewood to take It up agam m 1971. When
the Agency asked Edgewood to take it up again, they did, they did
a certain amount of testing and that te~~g was completed·rin June•. "
of 1973, when the fundingfrom t~etAgency was completed.
There are, I think, five dqcuments relevant to this, which your staff
has been provided by the Agency. First, is a CIA document dated
May 29, 1973, which is a memorandum for the director of research
and development. The second is all undated CIA document entitled,
"Influencing Human Behavior." The third is a CIA document dated
February 12, 1975, which isa memorandum for the record and a trip
report to. Ed~ew?o~. to.. int~~ew ~~~pl~ with r.esp~ct, ~~~~~.~~~t

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1971, which, again~ is a memorandum for the director of research and
development.'
.
Those are the documents that we have; those 'are the documents
that the Ag~neyhas; and that is what we know about that program.
'. Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is very helpful. I Eather from what
you say that the interest of the Department-DOD had terminated
prior to the actual testing that was done.
Ms. SIEMER. That appears to be the case. This compound was one
of.a large number of compounds that were surveyed by Edgewood for'
yario~~ purp~ses. The Agency,came ~d loo~ed atEdgew~'s survey,
Identifiea this compound as of particular mterest to theIr purpose,
and asked that furtlier work be done~
.
Senator SCHWEiKER.There was a destruction of CIA documents in
January.1973. Is there any indication that signficant documents
relating to this project might have been destroyed with the files that
the CIA desfroyed around that period of time?
, Ms. SIEMER. I do not know that, Senator. I have no wayof knowing
how the Agency kept their records with respect to this, or what records
.'
. .
one would expect to find.
Senator KENNEDY. I think Dr. Gottlieb did that prior, to the time
he left. We are going to hear about that in a short time.
Were there any occasions that you.know of where the CIA decided
that they did not want to share the results of some of these experiments
with the Department of DefenSe, and where they took the projects
out from under the Defense Department's surveillance?
Ms. SIEMER. Yes, Senator, and that is the experiment that Senator
Schweiker referred to with respect to blast concussion. The Navy
had some interest in th!l',t. project because they have an ongoing &tudy
of headgear and protective headgear.
The proiect began in October 1954, and it was a theoretical, physical
study mtended to use fluid-filled flasks and d;ynamite, to see what
happened to the fluid in the flask' when the impact from the blast hit
them. That work was funded by the Agency, and when the contractor
came in with .a follow-on proposal, the Age~cy's docume!1ts indicate
that they deCided to termmate the Navy's mvolvement m that program because ,they doubted the Navy's capability to maintain the
security of the program..
'
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Senator SCHWEIKER.Do the documents show how long after the
Navy's involvement terminated that the CIA carried on with the
project? '
, Ms. SIEMER. Theydo not, an.d they do not show that the CIA did
carry it on. They do show that the CIA terminated the Navy involvement and, ~pecifically, they were concerned with the possibility of
operating_a program securel~; under the previous cover, which was the
Office of Naval Research.
Senator KENNEDY..That means, basically, they did not trust them?
. Ms. SIEMER. I would hope that they would trust the Navy, but
apparently what it involved was-the CIA's document says that this
work would involve human experiments of a type not easily justifiable
on ,medical or therapeutic grounds. They also noted that they would
have to clear a number of N ~vy peI'l:!onnel; a number of Navy personnel
would have to know that this work was going on. They did not want
"',",'""'''' .to"do";that.
Senator KENNEDY. What year was that?

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Ms. SIEMER. That was in 1956.
Senator KENNEDY. I see.
Ms. SIEMER. So, they. decided against clearing the Navy personnel,
and since theY' could not run theprogr!'J1lwithout c!earing the,Navy
personnel, uS1;Ilg. the Navy as acondUlt,· they termmated the Nav,Y
mvolvement m the program. Now, you have heard testimony:, this,
morning that they &Iso terminated th~ program..We have no way of.
knowing that that is the case.
' . .'.
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Senator KENNEDY. We have been over, in 1975, the Department
of Defense.'.s Programs in very co.nsiderable detaiL Could you briefly
describe the. kinds of research ~rojects that were of. interest tQ. the
DOD over the recent periods of time, and the significant res11lts of
from,
any'of , these
any that.? the Department of Defense derived '
programs. ' .
. ..
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Ms. SIEMER. Yes, Senator. The program that I described at
Edgewood, which terminated in 1973, is really the oril, significant
recent program that was conducted, using military facilities. AndeS
I'said, that program was successful in the sense, that the,Arn'1y develo~edwhat the Agency asked them to develop, and.they were successfUl in doing what the Agency asked them to do. Whether that' constitutes a product or COnstitUtes a. contribJ,Ition, I do not know.
The remaining programs, as you can see-four of. them weIe terminated in the early 1950's or 1960's, and those are four Navy programs, and those programs are prim~ily where the Navy acted as a
conduit for Centr8.1 Intelligence Agency funds. Let me just review
those briefly for you.
'
,
.'
There were four programs in which our records indicate that the
Navy operated solely as a channel for funds to outside contractors.
Those are the programs described in my memorandum" the first of
which is a synthesis of analogs of certain kinds. of stimulants. The
second is the identification of a nonaddictive substitute for codeine.
The third is the blast concussion project which I have jm~t discussed"
and the fourth is the administration of LSD to human, subiects,
. ,.' "
,.
~,
again, back in the early 1950's.
,Those four projects, the documents indicate; the Navy operated
solely as a conduit of funds. Two of. the ,re~aining programs were
Army programs, and there was no human testmg., Those programsthe first is described on page 4 of my memorandum, and thll.t, was
the effort to identify drugs with behavioral efi'ects.This is the Chickwit, or ~fkchiekwit, program, which was looking to identify developments in Europe or the Far East.
'
The second was a project to develop a data base for computer use
to easily access the large amount of iriformationabout various drugs,
and Edgewood contributed to the data base that 'was used by the
Agency for its Project Often.
.
Senator KENNEDY. I guess they had a division between the Agency
and the DOD, a matter which we referred to earlier. Also, during the
late 1950's, there was a decision by' DOD to split off its test.ing. ' in
terms of LSD, from the CIA, and those are referredto in-the Church
committee report.
'
So, I think the significance is that we have seen in the past a division
of responsibility and the separations of responsibility, and the absence
of coordination. And at least in terms of the most recent times, we
have seen a continued division, in terms of responsibility j as late as

152
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this morning, at least in terms of interpretation about who had the
responsibility in these particular areas of Mkchick\\it, Search, and
Ultra.
What benefits were derived from these programs? ,
"
. Ms. SIE'\IER. The blast concussion program that was conducted by
the Navy for a year resulted in a 17-page research report, which I ani
informed was a valuable <:ontribution. That researcher has continued
,to,vork in that field,· and that is a field that is of substantial use to the
military, ~causeit involves the development of protective headgear.
The proJect to develop data bases for computer access also has a
substantial amount of use. As you know, there is a vast amount of
data about drugs, and their side effects and direct effects, available,
andbeing,aple toacce$S,that information, and retrieve it quickly and
, "
,"
'
,efficiently is a useful contribution.
The only other program that was conducted by the services is the
program at Edgewood with respect to applying this compound to
adhesive substances, and ,vhether that was useful or not would have
to come from the Agency. We were successful in doing what they asked
us to do, which is developing a way of appl~ng it to the adhesive
substance, but whether the use of an adhesIve substance is useful,
we do not know.
'
" Senator CUAFEE. It seems to me that in some of these experiments,
the fact that they are not useful, itself, is helpful. A negative answer
can sometimes be of assistance.
The thing that has bothered me a little is, for example, the testing
of this EA-3167 that was being done at Edgewood Arsenal, under
the Army's direction and ",ithout the CIA involvement, at the
beginning, anyway, and it seems to me that recordkeeping in this
'
whole business seems to have been haphazard, at best.
Suppose somebody comes &long 5 years from now and thinks that
there might be something to EA-3167? Are they going to start all
over again, or does somebody have a record that shows this was a
failure?
Ms. SIEMER. The records available show what the compound is,
chemically; show what the results were on dogs, guinea pigs, monkeys,
and so on, and so all of the results of that research are available. As
to the application-what .the Central Intelligence Agency made of
whatever was done for this particular application at Edgewood, I do
not know what records are available of that.
'
But, the actual results of dog and monkey and mouse experimentsthat is, that the mouse died, or the monkey had particular effects1 believe are available. '
.
Senator CUAFEE. Well, it seems to me fairly important to have
this information-you mentioned a retrieval system. It is fairly
important, like we Just said"that you do not go through this all over
again when some bright fellow comes up with the suggestion.
Also, with reference to those two military volunteers that were
discussed-now, was that under CIA, or was that under-I was
going to say "you," but 1 will say the Army I am not sure.
Ms. SIEMER. Well, that is the subject of the current discussion, as
to whose problem it was. It is my conclusion from the documents that
that was a part of the ctA program. I cannot say it any more definitively than Admiral Turner can say it is his conclusion it was a part of
8. DOD program.
'

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153

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Senator CBAFEE.Thank you very muc'll.
Senator SCBWElltER. Based on your survey of the different projects
that were done through the ,Defartment o.f Defense, I wonder if you
could give us a rough estimate 0 ' how many human subjects were, used
by ~he Department of Defense in these lands of experimentS over this
penod.,
.
',.
'.'"
, '
'Now, I aIllnot talking about situations in which the Department of
Defense was merely a conduit for the CIA~ Obviously, as you point out
in your statement to us, DOD served as a conduit in a number of
instances. On the other hand, there were some experiments that the
~efense Depa~ment was r.esponsible for"not.as a conduit,. Could you
give the comnuttee any kind of a rough estunate of the number of
hu.man ~ein~ the.t,!ere involved in these kinds of eJg>eriments during
this penod, m eXJ!enments that the Department of Defense or one of
its branches or subintelligence groups was running? '
Ms. SIE~ER. Yes; I think, Senator, I could give you somesketchy
understanding that I have from the documents. Of these, eight programs in which there was some military participation, there are four
in which there was human testing, and one in which there was a possibility of human testing.
The first is the Edgewood Arsenal program that we have been
talking about, and tha.t is this compoundEA-3167.Prior to the
Agency's involvement in 1971, there was testing of that compound in
a ilifferent form and for different purposes at the Holmesburg State
Prison in Pennsylvania. The documents indicate that that may have
involved from 5 to '12 prisoners; one dOcument says 5, another one
'
says 12.
There was subsequent testing of that compound at the Edgewood
laboratories involving military volunteers, and that phase of it may
have involved as mariyas 15 persons.
Senator SCBWEIltER. They were witting?
Ms. SIElfER. Yes; they were, Senator, and that was prior to the
Agency's involvement.
,
.
The Navy project with respect to synthesis of analogs of certain
stimulant~the documents do not indicate that that involved human
testing, but it is possible that it did. I am unable to determine whether
it did or did not. 'The relative CIA document indicates that the merits
"
'
were going to be determined· on tests on mice.
The second program conducted by the Navy, which was the identification of a nonaddictive ,substitute for codeine, wascamedoutat a
Government agency in Kentucky. We do not have any indication of
how many 'persons that was conducted on, but that was a very substantial proJ~ct. The Central Intelligence Agency spent over $280,000
on that proJect, and tha.t was an average of, between $34,000 and
. $45,000 a year. So, there may have been a substantial' number of
people involved in that.
Senator SCuWEI:KER. Again, were they witting or unwitting subjects?'
,
'
Ms. SIElIER. I have no way of telling that. Those records would
be available only from the Agency. This is a program in which wethat, the Navy-'was only a conduit for the funds.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Is that Dr. Isbell's work that you are talking
about?
Ms. SIElIER. Yes; it is.

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The third is the administration of LSD to human subjects. That
was begun ~ 1952 ~dcompleted in 1956. Our records indicate that
there were SIX knowmgsubJects who were a part of the researchers'·
own staB who were involved in that, and that later on, there were
eight subjects who were Soviet defectors who were tested in Europe-.
I amson:y. That i~ part of project 5.
.. .
..
On proJect 4,thiS was done by CIA, and those are the only facts
that we have in our documents.
. On. the 5th, the Navy project which was development o! speech~
mdu~UlItdrugs, .there was a ~t o~ those drugs on e1ght SoViet defectors m Europe m 1952, I think-m August or September of 1952-·
and the test Was allparently a failure, because they could not ~ormu
late the substance lD a way that the defectors could not taste ·1t and,
.
therefore, they could not be kept unwitting olthe test.
Senator KENNEDY. Sometimes I think that might have leaked out
from over-in the. Senate, that speech-inducing drUg.
Ms. SIEMER. That is it. That is what we know from the documents
we have available.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Now, is this work that you have described
pretty well confined to programs. conducte4 in cOD;1lection with the
CIA? In other words, my quest10n also d1rected1tself-and lam
not sure if I have made 1t clear-to non-CIA sponsored work. Are
you including that in your mswer?
...
Ms. SIEMER. No, I am not, Senator. The non-CIA sponsored
work was previously reported -to you in 1975, and you nave our
Inspector General's report on that and that is, so far as we know, a
complete report.
senator SCBWEIKER. OK. Now, in connection with that, a couple
of years ago, we were told by the Defense Depa.rtment that they
would make every effort to contact people who had been used as
subjects of DOD research. I think tllere were several thousands of
people involved, as I recall, at least well over a 1,000, though I cannot
be precise, without checking. The Department was going to make
every effort to contact the people who were tested in the pro~am. I
realiZe that you are new on board and were not involved Wlth this
initially, so my question may be something you have to report back
to us on a little 6it later.
Could you update this committee on whether DOD has been
successful in contacting former subjects of research? "How effective
have the Department's efforts to follow up and inform the subjects
of those tests been? The witnesses at our "previous hearings did, I
believe, make that commitment to us.
Ms. SIEIIER. I do have a report on that for you, Senator. This
report is as of August 22, 1977, which is the date of your original
hearings on this subject. As of that date, we had completed medical
examinations on 127 of the known participants; 176 had been contacted and had sgreed to an examination, but the examination had
not yet been scheduled; 146 had been located, but they had" not
made a decision as yet as to whether to be examined; 22 were deceased, and we were able to find death certificates for 12 of those,
but have other information that 22 of them were deceased; 39 refused
examination, and 177 we are still working on locating.

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Senator SCHWEIKER. I want to compliment you on your testimony.
You certainly have been very direct,specific, and candid with uS~It ,'.
is obvious that you have done your homework and certainly tried to'.
comply with the intent of the, committee's request for testimony in
areas of our responsibility, and we thailkyou for that.
. '. , ' ".. . .
Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Chairman, iu~t one other question. About
those two military volunteers that were involved in J973~was, there
any followup on them, regardless. of who was.,' re.spo,' ·b,le fo.,.r., .,th.e
expe,rimentation, either DOD or CIA? .
.', .. . . '
. Ms. SIE11E~. It is ~~ understanding,.Sena~r, that they are incl~ded
m the followup statistics that I have Just given you.
• .
Senator CHAFEE. Now, I iustwonder, out,ofct.¢,ol;ity, would the
results of that examination go back into the file at'Edg~'W9od, so that
the experimentation is then wrapped up and, the documentation on
the experimentation CQlDpleted? .
". '.
.' , '
Ms. SIEMER. The followup study is being done as a separate ,study,
but the information developed from it can be accessed through
computers and ,other records by researchers. We have, privacy problems, and that is, you have to be able to generalize the data, and
.
.
cannot transmit data about a specific person.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Mr. Cliairman, I would like to add my
congratulations. on the testimony today. You certainly had all the
facts.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, all of us are impressed. You obviously
have personally taken this-and the Department has-as a matter of
very considerable priority and importance,and it is shown by your
faniiliarity with the material and the responsiveness to the questions.
Ms. SIEMER. Thank you, Senator.
"
.
[The following material was submitted for the record:]
.
.DS1.

•
•

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156
Septer.~er

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20, 1977

!io:lorable Edward H. ' Kennedy
Gnited States Senate
C~ai~, Senate Subcommittee on
Eaa1th,& Scientific ?esearch
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chai...--=an:

Your letter to the SecretarJ of Defense of August 10 •
1977 recuested all classified and unclassified co~~ents
relatinqina:lywayto ~u::lan e~eri..:entat:ion in c9nnection
with Central. Intel.ligence Agency projects casignated by the
coce Hords~·IKSZi\RCH, !'1AOF':'~1 and I·~~C3ICXtaT.
Pu:suant to that request, the O:ficB of General Counsel
cocrdinatcd a search of the files r:tainbined by the Ar::ly,
Havy and Air ;crce fror.l1950 to t.~e present. That search
'\;as cOl':1?leted on Septe::lber 15, 1977 Cl..'1d arnet!1orandum ~as
pr~pared for the Secretary s~~arizing~le results.
I have enclosed a copy of that ~2~ran~~ ~~d co?ies of
each of the doc~»ants r3tricved ir~ Depar~~nt of'ne=anse
fil~s.
It appears fr~ the available doc~~ents that proj~cts M:{SEAo.~C'.d, ~'Lf.\OF':n-r ~~d :,L,caIC:~tn:'1' were direct:ec, controlled and funded by the Central Intellis-ence ~'\genC".!. ~!uch
of h~e participation of the milit~ry eepart~ents ~as 301ely
as a conduit of funds fr~ tha Central Intelligence ~gancy
to outsida ccntracto:s. A substantial a~ount of tr~s
j?articipation ~';,as tcr:::inated i:1 the 1950's a.~d1geO'3. The
remaining activity was te~natedno late~ thaD 1973.
A12 of the ~litarJ depart=ent docUQants identified in
Appendices A and a have been decl.assif1ed. The t!er.1orandum
rsfersto and appends certain CentrillIntelligence Agency
docucents that have not been declassified. If the Agency
decla3s1fies those docu=ents, ~~e ~emorandum should also be
declassified.

' I f the Subcommittee requires further information or
asSistiU].ce in this I:latter, please let r!'.e knOW'.
Sincerely,
Deanne C. Sierner

157

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GcNiUL COUNSEL OF THE DIPAltTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASNINGTON,

o. C,

20JOI

September 20, 1977

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M.&.y'ORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:,

ExperimentationProqrams Conducted by the
Department of Defense That Had CIA Sponsorship or Participation and That Involved the
Administration to Human Subjects of Drugs
Intended for Mind-control or Behaviormodification Purposes'
.'

On August 8, 1977 you requested that the Office of
General Counsel coordinate a search of oepart.ment of Defense
records to determine the extent of Department of Defense
participation in three projects identified by the Director
of Central Intelligence on August 3,1977 as including the
administration of drugs to human subjects for mind-control
or behavior-modification purposes. In addition, you,
requested that the search attempt to identify any other
project conducted or participated in by the Depart.mentof
Defense in which there was any Central Intelligence Agency
involvement and which included the administration of drugs
to human subjects for mind-control or behavior-modification
purposes. That search was conducted during the period
August 15,1977 through September 15, 1977 ancl covered t.'le
records of the Military Departments from 1950 to the
present.
The results of the.search indicate that there were three
such pxograms in which the Army participated over the period
1969 to 1973; five such programs in which the Navy participated over the period 1947 to 1973; and no such proqrams in
which the Air Force participated. In four 'of these eig~t
programs the Department of Defens. participation was limited
to channeling funds to outsid~contractor~ in order that the
sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency be cov~red.·
In two of the remaining'four programs there was no testing
on human SUbjects. Four of the programs were terminated in
the 1950'$ or early 1960's and the remainder were terminated
in 1973.

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It appears from the documents that the three codeword
projects of the Central Intelligence AgenCy identified by
the Director in.his testimony as basically Department of
Defense projects were, in fact, planned, directed and
controlled by the Central Intelligence Agencr. Each of
these projects and the participation of. the military
services is described below.

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Codeword Projects Identified by the Central Intelliqence
Agency

In testimony on August 3, 1977, before a joint session
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, the Director .
of Central Intelligence reported that the Central Intelligence
Agency had located a number of boxe~of documents, consisting
largely of financial records,.relating to experiments using
human subjects in which drug. were tested for mind-control and
behavior-modification purposes. The Director testified that
it appeared that three of ~e projects described by these
documents -- projec~ designated MKSEARCH, MKOFTEN and
.
MKCHICKWIT -- were Department of DefenSe programs with which
the Central Intelligence Agency had had some contact. The
Director also described three other projects --designated
MKULTRA, MKDELTA and MKNAOMI -- which were primarily Central
Intelligence Agency projects but which might have had some
Department of Defense involvement.
It appears from the available documents that these
projects cover subject matters as foliows:
MKDELTA: This was apparently the first project
established by CIA in OctOber, 1952, for the
use of biochemicals in clandestine operations.
It may never have been implemented operationally.
MKULTRA: This was a successor project to MKDELTA
established in April,. 1953, and terminating some
time in the late 1960'S, .probably after 1966.
This program considered various means of controlling human behavior. DrUgs were only one aspect
of this activity.
MKNAOMI: This project began in the 1950's and was
terminated, at least with respect to biological
projects, in 1969. This may have been a successor

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159
3

project to MKDELTA •.. Its' purpose was to
stockpile severely incapacitating and
lethal materials, and to develop gadgetry
for the dissemination of these materials.

•

MKSEARCH: This was apparently a successor
project to MKULTRA, which began in 1965
and was terminated in 1973. The objective
of the project was to develop a capability
to manipulate human behavior in a predictable mann~r throughtbe use of drugs •

•

MKCHICKWIT or CHICKWIT: . This was apparently
a.part of the MKSEARCHprogram. Its
objective was to identify new drug',
de:velopments in Europe and Asia and to
obtain information and samples.
MK~FTEN

or OFTEN:

T~iswas

also apparently
Its
objective was to test the behavioral and
toxicoloqicaleffects of certain drugs
on animals and humans.

a part of the MKSEARCB project.

Beginning c>n August 4, 1977, Army .and Navy investigators
undertook a search of the boxes of Central Intelligence
Agency records identified by the CIA code words OFTEN and
'CHICKWIT in order to locate documents relevant to possible
Department of Defense involvement in these projects. On
September 7, 1977, the Agency permitted DoD representatives
to search additional boxes containing MKULTRA records. Both
sets of materials consisted of approvals of advances of funds,
vouchers and accounting records relating to these projects.
II.

Army

~=~qrams

It appears from the available documents that the Army was
involved in one aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency
project desiqnated as MKCHICXWIT and two aspects of a counterpart project desiqnated as MKOFTEN. The document search is
described in section A below, and each of the Army proqrams
is described in section B below.
A.

Records searched

The search of Army records was coordinated by the Director
of the Staff. The search included the files at the Edgewood

160

Arsenal Research Laboratories, the Dugway Proving Groun4s,
the Department of Defense Investigative Service (with respect
to the Special operations Division at Fort Detrick), the
Department of the Army Inspector. General, the Army activity
in the U.S. Biological Warfare Program, and the Army
Intelligence Agency.
B.

Programs identified
(l)

Identification of new drugs with behavioral
effects

This project began in 1967 and was terJi\inated in 1973.
It was carried out primarily by a contractor in California.
The project was apparently funded jointly by the Army,
through Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The funds contributed by the
Agency were used by Edgewood for payments to a private
contractor. This project was a part of the project
designa ted as MKCHICKWIT.
This project was involved solely with the collection
of information. No testing on human subjects was conducted.
The Central Intelligence Agency apparently provided $12,084
in 1967 and $5,0~0 in 1969 for this project. The extent of
the Army's financial contribution to this project is unknown.
(2)

Databases on evaluation of pharmacological
products

This project apparently began in 1968 and was completed
by 1971. It was carried out by the Edgewood Arsenal Research
Laboratories. The Central Intelligence Agency transferred
funds to the Army for this purpose in 1968, 1970 and 1971.
This project was a part of the project desiqnated as MKOFTEN.
Zdgewood created data bases for computer use with respect
to information on pharmacological products. These included
human clinical data obtained from volunteer subjects in other
Edgewood projects, not connected with the Central Intelligence
Agency. These data bases were acquired by the Agency in an
effort to enhance its computer capability to detect and
nullify manipulation of U.S. personnel by means of these
materials. The two data bases provided by EdgewOOd, arising
i

161
5

out oE its work, were supplemented by three other data bases
created by other contractors or the Agency. V
This pr6jcci involved only the transfer of inforrnatio~
t.o computer usable :orm. No testing on human subjects \-1<15
conducted. The amount of funding is not known.
(3)

•

Determination of clinical effects of a
glycolate class chemical

This project began in 1971 and was tertninated in 1973 •
It was carried out by the Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories and was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.
This project was a part of the project design~ted as ~~OFTEN.
It appears from the available documents that Edgewood
had been testing a number 6fincapacitating agents in its
own programs without Central Intelligence Agency participation.
Edgewood identified a compound designated as EAt3l67 as
particularly effective and tested itQn animals. Edgewood
also engaged in clinical testing on human volunteers at the
Holmesburg State Prison in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, using
prisoners as test subjects and at the Edgewood laboratories
using military personnel as test subjec~s. It appears that
all of the test subjects were volunteers and that stringent
medical safeguards and followup procedures were used.
In 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed prior
Edgewood work and identified EA,3167 as relevant to the
~mOFTEN program.
The Agency set up a joint effort with
Edgewood to pursue further testing of this compound. In
1971. the Agency transferred to Edgewo6d $37,000 for this
purpose. Most of the testing under CIA. spOnsors~ip was with
animals. The primary effort was t6 determine-whether EM3l67
could be used effec::tivelyif applied to the sk':'n.through some
type of adhesive tape~ There was only· one experiment that
involved human subjects. In June, 1973, two military volunteers
were apparently tested using EA'3167~ The documents do not
give any details with respect to these tests.

*/ The Navy contributed a similar data base to the MKOFTEN
but it appears from ~he available documents that the
work 'to create the data base was undertaken as an independent
Navy project not designed for any CIA use, and that there was
no transfer of CIA funds to the Navy for this purpose. .
~roject

•.

162
5

Docu6ents released

The Army h~s identified nine documents related to the
programs described in Section B. A list identifying those
documents is set out in Appendix A.
III.

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Navy Programs

It appears from the available , documents that the ~avy was
not involved in any aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency
projects designatedMKSEARCH and MKCHIC~iIT. It appears that
the Navy did act as a financial intermediary through which the
Central Intelligence Agency dealt with an outside contractor
that 'conducted one research effort that was apart of the
l-lROFTEN project. It also appears that the Navy conducted,
directly or through contractors, five programs. in which there
was Central Intelligence Agency sponsorship or participation
and which included the administration of drugs to human subjects for mind~control or behavior-modification purposes. The
records that were searched are described in section A below.
Each of the projects discovered is described in sectionB
below.
A.

Records Searched

The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
coordinated the search of Navy records. The search covered
archival material with respect to the activities of the
Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
and the Office of Naval Research.
B.

Programs identified
(1)

Synthesis of analogs of certain central
nervous system st~ulants

This project began in 1971 and was terminated in January,'
1973. It was performed by a contractor located in Massachusetts.
The involvement of the Navy was only as a conduit for funds
between the contractor and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Some of the funding documen~s identify this project as a part
of project OFTEN.
In December, 1970, the contractor contacted the Central
Intelligence Agency project officer directly and suggested
research work on two types of drugs: analogs of DOPA and
dopamine and analogs of picrotoxin. After the work was
undertaken, the contractor added a third aspect, the study of

163
7

analogs of the hallucinogen ibog.line. In March, 1972, the
contractor suggested enlarging the scope of the work to include
narcotic antagonists or blocking. agents. One.documentindicates that "The overall objective of these studies is to
synthesize new classes of pharmocologically active drugs
affecting the central nervous system so as to evaluate their
mOdification of man's behavior." (Doc. NO. CIA-I.) The
purpose of creating analogs, rather than using the parent
cornpounds, was to find drugs "which will be mQre. specific in
action as well as more reliable." (Doc. No. CIA~2.)
The Central Intelligence Agency may have transmitted as
much as $117,938 for this project.to the Office of Naval
Research during the period February 26, 19i1 through June 23,
1972. The Central Intelligence Agency authorization documen=
stated: "This project is funded through the Office of Nava!
Research •. This arrangement protects the Agency's association
with this area of research and provides the contractor with
credible sponsorship. The work will be unclassified, but
Agency association will be confidential." (DOC. No. CIA-l, 3.)
There is no indication in the documen~s available to
the Navy that human testing was performed by the researchers.
One of the documents reports: "The relative merits of the
synthetic compounds will be determined in mice, and information as to the underlying biochemical basis for the observed
pharmacological activities will be deduced from the comparative effects of the various compounds." (Doc. NO. CIA~a.)
One of the researcher's progress reports indicates an
intention to publishthe re9ults of the first phase of this
work, on analogs of DOPA and dopamine, ata professional
meeting in the fall of 1972 but there is no indication that
pUblication was accomplished. (Doc. No. N-2.)
(2)

Identification of nonaddictive substitute for
codeine

~!".;
.'

This project began in 1954 and was continued at least
until 1964. It was per~o~ed at the. facilities of another
government agency located in Kentueky. The involvement of
the Navy was only as a conduit for f~U\ds between the Central
Intelligence Agen~y and a researcher who was associated with
a federal gOvernment agency. One of the funding doc~~ents
identifies this as part of project MKPILOT •

1
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s
According to the information aV3ilable to the Navy, the
purpose of the project was to find a nonaddictive substitute
for codeine. The work was done at the Addictive Research
Center, U.S. Public Health Service Hospital, in Lexington,
Kentucky. It is unclear from the information available
to the Navy whether the researcher was an independent scientist using governmentfac:iilities or a government employee.
It appears that the researcher tested some 800 compo~nds
on addicted patients. There is no.indication in the documents
as t9 the number of persons involved or the compounds tested.
Three .. compounds wet::e.retained and . all are now common drugs:
darvonwhich is used as a pain killer; dextromethorphan which
is used in cough syrup: and lomotil which is used'as an
antidiarrhea drug.
The Central Intelligence Agency transferred at least
$282,215 to the Office of Naval Research for this program
with instructions to make the funds available to the researcher
at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital. The project costs
appear to have been between $34,000 and $45,000 per year.
These documents specify that "the interest of CIA in this
project is classified Secret and is not to. be revealed •••• n
(~., Doc. No. N-18.)
(3)

Identification of effects of blast concussion

This project began in October, 1954 and was terminated,
at least with respect to the Navy, in December, 1955. It was
performed by a contractor located in California. The involvement of the Navy \iaS primarily as a conduit of funds from the
Central Intelligence Agency to the contractor.·. A small amount
of Navy funds may also have been used for this contract. In
December, 1955 this project was terminated as far as the Navy
involvement was concerned and it thereafter apparently became
subproject S4 of the MK~LTRA project.
While the Navy was invoived with this project it did not
include any drug testing and apparently did not include any
testing on humans. The contractor was investigating a new
theory of the dynamics of brain concussion. Fluid-filled
flasks were used to measure the effect of blast impacts from
a 2 1/2 lb. charge of dynamite 10 feet away. The results
of th~s work were published in 1957 in a 17-page report
entitled "On the Impact Thresholds of Brain Concussion."
(Doc. N-19.)

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9

The Central Intelligence Agency transferred $20,000 to
the Office .0f.Naval Research for use on this project. The
Office of Naval Research may ha~!e contributed as much as
$5,000 of its own funds to this. project.

•
•

In December, 1955, the contractor submitted a proposal
for a continuation of the research for 1956. In that
proposal tQe c~ntractor pointed out that brain concussion "is
always followed by amne$ia for the actual moment of the
accident" and suggested that "if a technique were devised to
induce,brain concussion with0\ltgivingeither advance warping
or causing. external physical trauma, the person upon :r~covery
would be unable to recall what had happened to him. Under
these conditions the same technique of producing the
concussion could be re-used many times without disclosure of
its nature." (Doc. No. CIA-4.) In discussing the techniques
envisioned, the contractor described non-drug mean. for
inducing concussion, but went on to describe a technique for
providing immunity to concussion that "involves the introduction
of a small quantity of gas, approximately 1 cc, into the spinal
cord." (Doc. No. CIA-4.)

J.•.
.'.,

When this project proposal was received, CIA decided to
convert it to the MKULTRA project rather than using the Navy
as a conduit for funds. A memorandum dated January 10, 1956
explained:
The first year's work on this program
was financed through the Navy for several
reasons ••••

When [the contractor} was cleared and
informed of our true interests in this
research, the whole sc~~e of the project
changed, and it became apparent that
developments might. be expected in the
second year which. would make it impossible to operate the program securely under
the previous cover. Specifically, human
experiments of a type not easily justifiable
on medical-therapeutic grounds would be
involved ••• ~

~',;-~.' ..

For the reasons given above and because
this project in a general way will begin to
become involved in the subjects of interrogation and some aspects of brain-wa~hing,

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TSS!CD has decided that it should be funded
through project l1KULTRA rather than by less
secure r::ethods. .

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(Doc. No. CIA-S.) The project thereafter b~came subprojec=
54 of the MKULTRA project and there is no indication of furt~er
inVolvement by the Navy.
(4)

This project began in 1952 and was apparently completed
by 1956. It was performed by a researcher located in New York.
Navy is listed '.as a sponsor in only one CIA document prepared
at a later date, and not otherwise corroborated. If Navy was
inv..<tved, it was solely as a conduit for funds between the
Central Intelligence Agency and the researcher. This project
has been identified as subprojects 7, 27 and 40 of the
MKULTRA project.
(5)

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Administration of LSD to human subjects

Development and :administration of speechinducing drugs

This ~roject apparently began in 1947 and ended in 1953.
It was performed primarily by a contractor located in New
York and, in one aspect, by the Navy at a location in Europe.
The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency was apparently only as an interested observer. The project was funded
by the Navy through the Naval Medical Research Institute.
The Central Intelligence Agency records of this project are
apparently in the BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE project files.
The Navy arranged in 1950 to obtain marijuana and heroin
from the FBI for use in experiments and entered a contract
with a researcher in Np.~ York to develop drugs ~nd instrumentation for use in interrogation of prisoners of war, defectors
and similar persons. The security cover for the project was.
a study of motion sickness. The study began with six of the
researcher's staff as knowing volunteers. The project was
expanded to cover barbituates and benzedrine. Other substances were evaluated.
In August, 1952 ~he Office of Naval Intelligence informed
the Central Intelligence Agency that it had developed drugs
that might have the desired characteristics and was about to
test them on human subjects who would be unaware of the test.
The drugs were administered to about eight SUbjects, each of
whom was a Soviet defector, and each test was done in Europe

.....•..._.,,-_.__..•_"

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167
11

in September, 1952. The tests were apparently not satisfacto~y because the drugs used had such a bitter taste that it was
not possible to keep the human sUbjects from knowing abci".1t
the test. .
By September, 1952 it was apparent that this ?roject was
not producing useful results arid the Navy began to consider
ending it. By 1953 most work had apparently been phased out.
C.

•

oocumen til released

The Navy has identified 42 dq~uments which are related
to the programs d~scribed in section B. A list identifying
those documents is se~ out irt AppendixB.

•

IV.

Air Force Programs

It appears from the available doctimentsthat the Air
Force was not involved in any aspect of the Central Intelligence Agency projects designated MKSEARCH, ,MKOFTEN and
MKCHICKWIT. It also appears that the-Air Force was not
involVed in any program in which there was Central Intelligence
Agency sponsorship or participation and which included the
administration of drugs to human subjects for mind-control
or behavior~modification purposes.
A.

Reco~ds

searched

The search was conducted by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development and.
Logistics. The Air Staff offices in which records were
searched are: The Surgeon General, the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Research and Development, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, and the Air Force Intelligence Service.
B.

Programs identified

There were no records or information found relating to
projects designated MKSEARCH, MKOFTEN orMKCHICKWIT or
corresponding to the description of the subject matter of
those projects available through Central Intelligence Agency
files.
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.

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There were no documents or information f~hnd indicating
any CIA involvement in any experimentation program conducted·
by the Air Force that included administration of· drugs to
human subjects •
·~-1

Documents released

None.
VI.

Current PrograJDs ..

There are no programs currently maintained by any
Department of Defense component Or contractor involving
dJ;:ug testing on human sUbjects in which the Central IntelliqenceAgeney is in anyway involved.
All current Department of Defense programs involving the
use of investigational drugs on humans, including its contrAc~
tor programs, have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

.1·. ...

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Editor's Note: Due to the voluminous content or the appendixes
ineriUoned iI: th~s memorandum. and in the.interest of eco.nolily.
the material vas retained in the files of the. subcolIDDlttee.•

169

,iii"

Senator KENNEDY. We appreciate your testimony. We will try and
work, without t~ a lot more of your time-I am sure you have very
m:n: important things-just to try and resolve the basic kinds of
co .cts, so that in our report, we are able, to the extent that we can,
to ]!ut some of these matters to rest.
'
You have been very, very respon~ive and very helpful to the com"
,
mittee, and we appreciate your presence here.
Senator CHAFEE. Maintaining the high standards of the Department
of Defense.
Senator KENNEDY. We will recess and gather in the anteroom in
order to hear from Dr. Gottlieb.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
[The hearing was reconvened in theanterooiD..]
Senator KENNEDY. We will come to order.
I would ask if you would be kind enough to rise.- '.
Do you swear the testimony you will give is the trUth, the whole
truth, so help you, G o d ? '
,
Dr. GO'r1'LIEB. I do.
Mr. LENZNEB. I wanted to say, on behalf of Dr. Gottlieb, how much
we appreciate the courtesies that the committee has extended in
responaing to his health and cardiac problems. I also want to ~!press
our appreciation to the committee staff, to Dr. Horowitz, Walter
Sheridan, and Jim Mitchie for the assistance they have :provided in
reviewing the materials that the committee asked us to renew prior to
Dr. Gottlieb's testimony.
The doctor has got a brief statement he would like to read with the
committee's permission because I think it helpsJplace in perspective
some of the issues we believe the committee is interested in pursuing.
Senator KENNEDY. The record will show that Dr. Gottlieb has been
sworn, and the attome)", Mr. Lenzner, has indicated that Dr. Gottlieb
would like to read his statement. Then we will get into the question
period.
Dr. Gottlieb.
STATEMENT OF Sm:REY GOTTLIEB, M.D., FORMER CIA AGEn, ACCOXPABIED BY TERRY F. tENZER, ESQ., WALD, lIAltKRADER &
ROSS, WASHIRGTOlf, D.C.

Dr. GOTTLIEB. My name is Sidney Gottlieb and I reside in California. I am appea.rihg at this he~ as I have appeared in others in
the past, voluntarily and prepared to offer whatever constructive
testimony made possible by my background and remembrance of
things past.
I would like to first comment on project MKULTRA.
To the best of my recollection, several research inquiries-which
much later came to be organized under the cryptonym MKULTRAwere be~n in abou~ 1952. Th~ir purpo~ ~as to inves~igate whether
and how It was pOSSible to modify an mdiVldual's behaVior by convert
means. The context in which this investigation was started was that of
the height of the cold war with the Korean war just winding down;
with the CIA organizing its resources to liberate Eastern Europe by
paramilitary means; and with the threat of Soviet a~gression very
real and tangible, as exemplified by the recent Berlin aIrlift.

II
170

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In the judgment of the CIA, there Wa.s tangible evidence that both
the Soviets and the Red Chinese might be using techniques of altering
human behavior which w":re not understood by the United States
and which would have implications of national survival iIi the context
of national securitycon<;ernsat that time. It was felt to be mandatory
and of the utmost urgency for ourinte!Jigence organization to establish what waS possible in this field on a high priority basis.
.
To mention just a Jew examples, there was a concern about the
~parent manipulated conversions of Americans interned in Red
China for a very short time; there was also a concern about apparently
irrational remarks. made by a senior American diplomat returning
from the Soviet Union; perhaps most immediate and ~ent in,our
m.i:nds was the appa.rentbuyingupof the world supply of,atthat
time, little-known new psychogenic. material LSD;.. lastly, there was
a ~o~ li!>rary .of. documented~. instan~. of routine use' ~Y ~he
SoVIet secunty SerVIces of covertly adlDlIllStei-ed drugs. ThiS. list,
by the way, has grown and been added tQ up to the time I left the CIA.
I accept full responsibility for my own role in' these activities, in"
relation to what my position in the CIA implied, as to my level of
responsibility as it changed over the years. At theoutset,in the period
1.9~~-57, I was.he¥ of a branchofa c!iyiSion char~ed with the responSibility of looking mtothe matters. wDlch I described above. I set up
and handled SOIue projects myself, and supervised and administered
other CIA employees monitoring other projects. As the years went
on and I assumed broader responsibilities, my personal involvement in
the projects lessened. Thus, my involvement was most direct in the
Deriod 1951-57.
From 1957 to the' end of 1960, I was not directly involved at all,
being ,assigned to other matters. I was stationed overseas 1957-59,
and was assigned to another unit in headquarters in the period 1959
to the end of 1960. Late in 1960, I returned to TSD to become Chief
of the Research. and Development component; in 1962" I became
Deputy Chief of TSD; and from 1966 to 1973, I '":Vas Chief of TSD. I
retired from the CIA on June 30, 1973. I want to stress, however, that
a policy review of project MKULTRA and all of the Pi"ojects I w.as
connected with took place at least once a year during MKULTRA
a~tive period, which I remember as 1952-65. In addition,as each
project was funded, approval in writing at least two levels above mine
"
were required in all reSearch and development activities.
, Project names, like Artichoke and Bluebird, have been mentioned
in the press, associated with In'yname. My remembrance is that
, Project Artichoke was managed by the Office of Security and that I
had no direct or indirect responsibility for it, although I became
aware of its existence and general nature over the years. Project
Blu~bird, as I remember it,.was al~ an Office of SeclJ!ity concel!.t,
possibly never actually realized, which later evolved mto a TSDsponsor.ed activity 10C?~ into brl!~~wlLShing,and ultiulately included
the Society for InvestIgation of Huiifan Ecology.
One unusual project started in 1952 and continued until about 1965
was an an:angement o!iginally set up by me with the Bureau of
N 8J'Cotics~ In this regard, I have previously furnished my recollections
of this matter during my 40-oda hours of testimony to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence--I did not mean to say that the
testimony was odd-but I am glad to discuss these matters again with
this committee.

LJ
171

•
It

The origin of this Bureau of Narcotics activity rested in my becom!Jlg aware, thJ:ough read~ OSS. r~~arch files of, aninvest~ation
mto the behaVlor,;,altemating possIbilIties of Tetrohydrocannabmol,a. .
synthetic material related to the naturally active constituent of mati~ .
h uana, I was a.ble to contactaJi officer of the Bureau of Narcoties who'
hadpa.nicipated firsthand in theOSS investigations. With him, Imade
an arrangement, funded by the CIA, whereby he would covertly ad,;,
minister chemical materials to unwitting' people. The Bureau of
Narcotics, through this individual, had their own interest in determ~ whether .chemical materials could be used·to elicitor validate·.. ,
information obtained from drug informants. The arrangement would
benefit theClA's program in .that information would' be obtained,
. unobtainable in any other way, on the effects of these materials used in
situations dosely resembling those in actual operations.
I h~veno person!Ll. awarene..czs of specific individuals to whom these
matenals were admmIStered. To the. best of my knowledge and·remembrance,the ma.terials a~minis~red in th~ ~eat majority of cases under
the Bureau of Narcotics project were LSD. and Meretran. I do not
have detailed information on the exact number of individuals involved, but the impression I have is that the number involv:ed wa.s·
between 20 and 50 individuals over the years of theproiect.
.'
If lInight interject here, that impression remains after studying
carefully the files that your staff made available tome.
.'
I would like to add that the Bureau of Narcotics project was the
only one of its kind in the sense of tryfug to gain urgently needed information in the administration of materi81s in an operationalcont-ext.
Although it has drawn considerable attention in tlie news media, because of its unusual nature, it was actually a very small part· of an
overall program .which took place in more conventional project, in the
more normal setting of universities and laboratories, as bomeout by
the r~cords s~own ~ me by the committee staff.
.
.'
.
This cOmlDlttee mIght be mterested to know that the total amount
of money spent on everything related to MKULTRA was limited to
10 percen~ of the total rese~ch done ~~TSD~ To my reme~~!anc~,
at the heIght of the spending on MKULTRA~related actiVItIes, It
never even reached this percentage. .
.
The great bulk of the research done under the general umbrella,of
the Project MKULTRA took place in academic and other research
~et~~gs. T~ese p'rojectsalmost always repre~ente~ work that the
mdiVlduaI mvesngatorswould have been domg m any case. The
agency's role was to provitie the funds and, in many cases, provide
access to the investigator if specific interpretation of his results in
terms of out interests were needed. To my recollection, in every case,'
the results of the related research were published. I should add "where
approp'riate." I cannot testify that everybody published everything,
.
thq did.
'.
The degree Qfwittinpless of the principal investigators on these
projects varied depending on whether we judged his knowledge of
our specific interests to be necessary inproVlding useful results to us.
Thus, many _projects were established in which the principal investiftator was fully knowledgeable of who we were and exactly what our
~terests in the researcli were. Others were simply provided funds
through a covert organization and bad no idea of ultimate CIA
sponsorship.

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The detzreeto -which individuals others than the principal investigator needed to be witting of the agency's connection to the research
varied. It was generally le~tto. the p~incipal investigato! to advise .us
as to whether anyone else -melther his resetp"ch tem or m the admmistrative part of the university or research organization needed to be
made witting to the agency's relationship. To the best of my remembrance, although for general- security reasons we were eager to keep
this kind of· information -to It. minimuril,we went along with the
principal inv~tigator's desires and cleared and briefed whomever
he felt was necess~. -_-The ~enera~ subject o!why we felt it ~ne~ary to use funding
mechamsms like the Society for-the InvestIgation of Human Ecology
or the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research needs some comment. This involves the more general question of why we felt aU ofthis research needed to be kept secret insofar as Agency sponsorship was
concerned. The reason, however, it may seem with the benefit of
hindsight, was that we felt any potential enemies of this country
would be greatly benefited in their own possible future aggressive acts
against tlie United States if they were forewarned as to what the
nature and progress of our research in this field was.
T~e largest overall pic.ture that can be .Jl:~ven. of th~s I!TOUp of aca..;
demIc and other form81 research undertaking IS that they were an
att~mpt to harness th~ academic and research. cotnmunity of ~he
Umted States to prOVIde badly needed -answers to some pressmg
national security problems, in the shortest possible time, without
alerting potential enemies to the U.S. Government's interest in these
matters.
In aU cases, research results were published through -the normal
overt channels for publication of medical and physiological research.
I would like to remind the members of the committee· that at this
point in history the amount of available reliable data on LSD and
similar materials was essentially nil.
~ -~det:stand from r~adingn~wspa'per ~cco~nts _that one o.f the
pnnClpal mterests of this cODlIDlttee m this kind of research IS the_
degree of protection that was afforded to the- subjects used in -those
e~eri.mentswherehumans\lbiects'were used. As far as the Bureau of
Narcotics project is concerned, myimpre~ion was there was no advance
oWledfe. or protectioIl of the indiViduals concerned. The
only comment would like to m~e on this is that, harsh as it ma.y
seem·in-retrospect, it was felt that in an issue where national survival
might be concerned~ such a procedure. and such a risk was a reasonable one to take. I would like to remind the committee again that,
as far as those of us who participated in this work were concerned,
this country was involvedm a real covert war in the sense that the
cold war spilled over into intelligence activities.
Insofar as protection of individuals in the bulk of this work, as
rep~esented by formal research projects, is concerned, th~ .mat.ter
of informed consent and protection to the volunteers partlclpatmg
was left to each investigator according to the standards that either
he or his institution felt were appropriate to the situtation. Our
general feeling was that if we chose reputable andresponsibleinvestigators, appropriate standards in this -area would be used. I think,
in general, the procedures actually used in these experiments were
kn.

173

representative of what was considered to be adequate safeguards
at the, time.
' '
I niight, add I fu']y realize thQSe standardshll.ve chan~d since, then.
A comment should, be made on the kind of interest that the agency
had in these matters and how it may have changed over the years.
The qriginalimpetus for the work, as mentioned above, was the concern that aggressive use of behavior-altering techniques against this
couritryby itsenemies.Althou~h this remained a continuing and
probably primary focus in the history of these projects, the ,agen,cy
did become interested in the potential use of behavior modification.
techniques in unforeseen circumstances that might occur in the future.
It is undoubtedly true that some of these ,research activities were
continued into the middle or late 1960's when, in 100kiIigbackward
now~ the real possibility of their successful and effective use either
against us or by us was very low. In fact, 1 remember writing a report
:.- when I waS on detached assignment with another unit in theclandestine ser,'vices in about 1961 Which,,'con,cluded, that the potential effectiveness of these techniques and the inclination of American intelligence officers to use them was limited. The only reasOJis I can
provide now for the continuance of a small number of these activIties was that we felt we needed to be more certain than we were
of these negative results and also that we felt a need to maintain
contact with individuals knowled~eablein these fields to keep ourselves abreast of what, was happemng. '
I might add that I left out here, and I will freely admit t.o , certain
arilountof bureaucratic inertia that always iakesplace in the shutting
off an ongoing activity. That certainly was a factor.
In conclusion, I woUld like. to cOlIlment on three things which trouble
me very much, about the situation I find myself in.
:First, there have been many references in the press to- attemp.ts by
me to avoid testifyin~. These alleg,a,tions are without an)': basis in f,a,ct,
either in terms of "hiding" or miking myself ~available' to congressional committees.
In the case of my testimony before the Church committee in 1975,
I voluntarily and immediately returned from India as soon as I was
made aware at the missionary hospital, where, I was perCormingvolunta~ services, that I might be needed. I have been available lor all
legitimate inquiries at all times through my counsel.
'"
Second, I feel victimized and I am ap~alled at the CIA's policy,
w~u:rein someone or some group selectively pin~oints mI name by
failing to delete it from documents released under the Freedom of
Information Act without any permis$ion from me. That is, my name
is selectively left on released documents where all or most others are
deleted. I have a great concern for past, present, and future employees
of the CIA involved in sensitive, difficUlt, and potentially misunderstood work, as this policy of selective disclosure of individuals' names
gets ap~lied to them. I am sincerely concerned that the CIA's ability
to recruit clandestine assets in the future would be severely impaired.
Third, my concern is for the reputations of the many individuals
not employees of the agency, in academic and professional life who,
for the most patriotic and constructive of reasons, and gtlaranteed
both by myself and the Agency of confidentiality and nondisclosure,
chose to assist the. Agency in its research. efforts over the past years.
By now, in today's climate, the association in the news media of any

174

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name in the academic or professional world with CIA brings immediate
and au!'Omatic.negative connotatio~s and irreparab~y dam~s the.u
reputations. With regard to mytestlmony, I ho~ this comnuttee Vlill
understand my reluctance, except when absolutely essential, to mention other names. I &01 desirous and willing to share my knowledge of
matters of interest to the committee that I have in my memory but,
whatever the CIA's ~liciesmay be on this matter, I feel it is a point
of personal responsiliility to honor the commitment of confidentiality
that 1 feel tow8.rd these individuals and not to be a party to further
damage their reputationS.
. In summary, I would like this committee to know that I considered
all this work-at the tUne it was done and in the context of circumstances that were extant in that period-to be extremely unpleasant,
extremely d~cult, extrem~fizsensiti,:e ~utt above all, to be. extremely
urgent and lDlportant. Ire' e that It IS difficult to reconstruct those
times and that atmosphere today in this room.
Another thought tliat I woll1d like to leave you with is that should
the course of recent history have been slightly different from what
it was, I can easily imagine a congressional committee being extremely
critical of the agency for not ha~ done in",estJgations of this natUTe.
At this point, with. your permission, I would like to interject two or
three incidents very briefly to illustrate this point if you Will permit
·ili~
.
Senator KENNEDY. Fine.
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. I did not write them here because they were not
recalled. One is on at least two occasions in the past, I and an associate
of mine briefed the physician of the then President of the United
States on the inherent dangers and alerted them as to what to look
for should a covert attack against the President of this nature be
made.'
.
The second J?oint involves an incident that happened not too
long ago where, m connection with a Presidential visit to a potentially
hostile coun~, is the best way I can say it, the physician along on
this visit, when he came back, reported some-I ao not quite know
how to describe it-some unusual feelings he and several other
members of the party: had, and an associate of mine, someone who
worked for me, with knowledge of this whole research, was able to
counsel with him as to what this kind of behavior tnight mean. . '
I' just use this to illustrate but the bottom line on this whole business has not been written as far as I am concemed~
.
In any case, it is my simple wish to be as helpful as possible to this
comtnittee in obtaining its appropriate legislative goals, and I am
pre'pared to be as helpful and forthcoming as possible in the areas in
which you are interested. .
'. .
Senator KENNEDY. We will indicate at the outset that Dr. Gottlieb
is testifying pursuamt to a grant, of immunity. I think it is important
that the record. reflect that.
Mr. LENZNER. Thank you, sir.
Senator KIlNNEDY.We will be glad to include it.
One point in terms of the availability, Dr. Gottlieb, you made
reference to that in your formal statement. The 'fact is, just in terms
of our inquiry, we were unable to get any conversation or any information from you until we had the grant of immunity. We had other
agents who we had requested to come and who came. Others, we had
00 subpena 00 come. But really you were the only one that-well,

175
otherstalkedwithusandwould.co~e

back withagrant~fimJ:n~ty,
but you .are .tho only one who 1DSlSted on the gr:ant of lInmumty to
come and. talk. Ido not want to make more of that than that statement or comment, but I. think, sinee'You really .brought this up in
.terms of. availability; I think probably the record ought to at least
indicate what our unders~andingof the availability woUld be.
.' .
·Mr. LENZNEB. Senator, ill cowdcomment on that.
Dr. Gottlieb, folloWing our advicean~ counsel, s!rict advice,and
counsel, has been available to congressional COmmlttees and other
sources pursuant to a' grant of immunity. But he is relying on Qur
advi.ce and coons
.. el,not.... to. dis,cuss or.,waive aily legal rights that he
might have prior to this formal legal process taking plaee. But he
did ,come in a day earlier at your staffs .request ·to reView these, mat~rials,and we have tried to. be, cooperative~ ,the extent of 6 days of
testimony before the, Senate Select CoJ;llDlittee,' and now his testi';'
mony today.
, ' , . .....
Do you want to add anything to that?'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No. '. "
'. .
'
Senator KENNEDY. Before I ~t into ihejlow of the questions,
let me see if I understand one of the add-onS 'that you made in terms
of a Presidential visit to a foreign country. Upon his return, the
President and his :Q.arty sought and counseled with you about th~
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Excuse me, it was not me personally. It was someone who worked for me.
Senator KENNEDY.A$ociated with you. But they told you of. this.
Are you suggesting that at least these people, the Presidential
party, were drugged by a foreign country?
J?r. GOTrLIEB. ~ am suggesting t~at th~ywanted to help them
reVlewand determme w~ethe:t that ~ht have happened.
..
Senator KENNEDY: Old they look mto that? Did your associate
look into it?
Dr., GOTTLIEB. Yes. .
""
.
Senator KENNEDY. Did they make any judgment?: '.
Dr. GO'I"I'LIEB.I cannot give you a precise answer on that, nor am
I ~ure itis ~j)propriate for me to, but the fact is thatl cannot.
Senator KENNEDY. You could tell uS if the
"
".
.Dr~ GOTTLIEB~ I am going to try to be asrespoDsive as I can. My
remembrance is that they decided it was anilldetern:Unate thing
that lo~after the incident they' could ·not,at le$Stunequivocably,
c')nclude that this behavior was, due to some covert dru~..
.
SenatorKENNED:r. Can you tell us what year this happened?
,Dr. G()'1'TLIEB. I am not precisely fixed in the year. I woUld say
it was approximately 1971, approximately. ' .'
Senator KENNEDY. So I gather the results were inconclusive.
. Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes, that is my remembrance.! do not have a
sh~ detailed remembrance...
.
Senator KENNEDY. Would the other ~ency know that?·
Dr. GOTrLIEB. I just do not know. 1 bring it up only in the context
of iUustrating that we are walking in a margbl .here, on a border
where: you know, the relevance of work like this and the urg~ncy of
where, you . know, it, that the final answer possibly has not been
written.
Senator KENNEDY. Well since you raised it. I am interested in the
specific circumstances which you raised here.

176

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I think there are extraordinarily great implications on it about a
Presidential party. I think that that is so:mething that is worth knowing
about.
,
Is the Intelligence Committee familiar with thosee--- Dr. GOTrLIEB. I really do not know..
'
'. '.'
Senator KENNEDY. Senator Chafee is on the Intelligence Committee.
I do not know whether or notyouwan.t to pursue this, Senator Chafee.
We W&nt to get back into our other areas, but 1 think it is worth at
least findin2 out more about this incident.
'
,
Just'~aIly on this, is there any wayyo~ can.describe to us the type
of behaVIor that was of concern to the PresIdentIal party?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. '
. My best recollection' is that it was disoriented, unusual in terms of
the person'frhorinB.lbehavior. I can only give you a general description
','
of i t . '
Senator KENNEDY. Is this just the Presidential party or did it
include the President?
."
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My recollection is that it certainly did not include
'
the President.'
Sellator KENNEDY. The Presidential party.?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. And specifically it included the physician
himself and' some of his associates., You know, inappropriate tears
and crying, 1 remember was part of this manifested behavior.
Senator KENNED'!. If we may go ~ack a l~tt1e bit, i~t in followlnJ
through your expenence, Dr. Gottlieb. I think you tned to put this
program 1n some per~pective, the program of drug testing on unwitting

1
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I
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su~cts.

........

What was there about the times that caused you or your colleagues
in the Central Intelligence Agency to' undertue that project, the
overall MKULTRA research project?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. The feeling that we had was that there was a real
possibility that potential enemies, those enemies that were showing
specific aggressive intentions at that time, possessed capabilities in
this field that we knew nothing about, and the possession of those
capabilities, possible possession, combined with our own ignorance
about it, seemed to us to pose a threat of the magnitude of national
survival-as I said, hard as it may be to imagine that in this room
at these times.
'•
"
, ' '
,
Senator KENNEDY. You ~entioned sort of concrete examples up to
the time you left, the agency. Those concrete examples go right up
,
'
through 1972, 1973. '
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My best recollection is that e,' unitintbe agency,
the Counterintelligence Unit, who keeps track specifically of activities
of other intelligence service~, keeps a nmningaccount of those instances, and the degree of reality to them. In other word~, how well
they can be documented. I have'looked at tbisfile several times for
obvi~us reasonsdmju, my variou:, responsibilities in the CIA, and
that IS why I know It IS bOth growmg and real, and as far as I know,
up to the time I left the agency, current. In other words, what I am
trying to say is there are weU-documented instances of this country's
potential enemies' specific use of covert drug administrations against
Americans and others.
.
,
Senator KENNEDY. Your information is that it is continuing at the
present time?

177

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Dr.G()T'l'LIEB. I cannot talk about anything after 1973.·· . . . .' .'
Senator KENNEDY. Up' through 1973 ·though, covert· drug' admin-.
istratioDS were being used?
..
..
Dr. GO'1'TLIEB. That is my imp~sion. ..' . '.. ' . .... '. '"
."
Senator KENNEDY. That .IS IOU! l~pre~I()~.and.Y9ur ~ormatl~n?
Dr~ (lO'1'TLIEB. I. am afraId I m~htbe gtVlDg youa~qnpressl()n,
Sena~r, and that IS I am notsaymgthey.used LSD or psychogenic
ma~n~.I ~ saying t~a.t the gen.er&1 methOd.. of ope.r..t.ion. of c.o
. ' vert
.. .
.
admm19tratlon of d.rU2s 19 well documented.
SeJiator KENNEDY. '1>0 you want to just tell us the' type of things,
the most recent times that you were'
. ..
..
. p~. GO'1'T~IEB. I cannot remember thelJl. The list is long. As I say,
It IS lIDl!resslvethat way. T~eones I re~embe~,the;s~c~crem.em
brance I have are drugs which totally mC8.paCltate mdlV1duals l1l a
manner so that documents can be stolen. In other words, basically
insensate, and this would be, as 1 remember it, because it has been in
the ~ress several times, American and other couriers and military
attaches have had this sort of thing happen to them.' . '.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Are we talking about a handful of cases· or· are
we talking about hundreds, thousands?
".
Dr. GOTTLIEB. We seem to have trouble With precise figures
bec~use ~ d.o not b~~e that. ~ my hea~. In this rarticular. one, I
realIZe thIS IS a sensItIve and unportant Issue, and .do not want to
~ake ~sstatementS, so I would rather not use a number and be
ImprecIse.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Could I ask, are you talking about a handful
.
or more than a handful?
I think we ought to have some
.
. .
Dr. GOTTLIEB.' If you mean by handful, five, it is a lot more than
th~
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You listed a long list in your earlier testimony.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. By long, I mean more than 20. I do not remember
. ....
..
how much longer.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us how and why the ~t safehouses were set up?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
' . '
To repeat briefly what I said in the statement, that after becoming
acquainted with the Bureau of Narcotics agent with an interest and
background in this, 'he and· I worked out an administrative arrange-.
ment,and I might straighten one thing out here that has appeare~ in
several places, Doth in the press and elsewhere, andthat:was·that this
narcotics agent worked for CIA. As far 'as I am concemed, in my
remembrance of all of these matters, that is a total diStortion of what
happened. He remained a very active and, I understand, eftectiv~
Bureau of Narcotics agent and administrator; that he felt that his
interest and ours could be suecessfully intermingled. And the nature .
of the things that he did for us were indeed not things that he would
say, well, now, I am doing this for CIA. They were meant to be useful
in his own work, t.o the eXtent that he felt that way. I just want to
straighten that out. He never worked for CIA.
He was a member of another Govemment agency who' was cooperating with u:; in using facilities that this agency aid not feel they
could dC''"'! or were relevant.
-

.._-----------_., -,

_._._".-"-~"-_.~

'_""._0 __ ._ ..... __'.• _• . '

,~~ "~

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178

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Senator KENNEDY. But the fact is,is it not, that you really started
the program in, terms of this-·-Dr.. GOTTLIEB. Oh, yes, that is a fact.
,
Senator KENNEDY. They were really started by you and George
White, Morgan Hall?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
,
senator SCHWEIKEB.Were any of these agents paid by the CIA, or
we~ all. their salaries paid by the
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. By agents,
Senator SCHWEIKEl\. I mean ItDyof the people involved in the drug
experim~nts, who administered drugs or ran the safehou~es, people
from the Bureau of Nfircotics. Were any of them paid by the CIA
while they. did this work?
,
. .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. There was Olie unusual i>e).~od that I w~uld be happy
to go into of no longer than 3to 6 monthS that, due to special circumstances, I will relate toyou as best I understand them, we did pay Mr.
White's salary.
' . ,
As I say, just for a period of 3 to 6 months.
..
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Any others, or is that the onlY' one?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No. That is the only incidence. I will be glad to
recollect oo..you what I remember about that.
Sanator KENNEDY. Well, as I understand it, Morgan Hall did work
for and was being directly paid by,the agency for a period of approx~~3~~

Dr. GOTTLIEB. The main point I want to make is that he was paid by
the Bureau of Narcotics legitimately for all the other times. That is the
point I want to leave. .
.
Senator KENNEDY. But by the agency-Dr. GOTTLIEB. For this short period.
'
Senator KENNEDY. When he was not being paid by the CIA, but
was involved in this program in terms of the safehouses,hewas
effectively working for and with the understanding for the agency
itself?
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No; no--. .
Senator KENNEDY. As well as the Bureau of Narcotics?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No; I do not,think that is, in my formulation, the
way I would describe it at all, Senator. .
.
.
.'
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you describe it then.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. He was a working active Bure.au of NarcotiCs officer
gO!ng about his business and altering them insofar as he felt he could
.
help us and still arrange'his own a:1fairs.,
. Senator KENNEDY. But he was running the program, the safehouse
in San Francisco, was he not?
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. But the activities in the safehouse, whatever
information we were getting outof them, they all involved the Bureau
of Narcotics' interests.
Senator KENNEDY. That is right. But they also involved CIA
interests.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Oh, ye.~.
Senator KENNEDY. Effectively, I would describe it, and this is 8.
matter of semantics, you would effectively describe it that Morgan
Hall was the operational arm of the agency in terms of the safehouse
in San Francisco-that is my description.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have to accept the way you describe it--.

...

179

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,

•

Senator KENNEDY. I do not W&:llt to put wordlS-...
.'
Dr. GO'M'LIEB [continuing]. To me, and I have no axe'to grind now
in this area, there is no reason thlJ.t I would want tomBke it appear
t~at he was not working for C"!A, ith~ .was..But ~hefac,t isan~the
clrCumst~ces are, and! am f&J.rly famJliar WIth this comer of things,",
that.that lust was not the case.
'. . . ... ' '. ...'
Senator KENNEDY. What was his association with the. safehoUSe in
San Francisco for that period of'10 years?
"
.. ' .. '••
Dr. GOTTLIEB. There is no question that he was the principal and
practically the only person that, through whom, CIA became aware
of those results from all otthis that they felt they would be useful. I
. am n()t trying to dilute or mitigate or alter the fact that Mr. White
was it as far asthisprogr8J:!1 ~,?es.The point I wan~ to make ~though UJ
that these were always actiVIties that the Bureau of Narc()tiC$-.-.Senator KENNEDY. Had some interest in?
'.
",
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Had some interes.t in.'
.
.
Se~ator KENNEDY. He was still· the conduit of very Siza.ble amowits
of money during all this period, was he not?
.
'.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No question about it. .'
Senator KENNEDY~ From the agency?
Dr. GOTTLIEB~ Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. OK.
.
In terms of your kno~ledge, did the leadership of the Inte)ligence
Agency understand this program, the MKULTRA, and did they .
'. ' .
. . " '.
.approve it?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My answer to that, before you made available. to
me the documents you have, would have been absolutely. Havmg
read the documents. you have documented evidence of that, I. think
you have the Director's signature on enabling . :ncumentsthat got
tl\is s~arted, and as I mentioned in m.y statemeni., my remembrance
is that· there was a policy review of this project, at least once a year,
and more frequently than that later, and that people withrespoD$i...
bilities broader than mine alwaysapprovoed specific projects and
specific expenditures of funds. As I say, my remembrmce of this was
very mucli reinforced by all the signatures on the memoranda that!
saw.
Senator' Sen i:IKER. In your testimony you said Written' approval
fronl ~ersons at least two levels above you was required .for each·
project. What positions are you referring to when you speak of t~o.
levels ~bove you?
.' . .
.' .
.
'. '.' .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. The reason I put it that way, Senator Schweiker, is
that my own job changed. What two levels would be at any one time
above me would change. For instance, when I was a branch chief,
there would be more. tlian two levels. The division chief wouldsi~ it,
and the chief of then called TSS would sign it. and I do not remember
now but for certain levels of funds there woulq have to be one or two
,.,ignatures above his. depending on what the size of the expenditure
was.
Also I specifically remember briefing the Director of CIA repeatedly
on these matters.
Senator KENNEDY. Who. were they? What was it and who. were
they?

180

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Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have to be careful that my remembrance was
accurate. It was certainly Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone and Mr. Helms.
".
"
Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever brief a President?
. Dr. GOTTLIEB. No.
.
. . .
Senator KENNEDY~ Do you know if anyone briefed a President?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have no knowledge of that, Senator.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Could we go on to the focus on the safehouse
o~ration.·.
. . ' '.
What were the purposes of the safehouses-. Senator SCIJWEIKER. First, may· I inte!1?0se one question?
.
How about briefing Congress duringtlUs period?·Would you he.ve
briefed Congress or would you know that Congress had been briefed
on these projects?
...
..'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I really have no knowledge on that. As I understand it, the congressional. briefing procedures were'run, that was· done
by officers of the agency much higlier thanme,and we provided them
with information. I remember forwar<!ing information of this kind.
They would decide what to use and what not. But 1 have no direct
knowledge that Congress was or was not briefed.. .
Senator CUAFEE. Could I ask one question?
.
It is m:r underst.anding tha.~ thisw1?-ole operation was sf? se~itive
that the Inspector General himself did not know about It, IS that
correct?
..,
..
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. The only light I can throw on that, Senator Chafee,
is that there was an inspection and, as I remember it, the year might
have been 1957, but if you will remember from my testimony that
was'~ period that I was disassociating myself with TSS. I was going
overseas. But there was 'one, and I really do not know whathe·was
shown. Certain!y in the one I do remember, which was about 1961
or 1962, when I was back in TSD,tbe Inspector General had total
access to this program~ What I am sa~. is before 1961 there was
an inspection in TSD about that time. These took place about every
7 years. Before that time I really am' hazy on this point. I just do not
remember.·
.
. After that time, and including that inspection, I specificJL1lY remember the lns.J?ector General being made~rivy to thIS whole ~rogram.
Senator KENNEDY. As I underst.and, the In$pectoi' Generalrecommended a termination ·of this in 1963 on the unwitting part of-'.Dr. GOTTLIEB. That was not what herecommended,Senator.
What he recommended, Senator, Was that the Director make a new
determination as to whether he wanted it to continue or not. .;..
Senator KENNEDY. He questioned, as I understand, in 1963, the
testing of certain drugs on unwitting U.S. .citizens, is that correct?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. As I say, his specific recommendation was that .tbl!
Director of the CIA be given an opportunity to ~ain determine
whether this program should' continue. So it certainly raises the
question.
.'.
.
. Senator SCBWEIltER. And did the~rogram continue after that? Was
a new determination made by the Director?
Senator KENNEDY. May I just finish on .this?
What was yourrecommenriation at that time, as to whether or not
it should be continued?

181
Dr. GOTTLIEB. This needs to beputcarefullybecaUse~.in the first
place, the precision with which I remember this does not allowforim.
answer here. .As I r~member, I specifica~Y'; remember.meeting wi~h
Mr. McCone at which I was pT'esent WIth a whole, history of this
project, the
and cons of wntinuing or notcontin~ it 'were
~resented to . ,for decision. The instructions that I received after
this meeting was that the Director was considering this problem, had
not made a decision, and specifically keep the facilities, but stand
down on the unwitting testing~
'
,
.,,
'
Senator KEN'NEDY. What aid yOU recommend? I UllderStand that
to be the end result, at least in the documents that were made available. Principally, ina standb~J:\:uation, what did yourecoIriIriend?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. I do not t·
I can accurately testify on that
standpoint, Senator. My~membrance is that the pros and cons for
continuing it and diScontinuing it were presented byus.- , "
Senator KENNEDY. You are familiar with thedocumentfor~
Dr. GOTrLIEB. Is that one we saw the other day? Because those
documents were very helpful to m e . '
','"
Senator KENNEDY. It isIQ,telligenee .Agency document, second
p~J>h"
'.,
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Senatot;' I had not seen this.
, '
Mr. LENZNER. We did not see that the other day.
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. May we take 1 minute to read it?
Senator KENNEDY. Sure.
Dr. GOTrLIEB. Senator, I have no problem with admitting that we
&rg!1ed for the program.
' '"
Reading thiS document, I have no reason to dispute it was not
,written by me.
,
'
'
One point I want to make clear Is that this was a meeting, as you
will ~not therefor the purpose of deCiding anything-it was a
discussion of the whole ~roject.
Senator SCBWEIltER. Is it true M:r. "'Helms recommended the ,program be continued, including the testing of unwitting subjects?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. ~ain, Senator, I want to be careful where people
other than me are .mvolved ',because 'myremelJlbrance is not that
clear. I would honestly: have to be shown a doeumentlike I was just
shown to refresh my memory sharply on the'matter.
' ,
'
And right now, I cannot testify precisely as to whether he as an
individual said or felt or recommended it~
' '.,
'
Senator SCBWEIKER.Was he your boss at the tiIlle?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. At the time these discusSions took place? "SenatOr SCHWEIKER.He was your boss as I remember it, and you
said that at least two levels above yours were involved in decislonm~ on this program,~. _ .
Senator KENNEDY. The documents show that both Dr. Gottlieb
and Mr. Helms recoqunendeda continuation of the project.
N9W, can we get to the purpose of the safe houses.
Were unwitting drug tests conducted there and how many were
conducted?
Let's talk about New York City.
'
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. My answer to your question is, Senator, is that yes,
unwitting administration of drugs took place there, and 1 say tha.t
because I never personally witnessed any but I received reports on it
happening.

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I am confident that it did.
That is what the project was set up for. .
," .'.
In resP()nsetoyoursecond question of how m.~y, I testified after
carefuly lookingo.ver ell the files, that were shown to me, by best guess
would be 25 to 50.
.
. '
. SenatorKENNEDY~ Including New York's safe house and San Fran- .
cisco's safe house.
. . . .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My figure refers to total o~er all the years~ .
Senator KENNEDY. Over how many years?
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Well, as I say, it appeared that 1 feel this thing
was active,was1952.to 1965.
.
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. For 13 years you are suggesting that there were
only from 20 to 40 individuals or groups of tests?
.
.Dr. GO'M'LIEB. That is what I am saying my best remembrance is.
Senator KENNEDY. Individuals or groups of tests? .
'.
.' Dr. GO'M'LIEB. Senator, my impression of what went on in the safe
houses was that there was a good-deal of Bureau of Narcotics activity
not related to drug testing that went on and this, again, I want to
emphasize, is only an im:pression from talking to Mr. White mostly,
in that lots of p.otential informants -and other people related to the
Bureau of Narcotics activities were brought in and out of these safe
houses for operational reasons, and some of these individuals were
unwittingly· administered these drugs.
So, 1 am not .for a moment saying that as far as what you might
call operational encounters si\h drug enforcement and people related
to the Bureau of Narcotics operations, I cannot say how many of
those. I am talking about the ones t~at r have any reason to think
were administered drugs.
.
Senator KENNEDY. But it waS basically pretty much a joint oper.
ation, was it not, in terms of these safe houses?
. Dr. GO'M'LIEB. When you say, we need to be--for· me to give preClSe answers to that--.
Senator KENNEDY. Just in terms of the numbers.
As you are well familiar, havj.ng examined the checks during that
period of time, there were for th~ unde!'C0ve~ operat~oDs for the two
safe houses, as ··1 understand dunng this penod' of tlIDe; there were
more thin 200 paYJ!!ents that were made".J
'.
.
This is just San Francisco-for more than $20,OOo-andthe New
York one had considerably less. The bookkeeping, as I understand
from:the'records that were made available, were much inferior.
How d:Ck:u explain from where your name appears on a number of
those ch
,on the authorization for the expenditures of these
m.tters, what does this mean to you. in terms of these types of ex~ditures?
.
It would certainly seem that these places were much more active
just with regard to payments than you would suggest.
.
Dr. GO'M'LIIlB. Senator, I understand your asking me for my
impressions and my best understanding on mterpretation of the data
that these checks represent.
.
.
I am not disputing in any way that these checks were made, p'ayments were made, some of them are hard to understand, that all of
them-all of these 200-plus seem to have generic title of-'what were
th~-not STORMY.
You said 29 or 39 or what?

183
. Let's be careful here with· the figures, 20o-plus, and it referred to
amounts like 550 and 5100 that have titles besides STORMY,like
operational purposes or something. I have no way or no reason to
dispute that; in fact, they were used for operational purposes.
I do have a lot of confusion in my own mind that all of, these socalled operational p~ involved unwittingadministrations~
Let me make it clear, they may have~ I have no reasOn to think
that. Youasked me what my impression was; my impressionis derived
from all the information that lean remember about this.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, could you tell us a little bit about
STORMY?
.
Dr. GOTrLIEB. My remembrance is that STORMY was a method
- .'
of refening~LSDthat Mr.-White used.
Senator KENNEDY. W0'i~ntOU teU.ushow extensive that was?
Dr.' GOTTLIEB. Well, It· your staff ,::an tell you that better than
I can because I know it only from the documents I read which they
gave me, but I believe they said there were 32 STORMY connotations.
I would agree that they probably represented at least attempts at
drug. adminiStrations.
.'.
Senator KENNEDY. Many of the 5100 checks, some of which are
specificalllmarked for payment of undercover agents while admin..
iste~ STORMY and others, are not marked at all, were presumably
used for the same purpose because they were for the same amount,
cashed by the same people.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. What is the question, Senator?
. Senator KENNEDY. You are aware ·that~any of the checks say
STORMY and those were LSD checks. Then we have some of those
200 checks that were to the same people, same amount, same period
of'time from the CIA. .
.
I am just wondering if you can add anything to what you think-Dr. GOTTLIE~. MYlrocessing of that informatio~ Senator, as I
said, is that they cow be .drug admtnistrations, but you are asking
. me what ml impression of the total number is, and I think that
there is a difference between the $100 items that were handed out
and the actual cases in which drugs were administered.
Mr. LENZNER. Excuse me one second, Senator.
Senator KENNEDY. Go &head.

····g:G~Tl'LIEB.

There is a point, senator, that might have gotten a
little confused as we talked about this matter. Thatrib, that these
checks to which you refer, not written by CIA, they werecertain!y
~ CIA funds. But they were actually. written by Morgan ·Hall.
. senator KENNEDY. Right. But as you just mentioned, they could
have been.for drug testing, could they not?
pro GOTTLIEB. I certaiDly cannot say they were not.':;
'.
- I have no way of sa~ that.
.'
~.
Senator KENNEDY. That -were kept up_ in the same accounting
process in the CIA, in the same series of files, made out to the same
people for the same amount du~ the same period of time, and there
are the 32 that referred to STORMY sKxificJ!lly-and. we have
others,that have MIDNIGHT and CUM
wntten on It. We are
.
tl'I:ing to find out tbe extent of the amountDr. GOTTLIEB. I am not sitting here trying to minimizea.nything.
That is not Diy effort. I am trying to hQ responsive to your question
of what the total· number of drug administrations were, and I think

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. 184
the key p'oint hereis'a matter of interpreting that which is not precise,
namely, Just what were those items used for.
'
lam persuaded, for instance, that everyone of those $100 orS50
disbursements could have been situations where they thought they
might have used d r u g s . ;
,
1 am persuaded of that, but 1 am not at all persuaded that they
were administered in every one of these cases. '
"
There is no recollection I have nor have I seen &ny concrete evidence.
Senator KENNEDY. But the checks were cashed?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. These are returned checks.
Senator KENNEDY. In your opinion, were prostitutes used by
George White for his actiVIties in the San Franclscosafe house?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Ma.y I put this question, Senator~ also in a context?
Senator KENNEDY. Sure.
'
'
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I notice only from thin~ which Mr. White told me
and things which I picked up in associatlOn with him in his activities
over many years. '
,
' :,'
That is, that the general field of drug enforcement, and narcotics
use prostitutes and addicts and in the method of operation of an
outfit like ,the Bureau of Narcotics, the element of prostitution is
interwoven in the whole matter.
'
So I am certainly persuaded that as far as safe houses are concerned,
there were ]!rostitutes in them;
"
Senator KENNEDY. And involved in the testing?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have no specific knowledge of that, I would say.
Senator KENNEDY. What is your impression?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My impression is yes.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You are aware that photographic surveillance
and sound recortlingswere maintained?
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. That is another matter which I think needs to be
talked 'about in something more than a yes or no answer.
When these safe houses were set up, I do remember the attempt
was made to equip them and the original intention was to have ,a .
documented sound movie, you might say, $0 we would know something about the behavior of people when they were administered
these drugs.
To my remembrance, the movie part of it, although there was
equipment put in and tried, to my remembrance I never saw nor am
I aware of a movie made~
That does not mean there was not a movie made, but I find myself
having an objection to an element of pornography being put into
here, that is as far aslam concerned, was never there, namely some
asp_ectofcollecting pictures of prostitutes for the fun of it.
To my knowledge that never happened.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, they liadauthorization for the Jurchase
of two-way mirrors, for pho,tographic, equ!pment and soun recording_ equipment. Was this paid for by the CIA?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. There was no question in your r;nind that there
was an intention of using it?
'
Dr. GOTrLIEB. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And you do not know from your own direct
knowledge whether it actually was or was not used, is that correct?

rJ
185

•

Dr. GOTTLIEB. My impnession was that as far as the movies are
concerned, that was not used.
. , .
. Senator KENNEDY. Well, anythlng else? Stills? Recording
infonnation?
.
.
.
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Not to my knowledge.
. ...
.•. . ,...
My remembrance is that the Bureau of Narcotics in their standard
method of operations, either with us or independent of us, used audio
recordings of meetings with informants.;
Senator KENNEDY. Did the Bureau of Narcotics pay for' this?
I think the answer to that is no.
Dr.; GOTTLIEB. You m~anaudio equipment used in safe houses?
.
.
,
Senator KENNEDY. That is.right.
Dr..GOTTLIEB.. No. I think the CIA paid for that.
Senator KENNEDY. They paid for all of it?
' .'.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. That was considered a part of the CIA contribution. I have no argument with that.
.
. '
Senator KENNEDY. They paid for it on the west coast as well as
on the east coast?
Dr. GO'riLIEB. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you administer the drugs to any of your
colleagues or did your colleagues try out most of these drugs
themselves?
. .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. There was a period that we have not talked about,
Senator, that preceded the establishment of these safe houses, and that
could have, you know, overlapped in that period when there was an
extensive amount of self-expenmentation for the reason that we felt
that a first-hand knowledge of the subjective effects of these drugs
were important to those of us who were involved in the program.
Senator KENNEDY. This is about the time of the Olson ·case----Dr. GOTTLIEB. It preceded that and probably continued for awhile
.
.
afterwards.
Senator KENNEDY. Did that Olson case give you any cause to rethink the testing program on unwitting subjects?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. It certainly did.
Senator KENNEDY. Ifit did, what were the results of it?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. I think you can understand, Senator, that that was
a traumatic period as far as lamconcemed. It was a great tragedy
and it did cause us to consult with the people tha.t we ,felt werekriowledgeable,in helping us make a judgment as to whether togo ahead or
not.
,
'
It caused me a lot of personal anguisb.· I considered resigning from
the CI...·i, and going into other work because it affected me that way.
Our final conclusion was to ~o ahead with the work on the basis of
the best advice we could get medically was that the ~asual connection
between LSD and the actual suicide was not absolute at all, that the
two were separated bya week or so. That it was a reasonable risk to
take, and certainly Mr. White was told about the incident.
..
Senator KENNEDy.,Now, just to get back to the numbersagam- '
Senator SCH\VEIKER. May I follow this point up?
,
. After that Olson incident, why didn't you consider bringing in some
medical experts to exercise some sort of supervision of drug testing?
After all, there were two-way mirrors in the'safe house, so it co~d have
easily been done. Medical personnel could have come to observe what

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186
~~ happen~g so if th~re were any suspicious that another

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mCIdent was m themaking,there would be som6one on. the scene to
provide medical help or assistance. It seems to me that some steps
should have been taken to prevent a future Ouon case, and since you
had two-way mirrors, it seems tome that onesimple feasible thing that
could have been done was to bring ina medical observer.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My.remembrance, Senator Schweiker, is that that
may well ~~ve happened. There w~ a physician, in both cases there
were physICI&nS,to whom Mr. White was accredited to go,whenever
.
.
.
he felt he needed help or consultation or advice.
I .cannot recount to you now how often. and how much he sought this
.
.
.'
adVlce.
Senator ScBWEIE.EB. Of course, it was not a matter of his needing
help and advice; the subjects of the experiments were t;heoneswho
might have needed help. If you went through Mr. White, I am at a loss
to understand hew a doctor could make a judgment once removed on
whether or not something ought to be done.
Dr. GOTTL~EB. That is not what I mean, Senator.
I mean that there may have been these physicians who wereaccredited looking at it through the mirror. I just do not know. I don't
recollect.
,
Senator CHAFEE. I would like to ask a guestion if I might here.
You mentioned that in connection witli the death of Mr. Olson,
you personally were very disturbed, and on the basis of medical advice,
as I understood what you said, the decision was made to continue
with these e~riments.
Who ~got tlie medical advice?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. That is not quite what I meapt.
I did not mean that someone told us to go ahead with them. That
would have been shirking responsibility.
Senator CIIAFEE. What medical advice was received?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. As I say, I beg your indulgence·as far as revealing
names here, for ~he reason I me~tIoned .~ my opening statem.e~t:
If I can say this Wlthout revealing names, there were two phYSICIans
wholmewmoreabout LSD than anyone else at this time as far as we
are concerned, on the east coast, that there w~re several meetings
. held with them, and in the decision tha.t was made, their input into
this was that the relationship between Ul) and Olson's dl-ilt!:-. was
not necessarily causal.
.
Then a decision had to be made, was it important enough to take
wha.tever risks remamedafter that?
Senator CHAFEE. Do I understand from your conclusions here that
when all is said and done, you did not get much out of this'program?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. That is hindsight, Senator Chafee, that at the time
you were talking about we did not have
.
Senator CBAnE. That is right, but the part that I find interestirig--:. and you did not know it, obviously, until you finished the p!'ogrambut when you finished the program, you came to the conclusion you
did not get much out of it.
Yet, in yoUr statement you mentioned there is a growing library Qf
documented instances of routine use by the Soviet Security Services
of covertly administered drugs.
Have they succeeded where we have not?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. That is hard to say.
.
o

187'
That is why I made the statement that the bottom, line 'has not
been written on this.
My estilnateandplelwfremembe~that lam. atleast 5:years out of
date in followiJig thiS field, and having access to classified information
and soon, but at the-time I left the CIA, my conclusion would have
been that the probability of t~em, using psychogenic ma~rials in a
finely tuned way to alter behaVIor was very low on the basIS that we
found it was very' hard to do.
What! really-what ,really hap~ened'to people when they were
under the influence of these mind..;8.ltering or psychogenic drugs was
very variable, very unpredictable. The statement abOut the growing
liSt has to do with the general method of operation where youunwittiludy administer drugs.
'
,."
,Tlie drugs that I re~ember mostly used in these'documented cases
were more in the mockout'
"
Senator CiUPEI:. Sort of macelike?
Dr. G01TLIEB. Not mace.
,
Senator CBAFEE. I do not, mean mace specifically.
,
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Much more subtle than mace in the sense of renderingJhe individual. unconscious so you can manipulate him.
'
, That is a form of mani))t!lation,so you can t8.ke his papers.
Senator CBAFEE. There is il!)t.h~ subtle about this.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. It is subtle todotliis successfully, covertly, materials
have to be in small enough quantities, tasteless, and in fact,I remember-this is,a v~eremembrance, so don't hold my toes te theJireon
the details of it-but there was some mention in tbesefiles I referred
to about a ~tem, a potential enemy use, where they put a,sort of
pipe under the door of a sleep~ t~t and ran gasm, which would
essentially anesthesize them, but haa no odor so he would not be
alertedio it.
And d~ this anesthesia, they would come into his room and
search it and .take his documents and so on. '
.
But what I want to say, Senator, that is the 'sort of administration
I mean. That is,the sort of administration I mean.
, Senator SCHWEIKER. After the Olson case, Dr. Gottlieb, were you
given any w~ f100m lUlyoneabout what had happened here and
what should be done in the Cuture,to yourrecollectioil?
'Dr. GOTTLIE~. I have ·not seen papers relating to ,that in quite
awhile~ Senator, but my recollection is that there were certainly discussions, certainly, about terminating the program or going slow.
I~o not want to make any inferences from your question, but my
direct answer to your question is that I remember discussions like that.
I certainly do not ~ember anybody telling us to stop the program
,
"'
and knock everything oft'. " ,
, Senator SCHWEIKER. 'Well,' in documents provided to us for the
he~ in Augt...st which we conducted jointly with the Intelligence
CommIttee, we learned, and, Iqu·ote,
On February 12, 1954, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency wrote
Technical Services Staff officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate safeguards" to Dr-;Olson and for the lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual" to
whom the drug was adminiStered. On the same day that these individuals received
critical letters from the DCI. the Inspector General reviewed a report on Subproject 3 of MK-ULTRA. In that report, the same CIA officers who were criti_o
cied were quoted as to the purposes of Subproject 3-the observation of unwitting
peraoDS' who had been questioned after having been given a drug..
'

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188

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Based on that information, it would seem to me that the whole top
level of . the Agency was· critical of what happened in terms of unwitting testing and pretty much .said, "Do ·some~ .d.i1rerently ,
take s&feguards,and proceed with caution-if you proceed"at all." . .
I am not clear on what really happened 8.fter that message from
the DCI, because it ap~ars that the testing went on in just about
the same\vay as it had before, without safeguards. Nothin2changed•.
D r. GOTTLIEB.. I do not know. that I can h~!p with. the specifics,
what really took place and what happened. I will only repeat what I
do remember very clearly, Senator, but this program was reviewed
once a year and my own remembrance, and as responsive as I can
he to your query, we are talking about something that happened 23
'_11
.. 18 arsago--.
SenatorSCIlWEIUL 1 think you will'··
sureIyagreeth.at, expecl~Y
a fter the Olson incident, it was some~ that was indelibly etched
in your memory during that period of time. You· must recall what
happened..
. .
Dr. GOTTLIEIs. Yes; that the upper echelons of the agency were
thoroughly aware that the program was continued.
I cannot rationalize for you what happened specifically after the
. .'.
memorandums you are refe~ t.o.Senator CHAFEE. Could I 8$lt one question related to that, Dick?
Along with these critical reviews 6y the Inspector General, and the
death ,0fMr~ Olson, do you remember any additional safeguards
. being- taken to 'protect the subjects as a result of these actions, or
didn't you believe that additional safeguards should be taken?
Did these.justgo along in the same manner as they had before?
Dr. GO'I'TLIEB.. ·d.e from, as I say, pondering on the w.hole qu.estion, and alerting people who were involved about what hadh~p
~ned, I cannot respond to your question any more specifically than
that.
~
Senator CHAPEE. By alerting, you do not mean alerting the subjects, though?
_Dr. GO'I'TLIEB. No. .
SenatorCHAFEE. You still had unwitting subjects, so as best yC?u
can recall, despite the concem that was shown over the death of Mr.
Olson and. the .fact the:t you got medical testimony in which the
whole subJect of the tie-m between LSD and Mr. Olson's death
was discussed---despite aU of that, things went on just as in the
past as far as unwitt~ subjects wereconcemed?
...
. Dr. GOTrLIEB. Well, if you add to that statement, Senator, that
there was a lot of serious discussion about whether to go on or not,
my answer would bey-es.
.:.
Senator CHAPEE. The decision was, don't change anything?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Well, the best I can respond to that, that seems to
be the case.
Senator KENNEDY. Just in this area, again, to get back to the
numbers of people that were actually tested, you were out of the
countty for a penod of 5_years-Dr. GOTrLIEB. Actually 2 years.
Senator KENNEDY. Two years.
Do you know what was going on in the safe houses then?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have no recollection of that at all.
Senator .KENNEUY. Would you assume, that there was testing
during this 2-year period?
Asi.

189
Dr. GO'1'TLIIlB. I assume that..

•

..:..
..
I .think some of the chec~well,thereisno guestion about that. .
SenatorKIlNNBDY. The thing that lfindtroulilesomeisthat with.·
the sense of urgency that you 'placed on the propm from the beginning, ·the."prio~that it had in terms of ·the .directors, the.' brief~ th;at ·liad.
en place, the revi~ws <?f the various progr&l'DS~the·.
indications that you were for·' contmuatlon of,· the. program and the.
~cy that .you placed even in ·terinSof your testimony here tod~y,
wliyyou believe tJiat there wereonlyao.individuals who were actually
im~acted or aftected over a period of,14 years.
.,' . ,.
There is difficulty, I find, in taking both of those, juxtaposing
both of thoa&,kinds of'statements or coDlDlents, particularly against
a background where we have scores of checks to. the same· people,
kept in the same file, with astroilgpossibility forsamesernces.
And you have reservatiolls about the breadth of the' program",
I mean, 25 is just 2 a year, 2 individuals, 1 on. the east coast and 1
on the west. I just think that that is difficult to accept.
.., .
Dr. GOTTLIBB. I am just trying to respond" Senator,. appropriately
to you, to ~ur questio~. . "
... ,
Senator KIlNNBDY. F i n e . · ,
.,
Dr. GOT1'LIIlB. In the first place, as far as thegenerai concept of.
where this fitting into, the overall program, it was conceived of sort
of the last thing that might be done to get useful information..
It was not a numbers game. It was not a question of doing this
hundreds of times.
.
As far as rationalizing the number of checks with Certain amounts
of money with them against '. estimates I told you about, . I think I
am mO$~ ~asing. my impressions on those, tim.esthatI "asaware
by Mr. White telling me thaton~ of these had taken place. '
Again, I want to reiterate I cannot testify that, it was not administered 200 times. There was this- point about the east and w~t coast.
Please remember, actually. the times that 2 safe hOwieseXlSteclat
once were over a' fairly short period. '
'
.
,.
Senator KENNEDY. We willl·ust put in' the record the numbers
of cashed checks and'numbers o paYments during that periOd of time.
Let me move on. '
. ., .
,.
.
Mr. LIlNZNEB. Will the record reflect· that there. were 32 checkCJ
that were designated as 'Stormy. cheeks, ;because the witness has
testified----...,.
.
"
Senator KEN NEDY. We will print all .the cheeks 'in· the, record, and,
the numbers for each j>eriod,of time, and the numbers which··indicate
Storm,- 'during those years as well.·
.
Mr. LENZNEB. Thank you.
,
Senator KENNEDY. Was the FBI involved in any of these programs?
Dr. GOTI'tIEB. I am hesitating; Senator, to be sure I give you~ a
considered answer.
My off-the-hat answer would be not to my remembrance.
Senator SCHWEIKER. To your knowledge, did any of the· unwitting
.
victims require hos~italization?·
Dr. G01"'1'LIEB. You are talki~ about domestic..e.ctivities, now?
Senator SCHWEIKER. In the safe houses~
, 'Dr. GorrLIIIB. Ibave a reme:nbrance. I have onlV' a hazy remembrance of that having happened once in New Yor~ Oity. .
.
"
Senator SCHWEIKER. Dl.d you have other details about any, such
incidents? Can you tell us anything more about that case?

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190
.

Dr. GO'I'TLIu.Nd, sir.
....
.
Senator K~NNEDY..·· Can you tell us what was learned from the years
of th~ o~ratlon of the sa,fe house?'
Was It useful? ..
.
What can you tell us?
.
Dr. GoTTLIEB. I think what we learned from the safe houses was
more abou~ what you could not do than what you could do."That was
....
'
as relevant as positive information.
I think the conclusion frOm all the activities, was that it was very'
difticulttopredictably manipUlate hun:ran behavior in this way, and
that woUld be asummar.v statement I would make.
Senator KENNEDY. Obvio1.~sly, you believed that the SovietS or
other adversaries were doing it, as I understand it?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. We believed they might be doing it, Senator. I have
tried to be very careful in explaining to you why we felt that.
Senator KENNEDY. Just with regard to the usefulness of the information, did the lessons that were learned in these houSes have any
o~rational use?
.
....
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. I woUld have to say yes.
.
I think we would have been'in a far worse position in terms of being
!Poble . ~ brief/the .Presiden~'s phy'sicians before these trips, to field
mqwnes about this area, WIthout It.
.
Sena:~r KENNEDY. Do you know whether it led to the covert use
of ~gs by the Intelligence Agency?
Dr. GO'ITLIEB. I was advised by your staff that the area of the
overseas use of these ckugs was not one of your primary interests.
Is that accurate?
.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, the details of it.
But I think if you coUld answer whether you know if information.
. that was developed in these safe houses was used for covert operations
overseas without ge..!tting into countries or without getting-. Dr. GO'ITLIEB. My answer woUld be yeS.
.
Senator KENNEDY~ Can you tell us tlie extent of it?
Dr. ~OTTLIE'~ Well, the best response I can.give to .that, because
weare In an area here that I do worry about bemgpreclSe about, but
I woUld like.
. '
Senator KENNEDY.' If you·do notr-Dr. GOTTLIEB. Suggesting-I suggest you ask CIA which has that
information.
Senator KENN·~DY. Well, coUld we tum then-Dr~ GOTTLIEB~ May Iaad one thing?
Senator KENNEDY. Sure.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. This area was gone over in extensive detail by the
. .
Church committee.
Senator KENNEDY. Fine. That is fine.
Dr. GOTrLIEB. I testified fully on it.
..
Senator KENNEDY. Can we tum to some of the other MK-ULTRA
pr~ects.
"
Did you know Dr. Geschickter?
Dr~ GOTrLIEB. Yes.
.
Senator KENNEDY. What did he do for the. CIA?
Dr.·GoTTLIEB. I would. divide .the thinp which·Dr. Geschickter did
for the CIA in three parts..-'
'.'
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I want to say light now tha.t from my remembra.nceof our relations
o:ver a good nmnlierof years, Dr. Geschic}tter is exactly one of these .
individuals I was referring to who, out· of the most ,. patriotic and .
constructive motives chose to h~lp us, an~ I have aaeep.eoncem.~or
wha1i may have happened to hiS reputation as a result .of tpe dis-:
closures thathavl> been made.
."
But I wouldclividethisinthreeparts:·
".
. . .'. . .' ':.
In the firSt place, the Geschickter medical fund was a conduit for
funding other projects,andw.as very useful in that way, some of which
the purposes-some of which._· as far as we areconumed,the re~ons .
wh~ we wanted·to do it, were maWe awar~ to him and some we~e not.
The second use we made of Dr. Geschickter was he had hIS own
medic8J inten,sts that were' based on· his interest as a'pathologist in '..
.cancerand arthritis andhyperlension and several other things., '. ';'" .....
We.were intereSted in materials which he himSelf was experimenting .
with in terms of some of the effects,side effects sometimes, that had"
to do With what we called material like the kind I mentioned~ we had
evide~ceothers were using, knock out material and psychogenic
matenals, and so that was the second purpose.
.'
The third purpose was to use Dr.. Geschickter who. was close to uS
herein WashiDgton as general consultant. I and.o.ther individuals tha.t
worked with me would often go down and discuss a. problem that we
had and get his help in thinking through what the correct and appropriaie approach would be.
..
.'
Senator KENNEDY. But he was a witting participant in the activities
of the agency.
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. We went over in the course of our hearings
yesterd,ay, the dcvelopment of the Agency's relationship with Georgetown University.
. . '
.
you tell. us what were the Agency's intentions in getting
into that project to build the wing?
.'
Dr. GOTrLIEB. Most of what I can say that I feel were the-give .
. you useful baclquound rest on what I read the other day.
.~s happened a l<!ng t~e ago.. But my re~embrance\Vasthat we
conSidered our relationship WIth Dr.' Geschlckter a very valuable
one for the reasons that. I- mentioned, and that the contribution to.
thewin~ was generally considered a way in which· we could in.sure a
connection with him over the years, to have these kinds of services
a.vailable to us.
'.
' . '.
. Senator KENNEDY. Were you doing it to make Dr. Geschiekter
happy?
. '
Did Y9U have. a purposeful kind of project in mind?
. ' .'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. As I remember, havin~ my memory refreshed by
what· I read, we had in mind a locallacihty,c.. local facility at which
work cO!Jldgo on, tIJld I want sp.ecific&:1lyto e]J:clu.de unwit.tingtesting
fromthlS because that was our mtentlon here, WIth the kind of work
that went on in othermoreformalMK-UL'l'RA projects could go
on close at hand, that we could visit and. see and talk to.
That was the general concept. ..'
.'
.
Senator SCBWEIltER. Did it, in fact, happen tbatway?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. It did not.

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Looking back<·at it in retrospect, and reading these files in retromay seem-in fact, the plans that were made to l\ctu8.lly have
a facility at which formal and institutional research would go on, in
areas of interest.to us, ·was just never,realized~.; ...
SeriatorK~NNEDY.· You gave the mOiley"though?
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. Yes.' . . .
Senator KENNEDY. They did, in fact, contribuie $375,000.
What benefits were derived to the Agency from that?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I, w~uld have to s.ay J.!l ~trospect, t~e only 1?enefi~s
that the Agency denved W&$ mamtamlDg productive relatIOnship
. ., .
,'
with Dr. 'Geschickter, himself.
SenatorKENNEDY. T~ere was not any research done at the hospi~al?
, DI" GO'M'LIEB. To my knowledge as a result of building that wmg,
n~
'
Sent «;or KENNEDY. Well, the Director says he thoright that was
absOlutely incredible that the Agency w~uldbe involved in that.
, Dr. GO'M'LlEB. ,My response, to that 1S, I do not know how to re'
spond-to that.
.
I guess the Director is entitled to his reactions..'
senator KENNEDY. He. thought,as I ~",ould gather from histestimony, that it was incredible that they would have putuJ> the money
and then not at least have derived some degree of benefit from this
amount of money in :t.
.._
.
. Dr. GOTTLIEB. I can giyeyou a philosophical answer to that,
Senator, but I do not know how helpful it woUld be.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Why do we not, if we could, go to··the questions
.
of files.
We had a lot of testimony yesterday about the way records were
kept in the C I A . , '
.
Senator ScHwEIKER. Have you finished your questions on the
Geschickte.r relationship?
.-. '
.Senator KENNEDY. Yes. .
.
SenatOr ScHWEIKER. I have a.coupleof questionsonthat~
Along the same line that SenatorKennedy'1as. pursuing with regard to the hospital wing, Subproject 35.of MK:-ULTRA, we have
here a. memorandum from· the CIA f i l e s . - .
It says.that in the event· of Dr. ·Geschickter's death, the projects
will continue: u any o.ciivitiesunder- this project will be continued
through the Geschickter Fund and will· be unaffected' by his death."
The memorandum also gets very specific about what the CIA Will
get in !~tum for- itscon~ribution' tc? the building f~d. I ~ave trou~le
reCtiDciling statements likethese~ CIted by the CIA m their files, WIth
w~t you just said about the relationship between CIA and Dr.
GesChlCkter.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My response to that is to focus-the main point I
was· trying to make is that there were.. plans made and expectations
made. when this money was transferred that simply did not happen.
I think:thO$e were our-intentions when.the project was made, and
they just were-not realized.
.
SenatorSCHWEIKER~' Well, also,.in thesanie docuinent"it says:
s~ct

.,;;.

A memorandwn· of agreement will ,be signed' with Dr.' Ge$chickter outlining to
.the .greatest extent· pOssible the arrangements under which theh08pital .space
under his control will' be made available to Chemical Division personnel and tl:e
manner in which cover will. be provided and· other benefits obtained. The memorandum of'agreement will be retained in TSB.
. .

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What is your reSpoDseto .that?
.'
'.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I read that memo the other day.
. '"
'
, My response to that, as best as I c8.n'·recollect, the intentions w,ere
to do just what you read, to get slich ameIIiorandumof agreement.
1 am not aware that· that was ever actually done, senator.
Senator SCHWEIKER. You do not have any recollection of suc~ 0.
memorandum of agreement? .
'. ,
~'
.
Dr. GOTl'LI~lJ.lhave: a.. good r~ollection of the memorandum you
read,Senator.
.
.
Senator SCHWEIK.ER.. What about the memo referred to in the
document I just read from?
.
.
.
Dr. Gottlieb. The memo of agreement that Dr. Geschickter actually
signed ,or B.t1yimplementation of the series of events that you read
from that memo-'
Senator S~HWEIKER~ Di~ you ever discuss such a D1emorand~of
agreement Wlth Dr. Geschickter? .
. '
: .
Dr. GOTTLIEB~ I was not dealing with Dr. Geschickter at the tiIne.
Senator SCHWEIKER. You were not?
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I personally was not.
'.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER.·This project was under'your direction?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. It was. The man that worked for me dealt with it.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The project descriptions said-· three CIA.
biochemists or scientists would be provided cover as one of the benefits
the Agency would get in return for its contribution.
,.
.
Were they, in fact, provided cover by this project?
'.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I would have to answer that the way I did before,
these things were never implemented.
Senator ,SCHWEIKER. That was not implemented either?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No, sh-, to the best of my recollection.
-Senator SCHWEIKER. How waS the funding for this wing ha.nclled?
.In other words, how was the $375,000 payment made?
'.
.'
., p.r. GOTTLIEB. I do not remember'the fiscal-details. .
~ly remembrance was :helped by reading these files the other daywas the question of whether the CIA coUld legally do this certainly
came up, and extensive legal. opinion and approval right up to the
Director was received for it.,
, But as far as. the details of how the money was transferred to the
university, aside from the. fact that it ,was put in the GesohickterFund
. ~ an intermediate step or there may have been other intermediate
steps depending on what techniques they used, I am not specifically
aware of that.
'.
.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Dr. Gesebickter said yesterday that funding
was provided by either "a" Philadelphia' Foundation, or "the"
Philadelphia Foundation.
.
'
I wonder if you could shed some light on -that?
Dr. GOTrLIEB. I have no recollection on that.
1 want t.o make it clear, I am not disputing Dr. Gescbickter's
statement.
But I remember no details about a Philadelphia Foti:,.nation.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did not these plans come off?
.
We have a very ela.borate project description, with pretty detailed
planning. It was awrovedat the highest levels of the ~ency.Alot of
monc,y was spent. By all indications, the project seemed to have very
high pr.:ority, as an important integral part. of your program.

"1.94

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~ere is&; veIY det~ed,specific memorandum cOntaining t,he justificationsfor It. Why did not the plans come off? " ,
,
Dr. GOTTLIEB. May I have my memory refreshed 011 the date of
that memorandum?
'
,Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes. '
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Because,' I think that ,is relevant to' my giving a
responsive answer.'
"
'
Senator SCHWElltER~" It looks'like the dateS have been sanitized.
Dr. GOTTLIEB'. My suspicion is that the period after the event
you talk about may have happened when I left. "
"
Short of being reminded of the date, 'my response ·to you, Senator
Schweiker, woUld be that! would have to say'probably here expectatioJ}S ofeit~erfinding peop!e to do this, .qualifiedpeople who were
tramed medically and techDically to do thiS work, couldhavetumed
out to be very hard to do, or it could have been, also, that the.whole
.thing, faced with the reality 'of implementing it, could have seemed
,. '...
," , :
like an infeasible thing to do. .
I also want to add that efforts to implement research, particularly
with the complexities, the ~xira complexities of this'kind of cover and
sO'on, I mean with research efforts tbey often are expensive and do
not yield r e s u l t s . ,
'",
. senator SCHwEIB:.ER~ That would have beell perceived before the
project was designed approved, wouldn't it? You do not have to be an
expert in spY!ngtofigure out th.at doing these kinds of things at
Geo~etown. University w.~uld present so~e horrelldou~ :proble~,
particularly if you were gomg to·· try to do It on an unwlttmg basIS.
I have to believe those problems' were known before the project
was OK'd and that they certainly were taken into account before
it was approved. Still, notwithstanding all of these things that you
are pointing out now, the files indicate ·that the plan was to' gofuU
spoon ahead with this project.
'
,
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I re8lly_do not know how tot-espond to your query.
Senator SCHWEI:KER~ We have the date on the document you asked
about-I believe it's 1955. .
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I did not think that would 'chan~e my response.
Senator KENNEDY. The Senator has been good enough to yield.
l just have a couple remajnjng areas, Dr. Gottlieb.
'
One is on the area of files.
We had a lot of testimony yesterday about. the way the files were
kept in the CIA.
,.'.'
,
'
Some people talked about two sets of files, one detailed sUlXlIDary of
the project, and another boilerplate.
'
The 'boilerplate had ·variousmeailings. It was unclear whether it
represented an accurate summary or a misleading summary.
, Could you help clarify the recordkeeping system at the .Agency?
Dr~ GOTTLIEB. As far as I am concemed, based on the files that I
looked at Sunday, those files in the' sense of afisc81 interest, with
i?stifications that w~re involved in the Agency's regulations at the
tIme were reasonably accurate.
"
.
Your reference to boilerplate could be interpreted in several ways
I will do it in my own way.
I am not aware from reading those that there was, either a purposeful misrepresentation in what you are calling boilerplate, nor was
.
there an inference that this was one of two sets of files.

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The two sets of·files that I understand would be,.one, the files that
you now hav~; and two, substantive set of files which cont,am a lot
more technical d e t a i l . . .
....
Senator KENNEDY. Do you feel the summary documents, the ones
with your name on ~hem, a~ways repr~ented ~e core' or essence of
troth of what was gomg on m the particular proJect?
.
..
Dr. GOTtLIEB. I looked at a lot of·files, Senator.·
:.
.
I would say in a ~neral statement, the answer is yes.
Sena.tor KENNEDY. Can you .~ll us about why you destroyed the
files, and which ones you destroyed?
. ._
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. May I read a statement that I made?
I think it will be the shortest w~y to answer that.
1 made this before to the Churcbcommittee, and there has not been
anything changed in reSpect . to this.
There were -three reaSons. .
.
. One, as with the other files which were destroyed in a continuing
and important. CIA pro.gram. of files destroc.tio.n tohandl.e·a.b.urgeoning paper problem there was constant pressure to retire files and to
destroy those files which had no furthe.r use.
'..
....
Two, with my retirement and that of. others connected with this
work, and with the drug work over and inactive. for several· years,
these files were of no constructiye use to the A~ency. They were the
kind of sensitive files that were capable of bemgmisunderstood by
anyone not thoroughly familiar with their background.
. Three, the files contained the names of prominent scientists,
researchers,. and physicians who. had collaborated wi.th us and who
had been assured that their relationship with CIA would be kept
forever confidential.! felt that the careers and reputations of 'these
people would be severely damaged or ruined, for instance, in today's
climate of investigations, if their names and CIA, connection were
made public. I felt a s,Pecial deep personal obligation~orespect this
assurance of 'confidentlalityand to make as certain as I could that
these particular CIA sources would never be revealed. .
I am sorry, I left out the preamble.
.' . '
,','
In late 1972 and .early 1973) I began to systematically clean out
and destroy files and pP-p'ers which we felt were superfluous aild not
useful, relevailt. or meantngful to.my successors.
. In the case of the dru~ files, I specifically checked with my supe,rlors, to obtain authorizatloDsand concurrence to destroy these files.
My reasons for feeling that they should be destroyed were essentiaJly threefold and had absolutely nothing to do WIth covering up
illegal activities.
'
Senator KENNEDY. I would imagine if, these were just paperwork
, you would not have to check with a superior, wouldyou1'l'his was
something more involved than just eliminating paperwork, was it not?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I tried to make clear I was aware there was more
involved, that is why I checked-- .
Senator KENNEDY. Who did you check with?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I checked with Mr. Helms, who was then Director.
Senator KENNEDY. Did he order the destruction?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Certainly did not order them, he concurred.
Senator KENNEDY. You requested they be destroyedDr. GOTTLIEB. No, no.'
'

196

if
,[
.~

to des~y them.
decision always as.to what you need to go to
your'superiorsfor~ "
','
',,"
. "
SenatorKBNNED.Y.YouJelt you. should on this one?
Dr. GOT'l'LIBB. -Yes.
"
.
,
, Sen.atorKBNNEDY.So,cert&inly, the paperwol aspect was not
really tijeoverriding concern that you had. It was these otherreasoJ?-S?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No, I would hav:e to add that that was the motIve
behind my~goingthr()\Jghallmy·files.
,
,', .. "
'
Senator KENNEDY. You are nottrying·to leave the impression that
that was either a principal justificatIOn or reason to destroy the files,
are you?
,'
' ,,",
"
"
'
, Dr. GoTolLIEB.laIn·simplysayi~it was one of them.
Senator KENNEl>T.The tliing that I' suppose we :w:ould baveto
~ders,tand, haVing bee,'n,"given the, kind. of, prio~ty that :rou, stated
this,prognunwouldhave, your own strong .comD11~ent:to It over the
record of the exch~s we have had this ml)rnmg, and the other
record, "an~ your belielin 'the!m~rtance of,this in terins o! s~curity
reasons, that you felt that this kind of program was contmumgall
the way from 1973·when you left the Agency. I would have to ask.
why you felt that the national security reasons justified their
'
,
destruction?
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. Senator Kennedy, I think a careful search of the
records would show that it was illS that termmated this project and
that I many· tirnesgave the reasons why. "
, .
Tlief~t that at on.e period· in hist<?ry I felt s~rongly 'this was. a
relevantlUld.urgent program, and that m another time later, I specifically not only recommen~ed but implemented its termination, to me
are not inconsiStent.
.
8enatorKENNE~T. Well, you indicated to us that at the, time you
left in 1973, thatthel,lSe of the hebavioral kinds of drugs was at least
still being continued by adversaries. .
.
I mean,yougavethatcertain impression to us.
And you spelled out very clearly inyourJormal statement and others
that you felt this program was of a ~eat kind of importance.
1 &Ill ius~ w()nde~, ~hel:l.yoqsuddenly wentalo~ on justification,
,you urged Its contmuatlonm 1963, why at some pomtyou suddenly
decided that the. national security interests were ,not. served by at
least keeping the infonnation' and material that had been gathered
from aU these expenditures' and from, all the work that .was done.
Dr.90TrLlEB. 9nerespo!lse to your question, Senator,' ",ould be
that the substantIve technical work done on 99 percent of these
projects was published in open literature andavailable.rrhere was
.,'
nothing useful in the files that could add to that.
, The second point is, I must come back to what period of time we
are t,alkillgabOut. ' ,
.
,
As I tried to say, there became a growing realization that whatever
the foreign threat might be by 1973 or even earlier than that, that
that was. not a jus'tification to do any more than keeping in. touch
with s~veral individuals in this program t:o, b.e able to answer <\ues~ions
that mtght come up, that a program of this kind was no longer Justified.
It was not that the threat may have lessened, it was what we could
usefully do about it.
Senator KENNEDY. You made that decision in 1973?
Dr. GO'ITLIEB. No, no.' '

~;.

I~quested, I was··reallyaslcing his authorization

~e.needstomakea

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197

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I ~ould have to exa~e.the files.- The deCision w~ a ~~"one.
I·think your own eX&m1Datlon of the files' was .sho~ that although
this may have been a formal official determination of it then, .the
thing tapered off toalinost no$ing by 1967 or 1968. . '. . . '. ,
Senator KENNEDY. But the destruction, the decision'to destroy-'...-.Senator SCHWEIKEB. Is it not true that your Deputy obj~~ted tQ
the destrUction of .files for the reasons that we are getting at here?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have only heard that as a nnnor. .'
.
I have never seen a memo on that subject and never discussed it
with the person who was my Deputy at the time. " " ,'. . ,'..
Ido not know whether you are saying he told .you he objected to it
or whether he told'you he. told me. He might well have. A person can
have di1ferent feeJingsaboutit~
'..
.,
.
•..
Senator SCBWEIKEB. When you discussed it with your Deputy, do
you recall his having objected to destroying the records?
•
... Ibave got to believe he would have expressed' his reasons for object-in~to it to you,·that·he would'give.you his opinion.. .
.,'.
'. Dr. GOTTLIEB. I do not rece.11 that discussion with the person who
was my Deputy. I have no recollection of it. , . .
I am not saying it did not happen. He says. it did~
.
Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Gottlieb, Senator SChweiker is justgoiQg' to
continue the questions.
.'
I have askea him to ask a brief one for meat the conclusion.
-r have to excuse myself. I appreciate your presence here. ".
Senator ~CBWEIKEB. Dr. Got~eb, going bac~ to the role p~aye~ ~y
Dr. Geschickter and the Geschickter fund, did Dr. Geschickter m
essence oversee expenditures of several Il1illion dollars ','worth of
p~ects or channeled through his fund, acting as a conduit? ,
..
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. I would say I would have to dis&gJ'ee withtheiirst
part of your sta~ment and agree with the second one.
'
Senator SCBWEIKEB. You state your understanding of the relation;';'
shiJ?
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. He provided the conduit for sums of money in: the
amount ;)'"ou are talking about. HecertainJy was not· asked tosupervise
.'
.
.
. '.
··SenatorScBWEIKEB. You did say earlier he was used by you in some
consult!ng capacit! occasionally?
.'
,.'
Dr~_GOTTLIEB. But not necessarily on the project..'
.',
.
.' .Senator SCHWEIKEB. Not on these particular projects?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
.
.
Senator SCBWEIKEB. He cited the figure of about $2.3nrilli()D, as I
recall, as the amount of money that hiS fund handled for the CIA. .
Does th~t ring a bell with you?
' .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I would have to say that seems reasonable.
.'Senator SCBl!EIKEB. In listening to. your d.escription of the functions
that Dr. Geschickter performed and m readmg the CIA files about the
relationship, there is obviously a wider' unaccounted.for discrepancy
between what the files say and what, m fact, accordmgto both you
and Dr. Geschickterhappened--particulady in terms of the agreement
which was supposed to be worked out for use of the facility at'Georgetown, the Gonnan Building, the planned experiments which you say
were not conducted there, the use of patients as subjects, et cetera·
MigJlt we view this building fund contribution as the CIA's donation
to Dr. Geschickter's favorite charity in order to keep him as an
ongoing consultant to the CIA? .

198
Is that really what we are seeing here?

Dr. GOTTLIEB. Are you asking me, Senator, whether that is my'

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perspective?, ,
.
Senator SCHWElltER. Yes.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. No, it is not my perspective.
'
Senator SCHWElltER. Here is agreement that nobody lived up to, .
which did not mean a thing. It almost looks like it was written down
as a sort of charade~ Nobody knows about the facility providin~any ,
cover, nobody knows about having one-sixth of the space avallable
for clause, nobody tested anythh:!g there no people went in and out
on any specific research projects. Nobody knows about anything that
was to be included in the agreement ever happening.
'I do not know what otlier conclusion I could draw except that it
looks like a goodwill offering to Dr. Geschickter.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. The only light 1 could throw on that is to repeat
what I said before.,
My perspective is these w~r8' plans that there were intentions to
carry out, that just were not.
'
Senator SCHWElltER. It seems like the CIA went to an awful lot of
fuss and bother, and it seems also that the problems that you mentioned a few momen ts &g()...,........gecurity problems, and so forth-all of those
problems were known before this agreement was worked out. To do
the sort of things described in the proposed agreement, at Georgetowneven if only willing subjects wereused-'would surely, have raised
red :flagR. Yet the project was approved. ,
,
I come back to the fact that it looks tome as if it wa.., an artificial
device for keeping Dr. Geschickter happy because he was useful to
the CIA in some sort of consultant role.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. You said something there that I need to understand
better. Did you say witting or unwitting? ,
Senator SCHWEIKER. Witting, even if the intention was only to use
witting subjects. Maybe 1 did not say that.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. It is helpful, Senator, my perspective on this was
that of aD. expensive project that just never ,took place.
H you are saying, was it wasteful, my answer would have to be
yes in terms of CIA's interest. , "
,
Senator SCIIWElltEB. The project may not have taken place, you
say, but every one agrees that the project was paid for-the money
was spent. You are sa~g in your f?pinion ~t was not a matter of
donatmg to Dr. Geschlckter's favonte chanty to keep up a good
relationship there for consulting purposes?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I mentioned before when this subject first came up
that an element in trying to implement this was to insure the continuation of all three services that I mentioned we were getting from
Dr. Geschickter, that that was an element.
But ( certainly would have to say, no, the perspective you mentioned
,
was not mine.
Senator SCHWElltER. You mentioned it in your statement that a
number olthe projects in MK-ULTRA, I guess all of those conducted
at iheuniversities, were ultimately published, am I correct?
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. Most of them.
Senator SCHWEIXER. A-Iost of them.

199
Dr. GOTTLIEB. To the 'extent that information was published that
was llublishable. What I really mean'is, that they were not the kind
of thmgs that were developing ,data that was considered·secret.
.
. Senator SCHWEIKER. If that was true, why did we feel that "potential
~nemies of this country would be greatly benefited," as you also say
m your statement, if they knew about the nature and progress of ~ur
rese~rch.I am confused by your apparent coneemabout our enemIes'
learmg about our work, when -at the same time you make the obser.;.
vation that most of this work was published in the open literature
anyway. .
Can you clarify that?
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. I think I understand the reason you are confused.
What I· was' trying to make clear there was that if you tum the
situation around, this country's inteiligenceorgans would find it very
valuable if they could establish that another country's intelligence
organs are sponsoring a coherent group of projects and would draw
some pretty accurate conclusions as to specifically what their interest
might b e . ·
. Senator SCBWElKER. Let's look at some examples here from the
CIA files about the kind of research ,that the Agency had in mind,
areas of research which the research and development program of the
TSS Chemical Division was supporting.
In a document .relating to subproject 35, which of course was connected with Dr. Geschickter and his fund, we find· a list of materials
and methods the Agency wss interested in. I'll read a few items:
1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the
. point where the recipient would be discredited in public.
.
2~ Substances which increase the efficiency of mentation and perception. ,
3. Materials which "'ill prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of· alcohol.
4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized dis.'eases
in a reversible way so that they may be used.for malingenng, etc.
.
6.. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise
enhance its usefulness.
.
7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture·and coercion dtning interrogation and so-called "brain-washing".
8. Materials and physical methods which will. produce amnesia for events preceding and during 'heir use.

•

And the list gues on.
.
Surely, these would not be normal kinds of university projects that
we are discussing?
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I think data which was developed on all but a small
amount of. the work that was done in normal university settings
indeed was done to get basic data that we felt did not exist that were
relevant to these questions. .
Senator SCHWEIKER. The list also includes research into physical
methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of
time and capable of surreptitious use; and substances which produce
physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs, acute anemia, etc.
These certainly would not be published?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. They would not be published ,undar the headings
that you are talking about, but a researcher doing the actual work
that needed to be done, first. on. animals, to get this kind of data,
would certainly have a lot of data that was perfectly publisha.ble, and
did not necessarily mention these ends.

,,'I

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.A .potential.enemy analysis oJ· ~ whole group of projects could very
readIly lead 'him to those concluslons.
. '.
I do not know if I make that clear..
.'
Senator SCHWEIXER. I guess so. I think it's iD:t.portant to point out
that'in the same docu~entwh~ret~ list appears, explicit reference is
made to human testmg, which' ratses problems that "cannot be
handled by the ordinary contractor.". ".
. . . ....
.
I had earlier asked the Director on two occasions about brain
concussion studies.
.
One of the project descriptions refers to testing fluid-filled flasks and
using other means in an attempt to find out how the brain is shocked'
by concussion or blast effects. At one point I was told that it-was an
Office of Naval. Research project and the CIA was only indirectly
interested.
. '.
.
'.'
..,
. .
Then, DOD came back today and said just the.opposite, that this,
in fact,~as a CIA proi~c~, and the Office of Naval Resear~h w~ just
a condUIt for CIA fundmg.
.
'.
.'
Can you tell us more specifically about the brain concussion studies?
.
Was that one of your projects?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I do no·t have that-.I want to be very careful. I am
not saying it was·not, Senator, but it happened a long time ago, and
I did not see any data on it. .
.
.
An~ if I was goh:~g to be as responsive as I would like to be to your
questIon, I would like to have my memory refreshed.
.
Senator SCBWEIXER. We will get that for you in a moment.
.
Did you work closely with Dr. Robert Lashbrook?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Yes.
Senator SCHWEIKER. During the course of your association, did IOU
discuss the det&ilsof safe house projects as well as other MK-ULTRA
pr<tiects with him? .
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My impression would be that I certainly did, but
if you ask me to name instances when I did, or afternoons that I did,
I would be very hard -pressed.
..
.
Senator SCBWEIKEB. What capacity was he in· at the time that
you worked closely with him?
..
Dr. GOTTLIEB~ 1 think, as I remember, he was my deputy. ,
Senat()r SCHWEIKER. Would it not be fairly natural' that· almost
all operational material and information would be available to him,'
with few exceptions?
.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Pardon me?
.
.
I am consulting with myattomey because there is another individual
involved here ana I do not want to unknowingly h8.rm him.
Senator SCHWEIltEB. All right.
.
[Short pause~],
Senator SCBWEIltER. Do you have a response?
"
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I need to be reminded of the question because I
thought the question was: Do I remember or should he have had
knowledge of everythin~goingon-Senator SCBWEIltEB. Because he was yO,urdeputy.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My ~pression is "Yes."
. .
Senator SCBWEIKEB. Here is the documentation relating to the
brain concussion p~iect.
You are specifically listed as an accredited CIA technical liaison
representative for the project, along with another person.

••

201

Dr. GOTTLIJIlB. Remember, Senator, I did 'not deny knowledge of
this.
,
.'
"""
'
SeD9.tor SCHWEIKEB. I am trying to help you remember.
I br!\ showing you the documents. I mow you did not deny involyementin ihbproject. Ili'ould like to establish whether or not
this''!~ your proi'~ct,a CIA pl"Oject-I>OD said it was a CIA project.
This IS a memo:dated November 1954.
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Reading this, I still do not have a specmcrecollection of this project but I would not dispute that it was.
In ansWer to your question about what we were doing and why,
the' bestanswe:l,"I can ~ve you is that-ithadsomething'to do with a .
series of ultiJnate ends of the nature that you read before.
.
It sounds like a highly theoretical study of the kind that coUld be
published, by the way, that would backstop and lead perhaps to other
mvestigations. It sounds that way fromrea~ the paper.
.
Senator SCHWEIKEB•. As I recall from re~moredetailed documents.that I have n~t put bef0!8 you today, ~eproiect description
also discusses what It takes to mduceconcusslonand how to sneak
uJ? on a person and ind.uce a. C<!ncu~n, and how to have that occur
WIthout the personsbemg Wlttmg of It. The p~ose was to.produce
a concussion with IDaximumapmesia and no visIble injury.
There were a lot of ramifications to that sort ofresearcn.
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. Yes.
Senator SCBWEIKEB~ In the memorandum it lists' people from CIA,
who, have .knowlJdg,e of it, and, inter.est~
.. y enougli, it does not list
any technical people from the Office of Naval Research.
.
Wolild that not be a pretty clear indication that prime technical
r~onsibility would have rested with you folks?
Dr. GO'rI'LIEB. Senator, I did not sayit was an ONRlroject, I do
not want to be held to that. I believe someone else sai that. .
Senator SCHWEIKEB. Rea.ding· the memo, can you not make a
judgment, seeing how this was structured-.- '
Dr. GO'1'TLIEB. I thought I said from what I .was reading there, it
probably was a CIAproiect.
' . '.
.
Senator SCHWEIKEB. Dr. Gottlieb, what do. you know about the
knowle~ge of Mr..Ansling~r,of the~ureau of.Narcotics, or other
Bureau of Na.rcotics' officmJs, regarding Morgan Halls safehouse
activities.
. .
In other .words, how far up the Bureau o! Narcotics' chain of
command did' awareness of Mr. Hall's operations go?
Dr. GOTTLI~B•• I think the only thing 1 ~an say' that might really
help you on thism the sense that I am talking about my own knowledgezand not assumptions or inferences or impressions, was. that Mr.
AnsIiriger was knowledgeable of the safe houses that we set up and

w~~nator SCBWEI~B.AnYother Bureau of Narcotics' officials that

come to mind?
Dr. GO"ITLIEB. No.
Senator SCHWEIKEB•.Why did the CIA take over Mr. Hall's salary
for a time?
.
1
We discussed that earlier and you said this only/went on for a few.
months. What was the rationale for this departure from the rule?

202

)

,.I

. 'I

. I

,I,

·'1

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.i
i

. Dr. GO'M'LIEB. lprefaced this by saying there is no record that has
been kept of this, that what I am going to try to relnte to you, and it
is perhaps a little fuzzy in my mind; and I beg your indulgence there
for what might seem like Some discrepancies..
There was· a period,· and the period is exactly mentioned in some
of the. files .that were made av8.ilable to me ·.on Sunday, .where for
reasons lam not entirely sure of, it had something to do '\lY-ith some
of his past activities about some. people in high. places who were very
angry with him, and it was useful for Mr. Anslfuger to not have him
s~cifically on the Bureau.of NarcoticsJpayroll ·for a period of time.
He approached me and· said, since we are in this collaborative e1l'0rt,
would y:ou people be kind enough to formally take his salary fora
period through me so that I could honestly say that he if) working for
another agency for this period. That was the background of it.
Sehator8cIlWEIltEB..Someof the projects under MK-ULTRA involved hypnosis, is that correct?
'
Dr. GOTTLIEB. YJ'S.
.
.
Senator SCBWEIltER. Did any of these projects involve . something
called radio-hypnotic-intra-cerebral control, which is a combination,
as I understand it, in layman's terms, radio transmissions and
..
hypnosis?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. My answer is "No." .
Senator SCBWEIKER. None whatsoever?
.
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. Well, I am trying to be responsIve to the terms
that you used.
As I remember it, there was a current interest, running interest, all
the time in, what affects people's standing in the field of radio energy
have, and it could easily have been that somewhere in many projects,
someone was trying to see if you could hypnotize somebody easier if
he was standing in a radio beam.
.
. That would seem like a reasonable piece of research to do.
Wha't I am saying,! do not see that being the focus ofa large
interest or successful result come out of this.
Senator SCHWEIKER. We did have some testimony yesterday that
radar waves were used to wipe out memory in animal experiments. .
Dr. GOTTLIEB.l can believe that, SenatQr..
.
I would remind you that the problem of radio waves and what it
?oes ~.people is extremely current intereSt in.connection with events .
man lDlportantembassyoverseas now. There IS a great concern about
that.
.
.
SenatorScHWEIKER. Subproject 39 involved research on 142
criminaJIy insane individuals. Research techniques. included str~i~ht
interrogation, hypnosis, hypnosis in conjunction with LSD, and ~D
with interrogation.
.
Can you/shed any light on this experiment or what the purpose for
gettingi,Dio this area was? How successful or effective was the project?
Dr..60'M'LIEB. ~ have to again ask for a date on that if I can get it.
The reason I was asking for a date, there was a rather large period
of tUne that Iw~ not involved in this at all.
Senator SCHW£IKER. We have one. It is April 7, 1958.
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. I was not in the country, not connected with LSD,
had no lmowl~ge of it.

....

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'_._',",

.... -

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_'-"~_'------'-"~'-'.'.""

..... ":':"';-..:.':---..::~;

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203· .

Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you ever in your work under MK-ULTRAor other work in your division, buy "~ject" drugs from pharmaceutical.
concerns?
" . .... .....
.' ' . '
.
.'
.
I use "reject" in ~hetrade sellSe, drugs would not be available on
the. commercial mar:ket be.cause.they could' not meet the standards for
somereaso", or ano.tHer, such as having too. many adve~side effects.
Dr. GO'ITLIEB. Can Ispeculateona miSunderstanding of that term,
Senator?
. '.
"
Senator ScUWEIKEB. ~rtainly.Because it IIiay be helpfuL .
..
J?r. GO'ITLIE.B. Yq,ll. JI)II.Y, be talking aboJit .&. term u~d for. ~rugs
which drug c(\mp$Il,i~testandfind have SIde effects w:hichmltlgate
commercial e,xploita!ioD" becaus~ th~ milita.tthad a,continuing program, a very aggressive one, to PlDPomt those,m a sense that theybad
effects of,interest to the millta.ry, .and we did have liaison with .the
military and were interested. But that is what I think we are talking
about "'leject."·
."
.
.' .'
Senator SCHWEIKEB. I accept your definition.
....
'
.
Now, were there any of these kinds of drugs used as part of your
ongoing
MK-ULTRA or other teSting programs;,md
if so, for what
,
?
. '.

PIfr~GO'ITLIEB.

\,
\;
!

•

An in~rest in them there surely waS. The purpose
was, in our continu~search for.drugs that might have any of the
.....
effects on that list that you started to read before. .
. Senator SCHWEIKER. Was any of this work fruitful, to· your
.
..
.
knowledge?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. In a way, I guess that is the way LSD came .to our
knowledge. LSD was one of tliese compounds made by Sandos Pharmaceutical Co.
. ,.
Because of these bizarre side effects it had, they had no cOlDD1ercial
use for i t . ·
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Where did you get y-our LSD for your tests?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I am a little hazy on exactly where. ButI have got
a pretty good idea. It was from oneaf the major U.S.ph~aceutical.
houses who were maki~ dl"Ugs :of a ,similar structure ;end who .we
interested in manufactunng LSD for us. . " ' .
"; .
Senator SCHWEIKER. I wan~ to' make a clarification regarding the
time period of subproject 39., . .
.....
.•.. ..
The record shows that, subproject 39, dealing. with criminally
i~ane individuals apd using ~uch. techniques..as~ypposis, .hypnosIs
WIth LSD, and LSD mterro~atlons, actually began In 1954 and. lasted
through 1959, a ~-yearpenod. The memo I referred. to eatber!,as
, dated n 1958, while you were out of the country, b~t the project
covered a much longer time frame.
..'
.
And the cost was estimated 8.t $30,000.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I have been given a~iece of paper that willgive me a
little bit more information about this. I will rea.d it and try to respond.
I will just read you what we wrote:
It is thought that these persons have the 8ame kind of motivation for withholding certain information that is comparable to operational interrogations. in
the field.

That would be a clear rem~mbrance of mine, and' having been
stimulated by reading tbis as to why we were in it.

..
,>[

• I

Senator'Sc,BwBlltBR. Dr. Gottlieb, besides the safe houses that we
h..vediscussed·in some 'depth, here, where· else were drugs tested on
unwitting subjects? We know these tests went on in certain safe
houses.'
"
,,'
,
,,'
"
Whatabout other places and locations, to your kn.owlec!ge?
, Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. Are you talking about witll the United States?
Senator ScIlWBIlCEa:' Yes.
. Dr. GOTTLIEB~ I do not remember now the places where that was
done,unwitiing tests. We certainly,as I indicated before, did a, lot
of testing on ourselves.
'
Senator SCIlWEIDB. Well, now, we had, some information indicating
that drugs were slipped to unwitting subjects in bars in New York
Ci~.
"
Dr~ GOTTLIBB.! am sorry, I was in my:mind putting those under
the umbrella of the safe house.,
'
,
I did not realize you meant '!pecifically, physically outsidtSenator SCHWElDlL How. did you' relate them to safe houses,so
I understand...o..--;
Dr. GO'rl'LIEB. Thf!y were 'unwitting administrations that were
,
made by Morgan Hall or through Morgan H a l t ,
I ~ould liketosay~~~give the 'm~stPI'~~ise answer to that that I
can 1$ that. I am not specifiCally aware m the sense,that I can remember,
look,. this was done in a bar.
But I have no reason to think that that was·not done.
Senator ScBWEIDR. What did you do with the guantities of material
that ultimately. came into your possession-di'Ugs, poisons, toxic
substances-which either were produced for you or were studied by
you?
For example, we heard yesterday from Dr. Geschickter that we
imported a lot of JIOison mushrooms from Africa. What did we do with
;
them?
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I think toO answer the question precisely I did hear
about the mushroom discussion, and my best remembranCe of that,
and I want to underline this, to answer it most accurately, would
have to relate it to a particular project from where it was done,but
my general remembrance of it, that was a project that was discussing
some of the very basic aspects of relat~ a chemical and a structure
to an activity. It took place in the university somewhere, I cannot
remember.where, and tnat·,this material was procured in connection
with :getting this investigation or ma.terial fOl"him towotk on.
Itwasnotasecretorunwitt~
,
Senator ScHWEIUB. As a normal thing, what would you do with
this kind of toxic material?
"
Dr. GOTTLIEB. Material like the one you are ta.lkiJ!g about would
revert entirely to the investiga.tor dO!!lg the work. He works with
materia.ls, like that all the time, and different institutions do different

thi.!lgs.

SOme have a storage room, I guess they accumulate ; some destroy
them afterward.
Senator ScHWEIltEB. As you will· recall very vividly, our own Int511igence Committee looked into a. case where the CIA had maintained
and stored poison toxins that were supposed to have been destroy~d.

205
I eS$~h.e. resp~)Dsib. ility for that. fell somewhere between'CIA~d
Fort Detrick, but we had good eVldencethat deadly shelliiShtoxm
wl.'8 nQt destroyed even· after & Presidential order. SOme of the materials from projects like MKULTRA must have come into.· the
Agency's .hands. What happened to them? Do we know tbeywere
destroyed?--'
'.
'.
.
'..
:.
.
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. My experience is most specifically· rovertedto, our
pands;in other,word.!1,.it,was not'appropri~te.to leave them with the
mvestlgator because It 'Wasil't normal for him to have them,' and also
had to do his work' and were kept in the laboratory fot storage in the
CIA.
,"
.
'.
.
1 guess thAt laboratory, as lremember, this happened after I left, was
inventoried and reviewed and my understandiJig from the testimony
.that came up in those hearings that'you mentioned were all destroyea
and that did'not happen while I was there.
.
.
.
Senator SCBWEIItEB. One point that came to light in our review of
the financial records was that Mo~an Hall had considered subleasing
the safe house, or at least he had placed an ad to sublease' the safe
house.
'
Can you enlighten 'Us as to what was haCr:;ing here? .
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. I do not rememberanyt.
about that. .' '. '
Senator SCBWEIUB. That was February 8; 1955,; Morgan Hall
wrote a check to pay for an ad he placed to sublease the safe house.
Dr. GO'M'LIEB.I am sorry, Senatori I do not remember that incident
and cannot throw any liltht on it.
Senator SCBWEntEB.. I know you havea·plane.to make, so I'll try
to conclude this.
.
I have only one other area of questioning today.
EA3167,-the compound we diScussed in our open session with the
Defense Department, was tested by DOD for CIA by putting it on the
skin, what does this EA3167 do to people? Can you tell us in layman's
terms what effect you were looking for?
.
Dr. GOTTLIEB. lam· repeating something I heard ,the other day
because I have no recollection.of my own, but as it was'explained,to
me in. my work wi.ththe staff here on Sunday, it is material w.hiOO,
when added with other materlals,makesit possible to admjnister
something to the skin rather than orally or through the air. '
.
,That is myunderstan~of it.
,...,.. •
Senator SCBWEIKEB. It IS more or less anad m1D1 stenngagent,
then? You are saying you would mix some other drug with it,: some
hallucinogen or other drug, but EA3167 itselfhas no particular effect?
Dr. GO'M'LIEB. I want to be careful, Senator.
I do not have independent knowledge of this. I'am try!!tg to interpret that from what someone on your staff told me. That, is my
mterpretation of it.
.
.' Senator SCBWEIKEB. I guess that concludes our 'line of ·questions
fo~you, Dr. Gottlieb.
, We appreciate your being here. Thank you for coming.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gottlieb follows:] .
g1!
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206
-STATEM.ENT

or' OR. S IONEY GOTTLIEB

My name is Sidney Gottlieb and I reside in California.
I am appearing at this hearing as I have appeared in others in
the past ,voluntadlyand prepared t.o.. offer whatever construct ive
testimony made' possible by

background and rememQcance of

things past.
I would like t.o first comment on project. MKULTRA.
To the best of my recollection, several research
inquiries

which much later came to be organized under the

Crypt.onym I"KtjLTRA -- were begun in about
to

investi~ate

19~2.

'Their purpose was

whether and how it was· possible to modify an

individual's behavior by covert: means.

The context. in which

tt,lS investigation was started was that of the height of the
Cold War with the Korean War just winding down; with the CIA
organizing its resources to liberate Eastern
military means; and with the threat of Soviet

Europ~

by para-

~qgression

very

real andt.angible, as exemplified by the recent Berlin airlift •

In the judgment of the CIA, there was tanqible
evidence

t~at

both the Soviets and the Red Chinesemiqht be

usinq techniques of altering human behavior which were not
understood by the USA and which would have implications of
national survival in the context of national security 'concerns at that time.· It was felt to be mandatory and of the
utmost urgency for our intelligence organization to establish
what was

~~ossible

in t.his field on a

~j.qh

priority basis.

2 -

To mention just a few examples, there was a concern about the
apparent manipulated conversions of Americans interned in Red
China· for a very short time: there was cilsoa concern about
apparently irrational remarks made by a senioiAmerican diplomat
retur"nin9 from t.he Soviet Onion: perhaps l'Ilost immediate and
urge~t

.in our minds was t.he apparent

buyin~

supply of at-that-time-little-known new

up of the world

phychog~nic

mate.rial

LSD: lastly; there was a9rowin9 library of document.edinstances
of routine use by the Soviet Security Services of covertlyadminstered drugs.

This last., by the way, has grown and been

added to, up to the time I left the Agency (CIA).
I accept full responsibility for my own role
in these activities, in relation to what my position in the
CIA implied, as to my level of responsibilit.y as i t changed
over the years.

At the outset in the period 1951-1957, I

was head of a branch of a division charged with the responsibility
of looking into the matters which I de$cribed above.

I set

up and handled some projects myself, and supervised and
administered other CIA employees monit.oring other projects.
As the years went on and I assumed brcader responsibilities,
my personal involvement in the projects lessened.

Thus, my

involvement was most direct in the period 1951-1957.

Fr~m

1957 to the end of 1960, I was not directly involved at all,
being assigned to other matters.

I was stationed overseas

1957-1959 and was assigned to another unit in headquarters
in the period 1959 t.o the end of

1960~

Late in 1960,

208
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(
I returned to TSD to becollle Chief "of t.he Research and DevelopIIIent cOlllponent. f io.1962, I be callie Deputy Chief of TSDr and.

_.t

frolll 1966 to 1913, I was Chief of TSD.
on June 30, 1973.

I retired from the CIA

I want to :stress, however, that a policy·

review of project MKULTRA and all of the projects I was· con-nected with took place at least onC'e a year during MKULTRA"
active period, which I remember as 1952-1965.
.as each

In addition,

was funded, approval in writing at least two

~Ioject

levels above mine were required in all research and developmerit activities.
Project names like Artichoke and Bluebird have been
mentioned in the press, associated with my name.

My remembrance

is that project Artichoke was managed by the Office of Security
and that I

ha~

no direct or indirect resonsibility for it,

although I became
over the years.

aw~reof

its exist.ence and general nature

project Bluebird, as I remember it, was also

an Office of Security concept, possibly never actually realized,
-which later evolved into a TSD-sponsored activity looking
into brainwashing, and ultimately included the Society for
the Investigation of Human Ecology.
One unusual project started in 1952 and continued
unt.il abnut 1965 was an arrangement originally set up by !!Ie
with the Bureau of Narcotics.
v~ously

In this regard, I have pre-

furnished lilY recollections of this matter durin9 my
(

''!,.

209
-4 40 odd hour s of t.estimony to the Senat.e SC!lect Committee on
Intelligence, but I am glad to discuss these mat.ters again
with this Commit-tee. Tbe origin. of this Bureau of Narcotics
activity rested in my becoming aware t.hrough reading OSS

•

research files of an investigation into the behavior-alterating
possibilities of Tetrohydrocannabinol, a synt.het.ic material
related to the naturally active constituent of marijuana.
I was able to contact an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics
who had participated first-hand in the OSS investigations.
With him, I made an arrangement., funded by the CIA, whereby

~]
... '

he would covertly administer chemical materials to unwitting
people.

The Bureau of Narcotics, through this individual,

had their own interest. in determining whether chemical materials
could be used to elicit or validate information obtained from
drug informants.

The arrangement would benefit the CIA's

program in that information would be obtained, unobtainable
in any other way, on the effects of these
situations closely resembling

th~se

llIat~rials

used in

in,actual operations.

I have no personal awareness of specific individuals to whom
these materials were administ.ered.

the best of my knowledge

and remembrance, the materials administered in the great majority
of cases under the' Bureau of Narcotics project were LSD and
Meretran.

I do not have detailed informat ion on the exact

:'·····1····

number of individuals involved, but the impression I have is
)

that the number involved was between 20 and 50 individuals

~U·>·
','.

over the years of the

proj~t.

I would like to add that the

-'
210
- 5 -

Bureau of NarcoUcs project was the only one of its kind in
the sense of trying to gain urgently needed information in
the administration of materIals in an operational context.
Although it has drawn considerable attention in

')
.:(

th~

news

media, because of· its unusual nat ure, it was a very small
o

part of an overall program which took place in more conventional
project, in the more normal setting of unversities and lab9ratories, as born out by the records shown to me by the
Committee staff.

This Committee might be interested to know

that the total amount of money spent on everything related
to MKULTRA was limited to 10, of the total research done by
TSD.

To my remembrance, at the height of the spending on MKULTRA

related activities, it never even reached this percentage.
The great bulk of the research done under the general
umbrella of Project MKULTRA took place in academic and other
research settings.

These projects almost always represented

work that the individual investigators would have been doing
in any case.

The Agency's role was to provide the funds and,

in many cases, provide access to the investigator if specific
interpretation of his results in terms of our interests were
needed.

To my recollection, in every case, the results of

the related research were pUblished.
The degree of wittingness of the principal investigators on these projects varied

~epending

on whether we judged

his knowledge of our specific interests to be necessary in
providing useful results to us.

Thus, many projects were

211
- 6 -

established in which the principal investigator was fully
knowledgeable of who we were and exactly what our interests
in the research were.

Others were simply provided funds

t.hrough a covert organizat ion and had no idea of ult imate
CIA sponsorship.

The degree to which individuals otheis than the
principal investigator needed to be witting of the Agency's
eonnection to the research varied.

It was generally left to

the principal investigator to advise us as to whether anyone
else in either his research team or in the administrative part
of the university or research organization needed to be made
witting to the Agency's relationship.

To the best of my

remembrance, although for general security reasons we were
eager to keep this kind of information to a minimum, we went
along withtbe principal investigator's desires and cleared
and briefed whomever he felt was necessary.
The general subject of Why we felt it necessary to

:'. ] '
'.[,f
~

use funding mechanisms like the Society for the Investigation
of Human Ecology or the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research
needs some comment.

This involves the more general question

of Why we felt all of this research needed to be kept secret
insofar as Agency sponsorship was concerned.

The reason, however

n.·.~

a
.....

it may seem with the benefit of hindsig~t, was that we fel~any
potential enemies of this country would be greatly benefitted

J
(~

•.....} .

,k-

r.
.'.-:

212
- 7 -

in their own possible future aggressive acts aqainst the USA

if they were forwarned as to what the nature and progress of
our research in this field was.
The largest overall picture that can be given of this
group of academic and other formal research undertakings is that
they were an at.tempt to harness the academic and research community
of the

UnitedStat~s

to provide badly-needed answers to some

pressing national security problems, in the shortest possible
time, without "alerting potential enemies to the United States
Government's interest. in these matt.ers.
In all cases, r~~earch results were published through
the normal overt channels for publication of medical and
physiological research.

I would iike to remind the members

of the Commit.tee that at. this point in history t.he amount. of
available reliable data on LSD and similar materials was
essentially nil.
I understand from reading newspaper accounts that. one
of the principal interests of this Commit.tee in this kind of
research is the.degree of protection that was affordad to the
sUbject.s used in t.hose experiments where human sUbjects were
used •. As far

the Bureau of

~arcotics

project is concerned, my

impression was there was no advance knowledge or protection of the
individuals concerned.

The only

cow~ent

I would like to make

on this is that, harsh ·as it. may seem in retrospect, it was
felt that in an issue where national survival might be concerned,
such a procedure and such a riSk was a reasonable one to take.

213
- 8 -

I would like again to remind the Committee that, as far as
those of us 'tho participated in this work were concerned,
this country was involved in a real covert war in the sense
that the cold war spilled over into intelligence activities.
Insofar as protection of individuals in the bulk
of t.his work, as representated,by forlllal research projects,
is concerned, the matter of informed consent. and protection
to thevolunt.eers

part.ici~ating

according to the standards that.

was left to each investigat.or
eithe~

felt were appropriate to the sit.uation.

he or his institution
Our general feeling

was that. if we chose reputable and responsible investigators,
appropriate standards in this area would be used. I think,
in general, the procedures actually used in these experiments

,.'
"'.'.']'.

were representative of what was considered to be adequate
safeguards at .the time.
A

comm~nt

should be made on the kind of interest

that t.he Agency had in these matters and how it may have
changed over the years.

The original impetus for this work

as mentioned above vas the concern about aggressive use of
behavior-altering techniques against this country by its
enemies.

Although this remained a continuing and probably

primary focus in the history of these projects, the Agency

214

- 9 -

did become interested in the potential use of behavior
modification techniques in unforeseen circumstances that

\)
~

might occur in the· future.
It. is undoubt.edly true that some of these research

'I:

activities were continued into the middle or late 1960's

when in 100kin9 backward now the real possibility of their

successfUl and effective use either against us or by us was
verY low.

•••••••

•

In fact. I remember writing a report when I was

on detached assignment with another unit in the clandestine
services in about 1961 which concluded that the potential

effectiveness of these techniques and the inclination of
Americanint.elligence officers to use them was limited.

The

only reasons I can provide now for the continuance of a small
number of these activities was that we felt we needed to be
more certain than we were of these negative results and also
that We felt a need to maintain contact with individuals
knOWledgeable in these fields to keep ourselves abreast of
what was happening.
In conclusion, I would like to comment on three
things which trouble me very much about the situation I find
myself in.
First, there have been many references in the
press toatlempts by me to avoid testifying.

These allega-

tions are without any basis in fact, either in terms of

... - .. -....,.::."

- --"

..-_ .. _:_. ..-~:~,::.:.~:,--------~::
_

215
- 1'0 -

-hiding- or making myself unavailable to congressional eommittees.
In

~he

case of my testimony before the Church Committee in

1975, I voluntarily and immediately returned from India as
soon as I was made aware at the Missionary Hospital, where
I was performing voluntary services, that I might be needed.
I have been available for all legitimate inquiries at all
times through my counsel.
Second, I feel victimized and I am appalled at the
CIA's policy, wherein someone or some group selectively pinpoints my name by failing to delete it. from documents released under the Freedom of Information Act without
any permission from me.

That is, my name is selectively left

on released documents where all or most others are deleted.
I have a great concern for past, present and future employees
of the Agency involved in sensitive, difficult, and potentially
misunderstood work, as this policy of selective disclosure
of

individ~als

names gets applied to them. 1 am sincerely

concerned that the CIA'S ability to recruit

cl~ndestine

assets

in t.he future could be severely impaired.
Thirdly, my concern is for the

re~utations

of the many

individuals not employees of the Agency, in academic and pro-

fessional life who, for the most partiotic and constructive

·216
- 11 -

of reasons,

~nd

guaranteed both by myself and the Agency of

confidentiality and non-disclosure, chose to assist the Agency
in its research efforts over the, past years.

By now, the

association in the news media of any llame in the academic
or professional work with CIA brings immediate and automatic
negative connatations, and irreparably damages their reputations.

With regard to my testimony, I hope this Committee will

understand my reluctance, except when absolutely essential,
to mention other names.

I am desirous and willing to share any

knowledge of matters of interest

the Committee that I have

in my memory but, whatever the CIA's policies may be on this
matter, I feel it is a point of personal responsibility to
honor the commitment of confidentiality

th~t

I feel towards

these individuals and not to be a party to further damage
their reputations.
In summary, I would like this Committee

know that

I considered all this work -- at the time it was done and in
the context of circumstances that were ext.ant in that. period
to be extremely unpleasant., extremely difficult, extremely
sensitive, but above all, to be extremely urgent and important.
I realize that it is difficult to reconstruct

t~ose

times

and that atmosphere today in this room.
Another thought that I would like to leave you with
is that &hould the course of recent history have been slightly
different from what it was, I can easily imagine a congressional

217
-

l:l -

·coJDlllit.tee being extremely critical of t.he Agency for not having
don. investigations of this natur~.
J:I'"

In any event,.itis.my siJilple wise to be as helpful
as possible to this Committee in obtaining its appropriate
legislative goals, and I am prepared to be:as helpful and forthcoming as possible in the areas in which you are interested.

ll
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218
Sehatdr Schweiker~ We will contmue with another witness, but we
will recess lb:~t and go back, into the full committee hearing room for
an 'open sesSion.'
Thank you yery much.
[Short recess.]
,
• ,', ,'"
".
[The meeting 'reconvened in the ,full committee hearing room.]
Senator SCBWEIKER.At this' time we will call as the health subco~tt-ee'S next witness Mr. Peter C.,Bensinger, the Administrator
of the'DrugEnforcementAdministration.
:'
Mr. Bensinger, would you like to makes. few general remarks first?
Do' you have a prepared statement to present before I ask you a few
questions?'
,

STATEJIEn OFPETElt c. BQSIBGER, AD14ImSTRATOR; DRUG
DFORCDIEBT AD14mISTRATIOB, ACCOnAlfIED BY,10SEPlI
,DEUGo, ACTIBG CHIEF ,mSPECTO:R,DB,UG EBFORCEIlDT
AD14msTRATIOB
.J

Mr. BENSINGER. Thankyou, Senator Schweiker.
'
'
I would like to,if I might. also introduce Joe Krueger, Acting Chief
lns~ectorforDrug Enforcement Administration.
I have been Administrator for DEA since January 23, 1976. I
might add there was nomdication at the time I arrived at the Drug
Enforcement Admini'stration that any former narcotics agent of a
formerlredecessoragency of which there ha.ve been many, had been
engag~ in cooperation with the CIA or anyone else inexperime~"ation
with dmgs or unwilling subject3.
Needless to say, I was shocked and appalled that such activity did
take place, and I can conceive of no circumstances under which such
actiVIty could be justified.
Ul!.on determining that a former official was involved from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in this activity. I did direct DEA's Office of
Internal Security to conduct with highest priority a. thorough investigationto determine the nature and scope of drug testing activities,
cooperative relationships between predecessor agencies and individuals '
and the CIA.
The Office of Internal Security of DEA has determined with sworn
and written sts.tements from every national and rcgional program
,m'an~er that we are not providing facilities, drugs, or funds, for
unwilling testing on humans to the CIA or anyone else.
We have worked closely with the staff of this committee.
I would be happy to answer any questions, Senator.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think you are certainly correct.
You have, exhibited a very positive approach and worked very
cooperatively and very closely with the subcommittee.
So I understand your answer to my basic question, which I didn't
even havo to ask, is, you were not only surprised but shocked to
learn about your agency's former involvement with CIA drug testing,
and you are already taking steps to remedy it and prevent future
abuses by instituting your own investigatIon. Is that essentia.lly
correct?
'
Mr. BENSINGER. That is correct, Senator Schweiker, except that the
details that we have, both from committee staff an-d whatever records
are avai.ltile to us from the CIA indicate that this type of cooperative

• • • : , • • •' ••' __

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21~' .'

relationship iq. wh.j.ch facilities, saf~houses, were operated'-iil conjunction betweenFBN and CIAdidterrilinate in June 1965.
Senator SCIiwEIltER.The relationship apparently,termmated in
June 1965, and you were appris~d of i~ e~tence when,ro~g~y?
Mr~ BENSINGER. I was appnsed of It m September of this year
th.at this Drevio~ 12 years ago activity. did take place.'
.
Se~WrSClIWEIKER. .September of this year?
. .
Mr. BENsiNGER. 1977. . .... . .•..
'. '
Senator SCHWEIUR. .AndittertniJiated in 1965, about 12 years ago.
You ~ewth~ sort of cooperative relationship'laid out in theseheatings
as gomg agamstthe b&Slcdrug enforcement purposes of your agency?
.
Mr. BENSINGER. That is correct. . . '
Senator SCIfWEIKER. I gather you are taking every precaution
and safeguard' to assure that relationships like this or programs like
this do not happen wbiley9u are Adininistratot?
Mr. BENSINGER. Absolutely~. . . '.
Senator SCBWEIxER.. Weappreciate· yoUr' coming &Sa witness
today, and we thaJ'..k you for your patience in waiting until we completed our quesi.ioning of the other witnesses.
It is refreshing to see a positive, conStructive attitude on the part
of a Federal agency that wants to help and cooperate with us and
shares the same obj9ctivesas we do on this committee with regard
to human e~perimentation.
Thank you' very much for coming here today.
Mr. BENSINGER. Thank you.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. The subcommittee will now
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittee was a.djourned,
subject to the call of theChdir.]